BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)
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Was the fuel REALLY unusable?
As Jack's a dull boy says, when the fuel pumps for the remaining engines became uncovered, the 3.2 tonnes of fuel in the failed engine's tank would be pumped to it (assuming no further failure).
My money says that they got the FUEL QTY LOW message which comes on when any main tank gets to 900kg or less. This would have been at 3.2 + (0.9 x 3) = 5.9 tonnes (assuming fuel is perfectly balanced in the remaing three engines).
Upon getting this message they will have actioned the checklist. It includes instructions to land at the nearest suitable airfield, and to avoid high nose up attitudes and/or excessive accelerations. This would explain the Mayday and the statement that they are not going to go around.
Upon landing, with 5 tonnes remaining, the fuel synoptic would have 3.2 T in the failed engine and 0.6 T in each of the others. The 3.2 T is still useable, it is just that it's pumps are as strong as the other engines', and so it will only overide them when one of them stops working (ie the fuel becomes uncovered). This would explain baengman's comments about unuseable fuel. I do not believe the fuel was unusable, and I do not believe that the pilots would have been in a position to know that yet anyway, short of turning off all pumps on one of the working engines to see if the fuel transferred, and there are not many people that would have the balls to do that, suction feed or no suction feed!
As for those passengers on here who are worried about the safety implications of the decisions made. A Jumbo can taxy out, takeoff and do a 'no decision height' auto land on just three engines. There are lots of redundancies built into the aircraft, and the extra engine is just one of them. If one of the remaining three engines fails, the aircraft usually has to decend due to the reduced performance, but this is just the same on a two engined aircraft too. On two engines, more fuel is burnt than even on three, but it is policy to ensure that if at any point a second engine fails, there is still fuel enough to get to an airfield and land.
We do not play games and take risks of this nature. We have your lives in our hands, and we also have our own to concider too. We are a well trained profession and give nothing but our best to ensure you safety.
My money says that they got the FUEL QTY LOW message which comes on when any main tank gets to 900kg or less. This would have been at 3.2 + (0.9 x 3) = 5.9 tonnes (assuming fuel is perfectly balanced in the remaing three engines).
Upon getting this message they will have actioned the checklist. It includes instructions to land at the nearest suitable airfield, and to avoid high nose up attitudes and/or excessive accelerations. This would explain the Mayday and the statement that they are not going to go around.
Upon landing, with 5 tonnes remaining, the fuel synoptic would have 3.2 T in the failed engine and 0.6 T in each of the others. The 3.2 T is still useable, it is just that it's pumps are as strong as the other engines', and so it will only overide them when one of them stops working (ie the fuel becomes uncovered). This would explain baengman's comments about unuseable fuel. I do not believe the fuel was unusable, and I do not believe that the pilots would have been in a position to know that yet anyway, short of turning off all pumps on one of the working engines to see if the fuel transferred, and there are not many people that would have the balls to do that, suction feed or no suction feed!
As for those passengers on here who are worried about the safety implications of the decisions made. A Jumbo can taxy out, takeoff and do a 'no decision height' auto land on just three engines. There are lots of redundancies built into the aircraft, and the extra engine is just one of them. If one of the remaining three engines fails, the aircraft usually has to decend due to the reduced performance, but this is just the same on a two engined aircraft too. On two engines, more fuel is burnt than even on three, but it is policy to ensure that if at any point a second engine fails, there is still fuel enough to get to an airfield and land.
We do not play games and take risks of this nature. We have your lives in our hands, and we also have our own to concider too. We are a well trained profession and give nothing but our best to ensure you safety.
DOVE
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Did anybody consider what would have been the fate of the expedition if in the middle of nothing (the Decision point) they would have experienced a second engine failure? If they hardly made it, with the fuel, on three!? I've always been recommended not to enter into a funnel; never leave runway in the back, fuel on the ground and sky over the head. Why renounce (if not for safety reason) to the extra engine we always have on board?
