BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)
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My point was and is that there must have been a gross miscalculation of the EFOA or else it would not have ended up in a fuel emergency.
Upon crossing the pond the a/c was told by atc to descend and in doing so the fuel burn increased.
If they'd remained at the level they were at, I would be so bold as to suggest that the fuel on board would have been sufficient to reach the original planned destination. I don't know the exact fuel burn of the 400, but the airtime from MCR to LHR in the overall scale of the flight is not that much further.
As a direct result of changes to what had already been changed and replanned, they had to go for a plan C, rather than plan B, and it still happened without any injury or damage.
There's been plenty of threads here in the past about arrivals (especially) at LHR with less fuel remaining than was on this aircraft, but I don't see those crews being given the sort of aggravation that's happening here.
If I had been SLF on that flight, I would be sufficiently confident of the crew's overall control and awareness of the situation that they knew what they were doing. When it comes down to it, they are in the thing too, literally and metaphorically at the sharp end, so if it all goes wrong, they are likely to be the first to know about it in every way, which tends to concentrate the thinking wonderfully.
As has been suggested. maybe some breathing space is called for, so that the real and complete facts can be reported. Then, and only then, there might be a case to be made for informed discussion and debate, which might, or might not lead to changes in procedures. Anything else is verging on unfair on the people that did the job according to the book.
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Not trying to second guess the crew, just trying to present an opinion. If this were a generic situation brought up for discussion in the schoolhouse, it may be a valid point that the possibility always exists for things like a change in flight level that could alter the outcome of an abnormal situation.
Could they have refused the lower flight level based on their fuel status? Could they have recalculated the EFOA at the new flight level and turned around? Were they totally screwed by circumstances that were not in their control?
The point is not to slam the crew in their decision making, but to learn that within the scope of each individual pilots' threshold for safety, there must be a line that can never be crossed. Contrary to the views of some on the ground, we have ultimate control of the decision making process and should not be afraid to exercise it.
Any pilot worth his salt will tell you of similar instances they have experienced over their career, myself included. I am thankful that nothing worse came of this and I personally view this as a great opportunity for the rest of us to gain useful information that could affect our decision making process should we find ourselves in the same situation.
I strongly reccommend the book entitled "Redefining Airmanship" by Anthonthy Kern.
"I'd rather be lucky than good"
Could they have refused the lower flight level based on their fuel status? Could they have recalculated the EFOA at the new flight level and turned around? Were they totally screwed by circumstances that were not in their control?
The point is not to slam the crew in their decision making, but to learn that within the scope of each individual pilots' threshold for safety, there must be a line that can never be crossed. Contrary to the views of some on the ground, we have ultimate control of the decision making process and should not be afraid to exercise it.
Any pilot worth his salt will tell you of similar instances they have experienced over their career, myself included. I am thankful that nothing worse came of this and I personally view this as a great opportunity for the rest of us to gain useful information that could affect our decision making process should we find ourselves in the same situation.
I strongly reccommend the book entitled "Redefining Airmanship" by Anthonthy Kern.
"I'd rather be lucky than good"
Last edited by ManagedNav; 28th Feb 2005 at 01:21.
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i was there and it wasn't good
as a passenger on this flight i can tell you that most of the passengers were extremely alarmed by what happened as we could all see the flames coming from the engine.
The plane went along on the rear wheels for ages before we actually took off and we only just made if off the ground before the end of the runway. Then the flames, banging and shaking started We then cruised around the pacific for about 30 or 45 minutes at 5000FT and about 300MPH in a big circle just outside LAX whilst they decided what to do. Every so often another big bang or shake came along to keep us awake. The pilot took about 15 minutes before he told anybody what had happened and then said that we may have noticed a few sparks out of the engine !
The stewards told us that we would be landing and that they were dumping fuel - To say that people were unhappy when they decided to head home would be an understatement !
I understand that to a pilot this all might make sense but the feelings of the passenegers should have been considered and we were all sh*tting ourselves. The diversion to manchester due to low fuel was the icing on the cake.
I'm flying on Virgin next time !
The plane went along on the rear wheels for ages before we actually took off and we only just made if off the ground before the end of the runway. Then the flames, banging and shaking started We then cruised around the pacific for about 30 or 45 minutes at 5000FT and about 300MPH in a big circle just outside LAX whilst they decided what to do. Every so often another big bang or shake came along to keep us awake. The pilot took about 15 minutes before he told anybody what had happened and then said that we may have noticed a few sparks out of the engine !
