SQ006 Revisited
Guest
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Sad to say but the meeting was a total waste of time and noboby learned anything that could help to prevent the next disaster. A lot of polite waffling but nothing with any substance. As with so many other incidents and accidents, what happened in the cockpit will remain a big mystery. The new problem now is not minimum crew but minimum fuel!!!
Guest
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My aficionado colleagues tell me that to expect anything other than a total waste of time - as accurately relayed by John Barnes - when attending the Makan Kechil, in honour of the SQ006 trio, was to stretch the boundaries of optimism to hitherto unimagined dimensions. The trio, for their own legal survival in Singapore, or indeed anywhere else in the world, will have rapidly concluded, individually and collectively, that to reveal incriminating details of their thoughts and actions on the night of 31 Oct 2000 would be tantamount to requesting permanent assignment on Mars, beyond the jurisdiction of any meaningful court.
Further, the senior echelons of the present flight ops management are known to be vindictively resentful of the trio's actions in bringing about the accident, following which their "exemplary safety record" has been besmirched in such an abrupt manner. Forgetting, of course, that they are the compliant architects, within a broader national psychology, of the flight ops culture which has borne this accident and the many past serious incidents and potential disasters which have so far been successfully covered up. In particular, one unprecedented and highly lucrative two-year appointment extension could now be called into question following the hopeful publication of a Taiwanese interim safety report. Hence, the trio knows that it has serious enemies in this quarter and, even if fielding only a modicum of intelligence, will tread very warily.
Similarly ALPAS - an association, not a union, the latter having power to withhold labour - has been particularly witless in the present circumstance in that it has not seen the need to appoint independent legal counsel in Singapore, to act on behalf of the trio but has rather, to this date, pathetically relied on the good offices of the SQ retained "top legal representation". The trio will doubtless have concluded that the trusted maxim "he who pays the piper, calls the tune" is particularly apt in these trying days and will be further forced into isolated silence.
However, notwithstanding the above local difficulties, the major point at issue will be the class action against SQ, to be brought by the US survivors/relatives involved in the SQ006 disaster. Any American aviation law firm, with a reasonable reputation for competence and tenacity, heard before a US court, will be able to take SQ apart (see Gladiator passim) on the direct and subsidiary issues arising from the accident. Hence two points come into play, in generating the trio's present and ongoing silence:
1. SQ, as a means of safeguarding it's own legal position, has formally warned the trio to keep silence in anticipation of a class action in a US court in the event that it's initial seemingly magnanimous offer of settlement is rejected by survivors/relatives (it will be).
2. The trio as a means similarly of safeguarding it's position will not wish it to be conclude that either thought process, detailed at the beginning of this thread, came into play either individually or collectively, so demonstrating either a reckless or culpably negligent approach to the prevailing situation. In this matter they will be in harmony with SQ which will, in this event, have corollary charges of recklessness or culpable negligence made against it.
The trio is, I'm afraid, between a rock and a hard place - ALPAS please note and do something about it as there are a number of Singapore law firms not in thrall to either SQ or the CJ who would be both willing and able to cut a safeguard deal with SQ's lawyers and so prevent the boys from being thrown to the wolves in the rough days ahead.
Readers watch this space.
Further, the senior echelons of the present flight ops management are known to be vindictively resentful of the trio's actions in bringing about the accident, following which their "exemplary safety record" has been besmirched in such an abrupt manner. Forgetting, of course, that they are the compliant architects, within a broader national psychology, of the flight ops culture which has borne this accident and the many past serious incidents and potential disasters which have so far been successfully covered up. In particular, one unprecedented and highly lucrative two-year appointment extension could now be called into question following the hopeful publication of a Taiwanese interim safety report. Hence, the trio knows that it has serious enemies in this quarter and, even if fielding only a modicum of intelligence, will tread very warily.
Similarly ALPAS - an association, not a union, the latter having power to withhold labour - has been particularly witless in the present circumstance in that it has not seen the need to appoint independent legal counsel in Singapore, to act on behalf of the trio but has rather, to this date, pathetically relied on the good offices of the SQ retained "top legal representation". The trio will doubtless have concluded that the trusted maxim "he who pays the piper, calls the tune" is particularly apt in these trying days and will be further forced into isolated silence.
However, notwithstanding the above local difficulties, the major point at issue will be the class action against SQ, to be brought by the US survivors/relatives involved in the SQ006 disaster. Any American aviation law firm, with a reasonable reputation for competence and tenacity, heard before a US court, will be able to take SQ apart (see Gladiator passim) on the direct and subsidiary issues arising from the accident. Hence two points come into play, in generating the trio's present and ongoing silence:
1. SQ, as a means of safeguarding it's own legal position, has formally warned the trio to keep silence in anticipation of a class action in a US court in the event that it's initial seemingly magnanimous offer of settlement is rejected by survivors/relatives (it will be).
