Crew Resource Management: The Debate
Guest
Posts: n/a
bunyip
i think the reason FMA call outs are made ,is in case my piece of plastic with wires in, is showing something different to the independently sourced piece of plastic with wires in my copilot islooking at
t
BenThere
agreed. i think
k we may have some similar tee shirts
t
i think the reason FMA call outs are made ,is in case my piece of plastic with wires in, is showing something different to the independently sourced piece of plastic with wires in my copilot islooking at
t
BenThere
agreed. i think
k we may have some similar tee shirts
t
Guest
Posts: n/a
ANYTHING that in any way diminishes Captains Authority, is wrong, dangerous, and a foot in the door for further incursions.
This is especially true in the major airlines where the Captains have gone through a rigid selection process to get hired, then promoted, and then checked, and rechecked, etc......
This is especially true in the major airlines where the Captains have gone through a rigid selection process to get hired, then promoted, and then checked, and rechecked, etc......
Guest
Posts: n/a
Sweeper. There may be something in that, but you can fly the airplane with tape acros the FMA and by observing the basics you can see that the airplane is doing what it should. The FMA is not necessary for safe flight. Again, look at what Boeing says: Monitor the airplane! They do not say Monitor the FMA! Of course, we know better (not!)
Boeing tells you to monitor the speed, alt, heading and EPR. If you (both) do that, you do not need to monitor the FMA.
It is designed to alert you when something changes, and if you are doing your job you will see it, and regard it as confirmation of what you already know. If the FMA is your sole source of information about your airplane performance you have lost the plot. The majority of pilots out there, because of faulty training, are in this category.
When the airplane does a takeoff and SID, you SHOULD monitor that it does as it was programmed to do. Many times (just this morning, in fact) I have had FOs who have not seen a diversion from heading, track or thrust change, because all they monitor is the bloody FMA. If it doesn't happen there, it doesn't happen.
And they ALWAYS miss it when something that should happen doesn't.
We would be safer if the FMA was removed from the airplane, and if that can't be done, let it do it's job and don't call unless it is wrong. That way I just might start listening.
One more comment, if you don't mind; I notice that people who have only seen one way of doing something always defend that way. They are used to it and it works for them, and they do not see the inefficiencies or dangers. When someone like me, who has had the opportunity to see it done the right way (nearly always the way the manufacturer wrote it) they don't even want to listen.
And even though the Ops Manual might be written correctly, there are always those who take extra steps or variations, that have no value and sometimes are negative. But someone sees it and thinks "Ooh, I'd like to do that too!" So that soon everyone is doing it wrong. To the point that eventually the checkers are yelling if you don't do it too!
If you ran a business like that you would be bankrupt in a jiffy.
Boeing tells you to monitor the speed, alt, heading and EPR. If you (both) do that, you do not need to monitor the FMA.
It is designed to alert you when something changes, and if you are doing your job you will see it, and regard it as confirmation of what you already know. If the FMA is your sole source of information about your airplane performance you have lost the plot. The majority of pilots out there, because of faulty training, are in this category.
When the airplane does a takeoff and SID, you SHOULD monitor that it does as it was programmed to do. Many times (just this morning, in fact) I have had FOs who have not seen a diversion from heading, track or thrust change, because all they monitor is the bloody FMA. If it doesn't happen there, it doesn't happen.
And they ALWAYS miss it when something that should happen doesn't.
We would be safer if the FMA was removed from the airplane, and if that can't be done, let it do it's job and don't call unless it is wrong. That way I just might start listening.
One more comment, if you don't mind; I notice that people who have only seen one way of doing something always defend that way. They are used to it and it works for them, and they do not see the inefficiencies or dangers. When someone like me, who has had the opportunity to see it done the right way (nearly always the way the manufacturer wrote it) they don't even want to listen.
And even though the Ops Manual might be written correctly, there are always those who take extra steps or variations, that have no value and sometimes are negative. But someone sees it and thinks "Ooh, I'd like to do that too!" So that soon everyone is doing it wrong. To the point that eventually the checkers are yelling if you don't do it too!
If you ran a business like that you would be bankrupt in a jiffy.
Guest
Posts: n/a
To 411A
You're right. No. 1 should have read "everyone" vice "Captains". Thanks for the point out.
