SQ006 Revisited
Guest
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The factual report has been released by the Accident Safety Council http://www.asc.gov.tw/uw/uw_disp.exe..._oid=@720|30|1
The CVR transcript just prior to line-up makes interesting reading.
The CVR transcript just prior to line-up makes interesting reading.
Guest
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JR_wilco:
Rename glosend.appl with doc1.pdf, doc2.pdf and so on....
You'll need Adobe Acrobat Reader to read them (which you can download from http://www.adobe.com )
Cheers
Rename glosend.appl with doc1.pdf, doc2.pdf and so on....
You'll need Adobe Acrobat Reader to read them (which you can download from http://www.adobe.com )
Cheers
Guest
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"ONE RUNWAY light was broken and another was not bright enough when the Los Angeles-bound Flight SQ006 tried to take off on the wrong runway during a fierce rainstorm caused by an approaching typhoon, Taiwan’s chief crash investigator Kay Yong said in a preliminary report on the Oct. 31 accident.
Kay also said that the runway, closed for construction, should have been marked by a big cross, warning planes not to use it."
The real cause for SQ006 goes a lot deeper than the superficiality of missing markings and some dud lights - and is all to do with the "passivity of unfulfilled non-expectations".
a. If you're actively looking for something that constitutes guidance and it's needed to affirm the correctness of what you are doing (approach lights, runway edge lights, runway number marking, lit signs etc), you will be concerned about finding it (and anxious and anguished if you don't).
b. However if you are in a familiar situation, your alertness levels will be low and the absence of visual cues will be largely inconsequential (a complete non-starter as far as getting your attention and stimulating any mental alarms). It's not so much apathy or nonchalance as the "non-distraction of absent unsought cues". Situational awareness is a mighty fine thing but it has to be somehow kick-started. In the best of crews it does not sit there in the background ready to alert - not when it's a totally passive and innocuous scenario that's building up to the accident.
c. This crew was not really under a lot of pressure nor anticipation - even though they knew that the weather might worsen. Their plight started when they taxied out along the ramp taxi-route and not via the ramp-exit and down the "ex-runway" taxiway. They were, it appears, in the mind-set that, as they had done before, they were taxiing down the disused runway and would take a 90 right (at the end) followed by an immediate 90 right to line up on their departure runway threshold. But unfortunately, from the ramp area that put them on the right-hand runway and set them up for the accident. The mere absence of visual cues (approach lights, white runway edge lights, etc) was insufficient to alert them in their cocoon of reduced visibility. ATC were unconcerned because the crew had correctly read back their clearance. And I think that possibly the CRM situation was a typically Asian one - both F/O and S/O being mentally unprepared and characteristically unwilling to adopt a protectively questioning and cynically quizzical mind-set. The misunderstanding that may have otherwise saved the day just before they rolled tends to confirm that CRM needs to be active, assertive and then interventionist. But I'd not totally blame the crew...... it was simply a nice setup.
d. The only way to guard against a recurrence is to actively alert crews to these possibilities and potentialities. Attention-getting flashing strobe lights or noisy taxi barricades (road humps) are an easy solution to what happened. Without a clear recognition of this, nothing will be learnt from SQ006. It's simply symptomatic of the runway incursion problem that's plagueing aviation and which will no doubt generate further trauma. So if ICAO was genuinely in the business of Safety they'd have a small team of inspectors with a roving commission casting a continuing jaundiced eye at airports World-wide. It won't happen - but at least you could tell me why, after SQ006, it wouldn't have been cost-effective.
Kay also said that the runway, closed for construction, should have been marked by a big cross, warning planes not to use it."
The real cause for SQ006 goes a lot deeper than the superficiality of missing markings and some dud lights - and is all to do with the "passivity of unfulfilled non-expectations".
a. If you're actively looking for something that constitutes guidance and it's needed to affirm the correctness of what you are doing (approach lights, runway edge lights, runway number marking, lit signs etc), you will be concerned about finding it (and anxious and anguished if you don't).
b. However if you are in a familiar situation, your alertness levels will be low and the absence of visual cues will be largely inconsequential (a complete non-starter as far as getting your attention and stimulating any mental alarms). It's not so much apathy or nonchalance as the "non-distraction of absent unsought cues". Situational awareness is a mighty fine thing but it has to be somehow kick-started. In the best of crews it does not sit there in the background ready to alert - not when it's a totally passive and innocuous scenario that's building up to the accident.
c. This crew was not really under a lot of pressure nor anticipation - even though they knew that the weather might worsen. Their plight started when they taxied out along the ramp taxi-route and not via the ramp-exit and down the "ex-runway" taxiway. They were, it appears, in the mind-set that, as they had done before, they were taxiing down the disused runway and would take a 90 right (at the end) followed by an immediate 90 right to line up on their departure runway threshold. But unfortunately, from the ramp area that put them on the right-hand runway and set them up for the accident. The mere absence of visual cues (approach lights, white runway edge lights, etc) was insufficient to alert them in their cocoon of reduced visibility. ATC were unconcerned because the crew had correctly read back their clearance. And I think that possibly the CRM situation was a typically Asian one - both F/O and S/O being mentally unprepared and characteristically unwilling to adopt a protectively questioning and cynically quizzical mind-set. The misunderstanding that may have otherwise saved the day just before they rolled tends to confirm that CRM needs to be active, assertive and then interventionist. But I'd not totally blame the crew...... it was simply a nice setup.
d. The only way to guard against a recurrence is to actively alert crews to these possibilities and potentialities. Attention-getting flashing strobe lights or noisy taxi barricades (road humps) are an easy solution to what happened. Without a clear recognition of this, nothing will be learnt from SQ006. It's simply symptomatic of the runway incursion problem that's plagueing aviation and which will no doubt generate further trauma. So if ICAO was genuinely in the business of Safety they'd have a small team of inspectors with a roving commission casting a continuing jaundiced eye at airports World-wide. It won't happen - but at least you could tell me why, after SQ006, it wouldn't have been cost-effective.
Guest
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All the "noise" seems to be aimed here (and in many other threads on the board) at SQ. Whilst CRM may (or may not) have been a significant contributor to the accident, Begique's post above certainly makes a lot of sense.
The (TV) news is reporting the absence of a "large white X" painted at the entry to the non-usable runway, but even if this had been present, with the crew looking for lighting markers, would they have seen it on such an awful night.
"Speed bumps" do wonders for waking up dozing motorists, and I would suggest that suitable rubber mouldings, with built-in "cats eye" reflectors, could be portable and easily deployed. Dirty great red strobe lights would also be very hard to miss as a 747 runs over them!
------------------
What goes around . . .
. . often lands better!
The (TV) news is reporting the absence of a "large white X" painted at the entry to the non-usable runway, but even if this had been present, with the crew looking for lighting markers, would they have seen it on such an awful night.
"Speed bumps" do wonders for waking up dozing motorists, and I would suggest that suitable rubber mouldings, with built-in "cats eye" reflectors, could be portable and easily deployed. Dirty great red strobe lights would also be very hard to miss as a 747 runs over them!