2. The trio as a means similarly of safeguarding it's position will not wish it to be conclude that either thought process, detailed at the beginning of this thread, came into play either individually or collectively, so demonstrating either a reckless or culpably negligent approach to the prevailing situation. In this matter they will be in harmony with SQ which will, in this event, have corollary charges of recklessness or culpable negligence made against it.
The trio is, I'm afraid, between a rock and a hard place - ALPAS please note and do something about it as there are a number of Singapore law firms not in thrall to either SQ or the CJ who would be both willing and able to cut a safeguard deal with SQ's lawyers and so prevent the boys from being thrown to the wolves in the rough days ahead.
Readers watch this space.
Guest
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Strange that you mention " ( see Gladiator passim ) " .
Gladiator settled out of court and paid a six figure payout . Thats in addition to his own legal fee ! . I would have thought that if gladiator is so confident of winning the court case ( as he has always boasted ) , he would have gone to court , win the case and dont pay a cent . Plus SIA will pay his legal fees and expenses
Guest
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It's not only the crew involved with the accident who are been silenced by Singapore Airline's management.Current "Intams", ie messages to crew regarding company policies, state that no member of Singapore airlines shall speak of the incident, both publically or privately.
What right do SQ have to silence a none Singaporean? Company loyalty, ha, don't make me laugh. The sycophants of the B777 or A340 are all clambering to be promoted to the 747-400, and at what cost? It's not going to be pretty in this culture that made back stabbing an art form.
Contained within the same set of intams, are references to PA's made by commanders initial greeting to pax. Apparently, several local commanders have unwittingly made referrals to the SQ006 incident during their initial PA.The company has now had to issue a special set of instructions to prohibit this.
"Ladies and Gentlemen, you are now aboard our "Rainbow" 747-400 service, the only one now left in this unique colour scheme"
What right do SQ have to silence a none Singaporean? Company loyalty, ha, don't make me laugh. The sycophants of the B777 or A340 are all clambering to be promoted to the 747-400, and at what cost? It's not going to be pretty in this culture that made back stabbing an art form.
Contained within the same set of intams, are references to PA's made by commanders initial greeting to pax. Apparently, several local commanders have unwittingly made referrals to the SQ006 incident during their initial PA.The company has now had to issue a special set of instructions to prohibit this.
"Ladies and Gentlemen, you are now aboard our "Rainbow" 747-400 service, the only one now left in this unique colour scheme"
Guest
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Insider107:
Once again a well written and informative posting.
The travesty is not that SIA ordered over 1000 pilots into silence, but they believe they can. Will the fools never learn that it is this exact authoritarian behaviour that is the foe of air safety. How many more people will perish before SIA evolves into a safe airline. The postings here over the last couple of years have exposed a multitude of near misses and incidents which SIA desperatley tried to cover up. That not more people have died on this airline is a grand commendation to the airframe makers, and in no way imparted to SIA's operational prowess.
..... and what was the SIA share price today?
Once again a well written and informative posting.
The travesty is not that SIA ordered over 1000 pilots into silence, but they believe they can. Will the fools never learn that it is this exact authoritarian behaviour that is the foe of air safety. How many more people will perish before SIA evolves into a safe airline. The postings here over the last couple of years have exposed a multitude of near misses and incidents which SIA desperatley tried to cover up. That not more people have died on this airline is a grand commendation to the airframe makers, and in no way imparted to SIA's operational prowess.
..... and what was the SIA share price today?
Guest
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BEING SUBMISSIVE -
I can't speak to the SIA pilots, but in the States, such heavy-handed 'control' techniques have been successfully used.
The style is to tell a lie with great passion, then repeat it as often as possible until the pilots pick up on it.
For example, one of the USA 'Corporate Stockholm Syndrome' techniques has been to successfully NOT issue regulations to the pilots, take out FAR references in the Operations Manual (illegal), then convince the pilots that the OPS manual is an FAA accepted substitute for the regulations.
The unions even buy into it; it's killing people.
In the Alaska 506 incident, the copilot was successfully violated for questioning, but not overriding the captain. Even the FAA pushed corporate policy over regulation (authority of the PIC).
The technique works along with the politically correct phrase, "You can't say that." Imagine that expression being so common in the 'Land of the Free.'
Protests aside, SIA management might just get their way. A couple of terminations would convert the silence policy into a 'norm.'
Watch out.
I can't speak to the SIA pilots, but in the States, such heavy-handed 'control' techniques have been successfully used.
The style is to tell a lie with great passion, then repeat it as often as possible until the pilots pick up on it.