My airline has a bidding feature that allows you to designate by employee number (Captains only) those you don't want to fly with. It's a nice feature although I never used it. I would think if you received a number of "avoid" bids, you would want to take a look at your methods to determine why. Interpersonal skills aren't universal but they are so important in the smooth functioning of a crew. A captain who makes the effort to get everyone on the team is much-loved and highly regarded.
You're right. No. 1 should have read "everyone" vice "Captains". Thanks for the point out.
My airline has a bidding feature that allows you to designate by employee number (Captains only) those you don't want to fly with. It's a nice feature although I never used it. I would think if you received a number of "avoid" bids, you would want to take a look at your methods to determine why. Interpersonal skills aren't universal but they are so important in the smooth functioning of a crew. A captain who makes the effort to get everyone on the team is much-loved and highly regarded.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Esperto. Wrong!
I see from your profile that you are retired.
The dinosaurs died out too.
I've read a lot of that 'when Captains really were captains' bull**** in American magazines.
They were the days but there's no place for it in the modern cock-pit.
Good CRM skills (teamwork) can only ever make a captain's position stronger.
Have a nice day now!
[This message has been edited by Mr moto (edited 12 May 2001).]
I see from your profile that you are retired.
The dinosaurs died out too.
I've read a lot of that 'when Captains really were captains' bull**** in American magazines.
They were the days but there's no place for it in the modern cock-pit.
Good CRM skills (teamwork) can only ever make a captain's position stronger.
Have a nice day now!
[This message has been edited by Mr moto (edited 12 May 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
ESPERTO -
The copilot on Alaska 506 got burned for only questioning the captain's authority, as opposed to going to the back to verify the reality of the passenger oxygen masks. He's still trying to get his license back.
The FAA did an emergency revocation on his license and the NTSB Judge ruled that the copilot , holding an ATP Certificate, "..failed to exercise the highest requisite degree of care and responsibility, pursuant to the safety laws governing airline operations."
At the inquisition - I mean hearing, the flight attendants testified that they went to the cockpit, but never actually told the pilots what was going on in the back and that they were scared. Would a little CRM be in order???
Captain's authority - theoretically absolute; no questions on that.
Now go to the Air Mike Flight 985 case -
www.webpak.net/~skydream
The captain used the regulations, CRM and his automatic and declared emergency authority to effect a safe landing in Hong Kong. He not only got burned by the FAA, but you can't find a record of the event. Amazingly, his first and second officers praised his judgement in applying CRM in their statements. The FAA made the incident disappear. In theory, you need a Freedom of Information Act request to find it; the captain had to send out copies of the original documents to the offices from the white House down through the Inspector General's Office and the Justice department - no investigation. It may have disappeared again. The violation filed on the captain was for a flight taking place 2 days later (fictional. It was a safe landing; that's CRM.
CRM is good for any seat on the aircraft. Debate and rationalization won't change that. History is quite clear. In the past 4 years in the USA, except for EA-990, all the major accidents have been CRM failures. Particularly with respect to rule - 3; "Land as soon as possible." Even Boeing backed that one in hindsight in the Alaska 261 crash.
The bottom line is that CRM saves lives. At least give yourself the opportunity to live long enough to find another profession. CRM does exactly that.
The FAA refuses to push CRM into the cockpits, therefore, the U.S. pilots are on their own; so are the passengers. I recommend living to spend your paycheck; that's CRM.
The copilot on Alaska 506 got burned for only questioning the captain's authority, as opposed to going to the back to verify the reality of the passenger oxygen masks. He's still trying to get his license back.
The FAA did an emergency revocation on his license and the NTSB Judge ruled that the copilot , holding an ATP Certificate, "..failed to exercise the highest requisite degree of care and responsibility, pursuant to the safety laws governing airline operations."
At the inquisition - I mean hearing, the flight attendants testified that they went to the cockpit, but never actually told the pilots what was going on in the back and that they were scared. Would a little CRM be in order???
Captain's authority - theoretically absolute; no questions on that.
Now go to the Air Mike Flight 985 case -
www.webpak.net/~skydream
The captain used the regulations, CRM and his automatic and declared emergency authority to effect a safe landing in Hong Kong. He not only got burned by the FAA, but you can't find a record of the event. Amazingly, his first and second officers praised his judgement in applying CRM in their statements. The FAA made the incident disappear. In theory, you need a Freedom of Information Act request to find it; the captain had to send out copies of the original documents to the offices from the white House down through the Inspector General's Office and the Justice department - no investigation. It may have disappeared again. The violation filed on the captain was for a flight taking place 2 days later (fictional. It was a safe landing; that's CRM.
