Engine offs to the ground
 

I have been flying helicopters for almost ten years, instructing part time for 3 - 4 years but still not comfortable carrying out EOL's to the ground. I will only go to the ground if there is a 15 knot plus wind and dont actually shut the throttle intill i level the ship 6 - 8ft.

I believe the EOL's to the ground should be demonstrated regulary but suspect alot of instructors don't carry out this exercise due to obvious reasons.

How many of you do / dont carry out this exercise.

By the way i fly R22 / R44

EOL = Engine Off Landing i.e. to the ground. If it's not to the ground it's not an EOL.
:cool:

I've been flying 22's and 44's out of Booker for the last 3 years and both training schools actively encourage them to the ground. My personal view is that I think it is imperative in all weather conditions to practice these as much as possible. It's a pity that to many schools train to a power recovery and not to the ground out of the fear factor.

All the time I was training and SFH from Cambridge I did practice engine failures, with power recovery above 500' agl and practice forced landings/ EOL to the ground. Once in autorotation the most important part to learn and practice is within the last 100' or so before landing, so unless it is taught AND practiced regularly to the ground, how could any pilot really be considered fully current?
This would have to be more important for us SFH/private types who might get in the cockpit less than twice a month.

And if anyone wants the practice, see Liam at Cambridge... he loves them
:D

Its like any other aspect of flying.....practice makes perfect (or close to it). I was a QHI in the Army and nearly every flight ended in an EOL. I practiced and taught them from every conceivable altitude, speed and configuration. It is extremely important to build a student or experienced pilots confidence by allowing them to practice the ultimate emergency.

The only EOL that I did not, under any circumstances, practice was the EOL at night. I did however teach the technique, but during day-light hours only.

I found the most difficulty with EOLs onto snow covered ground or static water.

CF:
An EOL, distinct from an autorotation, is a JAR Syllabus exercise and has to be done.
Pity the poor student who has to do his first ever on GFT!
Or for real on a solo flight. Thinks.....legal liability.....?
In R22 or other low-inertia rotor helicopter, I have three suggestions:
1. Don't try (intentional) EOL until comfortably below MAUW.
2. Avoid gusty/windsheer conditions (and NB R22 Flight Manual Limitations on flying in strong winds)
3. Hover, Hover-Taxy or Constant Attidude EOLs: 10 kts minimum windspeed and Flare EOLs run on with 10kts through the disc.
And finally, if you get the chance, do some with another current FI to get your confidence up again!
Good luck!

This is the perienial argument.........to do it or not to do it.............

And there is no simple answer......it really depends on where you are in the Industry.

A CFI at a basic training school, or the Blue Suits at BHT DFW can auto those things to a dime every time [is the one with that beer tummy still there?]..........but so what??

On the other side of the coin the need to auto to touch down in a S76 is just not justified..........

That is not to say that the guys arn't expected to auto to a "Spot" for the final flare..... but then the throttles are back at 100% for the cushion.........to get to that spot is the critical part, NOT THE LANDING.

Most heavy fisted folk with flat pitch, high NR and approaching the cushion will get the thing on the ground safety.........but getting to that point is far more difficult.
That "Spot" may be a break in the trees, a vacant house lot, a crossroad or a school yard......but the landing will be untidy to say the least if you can't get to the "Spot"

For those guys that preach the requirement to complete the Engine Off stuff to the ground.........try pulling the mixture to lean/Cutoff at 2000 ft, then switches off, fuel off......and your on your way.......the total effect is far different to just closing a throttle.........the silence is deafening to start with, the required NR control is far more sensitive with no residual engine power........until you practice that, you can't claim you practice Engine Off to the ground.

If it is a JAR requirement........just great, watch the number of wrecks increase, and the already huge hull and liability insurance premiums go off the scale.....another great JAR decision.

Old Man Rotor,

Overall, I don't disagree with what you say. However, the requirement for full EOLs has been in UK requirements for ever, for singles anyway. So for the UK, the JAR makes little difference.

There was at least one training school that used to avoid EOLs (I am sure that there may be others). As a visiting examiner, I did a PPL test on one student there who went very pale when I asked for an EOL. I de-briefed the owner after the test, but they continued to ban EOLs "for insurance reasons". I did no more tests there. They went bust owing people a lot of money a short time later (not suggesting these were necessarily linked).