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As a simply paying passenger & member of BAEC (silver) I would like to say that IMHO & based on what baengman said ["Firstly, just after take off from LAX the number 2 engine surged, it was contained by the 3 man flight crew, shortly after that there was another surge with EGT hitting 1200 degrees. Lax control reported 20 ft flame from no 2 engine also"] I cannot understand why this flight didn't return to LAX as that would seem to me to be the safest & most prudent option?
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Doves, if they had had a second engine failure at decision point, it would not have been wise to go around anyway. The 747 cannot go around on two engines after flap 20 has been selected.
As I say in my post above, which you might have missed because I have only just posted it, the decision about not going around was based on the checklist they were probably following at that time. In actual fact, had any of the pumps become uncovered, the fuel from the failed engine would have been pumped to that tank.
The best way to ensure 100% safety onboard an aircraft is not to get on it at all. But people do because the risk is low enough that we accept it. The same is true of flying on three engines - provided the fuel and terrain etc, are carefully assessed.
As I say in my post above, which you might have missed because I have only just posted it, the decision about not going around was based on the checklist they were probably following at that time. In actual fact, had any of the pumps become uncovered, the fuel from the failed engine would have been pumped to that tank.
would seem to me to be the safest & most prudent option?
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Bahrainlad, i think the point you make is spot on, perception of how a company operates must come top of the list of pasenger preferences.
One wonders if this had not be BA but a less prestigious airline would we be saying the same thing. The ....."Its BA so must be OK"....way of thinking still seems to prevail in the industry for no logical reason.
I've been in the business for over 30 years and have spent all my time flying Mr Boeings jets, 707,737,757,767 and one thing I have learnt over the years is that any non normal situation invariably gets worse through unforseen problems.
BA's SOP's seem a little strange to me, they have as stated a 3 engine ferry procedure for positioning sick aircraft to a maintenance base from an outstation or diversion airfield but have a different procedure for positioning an aircraft once airborne. It doesn't make sense after all how many passengers would voluntarily buy a ticket for a 3 engine ferry flight accross the Atlantic.
The correct procedure in this case was to dump fuel land back in Lax and ferry the aircraft to the nearest maintenance facility.
I'm not criticising the crew they were complying with their SOP and direction from maintrol, they just found themselves in a non normal situation that got steadily worse.(surprise, surprise)
This procedure is based on beancounter mentality and so it will be perceived by the paying passengers, there is no case for carrying out a 3 engine ferry flight accross the Atlantic with a full load of passengers.
Wake up BA your crew were nearly put in the position of a more famous Concorde Captain for no justifiable reason.
AB
One wonders if this had not be BA but a less prestigious airline would we be saying the same thing. The ....."Its BA so must be OK"....way of thinking still seems to prevail in the industry for no logical reason.
I've been in the business for over 30 years and have spent all my time flying Mr Boeings jets, 707,737,757,767 and one thing I have learnt over the years is that any non normal situation invariably gets worse through unforseen problems.
BA's SOP's seem a little strange to me, they have as stated a 3 engine ferry procedure for positioning sick aircraft to a maintenance base from an outstation or diversion airfield but have a different procedure for positioning an aircraft once airborne. It doesn't make sense after all how many passengers would voluntarily buy a ticket for a 3 engine ferry flight accross the Atlantic.
The correct procedure in this case was to dump fuel land back in Lax and ferry the aircraft to the nearest maintenance facility.
I'm not criticising the crew they were complying with their SOP and direction from maintrol, they just found themselves in a non normal situation that got steadily worse.(surprise, surprise)
This procedure is based on beancounter mentality and so it will be perceived by the paying passengers, there is no case for carrying out a 3 engine ferry flight accross the Atlantic with a full load of passengers.
Wake up BA your crew were nearly put in the position of a more famous Concorde Captain for no justifiable reason.
AB
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Thanks GS-Alpha for the most precise description of events and consequences so far. Having flown the B737, B757 & B767 and just finished B744 ground school and therefore at the point where I can only forget more than I learn, I can now ask that the hand wringing posts by SLF with their insistence that they be informed of every decision made on the flight deck whether there is anything they can do about it or not, desist. The same goes for others who are not privvy to the precise details of everything we do at the front end.