CRM is good for any seat on the aircraft. Debate and rationalization won't change that. History is quite clear. In the past 4 years in the USA, except for EA-990, all the major accidents have been CRM failures. Particularly with respect to rule - 3; "Land as soon as possible." Even Boeing backed that one in hindsight in the Alaska 261 crash.
The bottom line is that CRM saves lives. At least give yourself the opportunity to live long enough to find another profession. CRM does exactly that.
The FAA refuses to push CRM into the cockpits, therefore, the U.S. pilots are on their own; so are the passengers. I recommend living to spend your paycheck; that's CRM.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Skydrifter - You cite one case, which is a controversial one, and then claim CRM can save lives.
Using the same premise, I could claim it could COST lives.
In this case, as in Swissair and God knows how many others, a F/E would have been invaluable.
Mr. moto - I see from your post you are still a kid - a "pilot" who can't spell "cockpit".
Captains STILL ARE Captains. They will always have their foolish critics.
This is a seperate issue, granted, but it is one which I think should be addressed.
[This message has been edited by I. M. Esperto (edited 13 May 2001).]
Using the same premise, I could claim it could COST lives.
In this case, as in Swissair and God knows how many others, a F/E would have been invaluable.
Mr. moto - I see from your post you are still a kid - a "pilot" who can't spell "cockpit".
Captains STILL ARE Captains. They will always have their foolish critics.
This is a seperate issue, granted, but it is one which I think should be addressed.
[This message has been edited by I. M. Esperto (edited 13 May 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
ESPERTO -
When you can cite the philosophy -
1. Stabilize the situation.
2. Use all available resources.
3. Land as soon as possible.
Adding the element of dynamic communication -
- as having the potential to cause a crash, you have my undivided attention - HOW DOES YOUR SCENARIO WORK???
Conversely, the failure to apply CRM has cost hundreds of lives in the last few years. 229 on SR-111 alone; they didn't land as soon as possible. They screwed around with checklists which couldn't have worked - not the pilot's fault, of course - and tried to dump fuel instead of immediately descending landing when it was clear that they had a major problem. The copilot tried; but the captain's "authority" ruled.
Even Boeing said, "When it takes 35 minutes to arrive at the conclusion to land, something is inherently wrong (checklist time requirement)."
If you've got something concrete to offer, I'm listening, but in the absence, I hope you'll understand that my conviction is that passionately telling a lie doesn't create an iota of truth.
Back to you -
[This message has been edited by SKYDRIFTER (edited 13 May 2001).]
When you can cite the philosophy -
1. Stabilize the situation.
2. Use all available resources.
3. Land as soon as possible.
Adding the element of dynamic communication -
- as having the potential to cause a crash, you have my undivided attention - HOW DOES YOUR SCENARIO WORK???
Conversely, the failure to apply CRM has cost hundreds of lives in the last few years. 229 on SR-111 alone; they didn't land as soon as possible. They screwed around with checklists which couldn't have worked - not the pilot's fault, of course - and tried to dump fuel instead of immediately descending landing when it was clear that they had a major problem. The copilot tried; but the captain's "authority" ruled.
Even Boeing said, "When it takes 35 minutes to arrive at the conclusion to land, something is inherently wrong (checklist time requirement)."
If you've got something concrete to offer, I'm listening, but in the absence, I hope you'll understand that my conviction is that passionately telling a lie doesn't create an iota of truth.
Back to you -
[This message has been edited by SKYDRIFTER (edited 13 May 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
CRM was not even discussed at the time I retired in 1987. I logged 20,000+ hours and never so much as blew a tire or scratched a wingtip.
If it ain't busted. don't try to fix it, as Murphy would say.
I flew F/O with old cranks that I thought were marginal in their abilities and decision making, but I kept my mouth shut, watched, and learned.
It all worked out fine without CRM. It should continue to do so.
ATP B-707, 720, 727, 747, 757, 767, L-1011.
If it ain't busted. don't try to fix it, as Murphy would say.
I flew F/O with old cranks that I thought were marginal in their abilities and decision making, but I kept my mouth shut, watched, and learned.
It all worked out fine without CRM. It should continue to do so.