For example, one of the USA 'Corporate Stockholm Syndrome' techniques has been to successfully NOT issue regulations to the pilots, take out FAR references in the Operations Manual (illegal), then convince the pilots that the OPS manual is an FAA accepted substitute for the regulations.
The unions even buy into it; it's killing people.
In the Alaska 506 incident, the copilot was successfully violated for questioning, but not overriding the captain. Even the FAA pushed corporate policy over regulation (authority of the PIC).
The technique works along with the politically correct phrase, "You can't say that." Imagine that expression being so common in the 'Land of the Free.'
Protests aside, SIA management might just get their way. A couple of terminations would convert the silence policy into a 'norm.'
Watch out.
Guest
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ExSimGuy
I’m afraid that your 568th posting, of 29 Jan, immediately following mine of the same date, was just a little too oblique for me. I do not understand the significance of “check the small print at the bottom of the page, all times UTC”. Can you explain?
I’m also in the dark with your equally cryptic “what goes around…..often makes a better landing”. I avidly await enlightenment.
Pillow
“See Gladiator passim”. Please go to search and then type in “gladiator” specifying Far East forum – all will be revealed.
I believe that most people are of the view that gladiator negotiated a “pro-bono” deal with a US law firm (any John Grisham novel refers on the meaning of pro bono), which then counter sued SQ on the basis of unsafe flight operations practices by the airline, as a defence manoeuvre against the airline’s pursuit of gladiator’s bond. The action took place in a US court and swiftly came to an end following the serving of subpoenas on both the SQ CEO and the SVP Flt Ops. Under the terms of the out of court settlement, gladiator was constrained to silence on details of these terms.
Titan
Precisely put. SQ’s consistently authoritarian behaviour is both the enemy of safe flight operations and of intelligent evolutionary change. As I have mentioned before, until such time as the present corrupted and ossified flight ops management retires, we will see more of the same. Unfortunately, the system perpetuates itself by promoting the sycophants, both local and ex-pat – sia sniffer refers . Perhaps our new general can figure this out and do something about it?
Whilst alluding to management style, readers may be interested to note the content of a poster currently gracing the walls of 4th floor STC. It quotes Sir Richard Branson, SQ’s co-shareholder in Virgin Atlantic Airways and gives an intimation of his management style (whether true or illusory is open to debate).
“I believe the highest priority is your employees. Then you take care of your customers and only then do you look after your shareholders’ interests. You see, if you bend over backwards to take care of your staff, ensuring they are happy and enjoying their jobs, they will take care of your customers for you. And in the long run, when employees continue providing customers with superb service, the customers’ referrals and repeat business will take care of our shareholders’ interests”
Readers will be interested to note the parallel philosophy practiced by 49% Virgin shareholder, Singapore Airlines.
I’m afraid that your 568th posting, of 29 Jan, immediately following mine of the same date, was just a little too oblique for me. I do not understand the significance of “check the small print at the bottom of the page, all times UTC”. Can you explain?
I’m also in the dark with your equally cryptic “what goes around…..often makes a better landing”. I avidly await enlightenment.
Pillow
“See Gladiator passim”. Please go to search and then type in “gladiator” specifying Far East forum – all will be revealed.
I believe that most people are of the view that gladiator negotiated a “pro-bono” deal with a US law firm (any John Grisham novel refers on the meaning of pro bono), which then counter sued SQ on the basis of unsafe flight operations practices by the airline, as a defence manoeuvre against the airline’s pursuit of gladiator’s bond. The action took place in a US court and swiftly came to an end following the serving of subpoenas on both the SQ CEO and the SVP Flt Ops. Under the terms of the out of court settlement, gladiator was constrained to silence on details of these terms.
Titan
Precisely put. SQ’s consistently authoritarian behaviour is both the enemy of safe flight operations and of intelligent evolutionary change. As I have mentioned before, until such time as the present corrupted and ossified flight ops management retires, we will see more of the same. Unfortunately, the system perpetuates itself by promoting the sycophants, both local and ex-pat – sia sniffer refers . Perhaps our new general can figure this out and do something about it?
Whilst alluding to management style, readers may be interested to note the content of a poster currently gracing the walls of 4th floor STC. It quotes Sir Richard Branson, SQ’s co-shareholder in Virgin Atlantic Airways and gives an intimation of his management style (whether true or illusory is open to debate).
“I believe the highest priority is your employees. Then you take care of your customers and only then do you look after your shareholders’ interests. You see, if you bend over backwards to take care of your staff, ensuring they are happy and enjoying their jobs, they will take care of your customers for you. And in the long run, when employees continue providing customers with superb service, the customers’ referrals and repeat business will take care of our shareholders’ interests”
Readers will be interested to note the parallel philosophy practiced by 49% Virgin shareholder, Singapore Airlines.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I feel bound to write, having seen alien779’s contribution, on another thread and the heavy-handed intervention on behalf of SQ that it represents and use this thread to maintain continuity.