The stewards told us that we would be landing and that they were dumping fuel - To say that people were unhappy when they decided to head home would be an understatement !
I understand that to a pilot this all might make sense but the feelings of the passenegers should have been considered and we were all sh*tting ourselves. The diversion to manchester due to low fuel was the icing on the cake.
I'm flying on Virgin next time !
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Pax Info
Several subjects occur on this thread - this is just about the passenger info side of things.
I had a popping engine on take off too once at Geneva on an MD-80 (a piece of tyre had gone into it, so that wasn´t our only problem).
As soon as we reasonably could - ie. after getting the ship to a safe height and established a short term plan of action - I informed the passengers to the best of my knowledge at the time, what we had. The cabin crew later confirmed that this had been a very good thing to do as it:
a. Showed the passengers that someone up front had noticed the problem and was dealing with it.
b. Helped a lot later in the flight, when we had to make a precautionary landing and needed the cooperation of our passengers.
This wasn´t the only information we passed on - during each flight phase we tried to keep everyone up to date.
During the approach the Cabin Chief was able to let me know that the passengers were in good shape and some were reading newspapers... A couple of letters from the passengers later showed their appreciation for the information.
Passengers please be aware, however, that there is a lot to do up front when things go wrong and what may appear to be an interminable delay to you - especially after some marked banging and flaming - may be an action filled few seconds to your cockpit crew.
FC.
I had a popping engine on take off too once at Geneva on an MD-80 (a piece of tyre had gone into it, so that wasn´t our only problem).
As soon as we reasonably could - ie. after getting the ship to a safe height and established a short term plan of action - I informed the passengers to the best of my knowledge at the time, what we had. The cabin crew later confirmed that this had been a very good thing to do as it:
a. Showed the passengers that someone up front had noticed the problem and was dealing with it.
b. Helped a lot later in the flight, when we had to make a precautionary landing and needed the cooperation of our passengers.
This wasn´t the only information we passed on - during each flight phase we tried to keep everyone up to date.
During the approach the Cabin Chief was able to let me know that the passengers were in good shape and some were reading newspapers... A couple of letters from the passengers later showed their appreciation for the information.
Passengers please be aware, however, that there is a lot to do up front when things go wrong and what may appear to be an interminable delay to you - especially after some marked banging and flaming - may be an action filled few seconds to your cockpit crew.
FC.
Controversial, moi?
rossma
It is a matter of deep regret that you and your fellow passengers felt the way you did.
It would not suprise me if BA policy changed in the light of the publicity surrounding this event. Not because it was intrinsically unsafe but because we are governed by perception rather than reality, courtesy of sensationalist and inaccurate reporting and publicity common for all world events.
I am sorry to hear that you will be choosing Virgin next time. Where did you find out that they have a different policy, given that despite the qustion being asked twice, nobody from any other airline has stated what their company policy is?
Finally could I correct one common misconception relating to jet transport aircraft? You say that
Presuming that the engine did not fail until airborne what you experienced was the normal (not just BA but all operators) practice of a reduced thrust takeoff. This is where all factors such as, air temperature, aircraft weight, length of runway, surrounding hills are taken into account and the safe minimum amount of power required is calculated and used.
The reasons are various not least that the engines are put under much less stress than when operating at full thrust and also the combustion chamber temperatures are far lower resulting in longer engine life.
It also means, as you correctly observed, that most of the runway length will be used before becoming airborne.
There are circumstances when a reduced thrust takeoff is not permitted e.g. conditions of windshear.
It is a matter of deep regret that you and your fellow passengers felt the way you did.
It would not suprise me if BA policy changed in the light of the publicity surrounding this event. Not because it was intrinsically unsafe but because we are governed by perception rather than reality, courtesy of sensationalist and inaccurate reporting and publicity common for all world events.
I am sorry to hear that you will be choosing Virgin next time. Where did you find out that they have a different policy, given that despite the qustion being asked twice, nobody from any other airline has stated what their company policy is?
Finally could I correct one common misconception relating to jet transport aircraft? You say that
The plane went along on the rear wheels for ages before we actually took off and we only just made if off the ground before the end of the runway.
The reasons are various not least that the engines are put under much less stress than when operating at full thrust and also the combustion chamber temperatures are far lower resulting in longer engine life.
