Lost Erebus tape holds vital clues
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Its not as cut and dry as a simple CFIT.Not by any means.For many people,the jury remains out and always will.The accident can be interpreted and dissected in so many ways.Collins was PIC and the PIC must know where he is(thats one angle).The Company handed Collins a flightplan that differed considerably to the one he had been briefed on(there's another angle).And the CAA oversaw the whole sorry incident,making only one inspection flight,not demanding that Antarctic survival equipment was carried or whiteout briefings performed,and feebly acquiescing to the company's request to drop the previous-visit requirement(yet another).
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Notwithstanding the offset flight plan coordinates, Captain Collins, in virtual IMC, had waited to hear three (3) "whoop-whoop-pull up" GPWS warnings before responding: (calling for: "max power, please"), instead of instantly responding with firewall power and simultaneous wings level 15+ degrees rotation to maximum climb angle! 
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which is, of course, what you would have done Glueball - even without the benefit of hindsight.
I suppose the facts that (as was made clear in Peter Mahons report):
1. Captain Collins and his crew were unknowingly experiencing sector whiteout. I.E. They believed they were looking at a flat ice shelf and overcast with 40 miles of vis (as reported to them by MacMurdo). They could see perfectly well ground features to the left and right. They believed this because:
2. The course they had been briefed they would be flying, three weeks earlier, was 27 miles west of where in fact they were, in the middle of a flat ice shelf at sea level.
The mountain that he didn't know was in front of him was invisible to him, even in perfect VMC. He had been given no specific training in how to recognise the conditions which made this so.
So you're saying he should have acted sooner on a warning that ANYONE could have doubted and that's very helpful at this point.
Even if he (or you) had responded immediately in the way you have described the aircraft could not have outclimbed the 13 degree slope on that heading, and due to the unknown whiteout they could not have seen which way to turn anyway.
I suppose the facts that (as was made clear in Peter Mahons report):
1. Captain Collins and his crew were unknowingly experiencing sector whiteout. I.E. They believed they were looking at a flat ice shelf and overcast with 40 miles of vis (as reported to them by MacMurdo). They could see perfectly well ground features to the left and right. They believed this because:
2. The course they had been briefed they would be flying, three weeks earlier, was 27 miles west of where in fact they were, in the middle of a flat ice shelf at sea level.
The mountain that he didn't know was in front of him was invisible to him, even in perfect VMC. He had been given no specific training in how to recognise the conditions which made this so.
So you're saying he should have acted sooner on a warning that ANYONE could have doubted and that's very helpful at this point.
Even if he (or you) had responded immediately in the way you have described the aircraft could not have outclimbed the 13 degree slope on that heading, and due to the unknown whiteout they could not have seen which way to turn anyway.
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The whole Erebus business was terribly sad. There was hardly anyone in New Zealand who didn't know someone involved.
I have a personal interest as I flew a Starlifter onto the ice at McMurdo a couple of years before the accident. The incident has fascinated me ever since and I have several books on the subject, including a copy of the original accident report. I also have a tape of the TV programme.
If only Air NZ had admitted that mistakes were made and tried to find the cause instead of attempting to blame the crew. There are lessons for us all here.
I have a personal interest as I flew a Starlifter onto the ice at McMurdo a couple of years before the accident. The incident has fascinated me ever since and I have several books on the subject, including a copy of the original accident report. I also have a tape of the TV programme.
If only Air NZ had admitted that mistakes were made and tried to find the cause instead of attempting to blame the crew. There are lessons for us all here.
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Rananim,
Why is it not a simple controlled flight into terrain??
The aircraft was completely serviceable, and it was flown into a mountain.
This was the company order for the descent, and as a copy of it was found in the cockpit after the accident the crew must have been aware of its requirements.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 Grid from McMurdo field within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
You will note that it states THE ONLY LET DOWN PROCEDURE AVAILABLE.