The smart money down here in Singapore is that the Taiwan trio will shortly be fired, though for what exact cause, remains shrouded in mystery. It is felt, however, that the upcoming interim Taiwanese report on the SQ0006 disaster is going to prove so damning that SQ will have to take steps to quickly distance itself from its employees and take refuge in the stance that the tech crew members did not follow laid down company procedures. ie you’re on your own boys. Will ALPAS finally wake up and quit spending members’ cash on beer and food and divert some funds to independent legal council for these colleagues?
In light of what seems to be about to be perpetrated, it is interesting to put it in context with the much vaunted SQ “Core Values”, which, being a relatively new joiner, I’m in a position to remember from my indoctrination course – I can’t, however, oblige with the company song as I’ve forgotten the words.
Of particular note is the Value, “Concern for Staff”, which states “We value our staff and care for their well-being. We treat them with respect and dignity and seek to provide them with appropriate training and development so that they can lead fulfilling careers”. SQ employees will note the forgoing with some irony, against a background of daily plummeting morale and disintegrating industrial relations.
Similarly, the SQ mantra “Industrial harmony is a critical success factor of a company’s continued prosperity and growth and Singapore Airlines is no exception. A strong working relationship between management, staff and the unions is the foundation which enables us to share pride in the Company, a vision of excellence and a determination to stay the best airline in the world. There are many instances to demonstrate theses shared values, whether within the Company or in the larger community”, is now wearing extremely thin.
Our present inept Association President, in his last missive of 19 January, tells us that SQ has summarily refused to negotiate further on the now 26 month out of date Collective Agreement (CA) and that he feels “like a virgin at a mass wedding”, having had no previous experience of events such as the upcoming, SQ forced, government arbitration of the CA case. Two points arise – when SQ don’t have complete and absolute acceptance of their diktat they take their bat and ball away and refuse to play, making something of a mockery of their foregoing public stance and, secondly, should the ALPAS President not be thinking seriously about getting a contract law firm to cast their eye over what we laughingly call the employment contract and should he not also be organising some professional assistance in his upcoming case?
Finally, given that arbitration goes along the SQ lines (it will), the CA will be dated February 2001 instead of November 1998 and, given that it will run the usual three years, it will effectively become a 5 year 3 month agreement, clearly demonstrating the SVP Flt Ops tried and trusted skill in industrial maneouvre.
Life goes on in Wonderland.
The smart money down here in Singapore is that the Taiwan trio will shortly be fired, though for what exact cause, remains shrouded in mystery. It is felt, however, that the upcoming interim Taiwanese report on the SQ0006 disaster is going to prove so damning that SQ will have to take steps to quickly distance itself from its employees and take refuge in the stance that the tech crew members did not follow laid down company procedures. ie you’re on your own boys. Will ALPAS finally wake up and quit spending members’ cash on beer and food and divert some funds to independent legal council for these colleagues?
In light of what seems to be about to be perpetrated, it is interesting to put it in context with the much vaunted SQ “Core Values”, which, being a relatively new joiner, I’m in a position to remember from my indoctrination course – I can’t, however, oblige with the company song as I’ve forgotten the words.
Of particular note is the Value, “Concern for Staff”, which states “We value our staff and care for their well-being. We treat them with respect and dignity and seek to provide them with appropriate training and development so that they can lead fulfilling careers”. SQ employees will note the forgoing with some irony, against a background of daily plummeting morale and disintegrating industrial relations.
Similarly, the SQ mantra “Industrial harmony is a critical success factor of a company’s continued prosperity and growth and Singapore Airlines is no exception. A strong working relationship between management, staff and the unions is the foundation which enables us to share pride in the Company, a vision of excellence and a determination to stay the best airline in the world. There are many instances to demonstrate theses shared values, whether within the Company or in the larger community”, is now wearing extremely thin.
Our present inept Association President, in his last missive of 19 January, tells us that SQ has summarily refused to negotiate further on the now 26 month out of date Collective Agreement (CA) and that he feels “like a virgin at a mass wedding”, having had no previous experience of events such as the upcoming, SQ forced, government arbitration of the CA case. Two points arise – when SQ don’t have complete and absolute acceptance of their diktat they take their bat and ball away and refuse to play, making something of a mockery of their foregoing public stance and, secondly, should the ALPAS President not be thinking seriously about getting a contract law firm to cast their eye over what we laughingly call the employment contract and should he not also be organising some professional assistance in his upcoming case?
Finally, given that arbitration goes along the SQ lines (it will), the CA will be dated February 2001 instead of November 1998 and, given that it will run the usual three years, it will effectively become a 5 year 3 month agreement, clearly demonstrating the SVP Flt Ops tried and trusted skill in industrial maneouvre.