I think it is very much a matter of practice and currency - I would not want to do a practice EOL at the moment except dual with a current FI, as I am way out of practice (as I fly twins these days).

EOL
 

Helinut,

However, the requirement for full EOLs has been in UK requirements for ever, for singles anyway. So for the UK, the JAR makes little difference.

This may well be a requirement but in reality it is ridiclous to expect a PPL to be able to carry out an EOL on his GFT. (Not my words but from several examiners who i have produced students ready for test)

A very experienced examiner from Blackpool said to me that he would not expect a pilot with less than 500 hours to be able to carry out an EOL sucessfully so how is it possible for a 50 hour ppl to complete this on his GTF, maybe the CAA know the answer?

One thing i do know for sure is they wont be completing this exercise in my machine.

In the UK we are fortunate to have many experienced pilots who are capable of completing the EOL sussessfully during training on an airfield. If you travel to the USA (Florida) and ask them for EOL training very very few are willing to complete this exercise.

"This may well be a requirement but in reality it is ridiclous to expect a PPL to be able to carry out an EOL on his GFT".

I would have thought that the one time it is least ridiculous to expect a PPL to be able to carry out an EOL is on his GFT as that is the time when he should have had the most concentrated training he is likely to get.

" i have produced students ready for test"

If they aren't able to carry out an EOL on a GFT they're not ready for the test. Many years ago when I was an examiner (and yes it wasn't so long ago that the R22 hadn't been certified!) any PPL student who couldn't do an EOL on his GFT would not have gained his PPL(H).
:=

Maybe i'm just not reading this properly but in the UK do you guys actually turn the engine off for this procedure? I trained in Australia and during my course most of the Auto's performed where to the ground. IE enter Autorotation at 1000ish throttle closed all the way down to around 75 roll it into the overtravel bit and land it from there, However not once did the instructor kill the engine for real. As I said maybe I just misunderstand the definition of you Engine off techinque.

TPP,

We do the same as you in OZ; it would be foolhardy not to be able to recover from a poorly executed practice EOL. Never thought of it before, but maybe we should call it engine disconnected landing or something??

Cyclic Flare,

Are you saying that the examiners you mention don't follow the requirement to test pilots with an EOL??

EOL
 

Helinut,

I am not saying that the examiners don't carry out EOL on the test i am sure they do. But i imagine this is a dual excercise or do you just sit back with your arms folded.

When I used to conduct engine offs on a GFT it was very much a solo effort on the part of the examinee - but the air of nonchalance was entirely contrived and I was ready to take control in the final stages if need be! Naturally if that happened I'd congratulate the student on a good attempt and ask him to show me another one just like it, only better. This used to relax them as they felt I had confidence in their abilities. I don't remember anyone that I flew with failing a PPL test for failing to complete a satisfactory engine off. I wasn't looking for anything like perfection - just the ability of the candidate (and any passengers with him) to survive if it should ever happen.

Can't say I've noticed any difference at all in Nr control, though the noise is marginally less. In 1990 Eurocopter had a problem with a faulty batch of freewheels on the AS350B and it was not permitted to reduce power below a certain level without shutting down the engine - naturally that required the engine to be shut down for all autos and EOLs. The requirement was only in force for a fairly short period of time but it certainly helped to concentrate the mind when conducting training or tests! :D

Cyclic Flare,

It would depend a bit on what was being flown, but there would be no arms folded!. There are 2 drawbacks to doing flight tests, especially initial licence issue PPL(H):

under JAR an examiner is not supposed to have flown with the pilot before so he/she is an unknown to you (and you to him/her);
almost without exception and no matter how it is approached the pilot being tested is stressed up and can be full of surprises!

Without departing into a discussion of types, lets say that certain types have less margin for error than others. I would also vary what I did a bit, depending upon how the rest of the flight had gone.

Any doubts though, and I would take it or, at least sort out the bottom end. There is always the option to try again.

I do agree that what it is reasonable to expect of an ab-initio PPL(H) is less than a more experienced pilot. In my mind, I feel that what I wanted was for the pilot to be able to show that they could fly the thing to the ground to the flare etc. in such a way that whatever then happened, there was a high probability that all occupants would survive.

