Gulf 072 report out next week?
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ExEng...Thank you for your post. I have read the Trident report and have it here.
IMHO...I feel the Somatogravic illusion kills by rendering all the flightdeck incapable of action and it requires a number of steps into its jaws.
I agree with Ironbutt that the way to avoid taking these steps is to stick closely to Sop.
However this assumes the Sop and training are correct??
If not the sops provide and assist the first step closer to a Somatogravic illusion and accident.
In the Trident case I suggest dumping the droops and getting the stick push and the auto pilot disconecting, all in IMC, accelerating,then not, climbing rapidly then not, were sufficient to render four of Britains most highly trained low vis pilots, well used to instrument scan incapable of redeploying the droops, or comprehending what they had actually done, what was happening and simply reversing their last actions i.e. redploy the droops, reconnect the autopilot,and reset the stick push override.
Had a stick push ever killed a Trident crew?
I feel something sinister overtook this entire highly trained crew, and it also overtook the 3 Gulf Air A320 pilots on GF072.
I do not accept (yet) "They F....d up" or "They never should have been hired" as a worthy or concluding tribute to these seven pilots.
There were three A320 pilots on the Gf072 flight deck and a series of events I feel also took them well into the Somatogravic jaws.
They were all,(like all of the Trident crew) rendered incapable of proper flap action, autopilot engagement, or manual instrument flying when overtaken by this illusion.
On a positive note I hope Gulf Air will now discourage high speed below ten requests in the speed restricted airspaces.
Will go back to the 1974 company sops regarding the acceptence of night nonprecision approaches around the Gulf which were introduced after two similar fatal accidents on the RW12 Vor Bah.
Hold a seminar for their pilots on the "Black Hole" effect and the "Somatogravic" illusion on aircrew and aircraft operation.
Brief Atc on the dangers of multiple,high speed, instructions and questioning crews at low altitude during approaches and go arounds and immediatly on main gear touchdown on landings, especially in bad weather or at night.
Introduce a Star arrival from Saudi airspace to intercept the Rw 12 Vor final.
Or better still put an ILs onto RW12 as suggested by an Australian flight safety
proffesional.
Put an ILs on RW16 at Doha which is also a trap in low vis.
All of the above IMHO will be helpful to any remaining Gulf Air pilots.
IMHO...I feel the Somatogravic illusion kills by rendering all the flightdeck incapable of action and it requires a number of steps into its jaws.
I agree with Ironbutt that the way to avoid taking these steps is to stick closely to Sop.
However this assumes the Sop and training are correct??
If not the sops provide and assist the first step closer to a Somatogravic illusion and accident.
In the Trident case I suggest dumping the droops and getting the stick push and the auto pilot disconecting, all in IMC, accelerating,then not, climbing rapidly then not, were sufficient to render four of Britains most highly trained low vis pilots, well used to instrument scan incapable of redeploying the droops, or comprehending what they had actually done, what was happening and simply reversing their last actions i.e. redploy the droops, reconnect the autopilot,and reset the stick push override.
Had a stick push ever killed a Trident crew?
I feel something sinister overtook this entire highly trained crew, and it also overtook the 3 Gulf Air A320 pilots on GF072.
I do not accept (yet) "They F....d up" or "They never should have been hired" as a worthy or concluding tribute to these seven pilots.
There were three A320 pilots on the Gf072 flight deck and a series of events I feel also took them well into the Somatogravic jaws.
They were all,(like all of the Trident crew) rendered incapable of proper flap action, autopilot engagement, or manual instrument flying when overtaken by this illusion.
On a positive note I hope Gulf Air will now discourage high speed below ten requests in the speed restricted airspaces.
Will go back to the 1974 company sops regarding the acceptence of night nonprecision approaches around the Gulf which were introduced after two similar fatal accidents on the RW12 Vor Bah.
Hold a seminar for their pilots on the "Black Hole" effect and the "Somatogravic" illusion on aircrew and aircraft operation.
Brief Atc on the dangers of multiple,high speed, instructions and questioning crews at low altitude during approaches and go arounds and immediatly on main gear touchdown on landings, especially in bad weather or at night.
Introduce a Star arrival from Saudi airspace to intercept the Rw 12 Vor final.
Or better still put an ILs onto RW12 as suggested by an Australian flight safety
proffesional.
Put an ILs on RW16 at Doha which is also a trap in low vis.
All of the above IMHO will be helpful to any remaining Gulf Air pilots.
Join Date: Feb 2000
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If you want to find out about Samatographic illusions, go and talk to any military fighter pilot that has been involved in low-level intercepts at night or in a cloud over the sea.
A routine part of military instrument training and civilian (I hope) is to stress that the instruments do not lie. In addition, the Military's Aviation Medicine specialists brief their pilots about the effects of Samatographic Illusions. By the time you reach the front-line, you have seen the video and got the tee-shirt. If you follow the wise words you will be ok.
