SQ006 Revisited
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What a thoughtfully written posting; I did not know about the phone call, that came as a surprise (althought given the business culture it doesn't come as too much of a shock) - but to what extent would the Captain been scapegoated if he did not follow the 'request' - and this raises another issue - when does a request become an instruction or indeed a demand?
We all know that in every day life planners have a thing called consultation, where the thoughts of others are heard, but a decision is made, often without any regard to those views - is this the same?
Titan - Sentosa still has the remains of the old fort, but is a bit like hard labour, given that it is like a large public park with ageing attractions!
We all know that in every day life planners have a thing called consultation, where the thoughts of others are heard, but a decision is made, often without any regard to those views - is this the same?
Titan - Sentosa still has the remains of the old fort, but is a bit like hard labour, given that it is like a large public park with ageing attractions!
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Anti Skid On
I am actually talking about LKY's nemesis. LKY has had him incarcerated there for over 30 years because he refused to lower himself to replying to LKY's accusation that he was a communist. I never heard anyone talk about it in Singapore; it was a forbidden topic.
I am actually talking about LKY's nemesis. LKY has had him incarcerated there for over 30 years because he refused to lower himself to replying to LKY's accusation that he was a communist. I never heard anyone talk about it in Singapore; it was a forbidden topic.
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Insider107
Once again an eloquent and erudite posting. If only it would appear on the front page of the Straits Times.
The fallibility of your arguement and pleading, although thorough and logical, is, as always in Singapore, who shall be the brave soul to cast his fate by going first??
Regards
Once again an eloquent and erudite posting. If only it would appear on the front page of the Straits Times.
The fallibility of your arguement and pleading, although thorough and logical, is, as always in Singapore, who shall be the brave soul to cast his fate by going first??
Regards
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Insider, I'm afraid Danny isn't around at the moment to personally comment on your final paragraph but I know that it is something that he feels very strongly about.
Free interchange of safety information was one of the main themes that Danny and I reviewed when we were opening speakers at the excellent Flight International Crew Management Conference held in London recently.
We are acting to make this site a portal to safety and training resources for the aviation industry worldwide. We too were deeply impressed by the writing on the subject by farside. I wrote to him a week ago requesting permission to place his thoughts permanently on the main home page of the site and we hope that he will agree.
With over 140,000 individual readers per month our ability to disseminate human factors, safety, CRM and training information worldwide is unparalelled. While the tabloid nature of the site makes senior figures in these fields uncomfortable they are also beginning to find the immense (and totally cost free) communication power of PPRuNe impossible to ignore.
Quietly and in the background we continue our negotiations to bring together the best resources and have PPRuNe act as a conduit to them.
Incidently, one of our journalist friends has just written to let us now that the initial report on SQ006 will be released very shortly.
The press release stresses that the 380 page report from the Taiwanese Safety Council is factual only. Analysis will be confined to the final report. Publication will be 'next Friday.' From the dating on the report this could actually mean today but is probably more likey to be in a week.
------------------
Regards from the Towers
Rob Lloyd
[email protected]
[This message has been edited by PPRuNe Towers (edited 16 February 2001).]
Free interchange of safety information was one of the main themes that Danny and I reviewed when we were opening speakers at the excellent Flight International Crew Management Conference held in London recently.
We are acting to make this site a portal to safety and training resources for the aviation industry worldwide. We too were deeply impressed by the writing on the subject by farside. I wrote to him a week ago requesting permission to place his thoughts permanently on the main home page of the site and we hope that he will agree.
With over 140,000 individual readers per month our ability to disseminate human factors, safety, CRM and training information worldwide is unparalelled. While the tabloid nature of the site makes senior figures in these fields uncomfortable they are also beginning to find the immense (and totally cost free) communication power of PPRuNe impossible to ignore.
Quietly and in the background we continue our negotiations to bring together the best resources and have PPRuNe act as a conduit to them.
Incidently, one of our journalist friends has just written to let us now that the initial report on SQ006 will be released very shortly.
The press release stresses that the 380 page report from the Taiwanese Safety Council is factual only. Analysis will be confined to the final report. Publication will be 'next Friday.' From the dating on the report this could actually mean today but is probably more likey to be in a week.