ATP B-707, 720, 727, 747, 757, 767, L-1011.
Guest
Posts: n/a
ESPERTO -
The rest of us have to fly with an eye to dynamic safety.
I'm not discounting your experience. The concern goes the one's who crashed and why.
Hence; CRM.
No offense intended, but logic and anyone with the experience will tell you that CRM works. Going to the accidents, repeatedly - and criminally on the part of the FAA - when CRM isn't applied, risk is multiplied and CRM failures kill - unnecessarily. The record is clear, even if opinions are clouded.
If you can provide examples of CRM diminishing safety, I'm listening. Please don't confuse ego clashes with CRM.
"Captain, I'm looking at 110.3 as the ILS frequency for the left runway. Are you sure you're on the right plate?" - That's CRM.
"Captain, we've got smoke getting worse back here, we need to land." - That's CRM.
"Captain, we might be able to save the company some money on fuel, but if we get more than four turns in holding or miss the approach, we'll have to go to the alternate. Are you sure you don't want to add fuel?" - That's CRM.
"Captain, we don't have radar in these mountains; the procedure turn is mandatory. I know it's not in out Jepp manual, but it's in the AIM & TERPS manual." - That's CRM.
"Captain, we're diverting for a 'mechanical,' that invokes the emergency authority; we don't need to wait for Customs' permission to land. Let's get this damn thing on the ground." - That's CRM.
I assume it's okay if we use TCAS, that wasn't available in 1987, either.
The rest of us have to fly with an eye to dynamic safety.
I'm not discounting your experience. The concern goes the one's who crashed and why.
Hence; CRM.
No offense intended, but logic and anyone with the experience will tell you that CRM works. Going to the accidents, repeatedly - and criminally on the part of the FAA - when CRM isn't applied, risk is multiplied and CRM failures kill - unnecessarily. The record is clear, even if opinions are clouded.
If you can provide examples of CRM diminishing safety, I'm listening. Please don't confuse ego clashes with CRM.
"Captain, I'm looking at 110.3 as the ILS frequency for the left runway. Are you sure you're on the right plate?" - That's CRM.
"Captain, we've got smoke getting worse back here, we need to land." - That's CRM.
"Captain, we might be able to save the company some money on fuel, but if we get more than four turns in holding or miss the approach, we'll have to go to the alternate. Are you sure you don't want to add fuel?" - That's CRM.
"Captain, we don't have radar in these mountains; the procedure turn is mandatory. I know it's not in out Jepp manual, but it's in the AIM & TERPS manual." - That's CRM.
"Captain, we're diverting for a 'mechanical,' that invokes the emergency authority; we don't need to wait for Customs' permission to land. Let's get this damn thing on the ground." - That's CRM.
I assume it's okay if we use TCAS, that wasn't available in 1987, either.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I work for an airline where the seeds of CRM has grown into an Empire. Yes it is an important safety tool in preventing the preventable...but, it can also become counter productive if allowed to sprawl as ours has. A prime example is the definition of CRM itself, is it: Cockpit Resource Management, Crew Resource Managment or Cabin Crew Resource Management ? I understood it started as the former, developed to the next and now been taken over into the latter.
In our eagerness to break down the barriers in the flight deck and the cabin, we have begun to create a more insidious situation. My airline has always been a 'cabin crew' orientated airline (our boss has seen to that), but, this CRM enhanced 'familiarity' is now breeding contempt.
We were supposed to break down the barriers, not blow the bloody doors off!
In our eagerness to break down the barriers in the flight deck and the cabin, we have begun to create a more insidious situation. My airline has always been a 'cabin crew' orientated airline (our boss has seen to that), but, this CRM enhanced 'familiarity' is now breeding contempt.
We were supposed to break down the barriers, not blow the bloody doors off!
Guest
Posts: n/a
Tom East -
I won't argue that there's a limit to the CRM issue. There's a difference between CRM and power-tripping. As with the sexual harassment stuff, it can get turned into a blind power trip.
As much as I preach the issue, when power-tripping is convoluted as CRM, there's another problem. It's important to separate the two.
I've had a flight attendant over-dramatically describe an unruly passenger as needing cockpit attention. Going back to head off a sky-rage incident, I found only a moderately disgusted passenger who appropriately inferred that he was entitled to be treated with respect. The surrounding passengers suggested that the flight attendant needed a new attitude, as did the other flight attendants.