Life goes on in Wonderland.
Guest
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insider whatevr,
wellu said it man .we are gonna get totalled in the IAC. one question ..has there ever been a situation when we did win at these so called "arbitration" courts?the current president? he is a good man no doubt but what confidence huh?
wellu said it man .we are gonna get totalled in the IAC. one question ..has there ever been a situation when we did win at these so called "arbitration" courts?the current president? he is a good man no doubt but what confidence huh?
Guest
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Can anyone explain what a PVI or PVD is? Is this an SQ option on the -400?
Am familar with PFD, but it is pretty much always selected on unless things are not working out too well.
And what is the indicator on the glareshield? All I have ever seen is a "Master Warning/Caution Reset Switch and Light".
Never seen anything on the glareshied "turning" as such. As I said is this an SQ option?
Am familar with PFD, but it is pretty much always selected on unless things are not working out too well.
And what is the indicator on the glareshield? All I have ever seen is a "Master Warning/Caution Reset Switch and Light".
Never seen anything on the glareshied "turning" as such. As I said is this an SQ option?
Guest
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Sqrew
I’m certain that ALPAS has never won an action in the Singapore IAC – Industrial Arbitration Court. Perhaps this is because:
1. It has never been properly legally represented at any hearings
2. As in the latest case, it has never troubled to present a cogent, reasoned and logical counter case to that presented by SQ and authored by the former DFO, now metamorphosised into SVPFO.
Tans
PVI/PVD is Airbus/Boeing speak respectively for Para Visual Indicator/Para Visual Display – both terms are current within SQ.
PFD is Airbus speak for Primary Flight Display.
Are you sure that you are a pilot?
I’m certain that ALPAS has never won an action in the Singapore IAC – Industrial Arbitration Court. Perhaps this is because:
1. It has never been properly legally represented at any hearings
2. As in the latest case, it has never troubled to present a cogent, reasoned and logical counter case to that presented by SQ and authored by the former DFO, now metamorphosised into SVPFO.
Tans
PVI/PVD is Airbus/Boeing speak respectively for Para Visual Indicator/Para Visual Display – both terms are current within SQ.
PFD is Airbus speak for Primary Flight Display.
Are you sure that you are a pilot?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Sadly, until LKY and his cronies pass away I don't see how ALPA-S will ever have the courage to fight a real Industrial Relations battle. Everyone fearfully remembers the night that LKY had the senior ALPA-S people arrrested and threatened with life in Changi Prison for not just themselves but their families as well.
If only all IR negotiation could be THAT effective!
If only all IR negotiation could be THAT effective!
Guest
Posts: n/a
Executions? Not any more. Too much public opinion. If the union rep gets too popular or sounds as if he has a case, make him Minister Without Portfolio. One day he is promoting the members' views, next day is saying, "Toe the party line." Works in Sg
Guest
Posts: n/a
Established !
Arrested? Well what would you call being ordered to appear before the Ministry of Labour in the middle of the night in a country with the power to arrest without cause?
They were given until 6am the following morning to resolve the "go-slow" or face the repercussions as previously outlined.
I completely understand your distaste in confronting the real-politik of Singapore and even ignorance at what happened; the ostrich factor thrives in Singapore, similiar to how Shultz would exclaim "I know nothink.. nothink!!".
Is lifetime incarceration on Sentosa still fashionable there in the Lyin City?
Arrested? Well what would you call being ordered to appear before the Ministry of Labour in the middle of the night in a country with the power to arrest without cause?
They were given until 6am the following morning to resolve the "go-slow" or face the repercussions as previously outlined.
I completely understand your distaste in confronting the real-politik of Singapore and even ignorance at what happened; the ostrich factor thrives in Singapore, similiar to how Shultz would exclaim "I know nothink.. nothink!!".
Is lifetime incarceration on Sentosa still fashionable there in the Lyin City?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Farside - what excellent articles written by yourself and posted by John Barnes on the “Management sweep at Singapore Airlines” thread, started by titan on 06 Feb 01. John Barnes was rather clumsy in posting without your consent but he has done us all a great service by airing your views and I’m sure that you’ve now forgiven him. I agree 100% with everything you write and I would like to develop a subject which you touched on in your second Article – the Tenerife disaster of 1974.
I’m using this thread as my subsequent subject matter is entirely consistent with the SQ006 debate and hence it is eminently logical to keep it under the “SQ006 Revisited” banner.
