Flight Deck Security Doors
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Skagness on the beach
Posts: 882
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Flight Deck Security Doors
Those doors are only going to stop a very stupid hyjacker or terrorist.
New Doors Causing Cockpit Problems
Los Angeles Times 12/14/03
author: Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar
author: Richard O'Reilly
Copyright 2003 / The Times Mirror Company
WASHINGTON -- American Airlines Flight 2885 to Orange County was 35,000 feet over Kansas when the captain was banged on the head, leaving him unable to fly the plane. A 12-pound panel in one of the new fortified cockpit doors had suddenly popped open and struck him.
British Airways Flight 146 from Calcutta to London was cruising over Europe when the pilots noticed a burning smell. Unable to find its source, the captain declared an emergency. The pilots donned oxygen masks and landed the Boeing 747 in Latvia. The problem: an overheated electrical component in a new anti-hijacking door.
The incidents this year are examples of glitches that suggest the new "fortress" cockpit doors are hardly foolproof. Publicly available documents show there have been at least 35 reported incidents involving problems with the operation of the doors since August 2002.
Even as industry and government fix operational problems, some pilots are questioning the overall design of the doors. They must be opened for pilots to use the bathroom and receive food and drink, creating a clear vulnerability. United Airlines is considering a second barrier -- perhaps a Kevlar net -- for better security.
The fortified doors, required by U.S. and international aviation authorities after the Sept. 11 attacks, were designed to withstand extreme pounding and a hail of bullets. Developed and installed in record time, they are considered a crucial defense in the war on terrorism.
But the security door might be opened a dozen or more times on a long flight, said Robert M. Semprini, a New York-based Boeing 737 co-pilot who often flies from coast to coast. "That's a huge loophole," he said.
"If a passenger sees a pilot walk out of the cockpit to go to the lavatory, they know the guy's got to go back in," said Semprini, who has proposed his own design for backup doors.
The Federal Aviation Administration said the fortified doors are a vast improvement over their flimsy predecessors. Some minor glitches were to be expected, but all problems have been or are being resolved, the agency said -- with no compromise of security or safety.
"We do not see any type of problem regarding the doors in the U.S. fleet," said Alison Duquette, an FAA spokeswoman. "They are working very well."
However, FAA Associate Administrator Nicholas Sabatini recently described the door requirements as "the minimum acceptable" standard.
"A company or airline may develop a design that exceeds the existing requirements [and], for example, provides for a secondary barrier door," Sabatini wrote in a June 23 letter to Semprini.
"We can't rely on the assumption that a secure cockpit has been guaranteed by the doors that were put in," said Robert W. Poole Jr., director of transportation studies at the Los Angeles-based Reason Foundation. "We haven't finished dealing with the problem."
The Times reviewed reports on an incident being investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board and another case handled by its British counterpart, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
The Times also examined a NASA database known as the Aviation Safety Reporting System for problems with cockpit doors from 2001 to 2003. Prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, there were two reports of problems. There were dozens of reports after fortified doors were installed, but those that involved simple errors by crews were not counted.
In addition to running the space program, NASA conducts aeronautic research. Its data, intended to provide early warning of aviation safety problems, does not identify the airline involved in an incident.
Some of the security breaches described in the NASA data were peculiar. A Boeing 737 was descending toward Portland International Airport in Oregon in June when a passenger stuck his head in the cockpit and said, "Captain, your door is not secure." He then shut the door and returned to his seat.
The crew reported that the door had been firmly closed, the cockpit lock switch was activated, and a warning light that would indicate a problem was off. The passenger left the plane before the pilots could talk to him.
More than 10,000 domestic and foreign planes serving the United States were equipped with fortified cockpit doors to meet an April 9 deadline set by the FAA. About 15 manufacturers used a variety of designs to meet federal standards. The doors typically are made of high-strength composite materials and cost $30,000 to $50,000. Taxpayers contributed about $13,000 per door to U.S. airlines.
In addition to their security features, the fortified doors have a safety role in the event of a serious decompression of the cockpit during flight. In some designs, large "blow-out" panels fitted in the door automatically swing open. These decompression panels are intended to prevent sudden stresses on the fuselage that could cause an in-flight breakup.
It was a blow-out panel on a Boeing 757 door that injured the captain of American Flight 2885 -- and prompted the FAA to issue a mandatory repair order affecting 2,089 planes worldwide with the same design.