Conversely, I've had copilots decide that they are in over their heads and ask me to take their landing. I didn't care why they thought what they did; I was glad they made the timely decision.
When the action will clearly enhance safety, go for it.
We're stuck with the fact that good judgement isn't something that can be legislated.
You're correct that distorted issues don't equate to CRM. I would hope that such is academic.
I won't doubt that distorted issues would make another thread.
I won't argue that there's a limit to the CRM issue. There's a difference between CRM and power-tripping. As with the sexual harassment stuff, it can get turned into a blind power trip.
As much as I preach the issue, when power-tripping is convoluted as CRM, there's another problem. It's important to separate the two.
I've had a flight attendant over-dramatically describe an unruly passenger as needing cockpit attention. Going back to head off a sky-rage incident, I found only a moderately disgusted passenger who appropriately inferred that he was entitled to be treated with respect. The surrounding passengers suggested that the flight attendant needed a new attitude, as did the other flight attendants.
Conversely, I've had copilots decide that they are in over their heads and ask me to take their landing. I didn't care why they thought what they did; I was glad they made the timely decision.
When the action will clearly enhance safety, go for it.
We're stuck with the fact that good judgement isn't something that can be legislated.
You're correct that distorted issues don't equate to CRM. I would hope that such is academic.
I won't doubt that distorted issues would make another thread.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Wrong again, Esperto!
There seems to be a misunderstanding between a captain's authority and his responsibility.
It is not a captain which flies an aeroplane assisted by a co-pilot.
That's the shift in modern thinking. There is only one crew. If either member of it screws up, they both screw up, if its not picked up, that is.
You see, the business of flying aeroplanes has changed so much as has the politics of air safety.
Remember the dinosaurs? They couldn't cope with the changing conditions. Your reply stinks all over of dino-dung!
By the way, 'I' before 'E', except after C!
There seems to be a misunderstanding between a captain's authority and his responsibility.
It is not a captain which flies an aeroplane assisted by a co-pilot.
That's the shift in modern thinking. There is only one crew. If either member of it screws up, they both screw up, if its not picked up, that is.
You see, the business of flying aeroplanes has changed so much as has the politics of air safety.
Remember the dinosaurs? They couldn't cope with the changing conditions. Your reply stinks all over of dino-dung!
By the way, 'I' before 'E', except after C!
Guest
Posts: n/a
CRM is a snot-nosed First Officers wet dream.
De-throne the old Captain, and you have anarchy.
Hey kid, next round's yours. I'm switching to a Dry Martini, Bombay Dry, with an olive, straight up.
Pinch that waitress and see if you can get her attention.
De-throne the old Captain, and you have anarchy.
Hey kid, next round's yours. I'm switching to a Dry Martini, Bombay Dry, with an olive, straight up.
Pinch that waitress and see if you can get her attention.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I reckon "bunyip" got to the essence of this subject in his post re the "contamination" of the manufacturers systems and procedures by overzealous Flt OPs and the almost pathological need that most pilots have to demonstrate that "they know better than the other guy".
Who knows better how to fly the aircraft safely, than the manufacturer who built and certified it, you mess with that, at your peril.
FAR25.101 General.
(h) The procedures established under paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section
must--
(1) Be able to be consistently executed in service by crews of average skill;
(2) Use methods or devices that are safe and reliable; and
(3) Include allowance for any time delays, in the execution of the procedures, that may reasonably be expected in service. (my bold)
The recent QF1 was a classic example thereof and I would commend the the "QF1 overun" thread in Dunnunda as an interesting read.
Balancing ego and professional judgement is the trick.
The old joke about doing it "standing up in a hammock" because you can, seems to pervade the issue.
Boeing get right down to the guts of it, "keep it simple when it all turns to grief."
Who knows better how to fly the aircraft safely, than the manufacturer who built and certified it, you mess with that, at your peril.
FAR25.101 General.
(h) The procedures established under paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section
must--
(1) Be able to be consistently executed in service by crews of average skill;
(2) Use methods or devices that are safe and reliable; and
(3) Include allowance for any time delays, in the execution of the procedures, that may reasonably be expected in service. (my bold)
The recent QF1 was a classic example thereof and I would commend the the "QF1 overun" thread in Dunnunda as an interesting read.
Balancing ego and professional judgement is the trick.
The old joke about doing it "standing up in a hammock" because you can, seems to pervade the issue.