------------------
Regards from the Towers
Rob Lloyd
[email protected]
[This message has been edited by PPRuNe Towers (edited 16 February 2001).]
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What an excellent article. I am off tomorrow for a two week period, but would very much like to continue on this thread. I have some information on the KLM disaster and lots of parallels could be drawn between that accident and SQ6. I will have to think about it a little but suggest that we come back to this subject and spent some time on it.
We must be able to learn from it . The only reaction so far from our management is an itam which states that we have to check that we are on the right runway. Nothing else. Complete silence. That is what I call lack of leadership. But then again this is PPRUNE at its best!!!
We must be able to learn from it . The only reaction so far from our management is an itam which states that we have to check that we are on the right runway. Nothing else. Complete silence. That is what I call lack of leadership. But then again this is PPRUNE at its best!!!
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INSIDER -
Another great posting. You're quite correct in your comparison of the KLM - PAN AM accident. Personally, I find it quite strange that for all the historic examples used, the KLM - PAN AM collision is not used as another deadly example of CRM failings. Admittedly, CRM wasn't a science in that time frame. Not that I have any ill feelings toward KLM; I hold them in high regard.
I've never been able to discover the details on the crew-rest issue in that accident - anybody know?
I'm curious as to the U.S. reaction to SQ-006, as SQ-006 is not the least bit different from the corporate mentality licensed by the FAA in the case of U.S. carriers.
As illustrated on the Airline Safety 'Net site ( www.webpak.net/~skydream ) in the CS-985 matter, the FAA made the original incident disappear, created a fictitious one two days later & pressed a violation on a captain who fell into an FAA negligent oversight trap. With the company and the union facilitating that process against the captain, one has to question the industry sanity standard in the U.S. The most amasing part of the Hong Kong affair was that despite the threat, the captain successfully used 'the book' to an extreme to save lives.
With Alaska 261 and American 1420 still to analysed by the NTSB, the treatment of facts will be interesting, by itself. Personally, I'm expecting a sham investigation in both accidents.
Another great posting. You're quite correct in your comparison of the KLM - PAN AM accident. Personally, I find it quite strange that for all the historic examples used, the KLM - PAN AM collision is not used as another deadly example of CRM failings. Admittedly, CRM wasn't a science in that time frame. Not that I have any ill feelings toward KLM; I hold them in high regard.
I've never been able to discover the details on the crew-rest issue in that accident - anybody know?
I'm curious as to the U.S. reaction to SQ-006, as SQ-006 is not the least bit different from the corporate mentality licensed by the FAA in the case of U.S. carriers.
As illustrated on the Airline Safety 'Net site ( www.webpak.net/~skydream ) in the CS-985 matter, the FAA made the original incident disappear, created a fictitious one two days later & pressed a violation on a captain who fell into an FAA negligent oversight trap. With the company and the union facilitating that process against the captain, one has to question the industry sanity standard in the U.S. The most amasing part of the Hong Kong affair was that despite the threat, the captain successfully used 'the book' to an extreme to save lives.
With Alaska 261 and American 1420 still to analysed by the NTSB, the treatment of facts will be interesting, by itself. Personally, I'm expecting a sham investigation in both accidents.
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Insider 107
Well said.
In my business we call this posture.
You cannot think in any other way, the privileges and responsibilities of your position and licenses require that you do so.
It is an indictment of a management safety culture extant, that this, as a concept, has to be even articulated.
The similarity between the SQ006 and Tenerife drivers is compelling.
The military mind is mutually exclusive of the civilian imperative. Military decision-making is premised on obtaining an objective, with the least loss of life and assets possible, but with the expectation that there will be. It is axiomatic that whilst there are mechanisms based on experience in place to minimise casualty, the fact that your enemy is equally resolute brings you to the point where the inherent risk in conflict is many many orders of magnitude greater than is acceptable in the civilian environment.
In the civilian environment there is absolutely no necessity to even visit this level. If the risk is beyond that which experience command judgement can accept you just don't go. Period.
Whilst the art of leading men is universal in its application, military discipline is top down with little room for interpretation, whereas civilian discipline is a little trickier.
If the two professions have anything in common it is that in the final analysis and the chips are down, there is no room for dissembling, ingenuousness, treachery, obloquy, or as us uncouth colonial Aussies are wont to say, bull****.