The weather at Mc Murdo was well below this minima, so does that authorize the crew to invent their own let down procedure?? The sector whiteout explains why they flew into Erebus without seeing it, but does not explain what they were doing down there.
Prospector
Why is it not a simple controlled flight into terrain??
The aircraft was completely serviceable, and it was flown into a mountain.
This was the company order for the descent, and as a copy of it was found in the cockpit after the accident the crew must have been aware of its requirements.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 Grid from McMurdo field within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
You will note that it states THE ONLY LET DOWN PROCEDURE AVAILABLE.
The weather at Mc Murdo was well below this minima, so does that authorize the crew to invent their own let down procedure?? The sector whiteout explains why they flew into Erebus without seeing it, but does not explain what they were doing down there.
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Why is CVR important?
Prospector, In response to your comment re CVR
"The CVR is not really that important in showing the cause of the accident, it is of interest only in trying to explain why they did what they did."
May I just point out that this comment contradicts itself. The dictionary definition of the word "cause" being "
1) The producer of an effect, result, or consequence.
2) The one, such as a person, event, or condition, that is responsible for an action or result.
3) A basis for an action or response; a reason
Since I am not a pilot, I cannot respond to your statement that that was "THE ONLY LET DOWN PROCEDURE AVAILABLE". I will ask one of several experienced pilots I know who was familiar with the procedures at the time to read your comments, consider and respond. I will get them to call themselves "Seeking Truth". Meanwhile if anyone familiar with the VMC let down procedures at the time would like to comment, pls feel free. I do know that the weather was not below that minima though as they state that they have 40nm vis at one point, and sector whiteout is not show showers, it is reflected light.
Meanwhile question for you Prospector-nice one this time. What does this mean please? "Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79." Does this mean there had previously been another let down policy?
"The CVR is not really that important in showing the cause of the accident, it is of interest only in trying to explain why they did what they did."
May I just point out that this comment contradicts itself. The dictionary definition of the word "cause" being "
1) The producer of an effect, result, or consequence.
2) The one, such as a person, event, or condition, that is responsible for an action or result.
3) A basis for an action or response; a reason
Since I am not a pilot, I cannot respond to your statement that that was "THE ONLY LET DOWN PROCEDURE AVAILABLE". I will ask one of several experienced pilots I know who was familiar with the procedures at the time to read your comments, consider and respond. I will get them to call themselves "Seeking Truth". Meanwhile if anyone familiar with the VMC let down procedures at the time would like to comment, pls feel free. I do know that the weather was not below that minima though as they state that they have 40nm vis at one point, and sector whiteout is not show showers, it is reflected light.
Meanwhile question for you Prospector-nice one this time. What does this mean please? "Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79." Does this mean there had previously been another let down policy?
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Seeking Answers,
The modification to the descent procedure was because the McMurdo NDB was no longer available, it was still operating but not being maintained so its accuracy could not be guaranteed.
The only let down procedure means just that. VMC or not, this was the only approved let down procedure, it was to avoid any chance of the set of circumstances that ended up in the result that eventuated.
These are the weather conditions that prevailed at the time.
Weather in the McMurdo area at the time of the disaster was reported to be completely overcast at 3500ft with other cloud layers above, and a wind of 10 knots. Mountain tops in the area were covered in cloud and, although the surface visibility was good, surface definition was poor and horizon definition only fair because the sun was obscured and snow surface features could not be readily identified except from close up.
Other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud.
TE901 were advised Ross Island under a low overcast base of 2000ft with light snow and a visibility of 40 nautical miles
Scott base advised the flight that the Wright and Taylor dry valleys area was clear and would make a better prospect for sightseeing than Ross Island.
The captain of a USAF C-141 Starlifter following 45 minutes behind the ANZ flight said no terrain was visible and he made a long gradual descent over the water, navigating entirely by inertial navigation system and maintaining 16,000ft until being picked up by McMurdo radar about 38 nm's out. He immediately entered cloud on starting his final descent, passing between layers with good visibility but no sight of the ground until the aircraft broke out at about 5000ft and landed normally at McMurdo.
