FedEx MD-10 MEM
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FedEx MD-10 MEM
FedEx jet skidded on pilot 'check'
NTSB inquiry reveals earlier problems of first officer
By Bartholomew Sullivan
Contact
May 26, 2004
WASHINGTON - Two minutes before a pre-Christmas FedEx flight from Oakland to
Memphis made a hard landing that bucked its right landing gear, the captain
joked to the first officer he was evaluating to "keep it out of the grass."
"I'll do my very best," First Officer Robyn S. Sclair responded, chuckling,
according to a cockpit voice recorder.
But it was not to be. At 12:26 p.m. on December 18, the 358,000-pound MD-10,
battling headwinds after a brief wind shear alert, hit the runway on its
left landing gear first, traveled 58 feet, then landed hard on the right
landing gear.
After rolling about 2,800 feet, the right landing gear collapsed, the plane
skidded off the runway and into the grass, and caught fire. Of the two crew
and five passengers, two received minor injuries, including Sclair, who had
rope burns from a cockpit escape.
While the accident remains under investigation, and no conclusions or
recommendations have been issued, the National Transportation Safety Board
released factual findings on the accident on Tuesday. They indicate that at
the time of the accident, Sclair was undergoing a company-mandated multi-leg
"line check," or supervised evaluation, after deviating from an assigned
altitude over England a month earlier.
The report reveals that Sclair, with FedEx since 1996, had received two
previous unsatisfactory proficiency ratings on MD-11s in 1999 and 2001, but
had received additional training and received satisfactory ratings both
times.
Interviews the NTSB did with an unidentified FedEx pilot indicated that she
had been late to work three out of 10 times in August and had received an
advisory letter from company officials on Dec. 8 warning against tardiness.
In 1994, an unidentified previous employer indicated unsatisfactory
proficiency ratings that year were the result of Sclair's "generally poor
airmanship"
Efforts to reach both Sclair and Capt. Richard W. Redditt through the Air
Line Pilots Association were unsuccessful Tuesday. Both are on paid leave
and are not flying pending the outcome of the investigation and an internal
company probe, said FedEx spokesman Kristin S. Krause.
No damage cost estimates are available, Krause said.
The cockpit voice recorder also indicates that Redditt told an unidentified
jumpseat passenger before the flight that Sclair had been coughing "like
crazy" on previous legs of the Memphis-Indianapolis-Oakland flight and that
he thought she might have pneumonia.
In response to a garbled comment from the jumpseater, Redditt adds: "I think
she would have if it hadn't been so much scrutiny on this line check." The
recording picks up constant coughing and throat-clearing from Sclair as the
plane descends over Arkansas into Memphis.
"Whatever happens today, I want to see a stable approach at 1,000 feet,"
Redditt tells Sclair as she begins the descent. If the plane isn't stable,
she's to "go around" again, he says. "No problem there," she answers.
It was just a few days before Christmas and it was a blustery, gusty day as
Flight 647 descended over Gilmore, Ark. An automated warning system alerted
the crew to wind shear conditions at about 1,900 feet. But before it touched
down, the plane appeared to passengers and Redditt to be properly oriented.
On the ground, after the landing gear collapsed, the right wing caught fire
and the plane had to be evacuated. When the inflatable escape slide was
deployed, however, wind gusts blew it under the fuselage. The crew and five
passengers had to escape through cockpit windows. Besides Sclair's rope
burns, another passenger fell, injuring a shoulder.
Before escaping, an amateur video obtained by the NTSB showed, those inside
threw personal belongings, including Christmas presents, from the plane. In
the wake of the accident, FedEx issued a directive that crews were to exit
as expeditiously as possible in an emergency and not take unnecessary risks
to salvage personal baggage.
The accident also resulted in a Federal Aviation Administration advisory.
Because the airport rescue crews expected only three crew, total, and seven
people escaped the flight, the FAA recommended cargo operators provide
personnel manifests for all incoming flights.
NTSB inquiry reveals earlier problems of first officer
By Bartholomew Sullivan
Contact
May 26, 2004
WASHINGTON - Two minutes before a pre-Christmas FedEx flight from Oakland to
Memphis made a hard landing that bucked its right landing gear, the captain
joked to the first officer he was evaluating to "keep it out of the grass."
"I'll do my very best," First Officer Robyn S. Sclair responded, chuckling,
according to a cockpit voice recorder.
But it was not to be. At 12:26 p.m. on December 18, the 358,000-pound MD-10,
battling headwinds after a brief wind shear alert, hit the runway on its
left landing gear first, traveled 58 feet, then landed hard on the right
landing gear.