The lady Cfi who taught me the way to fly was totally commited to EOLs, and looking back through my log i see only three flights when we didnt carry out at least three attempts, so much so that I now do at least two on every flight , I am totally happy in the knowledge that if the noise ceased I would be able to put the craft down and talk about it afterwards ( that is my hope) I may crawl away but then we'll have to wait and see! lifes full of little supprises.;)

Although I do EOLs to the ground, I'm convinced that they are counter-productive.
Modern helicopters are remarkably crashworthy. As long as you have a crack at the flare, you'll probably walk away.
The best pilot in the world will turn the machine over fifty per cent of the time when landing off-airfield.
What is really deadly, and what we do not practice, is getting into autorotation when the engine fails.
During practice, we give a warning, and enter relatively gently. It's not like that in the real world.
Research on Robinsons has been unable to turn up a single instance where a pilot who established autorotation was killed on landing - neither in countries where EOLs are mandated, nor where they are not.
Every pilot who was killed after the engine quit failed to establish autorotation.
What does that tell you?
We're polishing the wrong end of the autorotation, and writing off a lot of helicopters doing it.

T'aint,
my instructor would every now and again gently cut throttle on me while my hand was off the collective (dialling in the ATIS or whatever). He would also do it at night at the end of a nav-ex when I was tired and my guard was maybe lower than it should be. On hearing the horn he'd expect me to have the lever down well inside 2 seconds. The entry would always be messier than a 'HASEL' auto but it did teach good reflexes (Pavlov's dogs springs to mind). Once entered the auto would then be aborted more or less straight away. It was the entry he was worried about and not so much the rest. Like you, he firmly believed in the importance of polishing both ends. Do you ever do anything similar with your students?

Irlandés

t'aint natural,

Not sure about your analysis of the problem, in the sense that I see both ends of the EOL as important.

There is more than one interpretation of the accident history you quote (assuming it is true). It could be that it ain't possible to get the lever down fast enough in a Robbo in some circumstances - but that would go back over old ground that I am not overkeen to revisit.

The guys I used to be most worried about were PPL private owners who never used to practise autos at all. When you eventually persuaded them to go and do some dual time, the autos were just horrible. I often felt they would not have responded to a real engine failure at all. But aside from extreme cases like that, just how difficult is it to push a lever down promptly??

I always used to do a small number of throttle chops instructing on the R22 (both demos and for the student). Mind, if there was any student hesitation the lever went down anyway, so I am not sure exactly what it proved. I always thought it worthwhile to give some practical idea of the indications of engine failure.

In the US of A, I believe that they do shed loads of chops, but others will be able to comment on that.

My feeling is that any pilot needs to be competent and current at both ends of the EOL, if you fly a single. The level of competence ought to be considerably greater, if you are a professional pilot.

t'aint
I don't see how that can be. I always tought my students to be able to do an EOL that they could not only walk away from, but (provided they had been able to pick an area where it was possible to carry out a successful EOL), the aircraft would also sustain minimum damage. This also ensures that it is an EOl you can walk away from.;)
Where exactly do you get the statistics to back up this assertion?
Once they had built up a reasonable level of competence and confidence, I never used to give my students any warning during practice autos, nor did we enter gently - I just used to chop the throttle sharply, even in a climb, and afterwards say 'practice EOL'. It's surprising, even in a Robinson, just how much time there is to enter auto, and when a student knows that it can happen at any time when he/she is flying he/she will start to develop the instinct of always expecting it to happen and be looking out for a suitable emergency landing site.
;)

I learned to fly in Western Australia and within the 105 hour CPL syllabus at least 10 hours were throttle off landings to the ground.

The CFI would demonstrate at least 3 Engine Stopped at 1000 feet Landings at various stages of the training syllabus. This defiantly gave me a better understanding of the whole “scary” autorotation process and demonstrates that if you were unfortunate enough to suffer a real one, with a suitable landing site, it is possible to land the chopper (R22 in this case) with zero damage.

The CFI was not particulary keen on demonstrating the full engine stop landings, not because of the increased risk factor, but because of the lack of a cool down period before stopping the engine.