You will note that this flight maintained FL160 until picked up by McMurdo Radar.
I disagree with your statement re contradiction.
1. The producer of consequence In the wrong place produced the consequence.
2. It was the result of a conscious decision to be at that wrong place that caused the result.
3 The basis for that action was aforementioned conscious decision.
The CVR played no part in that conscious decision.
Prospector
The modification to the descent procedure was because the McMurdo NDB was no longer available, it was still operating but not being maintained so its accuracy could not be guaranteed.
The only let down procedure means just that. VMC or not, this was the only approved let down procedure, it was to avoid any chance of the set of circumstances that ended up in the result that eventuated.
These are the weather conditions that prevailed at the time.
Weather in the McMurdo area at the time of the disaster was reported to be completely overcast at 3500ft with other cloud layers above, and a wind of 10 knots. Mountain tops in the area were covered in cloud and, although the surface visibility was good, surface definition was poor and horizon definition only fair because the sun was obscured and snow surface features could not be readily identified except from close up.
Other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud.
TE901 were advised Ross Island under a low overcast base of 2000ft with light snow and a visibility of 40 nautical miles
Scott base advised the flight that the Wright and Taylor dry valleys area was clear and would make a better prospect for sightseeing than Ross Island.
The captain of a USAF C-141 Starlifter following 45 minutes behind the ANZ flight said no terrain was visible and he made a long gradual descent over the water, navigating entirely by inertial navigation system and maintaining 16,000ft until being picked up by McMurdo radar about 38 nm's out. He immediately entered cloud on starting his final descent, passing between layers with good visibility but no sight of the ground until the aircraft broke out at about 5000ft and landed normally at McMurdo.
You will note that this flight maintained FL160 until picked up by McMurdo Radar.
I disagree with your statement re contradiction.
1. The producer of consequence In the wrong place produced the consequence.
2. It was the result of a conscious decision to be at that wrong place that caused the result.
3 The basis for that action was aforementioned conscious decision.
The CVR played no part in that conscious decision.
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Prospector, I am surprised that you say the CVR played no part in this, considering the vast expence in retrieving the data from it.
You give the requirements for the let down which are based on the actual weather conditions the crew experienced.
You have weather from a ground station miles away and an actual from an aircraft 45 minutes later.
Unless you are gifted how could you know what the actual weather was that the crew were experiencing.
I would suggest that the CVR would at least give some insight into what the crew were considering to make their decisions.
There seems to be lots of discussion over what exactly was said on the CVR given your theory that it was irrelevant
You give the requirements for the let down which are based on the actual weather conditions the crew experienced.
You have weather from a ground station miles away and an actual from an aircraft 45 minutes later.
Unless you are gifted how could you know what the actual weather was that the crew were experiencing.
I would suggest that the CVR would at least give some insight into what the crew were considering to make their decisions.
There seems to be lots of discussion over what exactly was said on the CVR given your theory that it was irrelevant
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Instant GPWS reaction was the last chance at staying alive.
In virtual IMC and close to the ground, the aural GPWS alert must be respected at all costs. It's an extreme emergency that calls for instant, instinctive reaction...without thought.
The CVR tape demonstrated that the commander had hesitated in his response to the warning. Furthermore, the tape suggests that the commander had only "called" for max power, (F/E?, F/O?)rather than shove the throttles to the forward stops himself and simultaneously rotate into an aggressive climb angle.
(.....TDK mk2: The statement has nothing to do with "hindsight," rather it has to do with:
1. Survival instinct, and
2. It has to do with the trained reflexes of extracting ultimate climb performance (right up to the stick shaker)....)
The CVR tape demonstrated that the commander had hesitated in his response to the warning. Furthermore, the tape suggests that the commander had only "called" for max power, (F/E?, F/O?)rather than shove the throttles to the forward stops himself and simultaneously rotate into an aggressive climb angle.