Flight 2885 was bound for John Wayne Airport from St. Louis on the morning of June 10, with 93 passengers and a crew of five. A flight attendant had just handed the crew a tray of refreshments and was attempting to secure the cockpit door. The captain was on his feet, helping.
Suddenly, the door's upper blow-out panel -- about the size of a hefty cutting board -- popped open and swung down toward the captain's face.
"The captain received a 1-inch-long cut on his head ... rendering him incapacitated, " according to an NTSB summary. Although conscious, the captain was unable to do his job, and the first officer diverted the plane to Denver. The accident is under investigation.
NASA's database recorded a similar incident in December 2002 in which a co-pilot was injured. The FAA said it was aware of nine cases of blow-out panels inadvertently opening at the time it issued its repair order.
The company that made the doors for the Boeing 757, C&D Aerospace of Huntington Beach, said it suspects the cause of the problem was that some of its doors were improperly installed.
Nonetheless, C&D issued a service bulletin recommending a repair. "We added a strap on the back side of the latches, so when you slam the door, [the panel] wouldn't pop open," said Tom McFarland, an executive vice president for the firm.
The FAA made the repair mandatory in a July 10 directive that said, "An unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design." American Airlines spokesman Tim Wagner said the problem was corrected on all the carrier's planes and there were no further incidents.
Triggering a decompression panel automatically would create an opening in the cockpit door, but McFarland said that would not be a security risk. A pilot could just swing the panel back into place and it would lock again, he said.
The company also had to deal with cases of doors that appeared to be locked, but suddenly swung open on takeoff -- a problem commonly reported to NASA.
The cause probably was a brief interruption of power to a latching mechanism that holds the doors shut, McFarland said. The electrical interruption would have occurred before departure, when the aircraft switched from auxiliary to engine power.
"We ended up putting a different micro-switch in there that bridged the gap," said McFarland, and that appears to have solved the problem. Nonetheless, some pilots said they still make extra careful checks to avoid embarrassing themselves and alarming passengers if a door were to open on departure.
C&D is not the only company that has had to fix glitches.
Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx said installation problems most likely led to cases of overheating in an electrical component that locked the cockpit door of its 747, a venerable workhorse of international travel.
Aviation authorities in the United Kingdom investigated the incident on British Airways Flight 146, which made an emergency landing April 20 in Riga, Latvia, after pilots smelled smoke. The Calcutta-to-London flight carried 307 passengers and a crew of 18.
Smoke or fire are among the most dangerous conditions pilots can encounter in flight. A fire that grew out of control caused the 1998 crash of Swissair Flight 111 off Nova Scotia, killing all 229 people aboard.
British Airways had "no procedures in place" for its crews to diagnose the door problem and shut off power to the malfunctioning part, investigators found. After landing, pilots discovered that the area around the cockpit door was hot.
Boeing alerted other airlines to inspect the installation of 747 doors. British Airways said it fixed the problem on its planes. The airline also developed trouble-shooting guidance for pilots. Proulx said Boeing is working on a fuse that would protect the mechanism from overheating.
"It wouldn't be enough smoke to incapacitate the pilots or keep them from doing their jobs," Proulx said of the malfunction. "No flight control systems would be affected in any way. It would be an 'Oh, gosh, we smell smoke.' "
However, after a medical check, one of the co-pilots on the British Airways flight was found to have elevated levels of carbon monoxide in his blood. In sufficient quantities, carbon monoxide can lead to dizziness, blackouts or even death.
Another manufacturer, JAMCO America of Everett, Wash., said it replaced knobs on electrical switches pilots use to unlock the door on some Boeing 767s. The original version, located on an overhead panel that also holds other switches, resembled one that controls power for the plane's autopilot system. At least two pilots had mistakenly switched off power to their autopilots while trying to open cockpit doors in flight, creating confusion, according to NASA records.
Even if mechanical malfunctions have been addressed, some pilots remain concerned about the unavoidable exposure when the cockpit door is opened in flight.
"Our vulnerability point is when we are coming out to use the bathroom, or when food is being brought in -- it's not 100% foolproof," said Jon Russell, a safety officer for the Air Line Pilots Assn.
Some airlines mitigate the risk by having a flight attendant block the cabin aisle with a service cart when a pilot is using the bathroom. But pilots are calling for a safer option, and at least one major airline agrees.
"We are looking for a more permanent, better solution," said United spokesman Jeff Green. "We've prototyped a few solutions, and we're looking at getting into the design phase." Green would not comment on specifics, but other sources said one option could be a Kevlar net that would be stretched across the aisle just behind the forward galley and lavatory when the cockpit is opened.