After rolling about 2,800 feet, the right landing gear collapsed, the plane
skidded off the runway and into the grass, and caught fire. Of the two crew
and five passengers, two received minor injuries, including Sclair, who had
rope burns from a cockpit escape.
While the accident remains under investigation, and no conclusions or
recommendations have been issued, the National Transportation Safety Board
released factual findings on the accident on Tuesday. They indicate that at
the time of the accident, Sclair was undergoing a company-mandated multi-leg
"line check," or supervised evaluation, after deviating from an assigned
altitude over England a month earlier.
The report reveals that Sclair, with FedEx since 1996, had received two
previous unsatisfactory proficiency ratings on MD-11s in 1999 and 2001, but
had received additional training and received satisfactory ratings both
times.
Interviews the NTSB did with an unidentified FedEx pilot indicated that she
had been late to work three out of 10 times in August and had received an
advisory letter from company officials on Dec. 8 warning against tardiness.
In 1994, an unidentified previous employer indicated unsatisfactory
proficiency ratings that year were the result of Sclair's "generally poor
airmanship"
Efforts to reach both Sclair and Capt. Richard W. Redditt through the Air
Line Pilots Association were unsuccessful Tuesday. Both are on paid leave
and are not flying pending the outcome of the investigation and an internal
company probe, said FedEx spokesman Kristin S. Krause.
No damage cost estimates are available, Krause said.
The cockpit voice recorder also indicates that Redditt told an unidentified
jumpseat passenger before the flight that Sclair had been coughing "like
crazy" on previous legs of the Memphis-Indianapolis-Oakland flight and that
he thought she might have pneumonia.
In response to a garbled comment from the jumpseater, Redditt adds: "I think
she would have if it hadn't been so much scrutiny on this line check." The
recording picks up constant coughing and throat-clearing from Sclair as the
plane descends over Arkansas into Memphis.
"Whatever happens today, I want to see a stable approach at 1,000 feet,"
Redditt tells Sclair as she begins the descent. If the plane isn't stable,
she's to "go around" again, he says. "No problem there," she answers.
It was just a few days before Christmas and it was a blustery, gusty day as
Flight 647 descended over Gilmore, Ark. An automated warning system alerted
the crew to wind shear conditions at about 1,900 feet. But before it touched
down, the plane appeared to passengers and Redditt to be properly oriented.
On the ground, after the landing gear collapsed, the right wing caught fire
and the plane had to be evacuated. When the inflatable escape slide was
deployed, however, wind gusts blew it under the fuselage. The crew and five
passengers had to escape through cockpit windows. Besides Sclair's rope
burns, another passenger fell, injuring a shoulder.
Before escaping, an amateur video obtained by the NTSB showed, those inside
threw personal belongings, including Christmas presents, from the plane. In
the wake of the accident, FedEx issued a directive that crews were to exit
as expeditiously as possible in an emergency and not take unnecessary risks
to salvage personal baggage.
The accident also resulted in a Federal Aviation Administration advisory.
Because the airport rescue crews expected only three crew, total, and seven
people escaped the flight, the FAA recommended cargo operators provide
personnel manifests for all incoming flights.
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>>"They indicate that at the time of the accident, Sclair was undergoing a company-mandated multi-leg "line check," or supervised evaluation, after deviating from an assigned altitude over England a month earlier.
The report reveals that Sclair, with FedEx since 1996, had received two previous unsatisfactory proficiency ratings on MD 11s in 1999 and 2001, but had received additional training and received satisfactory ratings both times.
Interviews the NTSB did with an unidentified FedEx pilot indicated that she had been late to work three out of 10 times in August and had received an advisory letter from company officials on Dec. 8 warning against tardiness. In 1994, an unidentified previous employer indicated unsatisfactory proficiency ratings that year were the result of Sclair's "generally poor airmanship"<<
In fairness to Ms. Sclair, she may have been hired at a much lower experience level than her male colleagues to promote gender diversity, a common practice in the U.S. aviation workplace. A few "unsatisfactory proficiency ratings" from a previous employer would normally keep a non-diverse male applicant from being hired at a major carrier, even a cargo operator like FedEx. U.S. airlines have been required to do background checks including training information for the past several years.
The report reveals that Sclair, with FedEx since 1996, had received two previous unsatisfactory proficiency ratings on MD 11s in 1999 and 2001, but had received additional training and received satisfactory ratings both times.
Interviews the NTSB did with an unidentified FedEx pilot indicated that she had been late to work three out of 10 times in August and had received an advisory letter from company officials on Dec. 8 warning against tardiness. In 1994, an unidentified previous employer indicated unsatisfactory proficiency ratings that year were the result of Sclair's "generally poor airmanship"<<
In fairness to Ms. Sclair, she may have been hired at a much lower experience level than her male colleagues to promote gender diversity, a common practice in the U.S. aviation workplace. A few "unsatisfactory proficiency ratings" from a previous employer would normally keep a non-diverse male applicant from being hired at a major carrier, even a cargo operator like FedEx. U.S. airlines have been required to do background checks including training information for the past several years.