(.....TDK mk2: The statement has nothing to do with "hindsight," rather it has to do with:
1. Survival instinct, and
2. It has to do with the trained reflexes of extracting ultimate climb performance (right up to the stick shaker)....)
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GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull up. Whoop whoop.
FE Five hundred feet.
GPWS Pull up.
FE Four hundred feet.
GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull up. Whoop whoop. Pull up.
CA Go-around power please.
GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull -.
---------------------------------------------
FE Five hundred feet.
GPWS Pull up.
FE Four hundred feet.
GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull up. Whoop whoop. Pull up.
CA Go-around power please.
GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull -.
---------------------------------------------
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Got the T Shirt,
I give the weather at McMurdo as that was the weather given to the crew.
It was below the minima for the only approved let down, by the Company and the NZCAA. Nowhere is there any approval for VMC descent below FL160, so the argument as to whether they were VMC is not relevant.
Sector whiteout only shows why they never saw the mountain.
If the only descent approved for the flight had been complied with there is no way they would have been to the North of Erebus below 16,000ft.
To my mind it is inconceivable that any aircrew could agree that to invent their own descent procedure, in a place like Antarctica, on your first trip to the ice, knowing all the tricks that the weather, visibility etc can play down there, to disregard SOP's that have been established to protect the flight, the only Expert on Antarctica on board, Peter Mulgrew,obviously had not fixed their position beyond doubt, and to blat about at below 1500ft at 260+kts not knowing your exact position in questionable VMC does not leave the crew as blameless as Mahon's findings suggest.
As stated in earlier posts, in my opinion, and many others, the blame for this accident can be shared between NZCAA, Air New Zealand and the crew, the only thing open for discussion would be the percentage blame apportioned to each.
Prospector
I give the weather at McMurdo as that was the weather given to the crew.
It was below the minima for the only approved let down, by the Company and the NZCAA. Nowhere is there any approval for VMC descent below FL160, so the argument as to whether they were VMC is not relevant.
Sector whiteout only shows why they never saw the mountain.
If the only descent approved for the flight had been complied with there is no way they would have been to the North of Erebus below 16,000ft.
To my mind it is inconceivable that any aircrew could agree that to invent their own descent procedure, in a place like Antarctica, on your first trip to the ice, knowing all the tricks that the weather, visibility etc can play down there, to disregard SOP's that have been established to protect the flight, the only Expert on Antarctica on board, Peter Mulgrew,obviously had not fixed their position beyond doubt, and to blat about at below 1500ft at 260+kts not knowing your exact position in questionable VMC does not leave the crew as blameless as Mahon's findings suggest.
As stated in earlier posts, in my opinion, and many others, the blame for this accident can be shared between NZCAA, Air New Zealand and the crew, the only thing open for discussion would be the percentage blame apportioned to each.
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Agree to disagree...
Well Prospector, I think you and I are going to have to agree to disagree, although I think that your opinion may be fair enough based on the information that is currently available to you.
Therefore I shall have to see what I can do to get the correct info out. Although I have felt some satisfaction in starting and continuing to join in this thread, it is probably not the best use of time to try and change peoples minds one by one, point by point, and I have to face the fact that some people will never feel sure either way. It has however encouraged me to research the answers more thoroughly so I thank you for that.
I know people think the info already available is the sum total but that is not the case. If those reading this thread would continue to read info that comes out regarding Erebus and put that together with the information already available, before making up their minds, that would be most appreciated. Although I may post information from news articles or relevant information in future, I will leave it to others to discuss.
May your fuel be full, your sky clear and your winds steady. Goodbye for now.
Therefore I shall have to see what I can do to get the correct info out. Although I have felt some satisfaction in starting and continuing to join in this thread, it is probably not the best use of time to try and change peoples minds one by one, point by point, and I have to face the fact that some people will never feel sure either way. It has however encouraged me to research the answers more thoroughly so I thank you for that.