------------------
What goes around . . .
. . often lands better!
Guest
Posts: n/a
DERIVED FROM PRESENTED INFORMATION -
SQ-006
15:00:53 CA Light up.
15:00:54 FO Check.
15:01:12 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter switch in)
15:01:12 CA Fifty percent N-two.
15:01:14 FO Valve closed.
15:01:16 CA Starting Engine two.
15:01:18 MAINT Roger, start two.
15:01:18 FO OK, Starting two.
15:01:19 CA See if you can get…what's the latest weather. Can you write it
down What's the latest ... ATIS eh…
15:01:23 OBS OK, yah.
15:01:25 ATIS Taipei international Airport information "Tango." One four five
four, Zulu. Runway zero five left is in use. Runway zero six for departure only. Expect ILS
runway zero five left category two approach; wind zero two zero at three six gust five two,
visibility five hundred meters, runway zero five left RVR four hundred fifty meters, runway
zero six five hundred meters with heavy rain, cloud broken two hundred feet, overcast five
hundred feet, temperature two one; dew point two zero. QNH one zero zero one
Hectopascal. Departure frequency one two five point one. Caution - wind shear on runway
zero five left final. Due to radio interference, tower frequency change to one two nine point
three. Caution - taxiway November Sierra has been re-marked. Aircraft using November
Sierra, advise taxi slowly with caution. Taxiway November Papa behind Alpha one and
Alpha three closed. Runway zero five right between November four and November five
closed due to work in progress. Taxiway November four and November five still available.
Inform Taipei approach or tower initial contact you have"Tango."
15:01:29 CA Write up….write behind here.
15:01:29 CAM Write up.
15:01:30 OBS I got it.
15:01:33 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:01:38 MAINT Number two N one rotation.
15:01:40 CA Thank you.
15:01:41 FO Oil pressure number two.
15:01:43 CX 2043 Ground Cathay two zero four three request the wind and RVR
of runway zero six.
15:01:49 CA Light up.
15:01:49 FO Check.
15:01:51 GND Cathay two zero four three runway zero six RVR five hundred
fifty meters and wind zero two zero at three eight gust five one.
15:02:04 CA Ok lah, this is better still, Fifty percent N two.
15:02:04 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter switch in)
15:02:06 CX 2043 Cathay two zero four three.
15:02:07 FO Valve closed.
15:02:09 CA Ok starting three.
15:02:11 MAINT Roger start three.
15:02:12 CA Zero two zero better for us.
15:02:13 FO Ya.
15:02:14 CA Starting three please.
15:02:16 CA So resolved already it become less.
15:02:21 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:02:31 FO Oil pressure number three.
15:02:31 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:02:33 CA Roger N-one.
15:02:38 MAINT Number three N one rotation and set the brake.
15:02:42 CA Confirm set parking brakes.
15:02:44 MAINT Yes.
15:02:46 CAM (Sound similar to that of parking brake being set)
15:02:47 CA OK light up.
15:02:48 CA Check, parking brake set.
15:02:49 MAINT Roger.
15:03:01 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter switch in)
15:03:01 CA Fifty percent N-two.
15:03:03 FO Valve closed.
15:03:04 CA Ya.
15:03:05 CA Starting four.
15:03:08 MAINT Roger, starting four.
15:03:09 CA OK, start first, four.
15:03:24 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:03:27 FO None and oil pressure.
15:03:30 CA Fuel on.
15:03:34 MAINT Number four N one rotation.
15:03:35 CA Thank you.
15:03:37 CA Light up.
15:03:38 CA Check.
15:03:55 CA Zero two zero is better.
15:03:55 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter pressed switch in).
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:04:54 FO Point six.
15:04:56 CA OK, thanks.
15:04:57 CA That's the…OK…OK.
15:04:58 OBS This is the latest zero two zero three six gust fifty
two lah still within limit.
15:05:02 CA Yah, zero two zero better.
15:05:02 OBS Yah.
15:05:02 CA More, more on head wind side.
15:05:03 OBS The rest no significant change.
15:05:03 CA OK…
15:05:07 GND (Cathay 2043 - conversation with ground control)
15:05:45 CA OK, your side gone already, ah…
15:05:47 CA Is he there? OK, alright, OK, huh… gone away…
15:05:48 FO This guy, that guy out this side, on the right side.
15:05:50 CA OK, huh…
15:05:50 FO OK, wah "Terok" (terrible) man…
15:05:51 CA OK, lights…cabin going off.
15:05:52 CAM (Click)
15:05:53 FO OK.
15:05:55 RDO-2 Singapore six, request taxi.
15:05:57 GND Singapore six, taxi to runway zero-six via taxiway…
correction, runway zero-five left, via taxiway Sierra, West Cross, and November
Papa.
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:06:42 CA OK.
15:06:49 RDO (Dynasty four conversation with ground)
15:07:56 CAM (Sound similar to that of flap lever through the detent positions)
15:08:04 CA OK checking rudder er
15:08:06 CA Full left.
15:08:07 FO Full left.
15:08:08 CA Center.
15:08:09 FO Center.
15:08:10 CA OK, full right.
15:08:11 FO Full right.
15:08:12 CA Center.
15:08:13 FO Center.
15:08:14 FO My controls checks ah.
15:08:24 CA Hongkong is closed man, ha ha worse.
15:08:27 OBS Hongkong closed ah…
15:08:27 CA That' s what he said not accepting any…
15:08:29 FO I see.
15:08:30 CA I think some people might have diverted there lah I think.
15:08:40 FO Ok column coming back.
15:08:47 CA If the RVR five left was two hundred right just now we checked.
15:08:50 OBS RVR yah two hundred.
15:08:50 CA Correct, yah two hundred meters ah, ok lah.
15:08:54 CAM (Sound similar to that of seat motor)
15:08:55 CA Ok man before take off checklist.
15:08:56 FO Roger sir.
15:08:58 FO Before take off checks, flaps –
15:09:02 CA Twenty green.
15:09:03 FO Twenty green.
15:09:06 FO Flight control.
15:09:07 CA Check.
15:09:07 FO Check.
15:09:08 FO EPR and speeds.
15:09:09 CA Ok, EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, Vee R
one five six and Vee two, one six nine set.
15:09:15 FO EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, rotate one
five six and Vee two, one six nine.
15:09:19 RDO (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:10:35 FO That's all the moisture.
15:10:41 FO Turning left skidding er turning right err skidding left two
seven zero.
15:10:42 OBS The weather radar will be all red ha ha.
15:10:43 CA OK, passing ah two eight zero now, ah needles tracking and
turn right skidding left now ah, past heading of about two…three hundred now
ah…
15:10:45 FO Yah, that's right ah…
15:10:56 CAM (Sound of clicks)
15:11:00 FO My speed excursion is more than the left side, because the
wind is coming from here.
