Continental may be charged for Concorde Crash (Press Report)

[cyrano_de_bergerac]

Regarding liability, the essential point is that the titatium-alloy strip was a non-certified, non-approved part, that was installed completely half-assed. Many of you are looking at the failure from the wrong-end of the equation (an 'a posteriori' view)... presuming that since any part COULD fall off, therefore ANY part that falls should be equally without liability. You simply can't make that presupposition. You have to look at it with an 'a priori' view. If an airline installs something non-certified, where it's just "fudged" to make it work or fit, then the fact is it's reliabiliy is (dramatically) less and is mathematically much more probable to fail. An airline should know that, as should any mechanic. Either they DID know that... or SHOULD have ... either way is, by definition, negligence.

To NOT hold Continental responsible (at least partially), the resulting logic would mean you've opened up the acceptability of doing whatever you want, willy-nilly, when it comes to installation of non-standard (self-manufactured) parts, and I'm sure no one wants that.

[411A]

On the other hand, we can't have Commanders knowingly departing overweight...nor can we have airline engineering staff assembling wheels with missing spacers either.

Sauce for the goose/gander...and all that.

[cmf]

On the other hand, we can't have Commanders knowingly departing overweight...nor can we have airline engineering staff assembling wheels with missing spacers either.

411A,
Fully agree, but some may feel that it is OK since it happens from time to time

I think AF should get their rear warmed up because of what was discovered in the investigation but it probably belongs to a different topic than “Continental may be charged for Concorde Crash (Press Report).”

[gordonroxburgh]

3 things of note

The actual wind at the closest anemometer (sp) to the take off point has the wind at ZERO knots - The AAIB and BEA therefore were happy to conclude that the wind was not an issue that day.

BA were told to de-mod the spray guards post accdient to the unmodified AF standard, so they were definately not a factor.

The bogie beam spacer has been rulled out time and time again. The aircraft was perfectly straight on the runway until it hit the strip, with no correction being put in to corerect for the way it would move if the gear had not been parallel - this is in the FDR charts that are downloadable from the BEA website.

2 engines going to zero % at the same time has never even been simulated on Concorde - this caused her to veer over. we're not talking about running down to zero, were looking at 100% to 0% in a couple of seconds, when they surged with the explosion.

[BEagle]

gordonroxburgh, if the wind passed to the crew with their take-off clearance was substantially different to that used for their take-off performance calculations, then they should at the very least have discussed the matter.

A scenario I used many times when instructing on the VC10. The crew were given a forecast wind (260/15) and ATIS (280/12); however, whilst waiting at the holding point on a short RW 26 they also heard other traffic being cleared to land with a significantly different wind (350/5). If they didn't query the effect of the wind, then we'd stop the exercise and debrief the point...

But if a line Concorde crew didn't carry out such a basic "Is RTOW still valid?" check prior to commencing their take-off, then something was very wrong with their training.

[ElectroVlasic]

Well, I consider that it was inevitable that this accident happened. There were five other incidents where tire bursts led to fuel tank punctures. The data was there to see that a catastrophe was inevitable. The data was analyzed and the wrong conclusion was reached. It's just like the case of frozen insulation hitting the wing of the Space Shuttle. It doesn't matter exactly which piece of insulation hit the wing, the fact is the accident was ineveitable and nothing was done. I feel that in the case of Concorde, the ones truly responsible are grasping for something to deflect the blame. In the case of NASA, they have no such second party to blame.

If the need to resist FOD was not the real root cause of the catastrophe, then why was the airworthiness withdrawn till the airplane was reinforced? Otherwise, a different direction would have been taken. We would have airplane inspectors stationed at inspection stations at the aiport, making sure every piece of metal on the exterior of the airplane was secure, and we would have very frequent runway inspections to verify they were free of debris.

The example of a part of an airplane falling off and hitting an auto is not a proper example. The automobile is not expected to operate safely in the presence of falling debris. The airplane is expected to operate safely in the presence of FOD on the runway, just like the shuttle is expected to operate correctly in the environment it is launched in.

Thanks to everyone for the (generally) excellent level of discourse in this thread. I suspect we won't ever see eye to eye on it, but I have learned a lot from the discussion.

--ev--

[gordonroxburgh]

BEagle

The AAIB in the Uk and the BEA in France were happy that the wind played no factor in the accident, it was so low it was simply not a factor.

I put it to you that the wind that day at CDG was swirling round, the crew from their briefings knew that. so when they got a tail wind component from the tower it really did not even pass a thought, as they knew instinctively what the weather conditions were and that the wind in fact was light.

I sat in on a lecture by the lead UK investigator recently; now we can point the finger all we wnat at the official report, but it was it was conducted as a joint UK/French investigation, with the judicial review running in parallel causing all sorts of hassle. Now if the AAIB said the report IS what happened, I think we got to believe it and stop all the supposition. We can accuse the French of cover ups etc..but if the UK top dogs back the findings, well maybe we got to think that the report is in fact correct.