Whilst many of the enthusiasts and pax who post on here with valid questions are welcome, there comes a point, usually after someone with good knowledge of the daily operation of the aircraft type in question explains in undramatic fashion of the real sequence of events and considerations taken by a professional crew, when the comments by the non-pilots of the type are not necessary and only serve to infuriate those of us with lower tolerance thresholds. Trying to make points about fuel burns and procedures with other types of a/c or worse, comparing what someone might know about PC Flight Sims and the real world or demands by a pax with no real knowledge of what really goes on at the pointy end that the crew should have returned to the airport of departure onle serves to wind many others up and are little more than trying to point score and a waste of time and space on here.
It's bad enough that the likes of the Daily Mail pick up on the story here and then insert the word 'Terror' to their headline without having to deal with the infuriated non-pilots over the crews decisions on how to deal with the problem. Please, ask questions by all means but please think very carefully about dictating what you think they should have done.
Whilst many of the enthusiasts and pax who post on here with valid questions are welcome, there comes a point, usually after someone with good knowledge of the daily operation of the aircraft type in question explains in undramatic fashion of the real sequence of events and considerations taken by a professional crew, when the comments by the non-pilots of the type are not necessary and only serve to infuriate those of us with lower tolerance thresholds. Trying to make points about fuel burns and procedures with other types of a/c or worse, comparing what someone might know about PC Flight Sims and the real world or demands by a pax with no real knowledge of what really goes on at the pointy end that the crew should have returned to the airport of departure onle serves to wind many others up and are little more than trying to point score and a waste of time and space on here.
It's bad enough that the likes of the Daily Mail pick up on the story here and then insert the word 'Terror' to their headline without having to deal with the infuriated non-pilots over the crews decisions on how to deal with the problem. Please, ask questions by all means but please think very carefully about dictating what you think they should have done.
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Thanks Danny,
Would just like to point out that this is what I think might have happened given the info I have seen posted on here. It is not a description of the events though, as I have no inside information. It is simply an account of what would happen in a normal engine failure scenario.
Thanks GS-Alpha for the most precise description of events and consequences so far.
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I think there is some misunderstanding on probability going on here.
This is simply untrue.
Say the odds of loosing any particular engine are 1 in 100 (far too high I know but it make the maths easier)
The odds of loosing one engine out of four are therefore 4 x 1/100 = 4%
Now take the case of taking off then loosing one engine, now the other 3 engines don't know that 1 has already gone, so the odds of any particular one out of the three left shutting down are unchanged at 1/100. There are only 3 left so the odds of another shutting down are 3 x 1/100 = 3%
However we have not considered the common cause problem, this is an interesting case because the odds on IFSD depend on two catagories of events.
1.) problems peculiar to that particular engine
2.) problems that affect all four engines (fuel supply, bad maintenance etc.)
So the reduction of odds from 4% to 3% for another engine only applies if the issue effecting the shut down engine does not apply to the other 3. The is difficult to ascertain. I do not have the data, but would suggest that a second failure is in fact at least as likely as a first failure ONCE THE FIRST HAS HAPPENED.
This is known as conditional probabilty.
If you have trouble with getting your head round this, think of the case of tossing a coin.
What are the chances of getting 1 tail = 1/2
What are the chance of getting 2 tails - 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/4
BUT
Given that you have just tossed the coin and gotten a tail, what are the chances of getting another one = 1/2
In summary :-
Before you set off the odds of one IFSD are 4/100 = 4%
Before you set off 2 IFSD are extremly unlikey 4/100 X 3/100 = 12/10000 = 0.12%
BUT once you have had one IFSD the odds of a second are now just that 3/100 = 3%
With the rider that there may be a common cause which can only increase that 3% chance.
Remembering 3 things -
1.)To make maths easy I have used 1/100 for engine failure chances THIS IS FAR TOO HIGH.