Teaching egg-sucking, illusions do happen, so you fly attitude and then check the performance instruments to make certain that you are flying the required profile whilst monitoring the radar. On a typical intercept profile the aircraft could be descending from 8 or 9000' to 1000', whilst in a 70 Degree banked turn, pulling around 3-4g and accelerating from 300 to 550+ knots in full reheat. Trust me, from personal experience, the pitch up sensation is immense, far worse than you could ever experience in a commercial aircraft. Therefore, you believe the instruments as you were taught to do.
When you can't crack it, you roll off the bank and recover the aircraft, aborting the intercept (or approach?), because you are smart enough to realise that it is your little pink body that is at stake if you screw up.
Do not get me wrong, I have full sympathy for all of those involved in the Bahrain tragedy. However, a samatographic illusion is just that. Yes, it could occur off Bahrain in the blackhole over the Gulf but not if the crew are flying a sensible safe commercial profile. And even then, if the pilot has been correctly trained and carries out an effective instrument scan it is not an issue.
From what I have said above, it would be easy to assume that Aviation Medicine training (or lack of) might be a root cause of this incident. It might be a contributary factor but perhaps it would be more pertinent to look at the decision making of the Captain. I know of few commercial pilots (yes I am one now) that when they have screwed up the approach would then try to visually reposition for another go rather than taking ATC vectors downwind and setting up again. We are all human, we all make mistakes but the key is to trap the errors and to have the humility to take corrective action before the snowball gets rolling.
I hate all the speculation that surrounds the cause of the accidents before the board releases its findings. Lets let the men with the facts come up with their report and then feel free to dispute them. You never know, they might actually admit what really happened...
May they all rest in peace.
A routine part of military instrument training and civilian (I hope) is to stress that the instruments do not lie. In addition, the Military's Aviation Medicine specialists brief their pilots about the effects of Samatographic Illusions. By the time you reach the front-line, you have seen the video and got the tee-shirt. If you follow the wise words you will be ok.
Teaching egg-sucking, illusions do happen, so you fly attitude and then check the performance instruments to make certain that you are flying the required profile whilst monitoring the radar. On a typical intercept profile the aircraft could be descending from 8 or 9000' to 1000', whilst in a 70 Degree banked turn, pulling around 3-4g and accelerating from 300 to 550+ knots in full reheat. Trust me, from personal experience, the pitch up sensation is immense, far worse than you could ever experience in a commercial aircraft. Therefore, you believe the instruments as you were taught to do.
When you can't crack it, you roll off the bank and recover the aircraft, aborting the intercept (or approach?), because you are smart enough to realise that it is your little pink body that is at stake if you screw up.
Do not get me wrong, I have full sympathy for all of those involved in the Bahrain tragedy. However, a samatographic illusion is just that. Yes, it could occur off Bahrain in the blackhole over the Gulf but not if the crew are flying a sensible safe commercial profile. And even then, if the pilot has been correctly trained and carries out an effective instrument scan it is not an issue.
From what I have said above, it would be easy to assume that Aviation Medicine training (or lack of) might be a root cause of this incident. It might be a contributary factor but perhaps it would be more pertinent to look at the decision making of the Captain. I know of few commercial pilots (yes I am one now) that when they have screwed up the approach would then try to visually reposition for another go rather than taking ATC vectors downwind and setting up again. We are all human, we all make mistakes but the key is to trap the errors and to have the humility to take corrective action before the snowball gets rolling.
I hate all the speculation that surrounds the cause of the accidents before the board releases its findings. Lets let the men with the facts come up with their report and then feel free to dispute them. You never know, they might actually admit what really happened...
May they all rest in peace.
Join Date: Aug 2001
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Well, llamas was just a cria when the Staines wreck happened, but I do seem to recall that evidence given at the inquiry indicated that Captain Keyes had been involved in an argument with a fellow employee (in relation to the impending industrial action) less than an hour before take-off - described, as I recall, by an observer, as the most violent argument he'd ever seen.
Was it not suggested at the time that either
a) the confrontation that Capatin Keyes engaged in was so violent that it led to the heart attack that he later suffered? or
b) the First Officer, whose name, I fear, escapes me, but who witnessed the entire incident, was so intimidated by what he saw that he was inhibited from questioning Captain Keyes' actions during the climb-out, specifically, the incorrect manipulation of the slats?
Looking to learn.
llater,
llamas
Was it not suggested at the time that either
a) the confrontation that Capatin Keyes engaged in was so violent that it led to the heart attack that he later suffered? or
b) the First Officer, whose name, I fear, escapes me, but who witnessed the entire incident, was so intimidated by what he saw that he was inhibited from questioning Captain Keyes' actions during the climb-out, specifically, the incorrect manipulation of the slats?
Looking to learn.
llater,
llamas