15:11:03 CA Ah, yah…
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:12:01 FO Yah.
15:12:02 ATIS Taipei Chiang Kai Shek International airport Information
"Uniform," 1500 Zulu, runway zero-six for departure only, runway zero-five left for
Category Two approach and departure, wind zero two zero at three-six, gust five
six, visibility six hundred meters runway zero five RVR four hundred fifty meters
downward, runway six RVR five hundred fifty meters downward with heavy rain,
cloud broken two hundred feet overcast five hundred feet, temperature two-one,
dewpoint two-zero, QNH one zero zero one Hectopascal.
APPROXIMATELY 1 ½ MINUTES NOT DISPLAYED
15:13:25 FO Taipei Tower, good evening, Singapore six.
15:13:28 FO Singapore Six, good evening, Taipei Tower, hold short
runway zero-five left.
15:13:33 GND Hold short runway zero-five left, Singapore six.
15:113:38 TWR Singapore six, for information now surface wind zero two
zero at four, gust to four-three, say intention.
15:13:44 CA Gusting four-three, ah…
15:13:46 R-2 Thank you, Singapore six.
15:13:47 CA OK, OK; better…less.
15:13:48 OBS Less….less gust already.
15:13:54 CA Zero two zero, it's from left, lah…
15:13:56 OBS Two four; gust four three…
15:14:05 FO Zero two zero…
15:14:08 CA OK, this one will be here, ah…
15:14:18 CA Zero two zero…
15:14:20 OBS Yah, left, lah…
15:14:21 CA Go right, to the end of the runway, end of the runway, then
turn, OK.
15:14:31 OBS Quite a bit of aileron for the takeoff.
15:14:35 FO OK.
15:14:40 FO The next one.
15:14:41 FO The next one is 'November one.'
15:14:42 CA OK, second right.
15:14:44 FO Second right; that's right.
15:14:47 CA In Australia, to them, next one is this, first one, you know.
15:14:50 FO Next one this one.
15:15:51 CA Yah…ha ha.
15:14:52 CA Australian.
15:14:53 CA I think the best is to say 'second right, ah 'first right,' 'second
right,' ah…
15:14:55 FO Clearing that Satvoice…
15:14:58 CA Tell them that we are ready, lah…
15:15:02 R-2 Singapore six; ready.
15:15:08 R-2 Taxi into position and hold, Singapore Six.
15:15:12 FO I get them seated, ah…
15:15:12 CA OK, below the line, please.
15:15:15 FO Cabin crew to your takeoff station thanks.
15:15:20 CAM (Sound similar to door closing)
15:15:21 CAM (Sound of chime)
15:15:20 TWR Singapore six, Runway zero-five left, wind zero two zero an
eight, gust to five zero, cleared for takeoff.
15:15:30 RDO-2 Cleared for takeoff, Runway zero-five left, Singapore Six.
15:15:31 CA OK, man…
15:15:34 FO OK, checks below the line; Cabin Announcement complete.
15:15:37 FO Packs
15:15:38 CA OK, norm, eh…
15:15:39 FO Norm
15:15:40 FO Strobes on; landing lights all on.
15:15:44 FO Takeoff clearance.
15:15:45 CA Obtained, hah…
15:15:46 FO Obtained, Sir.
15:15:47 CA OK, thanks.
15:15:48 FO Before Takeoff checklist completed.
15:15:50 CAM Sound of click
15:15:50 FO OK, green lights are here.
15:15:52 CA It going to be very slippery, I am going to slow down a bit,
turn here.
15:15:53 FO Turning that…
15:16:07 FO And the PVD hasn't lined up, ah…
15:16:10 CA Yeah, we gotta line up first.
15:16:12 OBS We need forty-five degrees.
15:16:15 FO I see, excellent man…
15:16:16 CA Yah.
15:16:23 CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind, we can see the runway,
not so bad. OK, I am going to put it to high first. OK, ready eh, so, zero one zero
is from the left, lah OK.
15:16:27 FO OK.
15:16:30 CAM (Sound of windshield wipers going to HIGH speed)
15:16:31 FO Ready Sir, zero two zero check OK.
15:16:33 CA Left wing into aileron, left aileron into wind. Huh, OK. Cabin
reported, eh…
15:16:37 FO Yah, cabin is ready.
15:16:37 CA OK, thanks.
15:16:37 FO Yup, thanks.
15:16:43 FO OK, thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA.
15:16:43 FO Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA.
15:16:44 CA OK, Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA.
15:16:44 CAM (Sound of engines spooling up)
15:16:54 OBS Hold.
15:16:54 FO Hold.
END OF CVR PRESENTATION
SQ-006
15:00:53 CA Light up.
15:00:54 FO Check.
15:01:12 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter switch in)
15:01:12 CA Fifty percent N-two.
15:01:14 FO Valve closed.
15:01:16 CA Starting Engine two.
15:01:18 MAINT Roger, start two.
15:01:18 FO OK, Starting two.
15:01:19 CA See if you can get…what's the latest weather. Can you write it
down What's the latest ... ATIS eh…
15:01:23 OBS OK, yah.
15:01:25 ATIS Taipei international Airport information "Tango." One four five
four, Zulu. Runway zero five left is in use. Runway zero six for departure only. Expect ILS
runway zero five left category two approach; wind zero two zero at three six gust five two,
visibility five hundred meters, runway zero five left RVR four hundred fifty meters, runway
zero six five hundred meters with heavy rain, cloud broken two hundred feet, overcast five
hundred feet, temperature two one; dew point two zero. QNH one zero zero one
Hectopascal. Departure frequency one two five point one. Caution - wind shear on runway
zero five left final. Due to radio interference, tower frequency change to one two nine point
three. Caution - taxiway November Sierra has been re-marked. Aircraft using November
Sierra, advise taxi slowly with caution. Taxiway November Papa behind Alpha one and
Alpha three closed. Runway zero five right between November four and November five
closed due to work in progress. Taxiway November four and November five still available.
Inform Taipei approach or tower initial contact you have"Tango."
15:01:29 CA Write up….write behind here.
15:01:29 CAM Write up.
15:01:30 OBS I got it.
15:01:33 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:01:38 MAINT Number two N one rotation.
15:01:40 CA Thank you.
15:01:41 FO Oil pressure number two.
15:01:43 CX 2043 Ground Cathay two zero four three request the wind and RVR
of runway zero six.
15:01:49 CA Light up.
15:01:49 FO Check.
15:01:51 GND Cathay two zero four three runway zero six RVR five hundred
fifty meters and wind zero two zero at three eight gust five one.
15:02:04 CA Ok lah, this is better still, Fifty percent N two.
15:02:04 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter switch in)
15:02:06 CX 2043 Cathay two zero four three.
15:02:07 FO Valve closed.
15:02:09 CA Ok starting three.
15:02:11 MAINT Roger start three.
15:02:12 CA Zero two zero better for us.
15:02:13 FO Ya.
15:02:14 CA Starting three please.