2.) There are Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics
3.) I know something about maths, I know virtually nothing about flying anything bigger than a C172, and, I don't have an opinion about whether the crew did the right thing or not as I am not in position to evaluate the odds of any failure cases and the ramifications of them. Happy to leave it to the chaps and chapesses up front to get me to the snow.
As BahrainLad says statistically having lost one engine you would be extremely unfortunate to lose another and therefore continued flight is acceptable on a 4 engined a/c.
Say the odds of loosing any particular engine are 1 in 100 (far too high I know but it make the maths easier)
The odds of loosing one engine out of four are therefore 4 x 1/100 = 4%
Now take the case of taking off then loosing one engine, now the other 3 engines don't know that 1 has already gone, so the odds of any particular one out of the three left shutting down are unchanged at 1/100. There are only 3 left so the odds of another shutting down are 3 x 1/100 = 3%
However we have not considered the common cause problem, this is an interesting case because the odds on IFSD depend on two catagories of events.
1.) problems peculiar to that particular engine
2.) problems that affect all four engines (fuel supply, bad maintenance etc.)
So the reduction of odds from 4% to 3% for another engine only applies if the issue effecting the shut down engine does not apply to the other 3. The is difficult to ascertain. I do not have the data, but would suggest that a second failure is in fact at least as likely as a first failure ONCE THE FIRST HAS HAPPENED.
This is known as conditional probabilty.
If you have trouble with getting your head round this, think of the case of tossing a coin.
What are the chances of getting 1 tail = 1/2
What are the chance of getting 2 tails - 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/4
BUT
Given that you have just tossed the coin and gotten a tail, what are the chances of getting another one = 1/2
In summary :-
Before you set off the odds of one IFSD are 4/100 = 4%
Before you set off 2 IFSD are extremly unlikey 4/100 X 3/100 = 12/10000 = 0.12%
BUT once you have had one IFSD the odds of a second are now just that 3/100 = 3%
With the rider that there may be a common cause which can only increase that 3% chance.
Remembering 3 things -
1.)To make maths easy I have used 1/100 for engine failure chances THIS IS FAR TOO HIGH.
2.) There are Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics
3.) I know something about maths, I know virtually nothing about flying anything bigger than a C172, and, I don't have an opinion about whether the crew did the right thing or not as I am not in position to evaluate the odds of any failure cases and the ramifications of them. Happy to leave it to the chaps and chapesses up front to get me to the snow.
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Paul, you seem to know what you are talking about here, so I think you will agree that:
would actually be the chances of two totally unrelated IFSDs? Your previous argument about related shut downs would add another term to the expression, but I like your thinking in trying to calm down some of the concerned readers here...
Before you set off 2 IFSD are extremly unlikey 4/100 X 3/100 = 12/10000 = 0.12%
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GS-Alpha,
Absolutly correct, I didn't try to quantify what the odds would be for related shut downs, just mentioned that they can only make the odds of an IFSD go up, because any term added to the expression cannot be less than 0.
But some people have trouble with the fact that just because something is unlikely to happen, if it happens anyway it doesn't REDUCE the chances of it happening again.
If shutting down one made a second IFSD a lot less likely, you'd just take off then immediatly shut one down, because "a second shut down is very unlikely" complete tosh of course.
Absolutly correct, I didn't try to quantify what the odds would be for related shut downs, just mentioned that they can only make the odds of an IFSD go up, because any term added to the expression cannot be less than 0.
But some people have trouble with the fact that just because something is unlikely to happen, if it happens anyway it doesn't REDUCE the chances of it happening again.
If shutting down one made a second IFSD a lot less likely, you'd just take off then immediatly shut one down, because "a second shut down is very unlikely" complete tosh of course.
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Albert Ball Why is less risky to land back at LAX rather than continue say, to PHX? Or perhaps JFK? Easier surely to continue with a non normal situation rather than add to the problems by dumping fuel? Why not burn the fuel off getting closer to destination or home base, rather than chuck it out of the back and land back where you departed? The risks have been assessed by the FAA/JAA and found to be negligible.