The new general may find those experienced civilians who hold a well-earned posture a little different and more difficult than he is used to in his military role. If he is the leader it is suggested he is then, he will listen with deep respect and take advice with humility.
If he does not have any actual international heavy operating experience he would be wise to do more listening than talking. If these fora are even remotely close to the flavour of the situation, he will need all of his people skills just to sort out the men from the seemingly ingrained culture of sycophantic boys both local and expat.
Quite so, weasel wordsmiths and sycophants need not apply.
One of the great mysteries of life these forums seem to disclose is the low esteem towards and general bastardry visited on expat crews by this company.
There may be two possible reasons or a combination of for this.
I used to think that one of the truly clever traits partly responsible for the rise of the Asian economy (particularly Singapore) from third world status less than 30 years ago to their strength today, was their ability to use effectively external resources not then available to them to gain an objective. It cannot be denied that the use of expat staff, pilots and engineers were not just helpful but desperately needed to start and grow their airline.
Certainly national pride demands as a goal, that nationals eventually and as quickly as is possible take the reigns, but, is it reasonable to expect that a population of what, 3.5 million people, can produce locally the number of engineers and pilots necessary to man such a large and eminently commercially successful airline to the technical standard to which they aspire. Particularly when you consider that the Singaporean puts more store in their son as the doctor/lawyer/accountant than other equally worthy professions, the statistics (and relative pay scales it seems) are against it. It should be clear to them by now that simply throwing money at the problem and demanding that it be so (at least since the early seventies) just doesn't and isn't ever going to work. At least not without lowering the bar with a diminution of technical standards.
All of the great civilisations of history used, respected and handsomely rewarded expatriate (call it mercenary if you wish) help in their endeavours. Those that didn't rarely made it past 30 or 40 years before being reduced to supplicant status.
The current expansion and new orders can only exacerbate the "local" resource issue.
Expatriate crews are a fact of life worldwide in countries with relatively small population numbers. The "truly clever" would accept that as a fact of life, be welcoming, supportive and actively seek to make expat employees who choose to make the airline and country their new home really comfortable and equally part of the family. Use it to ensure their airlines pre-eminence. To continue to treat them as second-class citizens will tend to attract that standard of person. The real professionals will not have any trouble finding employment elsewhere.
The second reason may well be the attitude that some expats may hold towards the locals.
Which generated what is now of no consequence, suffice it to say that the fact that SQ took some pains to point out that SQ006s' Captain was "Malaysian" not just one of their Captains, with the implication that a Singaporean would not have erred so, stands as a sentinel as to whether they can take the road to survival as a vibrant and mature organization or whether they will remain blinded by their own hubris.
They simply do not have the human resources to do it on their own. There is no loss of face in using the best resources you need regardless of whence they come. There is much strength in understanding and taking steps to mitigate your weakness. This will take mature, wise and inclusive leadership. It would be truly stupid if they do not. Hubris and Nemesis are bedfellows.
It is a big bad world out there and to survive you need in the words of Farside
SQ006 will be a turning point for SQ as an airline.
They can take the road to mature survival illuminated by Farside in his brilliant post.
The hubristic alternative is the guaranteed and inevitable relegation to the "once were".
I hope a culture that has so wholeheartedly embraced modern technology will heed a message that could not otherwise have been delivered but by that very technology.
The choice and consequences are theirs. In the meantime there are alternative carriers for the enlightened travelling public.
Well said.
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size="2">I would further suggest, in conclusion, that if we only realised it, we do now operate in such a morale climate, post SQ006 (how can SQ now possibly carp at a weather delay decision?) and that, in the characteristic absence of any kind of lead from SQ, we should re-take our responsibility, reassert our professionalism and regain our pride as independent minded highly competent, reliable professionals, to be respected as prized assets. Only if we start thinking of ourselves in this manner can we expect SQ to do so and so stifle our new general's present derogatory view of us.</font>
You cannot think in any other way, the privileges and responsibilities of your position and licenses require that you do so.
It is an indictment of a management safety culture extant, that this, as a concept, has to be even articulated.
The similarity between the SQ006 and Tenerife drivers is compelling.