I know people think the info already available is the sum total but that is not the case. If those reading this thread would continue to read info that comes out regarding Erebus and put that together with the information already available, before making up their minds, that would be most appreciated. Although I may post information from news articles or relevant information in future, I will leave it to others to discuss.
May your fuel be full, your sky clear and your winds steady. Goodbye for now.
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Prospector,
All your comments are correct and the natural conclusion would be to wrap it up as a classic CFIT.The airline's failure to immediately stamp out descent below 16000 and /or 6000 when it first happened was grossly negligent.It created an atmosphere of tacit approval.How can Air NZ jump on the MSA bandwagon when it has overseen a policy of illegal descents for 2 whole years without saying a word.In other words,the MSA is 16000 if you fly into Erebus and whatever you want if you return home safe and sound.
The case for a simple CFIT is further obscured by the coordinates and the mess that was the navigation department.Collins had a right to expect that the flightplan was the one he had been briefed on.When he descended,he kept NAV track,confident that he was over the Sound.Legal?No,unless they were visual and no-one knows that.Pictures taken at impact show good visibility but the merging of the Erebus slope and cloud base would have laid the trap.
Once you factor in the negligence of the CAA(worse than Air NZ in my view),you begin to realise that the trap had been set for 2 years and it just needed the right weather conditions and twists of fate to make the accident inevitable.Collins was just along for the ride in many ways.
All your comments are correct and the natural conclusion would be to wrap it up as a classic CFIT.The airline's failure to immediately stamp out descent below 16000 and /or 6000 when it first happened was grossly negligent.It created an atmosphere of tacit approval.How can Air NZ jump on the MSA bandwagon when it has overseen a policy of illegal descents for 2 whole years without saying a word.In other words,the MSA is 16000 if you fly into Erebus and whatever you want if you return home safe and sound.
The case for a simple CFIT is further obscured by the coordinates and the mess that was the navigation department.Collins had a right to expect that the flightplan was the one he had been briefed on.When he descended,he kept NAV track,confident that he was over the Sound.Legal?No,unless they were visual and no-one knows that.Pictures taken at impact show good visibility but the merging of the Erebus slope and cloud base would have laid the trap.
Once you factor in the negligence of the CAA(worse than Air NZ in my view),you begin to realise that the trap had been set for 2 years and it just needed the right weather conditions and twists of fate to make the accident inevitable.Collins was just along for the ride in many ways.
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I find the reference to the GPWS warning and subsequent actions by the captain as most relevant to today's flight simulator training for type ratings. Specific dual instructional practice at GPWS pull-up recoveries is rarely part of any type rating syllabus - at least not in my experience.
Occasionally a simulator instructor will throw in an unexpected GPWS whoop whoop - pull up pull up, as a "test" but the serious "training" for this situation is rarely practiced. Often the reason is that it is considered a bit of a gimmick manoeuvre and not worthy of serious training. Another excuse for not training for GPWS pull-up's is that if it is not in the syllabus (type rating or LOFT) then it is not CASA approved and you aren't allowed to teach it. It is a vital sequence for training and should be taught during the type rating and then practiced regularly. This includes from descent with speed brakes extended at 250 knots as it is all too easy to forget to retract the speed brakes.
Sorry to hijack the Erebus discussion, but from what I read of the accident, the GPWS pull up manoeuvre at the time was not aggressive.
Occasionally a simulator instructor will throw in an unexpected GPWS whoop whoop - pull up pull up, as a "test" but the serious "training" for this situation is rarely practiced. Often the reason is that it is considered a bit of a gimmick manoeuvre and not worthy of serious training. Another excuse for not training for GPWS pull-up's is that if it is not in the syllabus (type rating or LOFT) then it is not CASA approved and you aren't allowed to teach it. It is a vital sequence for training and should be taught during the type rating and then practiced regularly. This includes from descent with speed brakes extended at 250 knots as it is all too easy to forget to retract the speed brakes.