The report does not go into the what ifs - no accident report will EVER do this, nor will it EVER apportion blame.

yes somethings happened that should not have, but as far as the main chain of events goes, the reports are correct and it was going to be a bad day form the moment she hit that Titanium, no matter what the weight was , no matter what the crew did.

I want to reenforce the point again - the BEA and AAIB both are in complete agreement that the take off run was 100% normal up until the titanium was hit. Now the judicial investigation also backs this up

Only disagreements the AAIB had with the BEA are, (which are listed in an appendix), was the physical way the tank failed form the inside out (both agree this was what happened, but not how it happened) and how the fuel was ignited (the French not 100% happy that the AAIB model was 100% accurate to prove it was lit by the 110V supply to the brake fans which was arc'ing

[BEagle]

gordonroxburgh, as I wrote earlier:

"A still air wind velocity was used to calculate a RTOW of 185070kg?

What would the real RTOW have been with a wind of 090/8 as passed by ATC?

What was the crew's reaction to the difference between these two values?"

Why did they not even discuss the change to RTOW? OK, the wind itself may not have been a causal factor per se - but this failure may have been indcative of AF crew and CRM standards....

[gordonroxburgh]

....the wind itself may not have been a causal factor per se - but this failure may have been indcative of AF crew and CRM standards....

I agree, these casual factors are mentioned in the report for this purpose. AF's training is was not what it should have been as noted in the judicial investigation.

[HowlingWind]

I have to go with ElectroVlasic on this one. I remain appalled that a burst tyre -- by whatever cause -- could have such a catastrophic result.

Given that such incidents were not without precedence, and that the other operator had taken measures to remedy same, AF's wish to blame CO is simply a misguided attempt to disavow its own negligence in the matter.

[gordonroxburgh]

and that the other operator had taken measures to remedy same

Nothing BA did would have prevented this incident, only mod was strengthened spray guards on the BA fleet, whcih as I said previsosly were de-moded for the return to service. This is why the BA fleet was grounded too.

AF are not blaming CO, the Judicial investigation are for the botched repair.

Concorde should have been grouned, as a tyre bust can't cause an aircraft to fall out of the sky. A change to operating proceedures (eg runway sweep),would possibly have been sufficent, with the thinking that Concorde was not going to be around for more that 5-10 year longer anyway and there were not that many flights

The new Michelin tyres would have solved all the issues, at the time may felt the Dunlop's used by BA may have been more resiliant that AF's Goodyear's

You all must remeber that it was the type of burst that caused the problem due to the nature of the strip, hence the blame for CO, or their nominated contractor.

[WupWupPullUp]

This topic will go on and on and on.

Some people on here would prefer to blame Air France, rather than accept the only factor that was 100% definately a direct contribution to the accident was the NON APPROVED repair by Continental, using NON APPROVED materials.

Other things MAY have been a factor (and are duly mentioned in the official report as CASUAL FACTORS), but then again they may NOT. The ONE AND ONLY factor that was definately a cause was the strip.

Now you can waffle on all you like about the fact that bits fall of airplanes all the time, and yes - they do - but the fact is that this particular bit was infinatelty more likely to have fallen off because it was NON APPROVED. It was also the wrong type of material, which made the damage to the tyre far worse than if it had been the approved material

If the strip of metal on that runway had been an approved strip, and had been installed properly, then CO would not be liable. But then again, the accident would PROBABLY not have occured, because the PROPER strip would have been made from Aluminium not Titanium, and PROBABLY wouldn't have caused the tyre to break up in the way that it did, so the fuel burst would have been far less severe (as per the previous incidents with Conc)

This is what the official joint UK AAIB and French BEA report says. This has nothing to do with AF wanting to point the finger elsewhere. Accept it - they know far more about it that you do!

[ClickRich]

If CO lose this case, what are the operational consequences for the aviation community? Anyone causing FODebris could be found liable in the event of an incident?

It might be said "yes, but this strip was not approved, it should never had been used". In fact, it has been mentioned that the workmanship is as much the cause for concern as its non-approval is.

and had been installed properly

However, the fact the strip was on the runway and no longer on the plane could be a failure any legal team would zero in on, whether the part was approved or not.

Does anyone here have any idea how much FODebris you were to find if you were to walk down any major airport runway?

I'm not saying that we should tolerate FOD, but airport operating practices would have to change hugely in order to monitor, clean and police FODebris and its creation. Who should pay for that change? Are we saying that ICAO should tighten up its runway inspection standards?

Ok, so for CDG to have this duty carried out by a dedicated safety team would be progress (and something which most sizeable UK airports do already), but the procedures needed to have spotted this strip would have to have been intense. Not easy without introducing extra hazards into the operating environment or discruptions to operations which would render some current airports untenable.