The military mind is mutually exclusive of the civilian imperative. Military decision-making is premised on obtaining an objective, with the least loss of life and assets possible, but with the expectation that there will be. It is axiomatic that whilst there are mechanisms based on experience in place to minimise casualty, the fact that your enemy is equally resolute brings you to the point where the inherent risk in conflict is many many orders of magnitude greater than is acceptable in the civilian environment.
In the civilian environment there is absolutely no necessity to even visit this level. If the risk is beyond that which experience command judgement can accept you just don't go. Period.
Whilst the art of leading men is universal in its application, military discipline is top down with little room for interpretation, whereas civilian discipline is a little trickier.
If the two professions have anything in common it is that in the final analysis and the chips are down, there is no room for dissembling, ingenuousness, treachery, obloquy, or as us uncouth colonial Aussies are wont to say, bull****.
The new general may find those experienced civilians who hold a well-earned posture a little different and more difficult than he is used to in his military role. If he is the leader it is suggested he is then, he will listen with deep respect and take advice with humility.
If he does not have any actual international heavy operating experience he would be wise to do more listening than talking. If these fora are even remotely close to the flavour of the situation, he will need all of his people skills just to sort out the men from the seemingly ingrained culture of sycophantic boys both local and expat.
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size="2">to "just following company policy". By which I mean are we substituting policy for good judgment and as individuals do we exercise the morale (sic) courage to coolly assess the rights and wrongs of a given operational situation, calmly formulate a reasoned solution with the assistance of the crew and available company resources and then stick with the derived decision, modified by equally reasoned evaluation of changing circumstances and so provide solid and reassuring leadership to our crews and passengers?</font>
One of the great mysteries of life these forums seem to disclose is the low esteem towards and general bastardry visited on expat crews by this company.
There may be two possible reasons or a combination of for this.
I used to think that one of the truly clever traits partly responsible for the rise of the Asian economy (particularly Singapore) from third world status less than 30 years ago to their strength today, was their ability to use effectively external resources not then available to them to gain an objective. It cannot be denied that the use of expat staff, pilots and engineers were not just helpful but desperately needed to start and grow their airline.
Certainly national pride demands as a goal, that nationals eventually and as quickly as is possible take the reigns, but, is it reasonable to expect that a population of what, 3.5 million people, can produce locally the number of engineers and pilots necessary to man such a large and eminently commercially successful airline to the technical standard to which they aspire. Particularly when you consider that the Singaporean puts more store in their son as the doctor/lawyer/accountant than other equally worthy professions, the statistics (and relative pay scales it seems) are against it. It should be clear to them by now that simply throwing money at the problem and demanding that it be so (at least since the early seventies) just doesn't and isn't ever going to work. At least not without lowering the bar with a diminution of technical standards.
All of the great civilisations of history used, respected and handsomely rewarded expatriate (call it mercenary if you wish) help in their endeavours. Those that didn't rarely made it past 30 or 40 years before being reduced to supplicant status.
The current expansion and new orders can only exacerbate the "local" resource issue.
Expatriate crews are a fact of life worldwide in countries with relatively small population numbers. The "truly clever" would accept that as a fact of life, be welcoming, supportive and actively seek to make expat employees who choose to make the airline and country their new home really comfortable and equally part of the family. Use it to ensure their airlines pre-eminence. To continue to treat them as second-class citizens will tend to attract that standard of person. The real professionals will not have any trouble finding employment elsewhere.
The second reason may well be the attitude that some expats may hold towards the locals.
Which generated what is now of no consequence, suffice it to say that the fact that SQ took some pains to point out that SQ006s' Captain was "Malaysian" not just one of their Captains, with the implication that a Singaporean would not have erred so, stands as a sentinel as to whether they can take the road to survival as a vibrant and mature organization or whether they will remain blinded by their own hubris.
They simply do not have the human resources to do it on their own. There is no loss of face in using the best resources you need regardless of whence they come. There is much strength in understanding and taking steps to mitigate your weakness. This will take mature, wise and inclusive leadership. It would be truly stupid if they do not. Hubris and Nemesis are bedfellows.