The Approved Testing Officer and the Chief Flying Instructor were of the opinion that as long as a student at the end of their training can enter auto, control the RRPM and airspeed, pick and make a landing site, flare at about the right height with the correct type of flare for the prevailing conditions, level the chopper at the right height and keep it straight with minimal drift and yaw on touchdown, that is sufficient for a flight test and keeping the pilot and any passengers alive in the event of a real one.

Hope this is of some assistance.
:D

CF:
Perhaps I'm missing something, but nobody seems to have asked yet. Your original post says throttle not closed until leveling skids--are you saying you have power ON during "autorotation", or is it that you maintain a high idle while sprague clutch disengaged during autorotation?

I've not seen either usage described in texts. Is there a reference?

I have no problem with maintaining a high idle, of course, given the potential for an unsuspected carb-ice-dead-engine if the R22 tach reads below 55, ergo telling you nothing!

PA42,

I am fairly sure that CF means that he does not put the twist grip into the detent position until late on in the EOL. I certainly do/did the same, as it allows recovery to a hover recovery until very late, if all the ducks were not lined up.

Unless the twist grip is turned and held into the detent, lifting the lever would activate the mechanical correlator. This would open the closed throttle valve in the carb and the engine would speed up and the needles "join".

Helinut,

You have hit the nail on the head.

I wonder how many others carry out this procedure. It gives you a much larger margin than closing the throttle (into the detent) at 300ft especially if your a novice.

Sounds like this guy got it wrong and he has probably been flying all his life. So what chance has a brand new PPL got to complete it sucessfully. And don't mean to be able to walk away.

AAIB Bulletin No: 8/2002 Ref: EW/G2002/06/10 Category: 2.3
Aircraft Type and Registration: Robinson R22 Beta, G-BOEW
No & Type of Engines: 1 Lycoming O-320-B2C piston engine
Year of Manufacture: 1988
Date & Time (UTC): 10 June 2002 at 1103 hrs
Location: Cranfield Airport, Bedfordshire
Type of Flight: Aerial Work (Training)
Persons on Board: Crew - 2 Passengers - None
Injuries: Crew - None Passengers – N/A
Nature of Damage: Tail boom severed and tail rotor drive shaft damaged
Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence (Helicopters)
Commander's Age: 65 years
Commander's Flying Experience: 11,778 hours (of which 543 were on type)
Last 90 days - 93 hours
Last 28 days - 24 hours
Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot

The flying instructor was demonstrating a practice 'engine off' landing for a student. It was the seventh such landing that he had carried out that morning. During the run on, one main rotor blade struck the tail boom causing both the boom and tail rotor drive shaft to break.

The helicopter was landing on the grass helicopter strip, designated 22, heading into wind. The surface wind was reported as being from 230° at 24 kt. The initial ground contact was made on the port side skid on the right hand edge of the strip, which has a boundary marked with scraped earth that is slightly raised above the surrounding grass.

The pilot felt that the initial skid contact with this edge destabilised the run on and his subsequent attempted corrections led to large control inputs at a low main rotor speed.

The pilot commented that there were no cockpit indications to show that any damage had occurred, but he felt a slight vibration and a change of rotor noise following the event. The accident was observed by ATC who alerted the pilot and advised him to shut down.













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Published 8 August 2002
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Cyclic Flare: I expect you are not the only one who is at a heightened state of readiness on EOLs! Which in the case of the R22, is no bad thing; your 15kt wind min is not a bad idea either, though a student ought to be shown and practice in all conditions. In any event as it's a legal req. in the UK I'm sure noone is only doing power recoveries and passing a skill test.
In practice only a very brave soul would flutter down in a 22 arms folded in training or on test and in truth the odd tweak here or there to save that long walk back is almost de rigeur, especially as the throttle on Robbies is held in the detente. With respect to B206 or B47 then arms folded EOLs are possible and with a bit of wind ditto R44...although throwing £250k+ worth of machinery at the ground concentrates the mind, too
From my own experience the throttle can be popped in the detent at a fairly early stage in the descent -say 3-500'- so long as airspeed and RRPM are as desired and it's quite clear you'll land close to the intended touch down point (sometimes called a "gate"). That allows a bit more time to settle into the EOL without being too hurried at the bottom. As for R22 engine offs in the hover, well - yer pays yer money and yer takes yer chances...
I'm not helping am I?;)