[WupWupPullUp]

Actually, speaking of FoD, it reminds me of an incident at a local GA airfield a while ago.

The local firecrew arrived in the morning and did their start of day checks, including a full runway inspection. They gave the "all-clear" and signed the sheet off, before going to the canteen for their breakfast.

Tower got a call shortly after from the first departing aircraft of the day, saying "there is an object on the runway".

Tower turned the firecrew out, who duly "discovered" a dead cow (stone cold) slap bang in the middle of the runway intersection!

How on earth they'd missed it, nobody knows!

[lomapaseo]

Does anyone here have any idea how much FODebris you were to find if you were to walk down any major airport runway?

As one who has done this many times, yes.

Also as one who has overseen system safety analysis I can tell you that it was unforseen and extremely unlikely that one could have forseen the consequences of the existance of the object.

I'll admit that tort law in france belongs to their judges and none of us may influence their progression along these lines, however the regulatory administration of the rules governing safety of flight may and have approached this from a different perspective.

[DingerX]

Far be it from me to argue with the unquestionable authority of capitals and bold text, but the metal strip was not by a long shot the "one and only factor that was definately (sic) a cause." There's plenty of causes, and there are plenty of non-approved procedures in this accident, just as in any other one. The difficulty lies in identifying the full causal chain, excluding red herrings (such as the non-factor of wind), and apportioning responsibility.

As for the fuel leak goes, the total flight hours logged by all Concordes was about 300,000 with something on the order of 100,000 cycles. The 737-300 annually logs something like 3 million flight hours in over 2 million cycles. So if the Concorde flew as much as the 737-300 (excluding other variants), blowout incidents with damage would occur daily and twice a week we'd have a punctured fuel tank as a result. How many times that fuel hits something hot or arcing is anybody's guess.
If a smoker chucks a lit cigarette butt off a motorway overpass, he's certainly littering. But if it lands in the bed of a dumptruck hauling black gunpowder in contravention of accepted safety practices, do we charge that smoker with manslaughter?

[WupWupPullUp]

The defenition of the causal factor, is the single event in the chain, which if removed would avoid the accident. The only such factor in this accident is the strip.

If the strip hadn't fallen off the CO aircraft, there would have been NO accident. FACT.

Name any other factor in this incident that was 100% directly a cause :

Wind? No. Even if there had been a 10kt headwind, the accident would still have occured. The report confirms that the actual wind was ~0 kts.

Operating practices? No. Despite the crew not following SOPs to the letter (understandable to a degree, given the circumstances), the accident would have happened anyway. Nothing they did (or didn't do) could have rescued the airplane.

Overweight? No. Even if the a/c had been a little bit lighter, the accident would still have happened. The report made reference to the Vzrc with 2 engines inop. can't remember the exact figure, but it was way above their achievable speed, given their lack of altitude.

Maintenance? No. Even if the u/c spacer had not been missing, the accident would still have happened. The FDR proves that the track was centreline.

Wheel deflectors? No. The report confirmed that BAs water deflectors would not have prevented the accident. (in face, they were removed by BA following the accident).

Yes, we all agree that Wind, OPs and weight MAY have been a factor, and may have contributed to the accident, and it important to acknowledge that these things should not have happened, but that doesn't mean they were the cause of the accident.

Like I said before, it is very unfortunate that CO were using unapproved techniques and unapproved materials to do the repair. If they had stuck to the approved repair, then chances are the strip wouldn't have fallen off.

If a smoker chucks a lit cigarette butt off a motorway overpass, he\'s certainly littering. But if it lands in the bed of a dumptruck hauling black gunpowder in contravention of accepted safety practices, do we charge that smoker with manslaughter?

That's a bit of a silly argument really.

If a man drives his car whilst fractionally over the Drink Driving limit and someone runs out right in front of his car and winds up dead, who would you want to charge with manslaughter?

If you break the rules and something goes wrong, you\'re in the firing line. As simple as that.

[ClickRich]

I recieved a Christmas this morning. Before you rush to congratulate me, what I wanted to point out is that on the back it says "WARNING: May contain small parts and/or sharp points/edges." It's a plain card. No fancy bits. The world is going mad.

I wonder if this is a notice we will see adjacent to all runway clearance bar lights in the near future?

[enicalyth]

causality

Wupwuppullup?

I suspect the dead cow you mention was unauthorised cargo that fell out of an overflying CO aircraft.

Gordon Roxburgh and others?

Is it possible for the track to be straight yet the undercart shimmying to a degree so that the nett effect is still a straight line but the the tyre sidewalls overstressed?

That could account for the tyre bursting without hitting the strip.

[ClickRich]

I believe that the investigation managed to definitely show that the primary tyre failure matched the shape of the FOD strip.