It is a big bad world out there and to survive you need in the words of Farside
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size="2">As a wise man said once before, " Problems can not be solved by thinking in the same way in which they were created. "
I therefore believe that if we want to be serious about our effort to improve the safety culture in SIA we have to embark on a complete new road and leave a lot of our old habits behind.</font>
I therefore believe that if we want to be serious about our effort to improve the safety culture in SIA we have to embark on a complete new road and leave a lot of our old habits behind.</font>
They can take the road to mature survival illuminated by Farside in his brilliant post.
The hubristic alternative is the guaranteed and inevitable relegation to the "once were".
I hope a culture that has so wholeheartedly embraced modern technology will heed a message that could not otherwise have been delivered but by that very technology.
The choice and consequences are theirs. In the meantime there are alternative carriers for the enlightened travelling public.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I never realized there was so much talent among the troops, and although there is no sign yet of any change here in Singapore, we must be able to start the ball rolling. It is really exciting to see that with all the different angles we are coming from the end result might be a very positive improvement in Singapore Airlines in general, especially in the Flight Ops department. I hope that the outcome of the Taipeh audit next week will result in a positive discussion, although there will be reasons enough to descent into a mudslinging match. I believe that some very serious acquisitions will be made, which most probably will all be true as well, but again we can learn from it , move forward and try to prevent the next disaster. I am off now 2 weeks sailing
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I’m sure that all colleagues await with avid interest, publication on 23 Feb 2001 of the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council interim report on the SQ006 disaster of 31 Oct 2000.
Of particular interest will be mention (or not) of the captain’s rest period subsequent to his previous Melbourne COP and prior to duty report for SQ0006.
It would seem that he was a day short of statutory rest requirement but it is believed that this oversight has swiftly been rectified by firing the rostering girl “responsible”.
Who says SQ hasn’t got a modern, effective management?
Of particular interest will be mention (or not) of the captain’s rest period subsequent to his previous Melbourne COP and prior to duty report for SQ0006.
It would seem that he was a day short of statutory rest requirement but it is believed that this oversight has swiftly been rectified by firing the rostering girl “responsible”.
Who says SQ hasn’t got a modern, effective management?
Guest
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Gaunty
Absolutely beautifully put:
"I hope a culture that has so wholeheartedly embraced modern technology will heed a message that could not otherwise have been delivered but by that technology"
You have distilled to the very essence!
Kind regards
Absolutely beautifully put:
"I hope a culture that has so wholeheartedly embraced modern technology will heed a message that could not otherwise have been delivered but by that technology"
You have distilled to the very essence!
Kind regards
Guest
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The Singapore Government has all along controlled the people's mind, will, destiny, hope, lives, jobs, etc. However, they have no control of the Internet, and certainly does not realise the power of Pprune!
The wings of change are near at hand, thanks to the courageous Gladiator, Titan, Farside, Insider007 and others who stand for righteousness.
The truth will set us free.
The wings of change are near at hand, thanks to the courageous Gladiator, Titan, Farside, Insider007 and others who stand for righteousness.
The truth will set us free.
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Lee
May I quote you?
"The Singapore Government has all along controlled the people's mind, will, destiny, hope, lives, jobs, etc. However, they have no control of the Internet, and certainly does not realise the power of Pprune!"
Maybe you could reinforce the above to the ALPAS members, who I'm trying to move from their paralysis, on the "SQ Pilots - Give ALPAS Your View" thread? It really is so easy for them to make a risk free move!
Kind regards
Insider107
May I quote you?
"The Singapore Government has all along controlled the people's mind, will, destiny, hope, lives, jobs, etc. However, they have no control of the Internet, and certainly does not realise the power of Pprune!"
Maybe you could reinforce the above to the ALPAS members, who I'm trying to move from their paralysis, on the "SQ Pilots - Give ALPAS Your View" thread? It really is so easy for them to make a risk free move!
Kind regards
Insider107
Guest
Posts: n/a
I understand that the Taiwan Safety Council will be publishing its interim findings on the SQ006 crash today - 23 Feb. As well as publishing a hard copy report, I seem to remember that the Council will also put it on a dedicated web site. Anyone know the URL?
Guest
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Taipei Times reports "Communication error behind crash" - supposedly F/O tried to tell the CAPT that "something was wrong with the Nav Display" but was interrupted.