It also means, as you correctly observed, that most of the runway length will be used before becoming airborne.
There are circumstances when a reduced thrust takeoff is not permitted e.g. conditions of windshear.
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a passengers view
My comment that i will fly virgin next time is bit flippant - we are all still really shaken up by what happened. My wife and 2 of my 3 kids were on the plane with me and it really wasn't good. Thoughts of leaving an orphan behind etc etc.
As i stated i do appreciate that a pilot views these things differently but you could see that the stewards were just as rattled as we were.
As an aside, one good thing did come of it - i've never seen people watch the safety briefing before. We had a plane full of attentive people on the shuttle flight down from manchester to heathrow!
As i stated i do appreciate that a pilot views these things differently but you could see that the stewards were just as rattled as we were.
As an aside, one good thing did come of it - i've never seen people watch the safety briefing before. We had a plane full of attentive people on the shuttle flight down from manchester to heathrow!
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timzsta is a fATPL wannabee with 200 hours. This whole episode has been something of an eye opener for me.
Picture it this way. I am at an interview for my first job. Panel ask me what I would do following engine failure at take off at the start of 10 hour sector, some of it over a large cold ocean. If I replied "continue to destination" how many pilots here would guarantee me that I would get the job?
Who was it that famously said "just because we can do something it does not follow that we should?".
When I was in the Royal Navy I first became involved in aviation. I was taught about the accident chain. Accidents rarely occur as a result of one single event but as a result of a serious of events. If you can stop any of the series of events happening you stand a good chance of preventing the accident. It seems the accident was prevented only at the last event.
I recall an incident not so long ago when a failure of an engine on a BAe 146 resulted in the failure of the other engine on that wing. In this 747 incident it seems there was quite a serious failure of the engine given the very high EGT recorded. Who is to say some debris from the engine may not have punctured a wing fuel tank causing a slow fuel leak that may not have been noticed until it was too late? Or another engine being damaged or some other system.
Having read this thread I am more enlightened as to the decision making process - at first I thought they were complete idiots to have continued, but it is not as straightforward as that.
In my humble opinion attempting to continue to LHR was the most extreme case of action. My thoughts were more along the line of maybe heading over to the East Coast and land there where it would have been easier to sort out onward travel to the UK for the passengers. If you were worried about the cost of dumping all the fuel and putting passengers up in hotels for a few days then the aforementioned may have been the most sensible way of doing it.
But deciding to cross the atlantic following an engine failure seems like a bold decision to say the least. Perhaps this incident shows that there are "old and bold aviators". At this time of year can anybody hazard a guess as to what the survival time in the North Atlantic is if you should have to go swimming?
Yes its unlikely you would lose the other three engines but you don't have to do many case studies on your MCC course to realise the first problem you have is very rarely the last. Go and have a look at the "atlantic glider" thread as a testament to that.
Picture it this way. I am at an interview for my first job. Panel ask me what I would do following engine failure at take off at the start of 10 hour sector, some of it over a large cold ocean. If I replied "continue to destination" how many pilots here would guarantee me that I would get the job?
Who was it that famously said "just because we can do something it does not follow that we should?".
When I was in the Royal Navy I first became involved in aviation. I was taught about the accident chain. Accidents rarely occur as a result of one single event but as a result of a serious of events. If you can stop any of the series of events happening you stand a good chance of preventing the accident. It seems the accident was prevented only at the last event.
I recall an incident not so long ago when a failure of an engine on a BAe 146 resulted in the failure of the other engine on that wing. In this 747 incident it seems there was quite a serious failure of the engine given the very high EGT recorded. Who is to say some debris from the engine may not have punctured a wing fuel tank causing a slow fuel leak that may not have been noticed until it was too late? Or another engine being damaged or some other system.
Having read this thread I am more enlightened as to the decision making process - at first I thought they were complete idiots to have continued, but it is not as straightforward as that.
In my humble opinion attempting to continue to LHR was the most extreme case of action. My thoughts were more along the line of maybe heading over to the East Coast and land there where it would have been easier to sort out onward travel to the UK for the passengers. If you were worried about the cost of dumping all the fuel and putting passengers up in hotels for a few days then the aforementioned may have been the most sensible way of doing it.
But deciding to cross the atlantic following an engine failure seems like a bold decision to say the least. Perhaps this incident shows that there are "old and bold aviators". At this time of year can anybody hazard a guess as to what the survival time in the North Atlantic is if you should have to go swimming?