Titan - thank you for starting your thread – you are absolutely correct in that the “higher management”, EVPT Lt-Gen Bey will be taking over the helms of both Flt Ops and Engineering – with the assistance of Air Force subordinates! It is to be hoped that he performs the kind of turnaround job on SQ, in terms of arresting and reversing plummeting morale, as my FO colleagues tell me he crafted with the Singaporean Air Force. Despite rumours that he maintains an authoritarian stance with the FO’s (he is more conciliatory with the captains – ex-pats at least) he really does deserve our support and forbearance. The alternative to his successful handling of events that can easily develop to threaten the very existence of the company is hinted at by gaunty’s post of 11 Feb 01 and his particular encouragement for us all to study the word hubris. In terms of SQ’s behaviour and development over the past 20 years a particularly Homeric paraphrase comes to mind – “whom the gods would destroy they first blind with hubris”. It is to be hoped that SQ’s “best airline in the world” and “world’s most profitable airline” rhetoric has not blinded them to the increasing likelihood of nemesis at the hands of SQ006 and any future disaster which their present culture is inexorably heading them towards.
As a peripheral issue, it would seem that SVPFO’s lucrative (S$3M per annum bonus for keeping flight ops costs to target – that is pilot salaries and allowances!) extended non-flying appointment to the age of 62, after 19 years in position, is shortly to be terminated. SQ’s lawyers are positioning for the flak to be unleashed, following the Taiwanese interim report on SQ006 and the required distancing from the tech crew “trio”, by their dismissal, which this will occasion, can only be morally upheld by a similar departure of the notional”man in charge”. Standby, therefore, for a form of words not unadjacent to “the SVPOF has now reconsidered his acceptance of the board’s request that he extend his appointment by a further two years beyond normal retirement age, with a view to now spending more time with his family”. SIA sniffer tells us on 09 Feb 01 that F.K is also to go – unsurprising, as the board had recently declared him “unacceptable” for promotion to the SVPFO position. Hence we can be free, at last, of his malign influence – things could indeed be changing! However, of final note on this theme, the other member of the troika, Director of Flt Training surely should also consider that the only honourable course of action is now to tender his resignation. He, after all, has moulded the training culture that has directly contributed to the Taiwan disaster!
Moving to Farside’s example of the Tenerife disaster, the parallel circumstances of SQ006 are noteworthy, whilst the directly comparable “stress events” of adverse weather/NOTAM conditions and company pressure/culture inputs are startling. In fact a good road map is now provided by events leading to Tenerife and subsequent correctional activity by KLM, to keep on the straight and narrow and avoid such further catastrophes.
I flew into Las Palmas (LPA) a couple of days after the tragedy and was thus able to get a pretty detailed idea of events at Tenerife North (TFN) – the only airport on the island at the time, before the opening of TFS and, being sited in a saddle, approx 2040 feet abmsl, subject to frequent closure by low stratus/fog. Such were the conditions on the day and the KLM flight plus many others diverted to LPA to await Wx improvement. A hoax bomb threat at LPA contributed to the mayhem and added further delay to KLM’s departure for TFN and then home to AMS. Following KLM’s arrival and turnaround at TFN the Wx fogged in again, though RVR was just in limits for take off. Meanwhile, (you’ve guessed it) the company urgently wanted the aircraft back in AMS for a subsequent service and FTL’s were now rearing their ugly heads. Wait for it! There was WIP on the parallel taxiway – the NOTAM’s for which were subsequently shown to be remiss and not widely available – which required taxiing aircraft to exit the parallel, enter the active, exit the active and re-enter the parallel before reaching the holding point. KLM went through this rigmarole in approx 300M vis and by the time they had lined up, the captain (training captain) was champing at the bit to get airborne and thus relieve himself of the intense frustrations of the day and rid himself of the FTL/Company pressure by just squeaking into AMS inside FTL discretion! All sound familiar? KLM was then given “line up and wait, call the tower on …..MHz”. Meanwhile, unbeknown, a Pan Am 747, on ground frequency followed the same taxi procedure, with the intention of clearing the active to allow the KLM take off – all in 200-300M vis and hence neither aircraft in visual contact with the other and, of course, no airport ground radar in those days! Back to KLM, where the highly stressed captain had now convinced himself that he had take off clearance so, despite the vehement protests to the contrary of his very junior FO, started the take off roll and so fatally collided with the Pan AM 747 still on the runway.
We have heard from Farside what KLM did in the aftermath, to avoid a repetition of this disaster and we still, of course, await similarly positive action from SQ. Meanwhile, in the interim, what, as captains, do we need to do to avoid the Tenerife and Taiwan situations, as factually stated and reasonably hypothesized respectively?