For the full story click here:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001...ory/0000074678
In case the linked page moves/disappears, here is the cut and paste:
"Communication error behind crash
FLIGHT SQ-006: A navigation display indicating the plane was on the wrong runway was ignored because a pre-flight safety check being done by the co-pilot was interrupted by the pilot, aviation insiders say
By Patrick Kearns and Chuang Chi-ting
STAFF REPORTERS
Poor communication in the cockpit of Singapore Airlines flight SQ-006 caused the accident in which the plane crashed and burst into a ball of flames last October, killing 83 of the 179 passengers aboard, aviation sources said yesterday.
The flight, which mistakenly headed down a runway closed for repairs, smashed into concrete barriers and heavy construction machinery during take-off, while Typhoon Xangsane lashed the airport with torrential rain and high winds.
According to two aviation industry insiders who requested anonymity, communications between the captain and his two-man crew broke down when the captain failed to heed a warning that the plane was not on the correct runway assigned for its takeoff.
Co-pilot interrupted
Lined up on what was believed to be the correct runway on Oct. 31, 2000, first officer Latif Cyrano ran the pre-flight checklist, pausing to tell Captain Foong Chee Kong that something was wrong on the navigation display, but was cut off in mid-sentence.
"The pilot cut off the first officer, assuming he was referring to the poor weather conditions, saying `Oh no problem, in this kind of weather we have everything we need ...'" said an air safety expert.
And with the captain apparently distracted by typhoon winds and rain outside, he discounted crucial information from the first officer.
"Investigation officials listening to the CVR [cockpit voice recorder] asked the first officer what he was trying to say before he was cut off," said the safety expert. "His reply was `I tried to tell him the situation was unstable.' Unstable means you are not on the center line."
The fact that the plane's triangular image appeared offset on the navigation display -- a cockpit screen showing the plane's runway alignment -- clearly shows that they were on the wrong runway.
Off center
If the plane were not on the right runway -- runway 05L -- "The crew would have seen the triangle indicator was off center," that's what the first officer was pointing out, said the expert.
"We were all shocked when we heard [that the cockpit conversation regarding the co-pilot's warning was misunderstood,]" said a senior 747-400 pilot close to the investigation. "The pilot thought he knew what the co-pilot was trying to tell him," when in fact he had misunderstood what was being said.
Still, questions remain as to why the crew's first officer -- or the other co-pilot, the cruising captain -- didn't insist that the captain listen to what he had to say.
"The communication problem resulted when the first officer failed to fulfil his responsibility and pursue the issue with the pilot," said the expert. "The pilot cut off the first officer, assuming he was referring to the poor weather conditions, saying, `Oh, no problem, in this kind of weather we have [checked] everything we need ..."
But flying a plane is a team effort, a basic rule that the crew of SQ-006 failed to follow.
"One should always mind suggestions from others [in the cockpit]. If the captain could have [followed the advice of the first officer,] taken a look at the navigation display and avoided rushing the take-off, the jet wouldn't have crashed," said the senior pilot.
Yet the crew, perhaps intimidated by the leader of their team, simply followed his lead.
"I believe the whole crew was affected by the pilot's arrogant attitude, otherwise they would have insisted proper take-off procedures be run step by step," the expert said.
"The pilot was trying to instill confidence in his crew and give the appearance that everything was all right, despite the storm raging outside."
Prior to the crash, Singapore Airlines had a virtually flawless safety record.
"If they followed standard airline take-off procedure for pilots, the [crash] would not have been possible -- it would have not been possible to take off from the wrong runway," said the expert.
The news came just two days prior to the scheduled release of the crash report tomorrow by the government body spearheading the investigation, the Cabinet-level Aviation Safety Council (ASC,*¸¦w©e*û·|).
Kay Yong (¦¥³Í), managing director of the ASC, did not dismiss the information provided by the two sources saying, "Such speculation will be clarified at Friday's press conference when the factual report on the crash is disclosed," he said yesterday.
Singapore Airlines spokeswoman Sharon Wu (§d»_«n) declined to comment on the information and said the airline "has not been informed of it. ... We would prefer to comment on the case after the investigation is completed," Wu said."