Yes its unlikely you would lose the other three engines but you don't have to do many case studies on your MCC course to realise the first problem you have is very rarely the last. Go and have a look at the "atlantic glider" thread as a testament to that.
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BA vs RN
timzsta, I believe that BA has flown a few more miles in four-donks than RN ever dreamed of. The 747's systems are well-proven to prevent "creeping failure" i.e. a cascading of individual failures (lack of redundancy) leading to an accident. Trend condition monitoring of engines gives a better assessment of the health of the remaining three than any military aircraft ever had.
Illigitum non carborundum.
Illigitum non carborundum.
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I am sure the 747 has fantastic redundancy. What those systems cannot legislate for is getting a lower cruising level then you planned for, subsequently resulting in not enough fuel to get you to where you want to get to. And then not being able to get as much fuel as you thought you could from one of your tanks, for whatever reason, resulting in an emergency being declared. I am sure the trend monitoring is great too - but what happens if it starts to paint an ugly picture halfway over the atlantic?
As soon as you start operating an aircraft in a non-standard way you run the risk of the unexpected happening. System redundancy does not give one carte blanche to press on regardless. For if the aeroplane does not do its best to ruin your day, then sure as hell, somebody or something else will.
Better to be down here wishing you was up there, then up there wishing you was down here.
Can you please answer my 'interview question' - it seems I have much to learn from somebody like you.
As soon as you start operating an aircraft in a non-standard way you run the risk of the unexpected happening. System redundancy does not give one carte blanche to press on regardless. For if the aeroplane does not do its best to ruin your day, then sure as hell, somebody or something else will.
Better to be down here wishing you was up there, then up there wishing you was down here.
Can you please answer my 'interview question' - it seems I have much to learn from somebody like you.
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As a BA 747 captain, perhaps I could add my tuppenceworth. I am not a manager and have no other knowledge of this incident than any other member of the public.
1) Whatever else I may think about British Airways, and I am happy to take it on the chin wrt service, punctuality etc etc, we do NOT compromise safety. When the decision was taken to continue to London there will have been NO question about the safety of so doing.
2) A 747-400 on 3 engines, at the sort of weight it would have been out of LAX, is just as safe as any twin-engined aircraft. I.e. it has FULL redundancy of ALL systems. As with any twin-engined aircraft it can cope easily with any engine failure, including the one on the same side. ALL hydraulic systems (and therefore controls, flaps, gear etc) will continue to operate normally.
3) A 3-engined 747-400 will cruise at a lower altitude and will therefore burn more fuel. The Flight Management System automatically calculates the new fuel burn on 3 engines at the lower altitude and presents the pilots with an accurate estimate of fuel on landing, whether at the intended destination or an alternate.
4) I have no idea why, towards the end of the flight (as I understand it), a 'Mayday' was transmitted. What I can say is that the transmittal of a 'Mayday' will guarantee that you will get a priority approach, so you have no concerns about whether the aircraft ahead will burst a tyre on the runway, be slow to clear the runway, or whatever......because the runway will be maintained clear for you to land on.
In short, the continuation of the flight is a non-event and the declaration of 'Mayday' ensured the continued safety of all on board. It was not an indication of imminent disaster.
It would be a real shame if all the publicity given to this event were to pressurize me or my colleagues into not transmitting a Mayday if necessary, because of all the publicity it might generate (17 pages so far on this site, a full page in the Times and God knows how much elsewhere).
Rossma - I deeply feel for you and your family. As I say, I have no more knowledge of what happened than most other people, and certainly far less than you have. I can say though that the guys in the flight deck will have been working flat out to sort the problem. It is always a balancing act between solving the immediate problem and keeping the Cabin Crew and passengers 'in the loop'. If there's a conflict, flying the aircraft will - and must - come first.
1) Whatever else I may think about British Airways, and I am happy to take it on the chin wrt service, punctuality etc etc, we do NOT compromise safety. When the decision was taken to continue to London there will have been NO question about the safety of so doing.
2) A 747-400 on 3 engines, at the sort of weight it would have been out of LAX, is just as safe as any twin-engined aircraft. I.e. it has FULL redundancy of ALL systems. As with any twin-engined aircraft it can cope easily with any engine failure, including the one on the same side. ALL hydraulic systems (and therefore controls, flaps, gear etc) will continue to operate normally.