It seems to me that people are asking the wrong question. The question should not be "should they have returned to LAX" because clearly the answer is NO. As a number of experts have indicated there is no problem continuing a flight on 3 engines with this aircraft. Surely we should be asking at what point the crew could have known that they would only have 5t of fuel by MAN and if they should have spotted this earlier and diverted to SNN.
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Sky Wave,
Five tonnes of fuel by Manchester is not a particular problem. Two tonnes by Manchester would have been a problem, and this is the quantity that people are talking about. However, as I have pointed out, it is very unlikely that they only had two tonnes of usable fuel by Manchester. They would have been choosing to go to Manchester rather than Heathrow, because if they had continued, then they would have been dangerously short of fuel - at Manchester they were not.
They could have declared Mayday for many reasons. One would be a definite fuel shortage, and this is the one that everyone has pounced on. Another could have been as I have said, that they were following a drill that says "land at nearest suitable airfiled". They would have already been going to Manchester anyway, but just to make sure they did not have to go around, they would declare the Mayday too. (Just following the QRH FUEL QTY LOW drill).
THERE ARE NO QUESTIONS TO ASK AT THIS POINT, and so ALL questions are the wrong questions. You can be sure that the pilot managers in BA are asking all of the right questions, and if there is anything to be learned from the incident, will pass it on to the pilot community. However, as I say, this is very likely to have been a straight forward non-normal procedure, carried out professionlly and safely.
I am going to retire from this thread now because I think I have explained everything as well as I can.
Five tonnes of fuel by Manchester is not a particular problem. Two tonnes by Manchester would have been a problem, and this is the quantity that people are talking about. However, as I have pointed out, it is very unlikely that they only had two tonnes of usable fuel by Manchester. They would have been choosing to go to Manchester rather than Heathrow, because if they had continued, then they would have been dangerously short of fuel - at Manchester they were not.
They could have declared Mayday for many reasons. One would be a definite fuel shortage, and this is the one that everyone has pounced on. Another could have been as I have said, that they were following a drill that says "land at nearest suitable airfiled". They would have already been going to Manchester anyway, but just to make sure they did not have to go around, they would declare the Mayday too. (Just following the QRH FUEL QTY LOW drill).
THERE ARE NO QUESTIONS TO ASK AT THIS POINT, and so ALL questions are the wrong questions. You can be sure that the pilot managers in BA are asking all of the right questions, and if there is anything to be learned from the incident, will pass it on to the pilot community. However, as I say, this is very likely to have been a straight forward non-normal procedure, carried out professionlly and safely.
I am going to retire from this thread now because I think I have explained everything as well as I can.
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GS-Alpha
Thanks for tkaing the time to give opinion and also the underlying logic of your thinking.
As a FQTV, I don't second guess the flight crew (I wouldn't like it if they told me how to do my job!), but the insight that you have provided is both interesting and reassuring, in the event that I am on a 744 that requires an IFSD.
Thanks for tkaing the time to give opinion and also the underlying logic of your thinking.
As a FQTV, I don't second guess the flight crew (I wouldn't like it if they told me how to do my job!), but the insight that you have provided is both interesting and reassuring, in the event that I am on a 744 that requires an IFSD.
Thanks for the response GS. I was under the impression that people were saying that 5t is basically fumes for a 744. I've seen these threads get sensationalised by people who don't know what they are talking about before and have no wish to go down that line. If you're telling me that 5t is no drama then I completely agree that there are no further questions to ask. I've also seen a lot of threads where ATC have stated that they will not give priority to anyone who declares a fuel emergency since no such situation exists in their book. Therefore the crew would have had to declare a PAN or a MAYDAY in order to be certain of a priority arrival.
Something seems fundamentally wrong with what occured here, whether it be because of the operator's SOP or the commander's decision is irrelevant.
In my humble opinion, sure, a 747 CAN fly safely on less than 4 engines, BUT, if one has failed (with 20 feet of flame coming out the back), then SURELY the aircraft MUST return back to the closest airfield as soon as possible if it can (even if it means dumping fuel first - how dangerous is THAT really anyway?).