"We're looking for something a little more secure," Green said.
New Doors Causing Cockpit Problems
Los Angeles Times 12/14/03
author: Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar
author: Richard O'Reilly
Copyright 2003 / The Times Mirror Company
WASHINGTON -- American Airlines Flight 2885 to Orange County was 35,000 feet over Kansas when the captain was banged on the head, leaving him unable to fly the plane. A 12-pound panel in one of the new fortified cockpit doors had suddenly popped open and struck him.
British Airways Flight 146 from Calcutta to London was cruising over Europe when the pilots noticed a burning smell. Unable to find its source, the captain declared an emergency. The pilots donned oxygen masks and landed the Boeing 747 in Latvia. The problem: an overheated electrical component in a new anti-hijacking door.
The incidents this year are examples of glitches that suggest the new "fortress" cockpit doors are hardly foolproof. Publicly available documents show there have been at least 35 reported incidents involving problems with the operation of the doors since August 2002.
Even as industry and government fix operational problems, some pilots are questioning the overall design of the doors. They must be opened for pilots to use the bathroom and receive food and drink, creating a clear vulnerability. United Airlines is considering a second barrier -- perhaps a Kevlar net -- for better security.
The fortified doors, required by U.S. and international aviation authorities after the Sept. 11 attacks, were designed to withstand extreme pounding and a hail of bullets. Developed and installed in record time, they are considered a crucial defense in the war on terrorism.
But the security door might be opened a dozen or more times on a long flight, said Robert M. Semprini, a New York-based Boeing 737 co-pilot who often flies from coast to coast. "That's a huge loophole," he said.
"If a passenger sees a pilot walk out of the cockpit to go to the lavatory, they know the guy's got to go back in," said Semprini, who has proposed his own design for backup doors.
The Federal Aviation Administration said the fortified doors are a vast improvement over their flimsy predecessors. Some minor glitches were to be expected, but all problems have been or are being resolved, the agency said -- with no compromise of security or safety.
"We do not see any type of problem regarding the doors in the U.S. fleet," said Alison Duquette, an FAA spokeswoman. "They are working very well."
However, FAA Associate Administrator Nicholas Sabatini recently described the door requirements as "the minimum acceptable" standard.
"A company or airline may develop a design that exceeds the existing requirements [and], for example, provides for a secondary barrier door," Sabatini wrote in a June 23 letter to Semprini.
"We can't rely on the assumption that a secure cockpit has been guaranteed by the doors that were put in," said Robert W. Poole Jr., director of transportation studies at the Los Angeles-based Reason Foundation. "We haven't finished dealing with the problem."
The Times reviewed reports on an incident being investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board and another case handled by its British counterpart, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
The Times also examined a NASA database known as the Aviation Safety Reporting System for problems with cockpit doors from 2001 to 2003. Prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, there were two reports of problems. There were dozens of reports after fortified doors were installed, but those that involved simple errors by crews were not counted.
In addition to running the space program, NASA conducts aeronautic research. Its data, intended to provide early warning of aviation safety problems, does not identify the airline involved in an incident.
Some of the security breaches described in the NASA data were peculiar. A Boeing 737 was descending toward Portland International Airport in Oregon in June when a passenger stuck his head in the cockpit and said, "Captain, your door is not secure." He then shut the door and returned to his seat.
The crew reported that the door had been firmly closed, the cockpit lock switch was activated, and a warning light that would indicate a problem was off. The passenger left the plane before the pilots could talk to him.
More than 10,000 domestic and foreign planes serving the United States were equipped with fortified cockpit doors to meet an April 9 deadline set by the FAA. About 15 manufacturers used a variety of designs to meet federal standards. The doors typically are made of high-strength composite materials and cost $30,000 to $50,000. Taxpayers contributed about $13,000 per door to U.S. airlines.
In addition to their security features, the fortified doors have a safety role in the event of a serious decompression of the cockpit during flight. In some designs, large "blow-out" panels fitted in the door automatically swing open. These decompression panels are intended to prevent sudden stresses on the fuselage that could cause an in-flight breakup.
It was a blow-out panel on a Boeing 757 door that injured the captain of American Flight 2885 -- and prompted the FAA to issue a mandatory repair order affecting 2,089 planes worldwide with the same design.