15:02:16 CA So resolved already it become less.
15:02:21 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:02:31 FO Oil pressure number three.
15:02:31 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:02:33 CA Roger N-one.
15:02:38 MAINT Number three N one rotation and set the brake.
15:02:42 CA Confirm set parking brakes.
15:02:44 MAINT Yes.
15:02:46 CAM (Sound similar to that of parking brake being set)
15:02:47 CA OK light up.
15:02:48 CA Check, parking brake set.
15:02:49 MAINT Roger.
15:03:01 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter switch in)
15:03:01 CA Fifty percent N-two.
15:03:03 FO Valve closed.
15:03:04 CA Ya.
15:03:05 CA Starting four.
15:03:08 MAINT Roger, starting four.
15:03:09 CA OK, start first, four.
15:03:24 CAM (Clicking sound -similar to the sound of chronometer resetting)
15:03:27 FO None and oil pressure.
15:03:30 CA Fuel on.
15:03:34 MAINT Number four N one rotation.
15:03:35 CA Thank you.
15:03:37 CA Light up.
15:03:38 CA Check.
15:03:55 CA Zero two zero is better.
15:03:55 CAM (Sound similar to that of starter pressed switch in).
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:04:54 FO Point six.
15:04:56 CA OK, thanks.
15:04:57 CA That's the…OK…OK.
15:04:58 OBS This is the latest zero two zero three six gust fifty
two lah still within limit.
15:05:02 CA Yah, zero two zero better.
15:05:02 OBS Yah.
15:05:02 CA More, more on head wind side.
15:05:03 OBS The rest no significant change.
15:05:03 CA OK…
15:05:07 GND (Cathay 2043 - conversation with ground control)
15:05:45 CA OK, your side gone already, ah…
15:05:47 CA Is he there? OK, alright, OK, huh… gone away…
15:05:48 FO This guy, that guy out this side, on the right side.
15:05:50 CA OK, huh…
15:05:50 FO OK, wah "Terok" (terrible) man…
15:05:51 CA OK, lights…cabin going off.
15:05:52 CAM (Click)
15:05:53 FO OK.
15:05:55 RDO-2 Singapore six, request taxi.
15:05:57 GND Singapore six, taxi to runway zero-six via taxiway…
correction, runway zero-five left, via taxiway Sierra, West Cross, and November
Papa.
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:06:42 CA OK.
15:06:49 RDO (Dynasty four conversation with ground)
15:07:56 CAM (Sound similar to that of flap lever through the detent positions)
15:08:04 CA OK checking rudder er
15:08:06 CA Full left.
15:08:07 FO Full left.
15:08:08 CA Center.
15:08:09 FO Center.
15:08:10 CA OK, full right.
15:08:11 FO Full right.
15:08:12 CA Center.
15:08:13 FO Center.
15:08:14 FO My controls checks ah.
15:08:24 CA Hongkong is closed man, ha ha worse.
15:08:27 OBS Hongkong closed ah…
15:08:27 CA That' s what he said not accepting any…
15:08:29 FO I see.
15:08:30 CA I think some people might have diverted there lah I think.
15:08:40 FO Ok column coming back.
15:08:47 CA If the RVR five left was two hundred right just now we checked.
15:08:50 OBS RVR yah two hundred.
15:08:50 CA Correct, yah two hundred meters ah, ok lah.
15:08:54 CAM (Sound similar to that of seat motor)
15:08:55 CA Ok man before take off checklist.
15:08:56 FO Roger sir.
15:08:58 FO Before take off checks, flaps –
15:09:02 CA Twenty green.
15:09:03 FO Twenty green.
15:09:06 FO Flight control.
15:09:07 CA Check.
15:09:07 FO Check.
15:09:08 FO EPR and speeds.
15:09:09 CA Ok, EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, Vee R
one five six and Vee two, one six nine set.
15:09:15 FO EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, rotate one
five six and Vee two, one six nine.
15:09:19 RDO (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:10:35 FO That's all the moisture.
15:10:41 FO Turning left skidding er turning right err skidding left two
seven zero.
15:10:42 OBS The weather radar will be all red ha ha.
15:10:43 CA OK, passing ah two eight zero now, ah needles tracking and
turn right skidding left now ah, past heading of about two…three hundred now
ah…
15:10:45 FO Yah, that's right ah…
15:10:56 CAM (Sound of clicks)
15:11:00 FO My speed excursion is more than the left side, because the
wind is coming from here.
15:11:03 CA Ah, yah…
BREAK IN PRESENTED DATA
15:12:01 FO Yah.
15:12:02 ATIS Taipei Chiang Kai Shek International airport Information
"Uniform," 1500 Zulu, runway zero-six for departure only, runway zero-five left for
Category Two approach and departure, wind zero two zero at three-six, gust five
six, visibility six hundred meters runway zero five RVR four hundred fifty meters
downward, runway six RVR five hundred fifty meters downward with heavy rain,
cloud broken two hundred feet overcast five hundred feet, temperature two-one,
dewpoint two-zero, QNH one zero zero one Hectopascal.
APPROXIMATELY 1 ½ MINUTES NOT DISPLAYED
15:13:25 FO Taipei Tower, good evening, Singapore six.
15:13:28 FO Singapore Six, good evening, Taipei Tower, hold short
runway zero-five left.
15:13:33 GND Hold short runway zero-five left, Singapore six.
15:113:38 TWR Singapore six, for information now surface wind zero two
zero at four, gust to four-three, say intention.
15:13:44 CA Gusting four-three, ah…
15:13:46 R-2 Thank you, Singapore six.
15:13:47 CA OK, OK; better…less.
15:13:48 OBS Less….less gust already.
15:13:54 CA Zero two zero, it's from left, lah…
15:13:56 OBS Two four; gust four three…
15:14:05 FO Zero two zero…
15:14:08 CA OK, this one will be here, ah…
15:14:18 CA Zero two zero…
15:14:20 OBS Yah, left, lah…
15:14:21 CA Go right, to the end of the runway, end of the runway, then
turn, OK.
15:14:31 OBS Quite a bit of aileron for the takeoff.
15:14:35 FO OK.
15:14:40 FO The next one.
15:14:41 FO The next one is 'November one.'
15:14:42 CA OK, second right.
15:14:44 FO Second right; that's right.
15:14:47 CA In Australia, to them, next one is this, first one, you know.
15:14:50 FO Next one this one.
15:15:51 CA Yah…ha ha.
15:14:52 CA Australian.
15:14:53 CA I think the best is to say 'second right, ah 'first right,' 'second
right,' ah…
15:14:55 FO Clearing that Satvoice…
15:14:58 CA Tell them that we are ready, lah…
15:15:02 R-2 Singapore six; ready.
15:15:08 R-2 Taxi into position and hold, Singapore Six.
15:15:12 FO I get them seated, ah…
15:15:12 CA OK, below the line, please.
15:15:15 FO Cabin crew to your takeoff station thanks.