Robinson Safety Notice SN-27 of June 1994 is titled SURPRISE THROTTLE CHOPS CAN BE DEADLY and advises flying instructors how they should give a student a simulated power failure. It says:
"Never truly surprise the student. Tell him you are going to give him a simulated power failure a few minutes before, and when you roll off the throttle, loudly announce 'power failure'."
The instructor is also advised to plan to initiate recovery within one second, regardless of the student's reaction.
The safety notice came about because surprise throttle chops were killing people.
As to the rollover statistics off-airfield (Soggyboxers) that's deduction from long discussion with high-time pilots. The last for-real engine-off I heard about was the Puma in Oxfordshire last month. Full crew, supremely competent, and it rolled over. No reflection on the crew - that's just the shape of the earth.
As to doing as little damage as possible, yes, but don't make it an article of faith. If the helicopter's let you down, stuff the damned thing. Frank will make you another one.
Unfortunately, the ones we smash up were usually in perfectly good nick, and we break them practising the wrong end of the auto.

During my last LPC (R44). The examiner told me to reach up and feel the vibration on the compass.
I obviously used my left hand for this, and whilst I was "Feeling the vibration" he slowly rolled off the throttle.
I considered it a very worthwhile excercise.

Now see what that dodgy Compass caused.........

Not being a whizz on the old 22, is there a directional verses yaw correlation interface???....most likely fed from the parrallel dual hydraulic systems. .

Touch the compass and yaw left......surely with this highly sofisticated piece of machinary there would be two redundant systems looking at this problem???...shock horror.

Why don't you learn on a turbine.........then the problem will not be one afterall..........TBF over 50,000 hours.......about 7-8 normal pilot lifetimes????.....or perhaps 5-6 of us??;)

I've done about 700 or 800 hours of instruction in 22's and 44's (mostly 22's). This has included PPL, CPL, and recurrent training.

To teach entry and spot selection/accuracy:
-throttle chops at cruise in the training area, unannounced (eventually) and taken to a power recovery in the hover. The throttle was returned to 104% in the late flare, not the auto.

To teach the final few seconds:
-autos to a prepared surface (ie runway) with run-on in low wind conditions.

There has been the odd bumpy landing but I have never felt on the verge of rolling one over or losing a tailboom.

Does anyone do autorotations in the R-22 regularly on paved surfaces?
Just curious, not being of that religious persuasion.

And another costly Statistic...........

Just ask the Grade 1 Instructor that rolled a 22 into a heap the other day whilst demonstrating an Auto onto Moorabbin Airport Australia........maybe 800 acres of flat space.

It will cost that Company [Perhaps Australia's most respected Training Institution].......the loss of one machine....lost income....higher insurance....possible injuries........and for what.

Some preconceived view that this action which could have been more serious.........that may actually save a future potential situation from getting as bad!!!!......lets get real.

Glad I am not the Instructor, the owner, or the insurance company............

on being part of the solution . . .
 

We seem to be in general agreement that rolling the heli into a ball is not good, nor fun. And that one of the ways it happens is what I'll call here the "powerless touchdown" (P.T.), since EOL obviously has many meanings to the many contributors.

Beyond saying powerless touchdown is dangerous and tricky, how about it we collect here on this thread a training aid: specifically,

A List of Major Avoidable Causes of Damage

in powerless touchdowns.

For instance: is touchdown on an unsuspected lumpy surface a major factor? Can we reduce damages by touching down only on spots we've walked out before going back up to commence auto?

Is failure to get skids properly level just prior to impact a common cause, or do almost no helicrunches result from poor skid-leveling-skills?

How many folks overdo the flare, trying for zero groundspeed, and find themselves with no cushion left? Or with no tail rotor left? How do we get the proper mix of speed-vs-alt-vs-RRPM firmly understood in safer maneuvers & ground training before we commit to a real P.T.?

One suspects that pilots prefer to practice in significant winds (10-20k?) for reduced ground travel, and that last-minute yaw-and-drift leads to rollover--how common is this as the cause-of-crunch? Where in the curriculum do we improve this sub-module of training before having to exercise it at end-of-auto?

And other questions. Post your own; be sure to provide real or imagined answers & statistics where possible.

One assumes that sharing a known explanation for previous accidents with the community will prevent at least one helicrunch, perhaps 10 or 20 helicrunches. Help the industry--share views on the Prevention as well as the Problem.