Flight 2885 was bound for John Wayne Airport from St. Louis on the morning of June 10, with 93 passengers and a crew of five. A flight attendant had just handed the crew a tray of refreshments and was attempting to secure the cockpit door. The captain was on his feet, helping.
Suddenly, the door's upper blow-out panel -- about the size of a hefty cutting board -- popped open and swung down toward the captain's face.
"The captain received a 1-inch-long cut on his head ... rendering him incapacitated, " according to an NTSB summary. Although conscious, the captain was unable to do his job, and the first officer diverted the plane to Denver. The accident is under investigation.
NASA's database recorded a similar incident in December 2002 in which a co-pilot was injured. The FAA said it was aware of nine cases of blow-out panels inadvertently opening at the time it issued its repair order.
The company that made the doors for the Boeing 757, C&D Aerospace of Huntington Beach, said it suspects the cause of the problem was that some of its doors were improperly installed.
Nonetheless, C&D issued a service bulletin recommending a repair. "We added a strap on the back side of the latches, so when you slam the door, [the panel] wouldn't pop open," said Tom McFarland, an executive vice president for the firm.
The FAA made the repair mandatory in a July 10 directive that said, "An unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design." American Airlines spokesman Tim Wagner said the problem was corrected on all the carrier's planes and there were no further incidents.
Triggering a decompression panel automatically would create an opening in the cockpit door, but McFarland said that would not be a security risk. A pilot could just swing the panel back into place and it would lock again, he said.
The company also had to deal with cases of doors that appeared to be locked, but suddenly swung open on takeoff -- a problem commonly reported to NASA.
The cause probably was a brief interruption of power to a latching mechanism that holds the doors shut, McFarland said. The electrical interruption would have occurred before departure, when the aircraft switched from auxiliary to engine power.
"We ended up putting a different micro-switch in there that bridged the gap," said McFarland, and that appears to have solved the problem. Nonetheless, some pilots said they still make extra careful checks to avoid embarrassing themselves and alarming passengers if a door were to open on departure.
C&D is not the only company that has had to fix glitches.
Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx said installation problems most likely led to cases of overheating in an electrical component that locked the cockpit door of its 747, a venerable workhorse of international travel.
Aviation authorities in the United Kingdom investigated the incident on British Airways Flight 146, which made an emergency landing April 20 in Riga, Latvia, after pilots smelled smoke. The Calcutta-to-London flight carried 307 passengers and a crew of 18.
Smoke or fire are among the most dangerous conditions pilots can encounter in flight. A fire that grew out of control caused the 1998 crash of Swissair Flight 111 off Nova Scotia, killing all 229 people aboard.
British Airways had "no procedures in place" for its crews to diagnose the door problem and shut off power to the malfunctioning part, investigators found. After landing, pilots discovered that the area around the cockpit door was hot.
Boeing alerted other airlines to inspect the installation of 747 doors. British Airways said it fixed the problem on its planes. The airline also developed trouble-shooting guidance for pilots. Proulx said Boeing is working on a fuse that would protect the mechanism from overheating.
"It wouldn't be enough smoke to incapacitate the pilots or keep them from doing their jobs," Proulx said of the malfunction. "No flight control systems would be affected in any way. It would be an 'Oh, gosh, we smell smoke.' "
However, after a medical check, one of the co-pilots on the British Airways flight was found to have elevated levels of carbon monoxide in his blood. In sufficient quantities, carbon monoxide can lead to dizziness, blackouts or even death.
Another manufacturer, JAMCO America of Everett, Wash., said it replaced knobs on electrical switches pilots use to unlock the door on some Boeing 767s. The original version, located on an overhead panel that also holds other switches, resembled one that controls power for the plane's autopilot system. At least two pilots had mistakenly switched off power to their autopilots while trying to open cockpit doors in flight, creating confusion, according to NASA records.
Even if mechanical malfunctions have been addressed, some pilots remain concerned about the unavoidable exposure when the cockpit door is opened in flight.
"Our vulnerability point is when we are coming out to use the bathroom, or when food is being brought in -- it's not 100% foolproof," said Jon Russell, a safety officer for the Air Line Pilots Assn.
Some airlines mitigate the risk by having a flight attendant block the cabin aisle with a service cart when a pilot is using the bathroom. But pilots are calling for a safer option, and at least one major airline agrees.