3) A 3-engined 747-400 will cruise at a lower altitude and will therefore burn more fuel. The Flight Management System automatically calculates the new fuel burn on 3 engines at the lower altitude and presents the pilots with an accurate estimate of fuel on landing, whether at the intended destination or an alternate.
4) I have no idea why, towards the end of the flight (as I understand it), a 'Mayday' was transmitted. What I can say is that the transmittal of a 'Mayday' will guarantee that you will get a priority approach, so you have no concerns about whether the aircraft ahead will burst a tyre on the runway, be slow to clear the runway, or whatever......because the runway will be maintained clear for you to land on.
In short, the continuation of the flight is a non-event and the declaration of 'Mayday' ensured the continued safety of all on board. It was not an indication of imminent disaster.
It would be a real shame if all the publicity given to this event were to pressurize me or my colleagues into not transmitting a Mayday if necessary, because of all the publicity it might generate (17 pages so far on this site, a full page in the Times and God knows how much elsewhere).
Rossma - I deeply feel for you and your family. As I say, I have no more knowledge of what happened than most other people, and certainly far less than you have. I can say though that the guys in the flight deck will have been working flat out to sort the problem. It is always a balancing act between solving the immediate problem and keeping the Cabin Crew and passengers 'in the loop'. If there's a conflict, flying the aircraft will - and must - come first.
Controversial, moi?
I am sure the trend monitoring is great too - but what happens if it starts to paint an ugly picture halfway over the atlantic?
The answer is you would continue on two to the nearest suitable airport.
If you are half-way across the atlantic in a 757, 767 or 777 and an engine fails, what would you do if the remaining engine started giving cause for concern?
Similar situation. Tell me which you would rather be on board.
Regarding the interview question if it were asked there would be no right or wrong answer. What they would be interested in hearing is your analysis of the hypothetical situation they presented you with and the quality of your thinking.
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Does that mean there is no right or wrong answer when it happens for real? Or does that just apply in the interview room? Because when your strapped to 350,000kgs of 747 with 350 punters onboard the consequences are a tad more serious.
My thinking would be I am not going to dump a huge amount of aviation fuel into the atmosphere at great expense and return to LAX and land my company with a huge hotel bill.
I would have chosen to continue to somewhere like Boston or New York, meaning I would not have to dump fuel and from those cities there would be more flights to the UK enabling the airline to get the passengers back to London quicker perhaps then if I returned to LAX.
I would not have attempted to fly all the way back to the UK on 3 engines. But that is my opinion as a 200 hr pilot who has not yet flown commercially. It maybe different if was a 10,000 hour 747 Captain.
Other people have mentioned the publics perception of BA's safety policy. Sometimes in aviation whilst arguably we remain safe, we don't do ourselves any favours in terms on public perception. There will be those who find it more then odd that if you loose an engine out of LAX bound for LHR you continue for 11 hours to London. Vice versa and you dump fuel and go back to Heathrow. Or if your in a twin you return to departure point regardless. Not saying that any of the above are right are wrong, thats just how joe public may see it. Although I saw it as a bold, but arguably justifiable decision to continue to Heathrow, when I showed my mum the Flight International piece on the incident she was alarmed to say the least.
The whole think might like good from an operational, JAR OPS and company manual point of view, but it doesn't look so good now it has found its way into the press. Perhaps we need to add another item to the checklist:
1. Is it safe?
2. Is it legal?
3. Is it convenient to the passengers?
4. Is it going to damage the environment?
5. Is it going to look good in the papers?
My thinking would be I am not going to dump a huge amount of aviation fuel into the atmosphere at great expense and return to LAX and land my company with a huge hotel bill.
I would have chosen to continue to somewhere like Boston or New York, meaning I would not have to dump fuel and from those cities there would be more flights to the UK enabling the airline to get the passengers back to London quicker perhaps then if I returned to LAX.
I would not have attempted to fly all the way back to the UK on 3 engines. But that is my opinion as a 200 hr pilot who has not yet flown commercially. It maybe different if was a 10,000 hour 747 Captain.