Sorry to hijack the Erebus discussion, but from what I read of the accident, the GPWS pull up manoeuvre at the time was not aggressive.
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Perhaps the instant experts pontificating with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight about how they would respond to the GPWS and done it so much better should actually read some of the bl**dy reports and get their facts straight! 
I'll help them get started with an extract from Chippindale's report, and he was not exactly biased in favour of the pilots, was he?
(My emphasis in red)
Glueball says
Crap. The CVR does not demonstrate anything of the sort. If the extract quoted above is not enough, then there is more in the conclusions.
The DFDR shows a 1.67g pull up two seconds after the GPWS warning. Two seconds again after that the No. 1 engine recorded 94% N1. (The parameters for the other engines at this time are not known due to the slow sampling rate.) At the same time the call "go-around power please" was made. This indicates to me that the power increase had already been made and the call was to confirm that the power was set correctly. Anyone got SOPs for a ground proximity warning that is not along the lines of:
1. Apply power and rotate to climb attitude.
2. Check configuration (gear flaps speedbrakes etc)
3. Confirm thrust set.
I have never seen any where you request the other crew to apply the power for you.
Is it too much to ask that we debate this issue using the facts that are available, and not go off half-cocked with ill-informed speculation?
Now who is going to be the next one to say Captain Collins did not respond correctly to the GPWS?
I'll help them get started with an extract from Chippindale's report, and he was not exactly biased in favour of the pilots, was he?
(My emphasis in red)
2.18 After the captain’s decision to climb the aircraft out of the area he and the co-pilot were discussing the most suitable climbout path when the ground proximity warning system sounded instructing the crew to “Pull up”.
The crew responded to the alarm without undue hesitation, the flight engineer calling off the heights of 500 and 400 feet indicated on the radio altimeter and the captain calling for “Go-round power”. The warning 6½ seconds before the impact was, however, too late for the crew’s action to make any significant effect on the aircraft’s level flight path. Their reaction time was established as very similar to or better than that of experienced crews placed in a similar situation in the training environment of the flight It is likely however that as a result of a whiteout the go-round attempt was procedural in response to the warning rather than a desperate attempt to avoid a readily apparent obstacle.
The crew responded to the alarm without undue hesitation, the flight engineer calling off the heights of 500 and 400 feet indicated on the radio altimeter and the captain calling for “Go-round power”. The warning 6½ seconds before the impact was, however, too late for the crew’s action to make any significant effect on the aircraft’s level flight path. Their reaction time was established as very similar to or better than that of experienced crews placed in a similar situation in the training environment of the flight It is likely however that as a result of a whiteout the go-round attempt was procedural in response to the warning rather than a desperate attempt to avoid a readily apparent obstacle.
The CVR tape demonstrated that the commander had hesitated in his response to the warning. Furthermore, the tape suggests that the commander had only "called" for max power, (F/E?, F/O?)rather than shove the throttles to the forward stops himself and simultaneously rotate into an aggressive climb angle.
Conclusions
The following conclusions are derived from a detailed study of the DFDR data in conjunction with analysis
of the CVR Tape:
*
*
The GPWS operated within its design parameters and provided 6.5 seconds of warning.
The crew responded expeditiously in the circumstances to the GPWS warning. Simulator trials
proved conclusively that with an unexpected warning such as this, it would have been impossible
to avoid the accident with a normal pilot’s response allowing reasonable identification and reaction
times to the GPWS warning.
The aircraft had barely commenced to respond to the avoidance manoeuvres and power application prior to impact.
The following conclusions are derived from a detailed study of the DFDR data in conjunction with analysis
of the CVR Tape:
*
*
The GPWS operated within its design parameters and provided 6.5 seconds of warning.