"We are looking for a more permanent, better solution," said United spokesman Jeff Green. "We've prototyped a few solutions, and we're looking at getting into the design phase." Green would not comment on specifics, but other sources said one option could be a Kevlar net that would be stretched across the aisle just behind the forward galley and lavatory when the cockpit is opened.
"We're looking for something a little more secure," Green said.
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Cheshire
Posts: 191
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hmm...
Interesting post 747Focal, I had no idea these new doors were the cause of so many headaches.
On the subject of making the doors more secure, why don't they just use two doors in an "airlock" type setup, i.e. : Only one door is ever open at any given time.
That way, when a pilot wishes to leave the cockpit, he can step into the "airlock" and lock the cockpit-side door behind him, then open the cabin-side door. This way the cabin would never be directly exposed to the cockpit. The "airlock" would only have to be big enough for one person at a time, so I can't see space being that much of an issue.
On the subject of making the doors more secure, why don't they just use two doors in an "airlock" type setup, i.e. : Only one door is ever open at any given time.
That way, when a pilot wishes to leave the cockpit, he can step into the "airlock" and lock the cockpit-side door behind him, then open the cabin-side door. This way the cabin would never be directly exposed to the cockpit. The "airlock" would only have to be big enough for one person at a time, so I can't see space being that much of an issue.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Skagness on the beach
Posts: 882
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Bog is down the back???? What is that?
The kevlar "net" is to keep somebody from stepping in the biffy and shooting the pilots through the wall.
The hidden mssg in the news article is that the doors are succeptable to electric shock..... hmmmm, don't think they should have said that. You can also trick the rapid decompression sensor into thinking one just occurred and the door will open as well.
The kevlar "net" is to keep somebody from stepping in the biffy and shooting the pilots through the wall.
The hidden mssg in the news article is that the doors are succeptable to electric shock..... hmmmm, don't think they should have said that. You can also trick the rapid decompression sensor into thinking one just occurred and the door will open as well.
With all the expense of armoured doors and CCTV, nobody has actually thought to put a 'John occupied' light in the drivers office. Even in 737 NGs the only people who don't know the 'bog' is occupied are the pilots!
UkEng
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: England
Posts: 87
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Another manufacturer, JAMCO America of Everett, Wash., said it replaced knobs on electrical switches pilots use to unlock the door on some Boeing 767s. The original version, located on an overhead panel that also holds other switches, resembled one that controls power for the plane's autopilot system. At least two pilots had mistakenly switched off power to their autopilots while trying to open cockpit doors in flight, creating confusion, according to NASA records.
Anyway, the door are a definate improvement over the old wafer thin composite doors and serve their purpose as both a deterrent and making the occupants feel secure.
A lot of the reinforced doors unlock now with a rapid change in air pressure and just fly open - saves anyone getting twatted with a big lump of blow out panel
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: Inside the M25
Posts: 2,404
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hm. I suspect that this story is being pushed by somebody who wants to sell a new type of door, maybe ....
Since we got the new doors, which are substantially more secure than the old ones, I have not had any technical issues with them - though in the same time, I've had snags with engines, brakes and other stuff. Of course something might go wrong with them - but that might happen with any aircraft component!
Since we got the new doors, which are substantially more secure than the old ones, I have not had any technical issues with them - though in the same time, I've had snags with engines, brakes and other stuff. Of course something might go wrong with them - but that might happen with any aircraft component!
I've only made a few posts so I don't feel the need to order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
Join Date: Sep 2000
Posts: 207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Anyway, the door are a definate improvement over the old wafer thin composite doors and serve their purpose as both a deterrent and making the occupants feel secure.
Those new doors and the ill thought out policies behind them will be the cause of severe problems for this industry in the next 10-15 years. Already the numbers of people who want to become airline pilots is reducing and the inability to allow youngsters to visit the flightdeck will have a long term effect on the numbers of kids who will want to do a job where you are locked away in a cubicle for hours on end.
Our job as pilots involves risk management. Every time we land our a/c we are managing some elements of risk. The risk of being attacked on the flight deck compared to the risks we undertake when landing the a/c show how much wasted effort is being put on these new doors and the regulations surrounding them. The overall effect is cosmetic and designed to show the travelling public that something is being done about security even though it is not the solution but a knee jerk reaction. As has been pointed out in other posts, as long as that door has to be opened any time in flight then its purpose and usefulness has been totally negated.