Other people have mentioned the publics perception of BA's safety policy. Sometimes in aviation whilst arguably we remain safe, we don't do ourselves any favours in terms on public perception. There will be those who find it more then odd that if you loose an engine out of LAX bound for LHR you continue for 11 hours to London. Vice versa and you dump fuel and go back to Heathrow. Or if your in a twin you return to departure point regardless. Not saying that any of the above are right are wrong, thats just how joe public may see it. Although I saw it as a bold, but arguably justifiable decision to continue to Heathrow, when I showed my mum the Flight International piece on the incident she was alarmed to say the least.
The whole think might like good from an operational, JAR OPS and company manual point of view, but it doesn't look so good now it has found its way into the press. Perhaps we need to add another item to the checklist:
1. Is it safe?
2. Is it legal?
3. Is it convenient to the passengers?
4. Is it going to damage the environment?
5. Is it going to look good in the papers?
Last edited by timzsta; 28th Feb 2005 at 15:34.
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M.Mouse,
We operate all variants of the B747, in a case like this the decision would rest with the Captain based on all available information, sometimes they have dumped fuel and landed, sometimes they have continued. Either way, paperwork is required on landing.
Nobody has posted that any B747 operator strictly prohibits continued flight following an engine failure!
Mutt.
We operate all variants of the B747, in a case like this the decision would rest with the Captain based on all available information, sometimes they have dumped fuel and landed, sometimes they have continued. Either way, paperwork is required on landing.
Nobody has posted that any B747 operator strictly prohibits continued flight following an engine failure!
Mutt.
Pax. vs. Crew Perspectives
I remain largely content with the decision making process. Most likely a diversion closer than MAN would have been chosen had the fuel been less.
rossma reports that the pax were treated to a rather more spectacular show than was viewed by the cockpit
Once the situation was sorted out, the continuation decision was made and the workload had settled down, it may have helped to have offered a more complete explanation to the pax -- from rossma's account, it does not seem one was made.
rossma also leaves open the question whether any crew came back to inspect the engine -- mind you in the post 9/11 environment, sending a flight crew member back into the cabin for inspection may no longer be an option; also the workload may have precluded sending any flight crew back and this duty may now be delegated to the cabin crew.
Also he did not say whether any external damage was apparent or not.
rossma reports that the pax were treated to a rather more spectacular show than was viewed by the cockpit
Once the situation was sorted out, the continuation decision was made and the workload had settled down, it may have helped to have offered a more complete explanation to the pax -- from rossma's account, it does not seem one was made.
rossma also leaves open the question whether any crew came back to inspect the engine -- mind you in the post 9/11 environment, sending a flight crew member back into the cabin for inspection may no longer be an option; also the workload may have precluded sending any flight crew back and this duty may now be delegated to the cabin crew.
Also he did not say whether any external damage was apparent or not.
Controversial, moi?
Mutt, thanks for that answer.
timzsta
There rarely is a definitive right or wrong answer. Your reasoning in your answer is sound (in my view).
You go on to say
Again, very sound questions but isn't it a sad fact of life that number 5 has to be considered, given its influence is out of all proportion to its usefulness in making a balanced judgement?
timzsta
There rarely is a definitive right or wrong answer. Your reasoning in your answer is sound (in my view).
You go on to say
1. Is it safe?
2. Is it legal?
3. Is it convenient to the passengers?
4. Is it going to damage the environment?
5. Is it going to look good in the papers?
2. Is it legal?
3. Is it convenient to the passengers?
4. Is it going to damage the environment?
5. Is it going to look good in the papers?
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Perhaps I can add a little information that will clear up the fuel situation.
First the credentials. I am a 744 Captain of 20,000 hours total flying time, and I have flown a 744 on 3 engines.
Second - the crew did the right thing.
OK.
Once we have reached the "tank to engine" stage of flight, at about 52 tonnes fuel remaining (ie 13 tonnes in each of main tanks 1-4, we normally feed each tank to its respective engine until landing (2 and 3 have an open crossfeed gallery, simply to keep that gallery pressurised).
On three engines, the dead engine's fuel tank will not feed any fuel in that circumstance, but we plainly want (need) to use fuel from that tank. To facilitate this, we use the override/jettison pumps in that tank to feed fuel to the remaining engines. They cut out at about 3 tonnes left in tank as they feed from the top of standpipes, intentionally leaving fuel that can only be reached by the lower pressure main tank boost pumps.
If you have not had experience of just how aggressive you need to be to feed this fuel to the other engines, it may catch you out later in the flight. In my opinion, it is best to decide how much fuel you wish to arrive with, in the dead engine's tank, and feed all other engines with this fuel early so as to allow normal tank to engine feed to the three live engines later in the flight (withing the constraints of lateral balance).