====
By the way, who will be the first to advertise a rental/instructional special low rate on 20-30 consecutive powerless touchdowns USING A RUNOUT R22? If hull value is down to $35,000 just before airframe overhaul due, seems like THAT would be the ship to use; cut a special deal with the insurance company to concentrate all the school's autos in that ship. And create a brisk market for 2000-hour R22's, too!

(Personally, I don't practice powerless landings solo--it seems too much to me like cutting mixture on BOTH engines of AMEL for dead-stick practice. $160,000 risk for infinitesimal gain! Like buying Enron, or landing in White House front yard without flak vest.)

pa42, fantastic post lets hope we get a reponse from the really experiened guys / girls.

Im off training now, will i be doing EOL,s i've got 15kts ???

I believe a successful landing (one where the crew walk away) is the aim of the game. A professional helicopter pilot includes (as a priority) EOL's and TR problems in their inventory.
If a pilot can prove to themselves that they can survive an EOL/TR control malfunction, then they can get on with the task in hand much more confidently.
The trouble is...forced landings, not under power, are exceedingly difficult to perform successfully. there are so many variables:
wind direction
height
speed
type of landing surface
reaction time
Nr control
Day/Night
Adrenaline flow
I was trying to recall how many EOL's I've done. Probably well in excess of a 1000 (on singles). Unfortunately, less than 5% were unannounced! So it doesn't really provide you with an ideal perspective in doing one in anger. I found that EOL's were a culmination of honing helicopter skills to as close to perfection as you can get. There is NO room for error once it goes quiet!
Flying an unstable glider to a full stop is probably the most exhilarating experience one can ever go through in helo flying.

That was 8 years ago, and now I can't even spell ELO(I fly twins). I feel there is a gap in my inventory now, one that is forever bugging me. However I still think about my parameters whilst flying and wonder whether I could make that field down there, safely. It's not a comfortable feeling. I know people say the chance of an EOL in a twin is millions to one, but people also say, you're only as good as your last accident!!!
Perhaps, really, I miss that thrill as the cab hits the deck in a straight line, no drift, no excess speed, level...as you lower the lever and she comes to a halt with decaying Nr and you exhale deeply with a huge smile on your face :D
My advice to ALL single drivers, is: make sure your EOL skills are near the top of your inventory or you might not live to regret it :eek:
Besides, it's what flying is all about......................

[Fanstops also result from: contaminated fuel / blocked fuel filter(s) / disconnected air bleeds to metering valves / icing / heavy rain / fires / leaking oil pipes...to name but a few].

Just my opinion, - but the key to success with engine-off landings is preventing the engine from going off.
Let's talk about Robinsons, as they do more than half of all single-engine helicopter hours and more than 90 percent of private training.
I'll say it again - as far as I can ascertain, no R22 pilot who got into autorotation has ever been killed on landing, either in countries where EOLs are mandatory or elsewhere. They die because engines fail, and they don't react quickly enough.
Is it possible to genuinely teach students to react in time? I don't think so. Bearing in mind the strictures against surprise throttle chops, it's difficult even to demonstrate engine failure. Requiring a pilot to be sufficiently keyed up, every second of every minute of every flight, to react in time is also asking the impossible.
But it is also true to say that most engine failures in Robinsons are caused by carb icing.
Therefore, it is important that the student know that if they forget everything else they were told and shown, they remember carb heat. Stamp it on their foreheads, write it on the bubble in chinagraph, go bananas when they forget.
Being able to land blue-side-up engine-off is a virtual irrelevance. Shame to smash up so many good machines practising shutting the stable door, again and again and again.

I have to comment of the last post. If it is truly not possible to teach students to adequately enter the auto after a true surprise engine failure, then how do you account for anyone ever getting into the autos you state are always survivable?

I have worked with dozens of students and low-time new hire pilots and all have been able to get an R22 or R44 into the auto following a surprise 'throttle chop' or they were not considered to be ready for the flight test/job.

It is true that carb ice and distractions from the aviating part of the job are large dangers for pilots of these types but that doesn't mean proper response isn't possible.