In fairness to Ms. Sclair, she may have been hired at a much lower experience level than her male colleagues to promote gender diversit
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Hmmm, same goes for ATC where I come from. Now, let me be the first to say that 99% of our qualified lady ATCOs are top shelf controllers. However, there is much more tolerance and patience given to lady trainees than the blokeys. Some of the girls have been way by their sell-by date before their training has eventually been terminated. In some cases they already held a sector validation.
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The women I have flown with at FedEx were all highly qualified. This is quite a slam on their work experience and expertise.
What about the white males involved in the 727 crash in Tallahassee and the MD-11 crash in Newark?
How about somebody does a study on accident rate versus being hired at lower or higher qualifications? Is there any evidence about these assertions or is it just something to bitch about? I welcome the facts.
MS
What about the white males involved in the 727 crash in Tallahassee and the MD-11 crash in Newark?
How about somebody does a study on accident rate versus being hired at lower or higher qualifications? Is there any evidence about these assertions or is it just something to bitch about? I welcome the facts.
MS
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>>How about somebody does a study on accident rate versus being hired at lower or higher qualifications?<<
Sadly, FedEx has had enough hull loss accidents in recent years to do a study in house...
Sadly, FedEx has had enough hull loss accidents in recent years to do a study in house...
Unfortunately this made headlines in at least one newspaper. It seems to me that the media could report the story without stating the names of the pilots. Remember the song by Don Henley (former Eagles), "Dirty Laundry", with his sharp critiques of television news channel reporting ? "...see the bubble-headed bleach blonde, comes on at five, she can tell you 'bout a plane crash, with a gleam in her eye.......you know I could have been an actor, but I wound up here......get the widow on the set, we need dirty laundry....".
Why do papers find it necessary to publish the names?
All I know is that there but for the grace of God go others...
Why do papers find it necessary to publish the names?
All I know is that there but for the grace of God go others...
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The US does, I agree, conduct its business in a very public fashion... naming names all over the place. A quick google of the unfortunate copilot's name reveals that she's quite the published GA writer. One or two of her articles are pretty good, actually.
Sounds like she felt like s*** and was up to her elbows in unpredictable weather. I for one wish her well.
Sounds like she felt like s*** and was up to her elbows in unpredictable weather. I for one wish her well.
“Hopefully our non-blame aviation society will address the problem and not the person”; lomapaseo 27 May. I agree, but with little confidence that ‘hope’ alone will succeed.
During the accident landing what were the other crew members doing? Surely if the weather conditions were unfavourable for continuing an evaluation then the Captain / Examiner should have curtailed the check. Why didn’t the Captain take over if the landing was not progressing as expected? An examiner cannot just sit back and let a poor landing deteriorate into a bad one; he has a role to play and a responsibility to intervene. The industry accepts that first officers may have reduced capability or judgement with respect to that of a captain; that is one reason we have captains.
Furthermore, from the originating incident, an alt bust, the outcome implied blame on the first officer, what was the captain doing during that incident.
At worst, the First Officer could be criticised for poor judgement of personal capability in the prevailing conditions or failing to alert the captain of such concerns … but then who amongst us would have taken such a (career limiting) decision?
As lomapaseo states our non-blame aviation society will address the problem, but what is, or where does “the problem” originate from? Is it an industry wide attitude, the regulators, the operators, or all of us? We are only human. Who will address the problem? Is an industry-wide culture change required, we all talk ‘no blame’ culture, but how many practice it? I hope that it does not take another major accident to introduce the necessary culture shock.
Yet who am I to seek these answers, for in doing so I seek to blame someone other than myself.
During the accident landing what were the other crew members doing? Surely if the weather conditions were unfavourable for continuing an evaluation then the Captain / Examiner should have curtailed the check. Why didn’t the Captain take over if the landing was not progressing as expected? An examiner cannot just sit back and let a poor landing deteriorate into a bad one; he has a role to play and a responsibility to intervene. The industry accepts that first officers may have reduced capability or judgement with respect to that of a captain; that is one reason we have captains.
Furthermore, from the originating incident, an alt bust, the outcome implied blame on the first officer, what was the captain doing during that incident.
At worst, the First Officer could be criticised for poor judgement of personal capability in the prevailing conditions or failing to alert the captain of such concerns … but then who amongst us would have taken such a (career limiting) decision?