15:15:20 CAM (Sound similar to door closing)
15:15:21 CAM (Sound of chime)
15:15:20 TWR Singapore six, Runway zero-five left, wind zero two zero an
eight, gust to five zero, cleared for takeoff.
15:15:30 RDO-2 Cleared for takeoff, Runway zero-five left, Singapore Six.
15:15:31 CA OK, man…
15:15:34 FO OK, checks below the line; Cabin Announcement complete.
15:15:37 FO Packs
15:15:38 CA OK, norm, eh…
15:15:39 FO Norm
15:15:40 FO Strobes on; landing lights all on.
15:15:44 FO Takeoff clearance.
15:15:45 CA Obtained, hah…
15:15:46 FO Obtained, Sir.
15:15:47 CA OK, thanks.
15:15:48 FO Before Takeoff checklist completed.
15:15:50 CAM Sound of click
15:15:50 FO OK, green lights are here.
15:15:52 CA It going to be very slippery, I am going to slow down a bit,
turn here.
15:15:53 FO Turning that…
15:16:07 FO And the PVD hasn't lined up, ah…
15:16:10 CA Yeah, we gotta line up first.
15:16:12 OBS We need forty-five degrees.
15:16:15 FO I see, excellent man…
15:16:16 CA Yah.
15:16:23 CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind, we can see the runway,
not so bad. OK, I am going to put it to high first. OK, ready eh, so, zero one zero
is from the left, lah OK.
15:16:27 FO OK.
15:16:30 CAM (Sound of windshield wipers going to HIGH speed)
15:16:31 FO Ready Sir, zero two zero check OK.
15:16:33 CA Left wing into aileron, left aileron into wind. Huh, OK. Cabin
reported, eh…
15:16:37 FO Yah, cabin is ready.
15:16:37 CA OK, thanks.
15:16:37 FO Yup, thanks.
15:16:43 FO OK, thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA.
15:16:43 FO Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA.
15:16:44 CA OK, Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA.
15:16:44 CAM (Sound of engines spooling up)
15:16:54 OBS Hold.
15:16:54 FO Hold.
END OF CVR PRESENTATION
Guest
Posts: n/a
Seems to me to be a clear cut case.
15:16:07 FO And the PVD hasn't lined up, ah…
15:16:23 CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind, we can see the runway, not so bad. OK, I am going to put it to high first. OK, ready eh, so, zero one zero is from the left, lah OK.
Here are the key words,
"CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind"
For those not familiar with PVD. It is Para Visual Display. This device was never certified by the FAA but used around the world. It is a very useful tool for low visibility takeoffs as well as RTOs. The equipment has the capability of takeoff and RTO in 00 visibility.
First you select the runway ILS frequency in the FMS. At about 45 degrees to runway centerline and PVD selected, a little window opens up on the glareshield. Inside the window is a yellow and black barber pole.
As you start to roll, no movement of the barber pole means centerline. If you drift left of centerline, the barber pole will spin to the right telling the pilot to kick right rudder and so forth.
In my days TPE 05L was not PVD certified, but nevertheless it is an excellent crosscheck instrument.
15:16:07 FO And the PVD hasn't lined up, ah…
15:16:23 CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind, we can see the runway, not so bad. OK, I am going to put it to high first. OK, ready eh, so, zero one zero is from the left, lah OK.
Here are the key words,
"CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind"
For those not familiar with PVD. It is Para Visual Display. This device was never certified by the FAA but used around the world. It is a very useful tool for low visibility takeoffs as well as RTOs. The equipment has the capability of takeoff and RTO in 00 visibility.
First you select the runway ILS frequency in the FMS. At about 45 degrees to runway centerline and PVD selected, a little window opens up on the glareshield. Inside the window is a yellow and black barber pole.
As you start to roll, no movement of the barber pole means centerline. If you drift left of centerline, the barber pole will spin to the right telling the pilot to kick right rudder and so forth.
In my days TPE 05L was not PVD certified, but nevertheless it is an excellent crosscheck instrument.
Guest
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Glads, I think the "never mind" comment made by the Captain referred to the fact that it was not an operational requirement to use it at the time.
But one must ask, though, in a cockpit resource management context, that when the PVD was indicating non-alignment with the centerline of 05L, given that the PVD is a reliable device, why was its indication ignored? CRM is more than cooperating with others in the cockpit.. it's using all resources that you have available to you to ensure the safe conduct of your flight.
Skydrifter, you must have the edited version of the CVR transcript. The downloadable version from the Aviation Saftey Council website has the full version.
But one must ask, though, in a cockpit resource management context, that when the PVD was indicating non-alignment with the centerline of 05L, given that the PVD is a reliable device, why was its indication ignored? CRM is more than cooperating with others in the cockpit.. it's using all resources that you have available to you to ensure the safe conduct of your flight.
Skydrifter, you must have the edited version of the CVR transcript. The downloadable version from the Aviation Saftey Council website has the full version.
Guest
Posts: n/a
True that the PVD was not operationaly required, however, if the crew intended in not using it as a crosscheck/backup, why did they load the ILS frequency into the FMS.
The point is that a tool was prepared for use as a reference, but it's replies were ingored. The very reply that could have saved the day.
An accident is never the contribution of one item, we all agree on this point. In my opinion the R/W markings are not an issue here. The crew would not have seen the white X from the starting point of 05R anyway, and since that portion was being used as a taxiway, no white X was required.
I my opinion the contributing factors are:
1- SIA's lack of proper air carrier culture, safety first, profits next.
2- The fear installed into the crewmembers by management. If you delay a flight, there will be hell to pay, promotions stalled, etc.
3- The F/O fears the Captain/bad or no CRM.
4- The Asian culture, "the supervisor is always right".
5- Crews are overworked, fatigue is rampant.
6- Crews are under paid, low morale.
7- SIA's famous attitude, "I am invincible".
8- Bad visibility.
SIA will do their best to blame someone else.
My employer has a fatigue policy. If you are not rested, you are off the flight with full pay. A simple oral explanation and end of the story.
The point is that a tool was prepared for use as a reference, but it's replies were ingored. The very reply that could have saved the day.
An accident is never the contribution of one item, we all agree on this point. In my opinion the R/W markings are not an issue here. The crew would not have seen the white X from the starting point of 05R anyway, and since that portion was being used as a taxiway, no white X was required.
I my opinion the contributing factors are:
1- SIA's lack of proper air carrier culture, safety first, profits next.
2- The fear installed into the crewmembers by management. If you delay a flight, there will be hell to pay, promotions stalled, etc.
3- The F/O fears the Captain/bad or no CRM.
4- The Asian culture, "the supervisor is always right".
5- Crews are overworked, fatigue is rampant.
6- Crews are under paid, low morale.
7- SIA's famous attitude, "I am invincible".
8- Bad visibility.
SIA will do their best to blame someone else.
My employer has a fatigue policy. If you are not rested, you are off the flight with full pay. A simple oral explanation and end of the story.