If the engine failed out over the Atlantic then sure, you have no choice but to press on and hope for the best (LUCKILY you have 3 more engines still), but when it is totally OBVIOUS that something is badly wrong (you had to shut down 1 engine) and you cannot be ABSOLUTELY sure what else might be affected because of it, and you are still close to an airport - get down and see what the problem is and maxmimize safety - you DO NOT just "press on" unless you absolutely have to (such as if it occurred over the Atlantic), surely?
How can it be assumed that because 1 engine failed in flight it is still safe to fly on 3 engines out over the Atlantic? This sounds like total rubbish to me, because you CANNOT possibly know exactly WHY the engine failed and if that reason could possibly cause FURTHER engine failures. You are close to an airport, therefore get down ASAP and maximize safety - do NOT press on - you are not being FORCED to press on. Period.
Happens out over the Atlantic, sure, "press on" - (you have no choice anyway, do you now?)
In my humble opinion, sure, a 747 CAN fly safely on less than 4 engines, BUT, if one has failed (with 20 feet of flame coming out the back), then SURELY the aircraft MUST return back to the closest airfield as soon as possible if it can (even if it means dumping fuel first - how dangerous is THAT really anyway?).
If the engine failed out over the Atlantic then sure, you have no choice but to press on and hope for the best (LUCKILY you have 3 more engines still), but when it is totally OBVIOUS that something is badly wrong (you had to shut down 1 engine) and you cannot be ABSOLUTELY sure what else might be affected because of it, and you are still close to an airport - get down and see what the problem is and maxmimize safety - you DO NOT just "press on" unless you absolutely have to (such as if it occurred over the Atlantic), surely?
How can it be assumed that because 1 engine failed in flight it is still safe to fly on 3 engines out over the Atlantic? This sounds like total rubbish to me, because you CANNOT possibly know exactly WHY the engine failed and if that reason could possibly cause FURTHER engine failures. You are close to an airport, therefore get down ASAP and maximize safety - do NOT press on - you are not being FORCED to press on. Period.
Happens out over the Atlantic, sure, "press on" - (you have no choice anyway, do you now?)
Warning Toxic!
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barryt- you really don't know what you are talking about.
This thread has been totally hijacked by people who know nothing saying how it should be. Apart from saying I think my reaction (speaking as a 17 year 747 veteran) would have been exactly the same as this crews. I know what is safe- remember the pilots are also on board that aeroplane and have mortgages and children and no desire to hazard themselves in any way. They followed the book. The book is correct. Would aviation ignoramuses please stop sounding off what their opinion of 'safe' practice is!
This thread has been totally hijacked by people who know nothing saying how it should be. Apart from saying I think my reaction (speaking as a 17 year 747 veteran) would have been exactly the same as this crews. I know what is safe- remember the pilots are also on board that aeroplane and have mortgages and children and no desire to hazard themselves in any way. They followed the book. The book is correct. Would aviation ignoramuses please stop sounding off what their opinion of 'safe' practice is!
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I know I said I would not add anymore but barryt has a point in a way. However, would you also say that we should not take off with one pack failed, because redundancy has been reduced? The CAA, JAA, or whatever governing body you care to mention, has assessed the risk and decided that it is OK to depart with certain systems degraded. Similarly, they have assessed that it is safe to continue a flight with one engine shut down. Maybe we should never fly more than gliding distance from an airfield, because at any point, all 4 engines might stop working? Where do you draw the line? When we concider whether to continue or not, we ASSUME that another engine IS going to fail. We then assess this situation across the entire journey, and check that we can still get to an airfield and land safely. If this is not possible for even a 5 mile stretch of the journey, then we turn back, or land at an airfield at some point before that 5 mile stretch.
I would suggest that most people give themselves a buffer on top of their calculations too. That is why this partcular crew would have gone for Manchester rather than Heathrow. JUST TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE.