The crew responded expeditiously in the circumstances to the GPWS warning. Simulator trials
proved conclusively that with an unexpected warning such as this, it would have been impossible
to avoid the accident with a normal pilot’s response allowing reasonable identification and reaction
times to the GPWS warning.
The aircraft had barely commenced to respond to the avoidance manoeuvres and power application prior to impact.
1. Apply power and rotate to climb attitude.
2. Check configuration (gear flaps speedbrakes etc)
3. Confirm thrust set.
I have never seen any where you request the other crew to apply the power for you.
Is it too much to ask that we debate this issue using the facts that are available, and not go off half-cocked with ill-informed speculation?
Now who is going to be the next one to say Captain Collins did not respond correctly to the GPWS?
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Menen:
Sorry mate,
Not you specifically. Our posts crossed and I hadn't seen yours before I posted mine.
I will have to type faster next time.
Are you saying Collins did it wrong though?
Sorry mate,
Not you specifically. Our posts crossed and I hadn't seen yours before I posted mine.
I will have to type faster next time.
Are you saying Collins did it wrong though?
Last edited by Desert Dingo; 13th Dec 2004 at 11:20.
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Questions on altitude & letdown answered
There have been several questions/statements on their altitude and letdown procedures so wanted to post this info which I was given by one of the DC10 pilots who testified and was on the transcript team.
Letdown procedures were given verbally at the briefing.
Letdown procedures were given verbally at the briefing.
- Approval was given for 1500ft
- Approval was given to use own initiative on letdown procedure and approach
- Testimony at trial was given by briefing pilot John Wilson and AirNZ Operations Manager Doug Keating
Twenty years ago I was invited to fly an ex-ANZ (KSSU)DC-10-30. (For those of you DC-10 pilots out there who are unfamiliar with such animals, even the flightdeck door was hinged on the wrong side).
From my point of view the most significant difference to all other DC-10s that I had ever flown was the Collins AINS 70 navigation system. This basically consisted of three Collins INS platforms which fed two navigation computers located behind the captain. They, in turn, fed the automatics and were controlled by two large alpha-numeric keyboards.
The nav computers could have all of the waypoints for the proposed flight loaded by a rather large (by modern standards) "Jep Tape" (although we distrusted the system so much that we did it the old way).
We were so bothered about this bit of kit that we spent a day with Collins in Los Angeles talking about it. The guy who gave us the course told us that after the Mt Erebus disaster the US Navy picked up everything they could find at the accident site. All the bits were put in plastic bags and flown back to Long Beach.
They were then laid out on benches in a hangar for the manufacturers to identify. He, to his total astonishment, found the carbon discs from inside the nav computers lying there on a bench and they were able to replay the last part of the flight.
I believe that it was as a result of this that the "missing waypoint" that took them through the mountain was identified.
My only question to this day is "What the hell were ANZ doing in Antartica farting around with a full load of punters in a DC-10 at 1,500 feet in the first place"?
From my point of view the most significant difference to all other DC-10s that I had ever flown was the Collins AINS 70 navigation system. This basically consisted of three Collins INS platforms which fed two navigation computers located behind the captain. They, in turn, fed the automatics and were controlled by two large alpha-numeric keyboards.
The nav computers could have all of the waypoints for the proposed flight loaded by a rather large (by modern standards) "Jep Tape" (although we distrusted the system so much that we did it the old way).
We were so bothered about this bit of kit that we spent a day with Collins in Los Angeles talking about it. The guy who gave us the course told us that after the Mt Erebus disaster the US Navy picked up everything they could find at the accident site. All the bits were put in plastic bags and flown back to Long Beach.
They were then laid out on benches in a hangar for the manufacturers to identify. He, to his total astonishment, found the carbon discs from inside the nav computers lying there on a bench and they were able to replay the last part of the flight.
I believe that it was as a result of this that the "missing waypoint" that took them through the mountain was identified.
My only question to this day is "What the hell were ANZ doing in Antartica farting around with a full load of punters in a DC-10 at 1,500 feet in the first place"?