Boeing get right down to the guts of it, "keep it simple when it all turns to grief."
Guest
Posts: n/a
Wow, what a lot to comment on.
One problem with the CRM issue is that in it's early stages airlines tried to enforce a kind of cockpit egalitaianism. But there is a heirarchy of authority and responsibility of command in the cockpit of an airliner. The airline I work for has, in my opinion, been backing away from it's early CRM egalitarianism because Captains have felt, and I belive not without merit, that everyone was being allowed to make his decissions for him. I also think that they have been backing away from their early CRM training because CRM was percieved to be no more than two or three individuals getting along. Or- if we're talking then we're communicating. I think that CRM teaching has muddied the waters more than anything. The issue isn't utilizing the resources available; but some very poor training in how to do just that. CRM is getting bigger and bigger. Soon CRM failures in simulator events will be jeopardy events. I don't have a problem with this if the various airline training departments will do their parts to clean up their acts also. QF1 if it's the event I'm thinking was a good example, as has been pointed out, of this. Unfortunately CRM, as it is preached by airlines, has just, in my opinion, become another method to find a scapegoat in the event of an incident or accident. Not at all unlike how pilot error was the catch all excuse for many years. Having said all that I am sure that I have committed grievous blunders in this area. But none of them were intentional. And that is the rub. Communications failures are almost never intentional. Communications failures are ussually the result of some exteranl factor such as fratigue, poor schedulling, conflicting information, etc. A point that I try to empahasise when I fly with a First Officers whom I've never met before is that I want them to tell me if they think I am not doing my job properly. On the other hand I do think it is only fair and proper that a First Officer, Flight Attendant, Mechanic, Dispatcher, etc. treat me with the respect that my responsibility deserves.
One problem with the CRM issue is that in it's early stages airlines tried to enforce a kind of cockpit egalitaianism. But there is a heirarchy of authority and responsibility of command in the cockpit of an airliner. The airline I work for has, in my opinion, been backing away from it's early CRM egalitarianism because Captains have felt, and I belive not without merit, that everyone was being allowed to make his decissions for him. I also think that they have been backing away from their early CRM training because CRM was percieved to be no more than two or three individuals getting along. Or- if we're talking then we're communicating. I think that CRM teaching has muddied the waters more than anything. The issue isn't utilizing the resources available; but some very poor training in how to do just that. CRM is getting bigger and bigger. Soon CRM failures in simulator events will be jeopardy events. I don't have a problem with this if the various airline training departments will do their parts to clean up their acts also. QF1 if it's the event I'm thinking was a good example, as has been pointed out, of this. Unfortunately CRM, as it is preached by airlines, has just, in my opinion, become another method to find a scapegoat in the event of an incident or accident. Not at all unlike how pilot error was the catch all excuse for many years. Having said all that I am sure that I have committed grievous blunders in this area. But none of them were intentional. And that is the rub. Communications failures are almost never intentional. Communications failures are ussually the result of some exteranl factor such as fratigue, poor schedulling, conflicting information, etc. A point that I try to empahasise when I fly with a First Officers whom I've never met before is that I want them to tell me if they think I am not doing my job properly. On the other hand I do think it is only fair and proper that a First Officer, Flight Attendant, Mechanic, Dispatcher, etc. treat me with the respect that my responsibility deserves.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Every time I flew I would make a comment to my F/O and F/E to the effect that they should not hesitate to point out something wrong, if they saw it.
I briefed the Cockpit F/A to let me know if there was something amiss in the cabin that I should be aware of.
That's called "Common Sense".
[This message has been edited by I. M. Esperto (edited 14 May 2001).]
I briefed the Cockpit F/A to let me know if there was something amiss in the cabin that I should be aware of.
That's called "Common Sense".
[This message has been edited by I. M. Esperto (edited 14 May 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
Yep. I gave you just enough rope to hang yourself with,
It was a snot-nosed first officer who was flying with an 'old' captain with marginal ability and decision-making skills who got killed along with everyone else in the Trident accident at Heathrow back in the early '70's.
He was probably just watching and learning.
They are your words. I rest my case.
It was a snot-nosed first officer who was flying with an 'old' captain with marginal ability and decision-making skills who got killed along with everyone else in the Trident accident at Heathrow back in the early '70's.
He was probably just watching and learning.
They are your words. I rest my case.