I would suggest that most people give themselves a buffer on top of their calculations too. That is why this partcular crew would have gone for Manchester rather than Heathrow. JUST TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE.
Rainbow : - No sir.
I have the greatest sympathy for the commander and yourself. I have a deep suspicion that the "book" here is incorrect.
Common sense tells me you must always choose the path of least risk given a "situation". You certainly DO NOT take further risks to safety. As a paying passenger I expect the "book" and my commander to always take the path with least risk to my safety.
You say you know what "safe is". How could you in this situation be 100% sure that it was ABSOLUTELY SAFE to press on and that what caused the engine to fail will DEFINATELY NOT cause more engines to fail.
Sure, the aircraft has a number of redundant systems, which are there for all of us to PREVENT the aircraft as much as possible from falling out of the sky instantly.
They are BACKUP mechanisms Rainbow. They SHOULD NOT be relied upon as if "nothing was wrong and all is safe" when something goes wrong.
Even WITH all the redundant systems, there could STILL have been something which caused this engine to fail and which was OUTSIDE of a redundant system. Admittedly, the chances are quite small, but still POSSIBLE.
I do not expect the operator to (I hate to use the word "force") the commander to take further risks on my behalf to potentially increase their fiscal "bottom line".
Once again, I have the greatest sympathy for the commander, as I have a sneaky suspicion he would more than likely have preferred to get back to LAX instead of pressing on, but chose not to because the "book" said it was OK, and he might have some serious explaining to do when he got back with possible negative ramifications from his employer.
In this day and age it just seems to me that often company profitability becomes more important than people's lives even.
Bit of a grey area I think, in that (like you say), this poor commander must remember he also has a mortgage and kids etc which he can't easily risk...
I have the greatest sympathy for the commander and yourself. I have a deep suspicion that the "book" here is incorrect.
Common sense tells me you must always choose the path of least risk given a "situation". You certainly DO NOT take further risks to safety. As a paying passenger I expect the "book" and my commander to always take the path with least risk to my safety.
You say you know what "safe is". How could you in this situation be 100% sure that it was ABSOLUTELY SAFE to press on and that what caused the engine to fail will DEFINATELY NOT cause more engines to fail.
Sure, the aircraft has a number of redundant systems, which are there for all of us to PREVENT the aircraft as much as possible from falling out of the sky instantly.
They are BACKUP mechanisms Rainbow. They SHOULD NOT be relied upon as if "nothing was wrong and all is safe" when something goes wrong.
Even WITH all the redundant systems, there could STILL have been something which caused this engine to fail and which was OUTSIDE of a redundant system. Admittedly, the chances are quite small, but still POSSIBLE.
I do not expect the operator to (I hate to use the word "force") the commander to take further risks on my behalf to potentially increase their fiscal "bottom line".
Once again, I have the greatest sympathy for the commander, as I have a sneaky suspicion he would more than likely have preferred to get back to LAX instead of pressing on, but chose not to because the "book" said it was OK, and he might have some serious explaining to do when he got back with possible negative ramifications from his employer.
In this day and age it just seems to me that often company profitability becomes more important than people's lives even.
Bit of a grey area I think, in that (like you say), this poor commander must remember he also has a mortgage and kids etc which he can't easily risk...
Warning Toxic!
Disgusted of Tunbridge
Disgusted of Tunbridge
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: Hampshire, UK
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barryt- you know nothing- you appear to consider yourself an expert on B747 emergency/backup systems. Please read Danny's post at the top of this page again and try and understand it. Why do people who know nothing start trying to dictate what correct aviation practice is? It is getting appalling that any 'incident' gets picked over judiciously by aviation neanderthals who knowing hardly anything about this business suddenly start dictating what accepted practice should be. If you know nothing, keep your peace and let the authorities handle the outcome. If there are recommendations to be made, let the experts make them, not 'shoot from the hip' instant opinions from a plethora of people who don't know a bean! I'm getting very fed up with spectators here using Pprune R & N to hold unofficial 'court martials' after any aviation event- before even the full news is out.