Here, the guys were left with more fuel in the dead tank than the others. However NONE OF THAT MEANS THAT THE FUEL WAS UNUSEABLE. If they had reached a state where fuel pumps in the low tanks were becoming uncovered, they would have operated with all pumps on, all crossfeed valves open, and, at that stage, all the fuel would have fed from wherever it was, to the three live engines. It just wouldn't have looked, or felt, very tidy.
Company policy requires the use of a Mayday call if you are going to land with less than reserve fuel (about 4.3 tonnes on a 744) and a PanPan if you think you MAY land in such a state. Now whether the guys on the day realised that that seemingly unuseable fuel was actually useable, I do not know, but nothing they did compromised the safely of the aircraft, or the passengers in the slightest.
First the credentials. I am a 744 Captain of 20,000 hours total flying time, and I have flown a 744 on 3 engines.
Second - the crew did the right thing.
OK.
Once we have reached the "tank to engine" stage of flight, at about 52 tonnes fuel remaining (ie 13 tonnes in each of main tanks 1-4, we normally feed each tank to its respective engine until landing (2 and 3 have an open crossfeed gallery, simply to keep that gallery pressurised).
On three engines, the dead engine's fuel tank will not feed any fuel in that circumstance, but we plainly want (need) to use fuel from that tank. To facilitate this, we use the override/jettison pumps in that tank to feed fuel to the remaining engines. They cut out at about 3 tonnes left in tank as they feed from the top of standpipes, intentionally leaving fuel that can only be reached by the lower pressure main tank boost pumps.
If you have not had experience of just how aggressive you need to be to feed this fuel to the other engines, it may catch you out later in the flight. In my opinion, it is best to decide how much fuel you wish to arrive with, in the dead engine's tank, and feed all other engines with this fuel early so as to allow normal tank to engine feed to the three live engines later in the flight (withing the constraints of lateral balance).
Here, the guys were left with more fuel in the dead tank than the others. However NONE OF THAT MEANS THAT THE FUEL WAS UNUSEABLE. If they had reached a state where fuel pumps in the low tanks were becoming uncovered, they would have operated with all pumps on, all crossfeed valves open, and, at that stage, all the fuel would have fed from wherever it was, to the three live engines. It just wouldn't have looked, or felt, very tidy.
Company policy requires the use of a Mayday call if you are going to land with less than reserve fuel (about 4.3 tonnes on a 744) and a PanPan if you think you MAY land in such a state. Now whether the guys on the day realised that that seemingly unuseable fuel was actually useable, I do not know, but nothing they did compromised the safely of the aircraft, or the passengers in the slightest.
There seem to be two main concerns here:
1. The flight didn't land immediately after an 'engine failure'.
2. There wasn't an incredible amount of fuel left after eventually landing in the UK (after declaring an emergency).
For the first point, this operator (as many others) does not count a 'contained' engine failure on a 4-engined aircraft as a major emergency necessitating a quick landing. Interestingly, it is quite legal in the USA to take off from an airport you cannot land back at as long as you have an alternate less than 2hrs away.
Once the initial fuss over the surge and shutdown had died away I expect the crew took a objective view of the situation. They carried on in the direction of their flight plan as they were going to be over an area with a reasonable density of suitable airfields for 2-3hrs, should they decide not to continue. They would have calculated the fuel burn at the lower altitude, then considered the impact of another important system failure on the operation, i.e. loss of pressurisation, another engine, etc. This would include MSA & driftdown considerations.
The decision to carry on would have been influenced by reports from engineering as to the severity of the failure and the health of the remaining systems. Crossing the North Atlantic is no different to crossing any other part of the globe where diversion airfields are thin on the ground. (Saharan Africa and Northern Canada, to name but a few.) I would surmise that their flightpath back from the West Coast probably took them fairly close to the 'non-ETOPS' route, leaving them alternates at Goose/Iqualuit, Sondestrom, Keflavik, etc. giving not far away from 1hrs flying to reach an alternate in the event of further problems.
Naturally progressing to the second point, I'm sure that regular checks were being made on the fuel burn and quantity predictions for arrival. I would imagine that LHR had long been ruled out as an achievable destination and that MAN had been selected as the first airfield off the North Atlantic with two independent runways (one of which could be nominated as the alternate for the other). The fact that it was a main maintenance base for the airline and had regular 'shuttle' flights to LHR would have been noted but not allowed to override any other safety criteria.