It saddens me to read of people who are going to work and they feel insecure or frightened and that somehow these new security doors are somehow going to be the magic solution. If only half the effort and money being spent on the 'doors' soultion was put into better intelligence gathering, training of able-bodied and educated security staff at the airports with intelligent profiling of pax we probably wouldn't have to suffer the sad spectacle of 'frightened' pilots worrying about their security.
What next? A permanently bolted door with a slot in it for food trays and plastic bottles for physiological relief? Until someone gets realistic and applies common sense to the risk involved we will continue to be subjected to solutions based on hype with cosmetic eye candy designed to calm pax who are largely ignorant of the risk management we deal with every working day. The odds of you winning the lottery are better than those of being involved in a flight where someone will attempt to enter the flight deck with the intnention of taking over control of the a/c. In fact, the effort put into preventing CFIT, which has a much higher risk of happening than forced entry into the flightdeck, just goes to show how fcuked up the authorities and the bureaucrats have got it. Risk management... I don't think so.
On the subject of making the doors more secure, why don't they just use two doors in an "airlock" type setup, i.e. : Only one door is ever open at any given time.
Already the numbers of people who want to become airline pilots is reducing and the inability to allow youngsters to visit the flightdeck will have a long term effect on the numbers of kids who will want to do a job where you are locked away in a cubicle for hours on end.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Embedded in a pocket of resistance
Posts: 269
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yep, most of us agree that some of the post 9-11 security measures are bullsh!t, but what are we gonna do about it?
Collect signatures and hand them over to key politicians? Send letters to the aviation authorities? Get pilot unions more involved? Email this tread to the media?
All this whining on pprune will not help at all and we can add this thread to the looooooong list of simular threads about cockpit doors, security checks, 5 year employment background checks and the right to carry a toothpick or a nail file onboard of an aircraft.
Collect signatures and hand them over to key politicians? Send letters to the aviation authorities? Get pilot unions more involved? Email this tread to the media?
All this whining on pprune will not help at all and we can add this thread to the looooooong list of simular threads about cockpit doors, security checks, 5 year employment background checks and the right to carry a toothpick or a nail file onboard of an aircraft.
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Cheshire
Posts: 191
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
MaxAngle:
I thought El Al's policy was to have a reinforced door locked from statup to shutdown, no matter what happens in the cabin, or am I mistaken?
The only airline in world that really takes security seriously is El Al, guess what sort of door set up they have?.
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Sol, sector ZZ9 plural Z alpha
Posts: 80
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why don't they just move the cabin doors aft of the forward throne room and have the posh pax use the back bog like everybody else?
Stick a microwave and kettle forward of the line too and you can sort out your own refreshments in the process!
Stick a microwave and kettle forward of the line too and you can sort out your own refreshments in the process!
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: uk
Posts: 25
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
well said cargo boy, agree totally, knee jerk reactions make for good publicity, misguided security suks, and i would suggest that most people who work at an airport see it every day, directives for this and that - just knee jerk reactions - like after the reporter got a knife through the security inside a cup of coke !! all of a sudden they ban anyone taking drinks through !!
let's face it, mr average going on hoildays with the kids ain't gonna hijack the areoplane with his nail clippers !!!
oh "QRH John occupied please" !
let's face it, mr average going on hoildays with the kids ain't gonna hijack the areoplane with his nail clippers !!!
oh "QRH John occupied please" !
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have had no problems with the new doors either technical or procedural - especially now that we have the camera.
I agree that this is an article probably originated by one of the many people that were pushing their 'instant answer' to the problem of flight deck break-in immediately after 9/11. There was everything being pushed around the marketplace ranging from kevlar screens to replacement bulkheads.
Thankfully the CnD products for Boeing were well constructed and trouble free. After initial problems with noise and strikers on the Airbus doors their reliability appears to be improving.
Anne
I agree that this is an article probably originated by one of the many people that were pushing their 'instant answer' to the problem of flight deck break-in immediately after 9/11. There was everything being pushed around the marketplace ranging from kevlar screens to replacement bulkheads.
Thankfully the CnD products for Boeing were well constructed and trouble free. After initial problems with noise and strikers on the Airbus doors their reliability appears to be improving.
Anne
Join Date: Apr 1999
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 305
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
At the other extreme: I fly a 19 seat twin turboprop featuring a crash axe behind the captains seat and a sign in the cabin proclaiming proudly "Axe behind seat".
Sort of makes searching the pax for nail files seem a bit pointless!!
Wouldn't have it any other way.
Sort of makes searching the pax for nail files seem a bit pointless!!
Wouldn't have it any other way.