For the full story click here:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001...ory/0000074678
In case the linked page moves/disappears, here is the cut and paste:
"Communication error behind crash
FLIGHT SQ-006: A navigation display indicating the plane was on the wrong runway was ignored because a pre-flight safety check being done by the co-pilot was interrupted by the pilot, aviation insiders say
By Patrick Kearns and Chuang Chi-ting
STAFF REPORTERS
Poor communication in the cockpit of Singapore Airlines flight SQ-006 caused the accident in which the plane crashed and burst into a ball of flames last October, killing 83 of the 179 passengers aboard, aviation sources said yesterday.
The flight, which mistakenly headed down a runway closed for repairs, smashed into concrete barriers and heavy construction machinery during take-off, while Typhoon Xangsane lashed the airport with torrential rain and high winds.
According to two aviation industry insiders who requested anonymity, communications between the captain and his two-man crew broke down when the captain failed to heed a warning that the plane was not on the correct runway assigned for its takeoff.
Co-pilot interrupted
Lined up on what was believed to be the correct runway on Oct. 31, 2000, first officer Latif Cyrano ran the pre-flight checklist, pausing to tell Captain Foong Chee Kong that something was wrong on the navigation display, but was cut off in mid-sentence.
"The pilot cut off the first officer, assuming he was referring to the poor weather conditions, saying `Oh no problem, in this kind of weather we have everything we need ...'" said an air safety expert.
And with the captain apparently distracted by typhoon winds and rain outside, he discounted crucial information from the first officer.
"Investigation officials listening to the CVR [cockpit voice recorder] asked the first officer what he was trying to say before he was cut off," said the safety expert. "His reply was `I tried to tell him the situation was unstable.' Unstable means you are not on the center line."
The fact that the plane's triangular image appeared offset on the navigation display -- a cockpit screen showing the plane's runway alignment -- clearly shows that they were on the wrong runway.
Off center
If the plane were not on the right runway -- runway 05L -- "The crew would have seen the triangle indicator was off center," that's what the first officer was pointing out, said the expert.
"We were all shocked when we heard [that the cockpit conversation regarding the co-pilot's warning was misunderstood,]" said a senior 747-400 pilot close to the investigation. "The pilot thought he knew what the co-pilot was trying to tell him," when in fact he had misunderstood what was being said.
Still, questions remain as to why the crew's first officer -- or the other co-pilot, the cruising captain -- didn't insist that the captain listen to what he had to say.
"The communication problem resulted when the first officer failed to fulfil his responsibility and pursue the issue with the pilot," said the expert. "The pilot cut off the first officer, assuming he was referring to the poor weather conditions, saying, `Oh, no problem, in this kind of weather we have [checked] everything we need ..."
But flying a plane is a team effort, a basic rule that the crew of SQ-006 failed to follow.
"One should always mind suggestions from others [in the cockpit]. If the captain could have [followed the advice of the first officer,] taken a look at the navigation display and avoided rushing the take-off, the jet wouldn't have crashed," said the senior pilot.
Yet the crew, perhaps intimidated by the leader of their team, simply followed his lead.
"I believe the whole crew was affected by the pilot's arrogant attitude, otherwise they would have insisted proper take-off procedures be run step by step," the expert said.
"The pilot was trying to instill confidence in his crew and give the appearance that everything was all right, despite the storm raging outside."
Prior to the crash, Singapore Airlines had a virtually flawless safety record.
"If they followed standard airline take-off procedure for pilots, the [crash] would not have been possible -- it would have not been possible to take off from the wrong runway," said the expert.
The news came just two days prior to the scheduled release of the crash report tomorrow by the government body spearheading the investigation, the Cabinet-level Aviation Safety Council (ASC,*¸¦w©e*û·|).
Kay Yong (¦¥³Í), managing director of the ASC, did not dismiss the information provided by the two sources saying, "Such speculation will be clarified at Friday's press conference when the factual report on the crash is disclosed," he said yesterday.
Singapore Airlines spokeswoman Sharon Wu (§d»_«n) declined to comment on the information and said the airline "has not been informed of it. ... We would prefer to comment on the case after the investigation is completed," Wu said."
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I've just returned from a long trip (as a pax, I hasten to add, in deference to the professionals) and have read this thread with interest.