Guest
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What I find difficult to understand is that this is a critical take-off, and yet the crew seem to be quite jovial about it all. The higher stress level and seriousness of the situation seems to escape them. The confusion over the first or second turn right is passed off with light hearted banter and amusement.
I don't see the light issue playing a major part here. The runway was NOTAMed off and a warning given on the ATIS. From the CVR the crew is well aware which runway they require and the fact that it is the second right.
There are many things in the transcript to be disturbed about.
I don't see the light issue playing a major part here. The runway was NOTAMed off and a warning given on the ATIS. From the CVR the crew is well aware which runway they require and the fact that it is the second right.
There are many things in the transcript to be disturbed about.
Guest
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Looking at previous discussions it is interesting that the issue is FINALLY getting narrowed to CRM. I'm surprised that the topic doesn't get more attention than it does.
I don't know the PVD device, I presume it's a heads-up display.
However, it sounds as though there was plenty of reason to ask CRM style questions. It also appears that Gladiator - among others - is quite correct on the effect of corporate, if not ethnic, culture.
Some previous thread alluded to the extreme priority given to a pilot's image. The implication was that often pilots die for their image. EA990 & the Silkair crash seem to emphasize that to a terrifying degree. Curious that no one seems to want to go near the self-image topic.
SQ006 seems to be another instance of the infamous 'immortality complex,' as well (It will always happen to the other guy; not to me,).
Previous exchanges seem to hit the issue dead-on with the position, "It isn't as much as WHAT happened, but HOW and WHY it happened." Seems that those exchanges bring in another powerful point of avoiding judgement, focusing on analysis.
This human-factors issue isn't going to cure itself. I'd say it's long overdue for serious attention. If management and the unions won't touch it, maybe the pilots need to self-educate.
If the concern over the U.S. carriers not issuing regulations to their pilots is true, a person can only imagine what else is being overlooked. The crew rest issue is another good example that the 'negligent oversight' issue isn't limited to CRM.
The Airline Safety Net website www.webpak.net/~skydream makes a good case for a lot of needed changes. That site really puts the actual reality of CRM in question. An FAA inspector friend says that he can't fault the allegations made, other than to say that some carriers have gone the extra mile, but not many. He didn't deny the FAA role.
Unless something radical happens at SQ, there might be a lot more crashes ahead. I don't mean to tamper with culture & tradition, but the left-seat 'royalty' thing just won't work.
I don't know the PVD device, I presume it's a heads-up display.
However, it sounds as though there was plenty of reason to ask CRM style questions. It also appears that Gladiator - among others - is quite correct on the effect of corporate, if not ethnic, culture.
Some previous thread alluded to the extreme priority given to a pilot's image. The implication was that often pilots die for their image. EA990 & the Silkair crash seem to emphasize that to a terrifying degree. Curious that no one seems to want to go near the self-image topic.
SQ006 seems to be another instance of the infamous 'immortality complex,' as well (It will always happen to the other guy; not to me,).
Previous exchanges seem to hit the issue dead-on with the position, "It isn't as much as WHAT happened, but HOW and WHY it happened." Seems that those exchanges bring in another powerful point of avoiding judgement, focusing on analysis.
This human-factors issue isn't going to cure itself. I'd say it's long overdue for serious attention. If management and the unions won't touch it, maybe the pilots need to self-educate.
If the concern over the U.S. carriers not issuing regulations to their pilots is true, a person can only imagine what else is being overlooked. The crew rest issue is another good example that the 'negligent oversight' issue isn't limited to CRM.
The Airline Safety Net website www.webpak.net/~skydream makes a good case for a lot of needed changes. That site really puts the actual reality of CRM in question. An FAA inspector friend says that he can't fault the allegations made, other than to say that some carriers have gone the extra mile, but not many. He didn't deny the FAA role.
Unless something radical happens at SQ, there might be a lot more crashes ahead. I don't mean to tamper with culture & tradition, but the left-seat 'royalty' thing just won't work.
Guest
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Rockhound
Thank you very much for your posting of 22 Feb which casts a more detailed light on the Tenerife disaster, mentioned firstly in Farside’s Article 2 on another thread and then in my recent posting of 16 Feb on this thread. I feel that I have to give you an equally detailed answer on this thread, even though the subject is overshadowed by comment following publication of the Taiwanese Safety Council’s first report on the SQ006 disaster. The following was penned whilst I’ve been away and out of reach of on-line facilities
I stand corrected on the actual dialogue which took place between the KLM captain and first officer and that between ATC and the KLM flight crew. I apologise for my inaccuracy and can only plead that I was writing/posting “on the hoof” and relying on memory of events which took place approximately a quarter of a century ago. Perhaps if you have a web site that contains CVR transcript information, you would serve us all well by providing it.
Notwithstanding, I do believe that you will find my recollection of all other circumstances which surrounded this disaster to be substantially correct and in particular I do believe that the conclusions which I drew in my original posting continue to stand, in light of the information disclosed in your posting.
If I may go through your posting from <after KLM was lined up for take off>, I hope that you will not consider me nit-picking to point out that you err on this point (easily done), as in fact the crew was merely cleared to “line up and wait” rather than “line up for take off” – two fundamentally different things!
Further, you will recall that the point I originally made was to the effect that “stress factors” of weather/NOTAM considerations plus company/FTL pressures compounding an already difficult day served to produce a state of mind in the captain whereby he convinced himself that he had the take off clearance he so badly wanted and probably also convinced his FO. Your writing <Van Zanten (captain) apparently began advancing the throttles and released the brakes some 6 seconds before Meurs (first officer) finished reading back the clearance, ending with “we are now at takeoff”> serves to neatly illustrate my point.
You mention that <in short, there is no evidence, as far as I am aware, that Meurs (first officer) harboured any serious reservations that KLM had not received take off clearance> perhaps should be put in the context of my first point, that the crew had been cleared to “line up and wait” and therefore had NOT received take off clearance. If I may tentatively suggest to you that we are discussing events which took place within an organisation that, at the time, was highly authoritarian and not overly given to the idea of junior crew members questioning exalted senior training captains, the first officer may have, in light of the captains actions in the 6 seconds prior to the first officer completing the ATC clearance read-back, similarly convinced himself that they had take off clearance and so therefore must have mistaken the original instruction to line up and wait – hence an initial reservation but overcome by a particular mind set. Let me please assure you that, after the long and trying day previously described, this is a thing easily done in the kind of culture KLM then was and SQ is now. If you are in any doubt as to the veracity of this proposition then perhaps you would care to check with any of the professionals you mention you defer to - I’m sure they will agree with me.
Thank you very much for your posting of 22 Feb which casts a more detailed light on the Tenerife disaster, mentioned firstly in Farside’s Article 2 on another thread and then in my recent posting of 16 Feb on this thread. I feel that I have to give you an equally detailed answer on this thread, even though the subject is overshadowed by comment following publication of the Taiwanese Safety Council’s first report on the SQ006 disaster. The following was penned whilst I’ve been away and out of reach of on-line facilities
I stand corrected on the actual dialogue which took place between the KLM captain and first officer and that between ATC and the KLM flight crew. I apologise for my inaccuracy and can only plead that I was writing/posting “on the hoof” and relying on memory of events which took place approximately a quarter of a century ago. Perhaps if you have a web site that contains CVR transcript information, you would serve us all well by providing it.