In regards to discussion further up the list, I have always performed autos to touchdown only on surfaces that have been inspected by myself and that I deem as minimal risk to the aircraft. Surprise practice engine failures off airfield and in areas I haven't surveyed are always taken to the hover power recovery to minimize risk. We also strived to avoid being predictable. Your student should NOT be able to anticipate when the engine will 'quit' on a training flight. These off-airfield autos were performed to teach just what was discussed above by Tain't Natural, a good entry to a stabilized auto that reaches a good landing spot. This is a survivable auto.

If I really thought that an engine failure was a guaranteed death sentence for these pilots then I would have a very hard time sleeping at night.

For myself, I had a student test my ability to enter an auto in an R22. While talking with my hands in the cockpit she had a small mental blunder and rolled off the throttle while in a max t/o power climb through a little over 1000'. As I heard the engine die I took control, entered the auto and was heading for a field. It wasn't until about halfway down that I noticed the engine idling (the horn covered the noise for a few seconds) and rolled up throttle to fly away. I was surprised but I was happy to learn that I would get the pole down.

T.c. &1000 P.T.'s! Q: Without Damage??
 

For Thomas coupling: you state "I was trying to recall how many EOL's I've done. Probably well in excess of a 1000 (on singles)."

Sounds hopeful--you're still with us, alive and well!?

Are all those helicopters also well? That is, was that 1000 without damaging any of the ships? (Be honest, now!)

AND are we safe to consider all of those were truly powerless touchdowns, in the sense that the needles were not synchronized before touchdown??

If both are true, then evidently the maneuver CAN be quite safe if carefully done in benign terrain (one wonders, after all the accident rumors), AND we are further impelled to improve training so the low-time guys can be as successful.

To what three major ingredients would you attribute your apparently accident-free 1000 P.T.'s? Share the secret, while we're all still alive!

(Especially needful, since there have been so far no substantive contributions to my proposed 'list of avoidable damage causes' of a few days ago.)

During the 60's-70's....fledgling US Army helicopter pilots did EOL's as a simple matter of course. I can recall some flight periods that were devoted to nothing else....one right after another and another and another....until they became second nature. The engine remained at idle throughout the maneuver from the time the throttle was rolled off until it was rolled up again during a before takeoff check for the next circuit. There were contests (very informal and most unapproved) to see who could slide the longest distance...who could land closer to a predetermined spot...who could hold the bird at a hover without engine power the longest.....all of which taught one the ability of the UH-1 (Bell 204/205) to perform in autorotation.

Autorotatations were stressed because of the very strong likelihood you would be doing some in anger within the next year while flying combat in Vietnam. FOD, in the form of 7.62 - 14.7mm lead pellets was a very common happening there....in addition to the normal rate of engine failures. It is reported that at one time, there were over 7,000 helicopters operational in Vietnam.

PA42: I really wasn't intending to boast with that figure. I'm sure several of my colleagues in the mil have clocked up similar as instructors on the basic training units (Gazelles)(Wasp(Scout)!)

As SAS stated, we would spend hours a day at that stage in their course, doing real EOL's (no engine running at all). All perfectly normal. However, as I said surprise EOL's were few and far between. We would let them judge the entrance position from 1000' initially, into wind, modify the glide (with power if necessary-to make the spot), then chop the throttle completely.
I never looked in to "match any needles" I'm afraid!! too busy looking outside!
Eventually we'd practice downwind(180, offset)/range(bleed the Nr down)/low speed(from 30kts,high power)/min speed(going backwards to start with before converting to fwd speed, and finally an unannounced EOL from the overhead at height using all of the above.
The incidences of damage were remarkably small. In fact In all my years as an instructor I can only think of a handful of 'bumps' where either the bottom of the fenestron scraped the deck causing the sacrificial flange to crack, or the skids digging in too deep at the end of the run on causing the adf aerials to head butt the ground!!
My worse experience was of a student who froze with panic on the collective when I wanted to slow the bottom of the descent - we overran the landing zone and skidded along the runway!!

I wonder if the mil still do EOL's???????

TC....................I have to agree with you. I too have done countless numbers of EOL's in Gazelles, Bell 47 and Scout without so much as bending or cracking a skid or a frangeable tail. Sure students try to kill you every flight, but, with experience you get to know what they are going to do and when.

I dont agree with teaching EOL's to an exact spot, thats asking too much of a student, but as a pure test of skill for an experienced pilot, its unbeatable.