In my own very humble opinion (humble because I’ve made so many past foul-ups and have been fated to get away with them), I think that as a start, we should perhaps individually consider our own mind sets and examine whether we are truly acting as aircraft captains or are we passing the buck on just about every occasion and reverting to “just following company policy”. By which I mean are we substituting policy for good judgment and as individuals do we exercise the morale courage to coolly assess the rights and wrongs of a given operational situation, calmly formulate a reasoned solution with the assistance of the crew and available company resources and then stick with the derived decision, modified by equally reasoned evaluation of changing circumstances and so provide solid and reassuring leadership to our crews and passengers?
If we can say that we do, then we are earning our money as decision makers on the spot, safeguarding our passengers, crew, aircraft and our company’s reputation and operating as efficiently as possible in all circumstances – very much as captains seemed to do so effortlessly when I first started flying and before the oversight and carping of cost accountants and lawyers emasculated their scope for effective action in all circumstances.
If, however, we take expedient recourse to what we know the company will favour as the “low cost solution”, we are abrogating our above responsibility and become mere ciphers of a bureaucracy ever more consumed by corporate greed, forgetting all our commitment to common sense and airmanship.
Moving on, it would seem that the captain of SQ006 received a phone call from SQ Ops at the Taipei hotel, prior to reporting for duty on the fateful night, to the effect that the typhoon front was imminent and “could he make best efforts to get airborne before the event”? All members of SQ will appreciate the pregnant significance of this “request”.
I suggest that if the captain had been operating in the morale climate that made possible the thought processes described above, then he would have been able to make reasoned and calm judgment and concluded a delay until post-front conditions prevailed, safe in the knowledge that he would not be “witch hunted” and that his command decision would be accepted without question as that emanating and expected from a seasoned professional.
I would further suggest, in conclusion, that if we only realised it, we do now operate in such a morale climate, post SQ006 (how can SQ now possibly carp at a weather delay decision?) and that, in the characteristic absence of any kind of lead from SQ, we should re-take our responsibility, reassert our professionalism and regain our pride as independent minded highly competent, reliable professionals, to be respected as prized assets. Only if we start thinking of ourselves in this manner can we expect SQ to do so and so stifle our new general’s present derogatory view of us.
Post Script. Danny. If you read this, I do hope that it reinforces to you the wonderful value of your web site and the ability of new technology to disseminate information and ideas between colleagues employed in companies where such dissemination is problematical. Keep up your superb work.
Kindest regards.
I’m using this thread as my subsequent subject matter is entirely consistent with the SQ006 debate and hence it is eminently logical to keep it under the “SQ006 Revisited” banner.
Titan - thank you for starting your thread – you are absolutely correct in that the “higher management”, EVPT Lt-Gen Bey will be taking over the helms of both Flt Ops and Engineering – with the assistance of Air Force subordinates! It is to be hoped that he performs the kind of turnaround job on SQ, in terms of arresting and reversing plummeting morale, as my FO colleagues tell me he crafted with the Singaporean Air Force. Despite rumours that he maintains an authoritarian stance with the FO’s (he is more conciliatory with the captains – ex-pats at least) he really does deserve our support and forbearance. The alternative to his successful handling of events that can easily develop to threaten the very existence of the company is hinted at by gaunty’s post of 11 Feb 01 and his particular encouragement for us all to study the word hubris. In terms of SQ’s behaviour and development over the past 20 years a particularly Homeric paraphrase comes to mind – “whom the gods would destroy they first blind with hubris”. It is to be hoped that SQ’s “best airline in the world” and “world’s most profitable airline” rhetoric has not blinded them to the increasing likelihood of nemesis at the hands of SQ006 and any future disaster which their present culture is inexorably heading them towards.
As a peripheral issue, it would seem that SVPFO’s lucrative (S$3M per annum bonus for keeping flight ops costs to target – that is pilot salaries and allowances!) extended non-flying appointment to the age of 62, after 19 years in position, is shortly to be terminated. SQ’s lawyers are positioning for the flak to be unleashed, following the Taiwanese interim report on SQ006 and the required distancing from the tech crew “trio”, by their dismissal, which this will occasion, can only be morally upheld by a similar departure of the notional”man in charge”. Standby, therefore, for a form of words not unadjacent to “the SVPOF has now reconsidered his acceptance of the board’s request that he extend his appointment by a further two years beyond normal retirement age, with a view to now spending more time with his family”. SIA sniffer tells us on 09 Feb 01 that F.K is also to go – unsurprising, as the board had recently declared him “unacceptable” for promotion to the SVPFO position. Hence we can be free, at last, of his malign influence – things could indeed be changing! However, of final note on this theme, the other member of the troika, Director of Flt Training surely should also consider that the only honourable course of action is now to tender his resignation. He, after all, has moulded the training culture that has directly contributed to the Taiwan disaster!