Notwithstanding, I do believe that you will find my recollection of all other circumstances which surrounded this disaster to be substantially correct and in particular I do believe that the conclusions which I drew in my original posting continue to stand, in light of the information disclosed in your posting.
If I may go through your posting from <after KLM was lined up for take off>, I hope that you will not consider me nit-picking to point out that you err on this point (easily done), as in fact the crew was merely cleared to “line up and wait” rather than “line up for take off” – two fundamentally different things!
Further, you will recall that the point I originally made was to the effect that “stress factors” of weather/NOTAM considerations plus company/FTL pressures compounding an already difficult day served to produce a state of mind in the captain whereby he convinced himself that he had the take off clearance he so badly wanted and probably also convinced his FO. Your writing <Van Zanten (captain) apparently began advancing the throttles and released the brakes some 6 seconds before Meurs (first officer) finished reading back the clearance, ending with “we are now at takeoff”> serves to neatly illustrate my point.
You mention that <in short, there is no evidence, as far as I am aware, that Meurs (first officer) harboured any serious reservations that KLM had not received take off clearance> perhaps should be put in the context of my first point, that the crew had been cleared to “line up and wait” and therefore had NOT received take off clearance. If I may tentatively suggest to you that we are discussing events which took place within an organisation that, at the time, was highly authoritarian and not overly given to the idea of junior crew members questioning exalted senior training captains, the first officer may have, in light of the captains actions in the 6 seconds prior to the first officer completing the ATC clearance read-back, similarly convinced himself that they had take off clearance and so therefore must have mistaken the original instruction to line up and wait – hence an initial reservation but overcome by a particular mind set. Let me please assure you that, after the long and trying day previously described, this is a thing easily done in the kind of culture KLM then was and SQ is now. If you are in any doubt as to the veracity of this proposition then perhaps you would care to check with any of the professionals you mention you defer to - I’m sure they will agree with me.
Guest
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INSIDER 107 -
I can't find the reference, for the moment, but I seem to recall that there was a significant protest of sorts from both the copilot & flight engineer in the Pan Am / KLM collision. It's a detail worth researching, as there are valid parallels to SQ-006.
I can't find the reference, for the moment, but I seem to recall that there was a significant protest of sorts from both the copilot & flight engineer in the Pan Am / KLM collision. It's a detail worth researching, as there are valid parallels to SQ-006.
Guest
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In my opinion,the crash of a Singapore Airlines Boeing 747-400 Flight SQ006 in Taipei was caused by the taxiway lights that misguided the pilot of the ill-fated aircraft towards runway 5R that was closed due to maintainance.The aircraft should depart from runway 5L which was the designated runway.In fact some of the lights which lead to runway 5L were dim or not in working order.This might be the cause of the fatal crash that had killed 83 of 179 passengers onboard.The windspeed at the time of the crash was 28 knots and was within flight operational limits.The three pilots,CPT Foong Chee Kong,F/O Latiff Cyrano and F/O Ng Kheng Leng were well trained and disciplined pilots.
[This message has been edited by muhdzailan (edited 26 February 2001).]
[This message has been edited by muhdzailan (edited 26 February 2001).]
Guest
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I am sure many of you out there had experienced the "leans" or other spatial disorientation before. What was the best stimulus that re-erects you brain or semi-circular canals? VISUAL reference to the earth.
Aviation medicine studies indicates that our visual sense are the most powerful when we are trying to evaluate our present state of orientation, though it has its limitations and can play tricks on us too. The point is, it is the most POWERFUL sense compared to the rest we have.
I am not pointing to or mitigating for the crew why they seem to ignore the PVD cues. I think the visual cue were SO POWERFUL that it overrides everything, be it real or an illusion.
Moreover, I wonder what's the confidence level of the crew on the reliability of the PVD system, which may lead them to discard them easier, like the boy who cried wolf.
[This message has been edited by 7times7 (edited 26 February 2001).]
Aviation medicine studies indicates that our visual sense are the most powerful when we are trying to evaluate our present state of orientation, though it has its limitations and can play tricks on us too. The point is, it is the most POWERFUL sense compared to the rest we have.
I am not pointing to or mitigating for the crew why they seem to ignore the PVD cues. I think the visual cue were SO POWERFUL that it overrides everything, be it real or an illusion.
Moreover, I wonder what's the confidence level of the crew on the reliability of the PVD system, which may lead them to discard them easier, like the boy who cried wolf.
[This message has been edited by 7times7 (edited 26 February 2001).]
Guest
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The Last moments of Flight SQ 006
2315 hrs 02 sec
SQ 006 calls:"Singapore Six ready."
2315 hrs 22 sec
RCTP Tower:"Singapore Six,Runway Zero Five Left...Cleared for take-off."
2315 hrs 52 sec
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"It's going to be very slippery.I am going to slow down a bit,slow turn here."
2316 hrs 07 sec
F/O Latiff Cyrano:"And the PVD (Para-Visual-Display) hasn't lined up,ah."
2316 hrs 10 sec
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"Yeah,we gotta line up first."
2316 hrs 12 sec
F/O Ng Kheng Leng: "We need 45 degrees."
2316 hrs 23 sec
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"Not on yet,er,PVD,huh,never mind,we can see the runway,not so bad.OK,I am going to put it to high first.OK,ready eh,so Zero One Zero(Wind direction) is from the left,lah,OK."
2316 hrs 36 secs
Take-off roll commences
2317 hrs 13 secs
F/O Latiff Cyrano:"Vee one"
2317 hrs 16 secs
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"....something there!"
Later,sounds of impact was heard.
2315 hrs 02 sec
SQ 006 calls:"Singapore Six ready."
2315 hrs 22 sec
RCTP Tower:"Singapore Six,Runway Zero Five Left...Cleared for take-off."
2315 hrs 52 sec
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"It's going to be very slippery.I am going to slow down a bit,slow turn here."
2316 hrs 07 sec
F/O Latiff Cyrano:"And the PVD (Para-Visual-Display) hasn't lined up,ah."
2316 hrs 10 sec
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"Yeah,we gotta line up first."
2316 hrs 12 sec
F/O Ng Kheng Leng: "We need 45 degrees."
2316 hrs 23 sec
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"Not on yet,er,PVD,huh,never mind,we can see the runway,not so bad.OK,I am going to put it to high first.OK,ready eh,so Zero One Zero(Wind direction) is from the left,lah,OK."
2316 hrs 36 secs
Take-off roll commences
2317 hrs 13 secs
F/O Latiff Cyrano:"Vee one"
2317 hrs 16 secs
Capt Foong Chee Kong:"....something there!"