Just before landing, there was some uncertainty over whether all the fuel from one of many tanks on the -400 would make it to the operating engines. I would guess the crew were 99% sure that it would but just in case, declared a MAYDAY and requested a sterile runway so they didn't have to find out...
They landed with Reserves + some amount. Not an incredibly ususual situation and one which you would expect following a diversion to an alternate in normal operations in any airline. By committing to an 'assured' landing at Manchester they could safely and legally use any 'diversion fuel' on getting to the destination.
I feel that many of the emotional replies on this thread come from those who have a) no experience of modern LR OPS and/or b) are not very familiar with JAR-OPS and it's application...
1. The flight didn't land immediately after an 'engine failure'.
2. There wasn't an incredible amount of fuel left after eventually landing in the UK (after declaring an emergency).
For the first point, this operator (as many others) does not count a 'contained' engine failure on a 4-engined aircraft as a major emergency necessitating a quick landing. Interestingly, it is quite legal in the USA to take off from an airport you cannot land back at as long as you have an alternate less than 2hrs away.
Once the initial fuss over the surge and shutdown had died away I expect the crew took a objective view of the situation. They carried on in the direction of their flight plan as they were going to be over an area with a reasonable density of suitable airfields for 2-3hrs, should they decide not to continue. They would have calculated the fuel burn at the lower altitude, then considered the impact of another important system failure on the operation, i.e. loss of pressurisation, another engine, etc. This would include MSA & driftdown considerations.
The decision to carry on would have been influenced by reports from engineering as to the severity of the failure and the health of the remaining systems. Crossing the North Atlantic is no different to crossing any other part of the globe where diversion airfields are thin on the ground. (Saharan Africa and Northern Canada, to name but a few.) I would surmise that their flightpath back from the West Coast probably took them fairly close to the 'non-ETOPS' route, leaving them alternates at Goose/Iqualuit, Sondestrom, Keflavik, etc. giving not far away from 1hrs flying to reach an alternate in the event of further problems.
Naturally progressing to the second point, I'm sure that regular checks were being made on the fuel burn and quantity predictions for arrival. I would imagine that LHR had long been ruled out as an achievable destination and that MAN had been selected as the first airfield off the North Atlantic with two independent runways (one of which could be nominated as the alternate for the other). The fact that it was a main maintenance base for the airline and had regular 'shuttle' flights to LHR would have been noted but not allowed to override any other safety criteria.
Just before landing, there was some uncertainty over whether all the fuel from one of many tanks on the -400 would make it to the operating engines. I would guess the crew were 99% sure that it would but just in case, declared a MAYDAY and requested a sterile runway so they didn't have to find out...
They landed with Reserves + some amount. Not an incredibly ususual situation and one which you would expect following a diversion to an alternate in normal operations in any airline. By committing to an 'assured' landing at Manchester they could safely and legally use any 'diversion fuel' on getting to the destination.
I feel that many of the emotional replies on this thread come from those who have a) no experience of modern LR OPS and/or b) are not very familiar with JAR-OPS and it's application...
Fullwings, finally a rational sensible response. However, MAN has not been a main maintenance base for BA for about 3 years...
Edited to add:
Another thought just occured to me. The crew had an engine surge and shut it down, continuing on three. Now, if the situation became really desperate in terms of power units left, they could attempt to restart it and get some thrust out of it. They wouldn't want to do this outside of a pressing emergency (as no-one could know what the actual damage was until inspected on the ground) but it still remained as an option. Given that leaving it shut down unless absolutely necessary would probably save BA £millions in repair costs, then that could be termed a commercial decision - but one that could be overturned at a moment's notice.
Last edited by FullWings; 28th Feb 2005 at 16:49.
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Inspecting engine inflight
Not that the subject hasn't been flogged sufficiently already - But a spot of awareness might help here.
Firstly, the engines are not visible from the pointy end of the Jumbo.
Second, after a 20:45 takeoff from LAX, it's going to be several hours before they are visible in morning light from the cabin.
Firstly, the engines are not visible from the pointy end of the Jumbo.
Second, after a 20:45 takeoff from LAX, it's going to be several hours before they are visible in morning light from the cabin.