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R22 down near Reading UK
https://www.readingchronicle.co.uk/n...crashes-field/
Firefighters from Wokingham Road and Wokingham fire stations were sent to the scene with an off-road vehicle from Crowthorne Community Fire Station, an Operational Support Unit from Whitley Wood Fire Station, and the Heavy Rescue Unit from Theale Community Fire Station. ...The pilot and passenger were treated by the Air Ambulance for minor injuries. |
Originally Posted by johni
(Post 11822909)
https://www.readingchronicle.co.uk/n...crashes-field/
From a 3 February incident. The helicopter landed in a muddy ploughed field at zero speed and rolled over |
I am guessing the mixture guard was not fitted. Oops.
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Originally Posted by flight beyond sight
(Post 11823443)
To clarify there were no injuries and the student pilot pulled the mixture not the carb heat when descending ( not a good idea )
The helicopter landed in a muddy ploughed field at zero speed and rolled over |
It will live again as a 1000 Heinz beans cans, infinitely more airworthy :E
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Originally Posted by GS-Alpha
(Post 11823512)
I am guessing the mixture guard was not fitted. Oops.
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How was it possible to accidentally pull the mixture with the guard fitted?
Was it maybe an action slip, with the student deliberately removing the guard and then pulling the mixture, thinking they were applying the correct sequence of actions to apply carb heat? |
Originally Posted by GS-Alpha
(Post 11824390)
How was it possible to accidentally pull the mixture with the guard fitted?
Was it maybe an action slip, with the student deliberately removing the guard and then pulling the mixture, thinking they were applying the correct sequence of actions to apply carb heat? |
Originally Posted by GS-Alpha
(Post 11824390)
How was it possible to accidentally pull the mixture with the guard fitted
to make matters worse the location of these on the dash was not the same from aircraft to aircraft (old H269 vs new 300CB vs "new equipement installed" pulling knob relocated ....) when flying those a night (with colour vision reduced), I always remind myself to think 3 times of what you are doing. |
With two pilots you should Identify, Confirm and then Select when operating any critical control.
ie. point at the switch/lever you want to move, get the other pilot to agree it is the correct one and then (and only then) select/move the switch/control. CRM 101 |
Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 11824816)
With two pilots you should Identify, Confirm and then Select when operating any critical control.
ie. point at the switch/lever you want to move, get the other pilot to agree it is the correct one and then (and only then) select/move the switch/control. CRM 101 This is 2 guys in a r22, get a grip :ugh: |
Originally Posted by Torquetalk
(Post 11825037)
SP, what methods are available to guard against this error? SP CRM might, for example, involve an adapted process using the same principle:
One finger on the carb heat STOP Positively identify Select If done consciously, this adds a layer of SA and can mitigate against the risk of ending the flight early. And if there are two people in aircraft who know the difference, why not involve the other person in the crosscheck? While we’re talking about getting a grip (on the right lever), why trash the suggestion? I dont know the experience levels of the pilots involved and it's not an insult to them, however, you are only as good as your experience and training. Whilst we allow ppl's to quality at 45 hours and instructors to instruct with barely many more hours, this is what we have to live with as an industry in the civvy world. more training costs more, becomes a barrier to entry, the industry is already in crisis with rising costs, so we will keep allowing the bare minimum and then say really enlightening things like 'shouldda operated like a 2 crew' |
Originally Posted by Torquetalk
(Post 11825048)
That was not said. How it is done MCC was mentioned.
And adapting practice (habits) when operating critical switches and levers in flight requires no great change to the training syllabus or more costs. An instructor can simply demonstrate that talking yourself through a critical action with a pause to crosscheck might be good practice. It would also make the transition to the MCC environment easier, as you already know that you don’t just operate critical switches without further consideration. |
The vast majority of UK PPL students take 70-100 hours to get a PPL(H)
It is not possible to get paid for flight instruction in the UK until you have have a CPL & FI rating, and that takes a minimum of 285 hours (you can't start the FI course until you have 250 hours)
Originally Posted by helicrazi
(Post 11825044)
Whilst we allow ppl's to quality at 45 hours and instructors to instruct with barely many more hours, this is what we have to live with as an industry in the civvy world.
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Originally Posted by johni
(Post 11825067)
The vast majority of UK PPL students take 70-100 hours to get a PPL(H)
It is not possible to get paid for flight instruction in the UK until you have have a CPL & FI rating, and that takes a minimum of 285 hours (you can't start the FI course until you have 250 hours) And you have proved my point, 285 hours, its nothing, especially if 45 of which are achieving a PPL |
Until PPL instructors earn A LOT more than £25-£30k a year, or A LOT more than £50 per datcon hour....the industry is not going to attract experienced and committed instructors.
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Originally Posted by johni
(Post 11825077)
Until PPL instructors earn A LOT more than £25-£30k a year, or A LOT more than £50 per datcon hour....the industry is not going to attract experienced and committed instructors.
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Originally Posted by helicrazi
(Post 11825006)
Yes for MCC trained crew in a mulitpilot operation,
This is 2 guys in a r22, get a grip :ugh: You don't need to have completed a MCC to understand or practice the concept and any instructor should instil CRM basics into his student from the very beginning. Arguing that you can't use airmanship just because you haven't done the course is infantile. |
Goodness me. Don't we get all PPRuNey quickly. A bit of perspective here. As you say this was training, and for all we know the instructor was indeed training his or her student about airmanship and to be cautious about rushed instrument selections. I know I've often included that in the brief.
Then consider that if the mixture guard was indeed installed the student would have had to go through a very specific sequence of actions that is completely different to pulling the carb heat, and if they're up for going down that rabbit hole it's unlikely that being drilled in instrument selection would have come into the student's head. And then consider what you'd like a student's reaction to be to the engine coughing ? A reflexive pull of the carb heat or a leisurely discussion about which control to actuate ? And when the engine quits due to carb icing should they discuss whether the collective is an appropriate choice ? The Blackrock SAR accident is a horrifying counter example where slavish application of two crew procedures actually caused the accident. This is training and in the process of training (even for military) people make mistakes, and sometimes (as you well know crab having found yourself on your arse in a field once before I believe) **** happens. |
Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 11824816)
With two pilots you should Identify, Confirm and then Select when operating any critical control.
ie. point at the switch/lever you want to move, get the other pilot to agree it is the correct one and then (and only then) select/move the switch/control. CRM 101 Sure, this conversation may have saved that poor Robby from becoming "Heinz bean cans", but I just don't think I could do it every time I want to push a button, or pull a lever,...at least not without bursting into laughter! :} |
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