Later,sounds of impact was heard.
Guest
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7X7,
You've raised some good points there, and I'm sure many pilots early on in their IFR training have been told often enough, to believe their instruments and not their senses. .. I know.. this is easier said than done.
The factual report gives some information about the general confidence level on the reliability of the PVD amongst SIA pilots which I have quoted below;
...and I agree with Gladiator in that a little more attention to this device (and possibly even the PFD), could have saved the day.
You've raised some good points there, and I'm sure many pilots early on in their IFR training have been told often enough, to believe their instruments and not their senses. .. I know.. this is easier said than done.
The factual report gives some information about the general confidence level on the reliability of the PVD amongst SIA pilots which I have quoted below;
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size="2">
1.18.6.6 PVD Reliability
Because the PVD is a reversionary (back-up) instrument, it needs to have
a high reliability. The reliability information is from several sources: SIA
747-400 pilots, other air carriers using the PVD, and the PVD manufacturer,
Smiths. Boeing itself does not maintain reliability information on this
instrument.
During several interviews with SIA pilots (five SIA Captains and one First
Officer, see Appendix 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-6, 7-8, 7-12), the following information
was obtained: Except for one interviewee who had heard of some pilots’
having problems with the PVD, all the others were clear that the PVD is a
reliable system if the runway is appropriately certified for PVD departures or as
long as there is no shielding of the LLZ/ILS signal. They have not heard of
any failures of the system. Even the one exception could not specify the type
or nature of apparent problems with the PVD he had heard about.
When the investigation team contacted the air carrier who have
purchased the PVD option for their 747-400s or 767s, there were no reported failures of the PVD system (Appendix 7-32).
The PVD manufacturer, Smiths Industries, provided repair data for 13
PVD computer units which were returned to them in the period from January
1998 to November 2000. During that period, one PVD unit was returned
because it did not activate on takeoff. A second PVD was returned because it
tripped off during takeoff with EICAS and status messages displayed. The
remainder were returned for various status and maintenance messages,
including seven returned to incorporate an upgrade. Smiths Industries was
not able to find faults in any of the 13 returned units (Appendix 7-33).
</font>
1.18.6.6 PVD Reliability
Because the PVD is a reversionary (back-up) instrument, it needs to have
a high reliability. The reliability information is from several sources: SIA
747-400 pilots, other air carriers using the PVD, and the PVD manufacturer,
Smiths. Boeing itself does not maintain reliability information on this
instrument.
During several interviews with SIA pilots (five SIA Captains and one First
Officer, see Appendix 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-6, 7-8, 7-12), the following information
was obtained: Except for one interviewee who had heard of some pilots’
having problems with the PVD, all the others were clear that the PVD is a
reliable system if the runway is appropriately certified for PVD departures or as
long as there is no shielding of the LLZ/ILS signal. They have not heard of
any failures of the system. Even the one exception could not specify the type
or nature of apparent problems with the PVD he had heard about.
When the investigation team contacted the air carrier who have
purchased the PVD option for their 747-400s or 767s, there were no reported failures of the PVD system (Appendix 7-32).
The PVD manufacturer, Smiths Industries, provided repair data for 13
PVD computer units which were returned to them in the period from January
1998 to November 2000. During that period, one PVD unit was returned
because it did not activate on takeoff. A second PVD was returned because it
tripped off during takeoff with EICAS and status messages displayed. The
remainder were returned for various status and maintenance messages,
including seven returned to incorporate an upgrade. Smiths Industries was
not able to find faults in any of the 13 returned units (Appendix 7-33).
</font>
Guest
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INSIDER 107 et al
Re: KLM/PanAm
For what happened during taxi prior to collision, go to:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/1977/770327-1htm
and for cvr transcript to:
safety.net/cvr/cvr_kl4805.htm
similarities yes. If you cant see,it pays to wait to make sure. We are in for a long exhange of views on this one.
Re: KLM/PanAm
For what happened during taxi prior to collision, go to:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/1977/770327-1htm
and for cvr transcript to:
safety.net/cvr/cvr_kl4805.htm
similarities yes. If you cant see,it pays to wait to make sure. We are in for a long exhange of views on this one.
Guest
Posts: n/a
thx WSSS,
quote
"the PVD is a reliable system if the runway
is appropriately certified for PVD departures or as long as there is no shielding of the LLZ/ILS signal"
The problem is very few airports are certified for PVD usage. Even for those certified, the airports need to be sanitized for that kind of ops, i.e.Cat III conditions.
For airports that are not certified, who is to know if the LLZ/ILS signals are good enough for the PVD system to be reliable. For example CAT 1 airports, the possibility of LLZ/ILS signals being shielded or reflected will render PVD displays erroneous, at best as a back up only, as mentioned in the report.
Then again you can only have so many other back ups but they are just that, back ups, not the authority for orientation of physical position.
If there is a conflict, the visual cues (with the earth, real or illusion) usually supercedes all the back up indications especially if you know that it is unrealiable in certain conditions, unless you have an authority to fall back on eg. the ADI when you get conflicting visual illusions just to draw a parallel.
In future with ADS-B or better gnd radars, that will be the authority for gnd orientation within its system limits of course.
In this accident, the back up PVD indications were discarded, I think, as unrealiable given the above background.
How many times when cruising at altitude, we can misjudge the passing traffic appearing visually to be below you, but actually above or vice versa. TCAS is the authority supposedly. Reminds me of recent JAL incident over Tokyo.
End of day, visual cues are very powerful, but you can be TOTALLY WRONG with it. We need full authority back up systems, crosschecking all the time.
Phew!
quote
"the PVD is a reliable system if the runway
is appropriately certified for PVD departures or as long as there is no shielding of the LLZ/ILS signal"
The problem is very few airports are certified for PVD usage. Even for those certified, the airports need to be sanitized for that kind of ops, i.e.Cat III conditions.
For airports that are not certified, who is to know if the LLZ/ILS signals are good enough for the PVD system to be reliable. For example CAT 1 airports, the possibility of LLZ/ILS signals being shielded or reflected will render PVD displays erroneous, at best as a back up only, as mentioned in the report.
Then again you can only have so many other back ups but they are just that, back ups, not the authority for orientation of physical position.
If there is a conflict, the visual cues (with the earth, real or illusion) usually supercedes all the back up indications especially if you know that it is unrealiable in certain conditions, unless you have an authority to fall back on eg. the ADI when you get conflicting visual illusions just to draw a parallel.
In future with ADS-B or better gnd radars, that will be the authority for gnd orientation within its system limits of course.
In this accident, the back up PVD indications were discarded, I think, as unrealiable given the above background.
How many times when cruising at altitude, we can misjudge the passing traffic appearing visually to be below you, but actually above or vice versa. TCAS is the authority supposedly. Reminds me of recent JAL incident over Tokyo.
End of day, visual cues are very powerful, but you can be TOTALLY WRONG with it. We need full authority back up systems, crosschecking all the time.
Phew!