As lomapaseo states our non-blame aviation society will address the problem, but what is, or where does “the problem” originate from? Is it an industry wide attitude, the regulators, the operators, or all of us? We are only human. Who will address the problem? Is an industry-wide culture change required, we all talk ‘no blame’ culture, but how many practice it? I hope that it does not take another major accident to introduce the necessary culture shock.
Yet who am I to seek these answers, for in doing so I seek to blame someone other than myself.
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It is HIGH time that operators (read...airlines) crack down bigtime on pilots who, for whatever reason, cannot cut the mustard, and perform to the accepted normal standard.
Cut the [email protected] right...otherwise, find another job.
For the individual in question, suspect a 'don't come Monday' letter was rather long overdue.
Cut the [email protected] right...otherwise, find another job.
For the individual in question, suspect a 'don't come Monday' letter was rather long overdue.
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Was this an MD10 or MD11?
There seem to have been a few cases of them falling apart with spar/gear failures in the past......... a previous Fedex, Mandarin in HKG, and I seem to recall some discussion as to spar strength. Perhaps this heavy arrival was just unlucky enough to find a weak spot.
As always, it's a shame to see so many join the lynch mob rather than waiting for the report.
Nearlybeentheredonethat
There seem to have been a few cases of them falling apart with spar/gear failures in the past......... a previous Fedex, Mandarin in HKG, and I seem to recall some discussion as to spar strength. Perhaps this heavy arrival was just unlucky enough to find a weak spot.
As always, it's a shame to see so many join the lynch mob rather than waiting for the report.
Nearlybeentheredonethat
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Yes, it was an MD-10. To my knowledge, the MD-10 is a cockpit and systems monitoring upgrade (no FE on MD-10’s) only. No structural upgrade.
The one large difference in failure modes between this (MEM) and the EWR MD-11 accident….in MEM the RH gear catastrophically failed – the unit broke into six pieces. In EWR, the spar failed (from loads transmitted through the gear). Touchdown of the RH main (MEM) was estimated to occur in the area of 14.5 fps (870 FPM). And in a crab.
The factual docket released does not seem to address (or I haven’t found it yet) whether the gear should have failed in this scenario (exceeded design limits, etc.) – that will be saved for the final report.
The one large difference in failure modes between this (MEM) and the EWR MD-11 accident….in MEM the RH gear catastrophically failed – the unit broke into six pieces. In EWR, the spar failed (from loads transmitted through the gear). Touchdown of the RH main (MEM) was estimated to occur in the area of 14.5 fps (870 FPM). And in a crab.
The factual docket released does not seem to address (or I haven’t found it yet) whether the gear should have failed in this scenario (exceeded design limits, etc.) – that will be saved for the final report.
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in MEM the RH gear catastrophically failed – the unit broke into six pieces
Does anybody have any more detailed info, or care to comment?
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Touchdown of the RH main (MEM) was estimated to occur in the area of 14.5 fps (870 FPM). And in a crab.
Larry in TN "the touchdown was in excess of certification limits.", but the design limit (when it breaks) should be 1.5x cert limit – 900 ft/min (15 ft/sec).
Clear_Prop you may wish to research the accident history of all MD10 & MD11 aircraft accidents involving gear / structural failure at touchdown; it does not make comfortable reading.
Whereas most aircraft structural designs will enable the gear to detach from the airframe where limit load is exceeded, the Boeing South aircraft appear to break the wing structure first, and in some cases if one wing is still at flight speed the aircraft turns over.
Clear_Prop you may wish to research the accident history of all MD10 & MD11 aircraft accidents involving gear / structural failure at touchdown; it does not make comfortable reading.
Whereas most aircraft structural designs will enable the gear to detach from the airframe where limit load is exceeded, the Boeing South aircraft appear to break the wing structure first, and in some cases if one wing is still at flight speed the aircraft turns over.
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>>but the design limit (when it breaks) should be 1.5x cert limit – 900 ft/min (15 ft/sec).<<
Yep, it broke pretty much as advertised this time.
>>you may wish to research the accident history of all MD10 & MD11 aircraft accidents involving gear / structural failure at touchdown; it does not make comfortable reading.<<
Here's a discussion of Mad Dog safety (actually the MD-11 but FedEx, gusty landings and gear failure are prominently mentioned):
http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/faq9.htm
It's probably a good thing that the MD-11 is used mostly for freight these days...
Yep, it broke pretty much as advertised this time.
>>you may wish to research the accident history of all MD10 & MD11 aircraft accidents involving gear / structural failure at touchdown; it does not make comfortable reading.<<
Here's a discussion of Mad Dog safety (actually the MD-11 but FedEx, gusty landings and gear failure are prominently mentioned):
http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/faq9.htm
It's probably a good thing that the MD-11 is used mostly for freight these days...