Moving to Farside’s example of the Tenerife disaster, the parallel circumstances of SQ006 are noteworthy, whilst the directly comparable “stress events” of adverse weather/NOTAM conditions and company pressure/culture inputs are startling. In fact a good road map is now provided by events leading to Tenerife and subsequent correctional activity by KLM, to keep on the straight and narrow and avoid such further catastrophes.
I flew into Las Palmas (LPA) a couple of days after the tragedy and was thus able to get a pretty detailed idea of events at Tenerife North (TFN) – the only airport on the island at the time, before the opening of TFS and, being sited in a saddle, approx 2040 feet abmsl, subject to frequent closure by low stratus/fog. Such were the conditions on the day and the KLM flight plus many others diverted to LPA to await Wx improvement. A hoax bomb threat at LPA contributed to the mayhem and added further delay to KLM’s departure for TFN and then home to AMS. Following KLM’s arrival and turnaround at TFN the Wx fogged in again, though RVR was just in limits for take off. Meanwhile, (you’ve guessed it) the company urgently wanted the aircraft back in AMS for a subsequent service and FTL’s were now rearing their ugly heads. Wait for it! There was WIP on the parallel taxiway – the NOTAM’s for which were subsequently shown to be remiss and not widely available – which required taxiing aircraft to exit the parallel, enter the active, exit the active and re-enter the parallel before reaching the holding point. KLM went through this rigmarole in approx 300M vis and by the time they had lined up, the captain (training captain) was champing at the bit to get airborne and thus relieve himself of the intense frustrations of the day and rid himself of the FTL/Company pressure by just squeaking into AMS inside FTL discretion! All sound familiar? KLM was then given “line up and wait, call the tower on …..MHz”. Meanwhile, unbeknown, a Pan Am 747, on ground frequency followed the same taxi procedure, with the intention of clearing the active to allow the KLM take off – all in 200-300M vis and hence neither aircraft in visual contact with the other and, of course, no airport ground radar in those days! Back to KLM, where the highly stressed captain had now convinced himself that he had take off clearance so, despite the vehement protests to the contrary of his very junior FO, started the take off roll and so fatally collided with the Pan AM 747 still on the runway.
We have heard from Farside what KLM did in the aftermath, to avoid a repetition of this disaster and we still, of course, await similarly positive action from SQ. Meanwhile, in the interim, what, as captains, do we need to do to avoid the Tenerife and Taiwan situations, as factually stated and reasonably hypothesized respectively?
In my own very humble opinion (humble because I’ve made so many past foul-ups and have been fated to get away with them), I think that as a start, we should perhaps individually consider our own mind sets and examine whether we are truly acting as aircraft captains or are we passing the buck on just about every occasion and reverting to “just following company policy”. By which I mean are we substituting policy for good judgment and as individuals do we exercise the morale courage to coolly assess the rights and wrongs of a given operational situation, calmly formulate a reasoned solution with the assistance of the crew and available company resources and then stick with the derived decision, modified by equally reasoned evaluation of changing circumstances and so provide solid and reassuring leadership to our crews and passengers?
If we can say that we do, then we are earning our money as decision makers on the spot, safeguarding our passengers, crew, aircraft and our company’s reputation and operating as efficiently as possible in all circumstances – very much as captains seemed to do so effortlessly when I first started flying and before the oversight and carping of cost accountants and lawyers emasculated their scope for effective action in all circumstances.
If, however, we take expedient recourse to what we know the company will favour as the “low cost solution”, we are abrogating our above responsibility and become mere ciphers of a bureaucracy ever more consumed by corporate greed, forgetting all our commitment to common sense and airmanship.
Moving on, it would seem that the captain of SQ006 received a phone call from SQ Ops at the Taipei hotel, prior to reporting for duty on the fateful night, to the effect that the typhoon front was imminent and “could he make best efforts to get airborne before the event”? All members of SQ will appreciate the pregnant significance of this “request”.
I suggest that if the captain had been operating in the morale climate that made possible the thought processes described above, then he would have been able to make reasoned and calm judgment and concluded a delay until post-front conditions prevailed, safe in the knowledge that he would not be “witch hunted” and that his command decision would be accepted without question as that emanating and expected from a seasoned professional.
I would further suggest, in conclusion, that if we only realised it, we do now operate in such a morale climate, post SQ006 (how can SQ now possibly carp at a weather delay decision?) and that, in the characteristic absence of any kind of lead from SQ, we should re-take our responsibility, reassert our professionalism and regain our pride as independent minded highly competent, reliable professionals, to be respected as prized assets. Only if we start thinking of ourselves in this manner can we expect SQ to do so and so stifle our new general’s present derogatory view of us.
Post Script. Danny. If you read this, I do hope that it reinforces to you the wonderful value of your web site and the ability of new technology to disseminate information and ideas between colleagues employed in companies where such dissemination is problematical. Keep up your superb work.
Kindest regards.