In reference to Insider107's posting of Feb 16, wherein he draws a parallel between the SQ006 accident and the Tenerife collision of 1977, I believe he errs when he asserts that the KLM captain, van Zanten, began his takeoff roll over the "vehement protests" of his FO, Meurs. According to the CVR transcript as contained in the official Spanish report on the accident, after KLM was lined up for takeoff and Meurs had finished the T/O ckeck list, Meurs reminded van Zanten they had not received "ATC clearance". Van Zanten acknowledged this and asked Meurs to request it. Meurs did so and the controller proceeded to give a route clearance. Van Zanten apparently began to advance the throttles and released the brakes some 6 seconds before Meurs finished reading back the clearance, ending with , "We are now at takeoff". The controller's response to the readback, "Stand by for takeoff...I will call you", was overlain by a simultaneous transmission from Pan Am to the controller, and the interfering transmissions came across in the KLM cockpit as a shrill squeal. By then, KLM was already stabilized in the takeoff roll.
In short, there is no evidence, as far as I am aware, that Meurs harboured any serious reservations that KLM had not received takeoff clearance. If Insider is privy to additional information, I would be interested to hear it.
Rockhound
In reference to Insider107's posting of Feb 16, wherein he draws a parallel between the SQ006 accident and the Tenerife collision of 1977, I believe he errs when he asserts that the KLM captain, van Zanten, began his takeoff roll over the "vehement protests" of his FO, Meurs. According to the CVR transcript as contained in the official Spanish report on the accident, after KLM was lined up for takeoff and Meurs had finished the T/O ckeck list, Meurs reminded van Zanten they had not received "ATC clearance". Van Zanten acknowledged this and asked Meurs to request it. Meurs did so and the controller proceeded to give a route clearance. Van Zanten apparently began to advance the throttles and released the brakes some 6 seconds before Meurs finished reading back the clearance, ending with , "We are now at takeoff". The controller's response to the readback, "Stand by for takeoff...I will call you", was overlain by a simultaneous transmission from Pan Am to the controller, and the interfering transmissions came across in the KLM cockpit as a shrill squeal. By then, KLM was already stabilized in the takeoff roll.
In short, there is no evidence, as far as I am aware, that Meurs harboured any serious reservations that KLM had not received takeoff clearance. If Insider is privy to additional information, I would be interested to hear it.
Rockhound
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"Prior to the crash, Singapore Airlines had a virtually flawless safety record"
What an absolute load of rubbish! A simple search through Pprune for "Singapore" or "SIA" will show otherwise.
The cause of the accident, as most of us here presumed, is mired in cultural matters. Questioning authority in Singapore is a risk, and then even if you have the courage, there is the added burden of considering how to do it without letting the authority lose face. It may well be that those few seconds needed for this consideration were what fixed the aircraft's fate.
This problem starts at the very top of their society. LKY tells Minister to jump, Minister tells public servant, public servant tells Grandfather, Grandfater tells father, father tells mother, mother tells child, child tells maid ..... and the maid goes outside and kicks the dog.
Most of the foreign nationals that left SIA empathise with the dog.
A point that is raised regularly here is "do we as outsiders have the right to judge on another country's internal cultural matters? A most arguable question in this day and age. For those that believe in the negative, then that is always conditional on the proviso that the people that perish in their accidents are restricted to those of their own society. Sadly, this is not the case with international air travel, which is a point worthy of reflection by all those that are blinded by company loyalty.
What an absolute load of rubbish! A simple search through Pprune for "Singapore" or "SIA" will show otherwise.
The cause of the accident, as most of us here presumed, is mired in cultural matters. Questioning authority in Singapore is a risk, and then even if you have the courage, there is the added burden of considering how to do it without letting the authority lose face. It may well be that those few seconds needed for this consideration were what fixed the aircraft's fate.
This problem starts at the very top of their society. LKY tells Minister to jump, Minister tells public servant, public servant tells Grandfather, Grandfater tells father, father tells mother, mother tells child, child tells maid ..... and the maid goes outside and kicks the dog.
Most of the foreign nationals that left SIA empathise with the dog.
A point that is raised regularly here is "do we as outsiders have the right to judge on another country's internal cultural matters? A most arguable question in this day and age. For those that believe in the negative, then that is always conditional on the proviso that the people that perish in their accidents are restricted to those of their own society. Sadly, this is not the case with international air travel, which is a point worthy of reflection by all those that are blinded by company loyalty.