You don't know what you don't know.

Maybe it has changed since I first found myself strapped to a Robbie with an instructor next to me, but on a training flight, during critical phases, or just generally, you needed to brief the instructor on what you were planning to do. Silence, or assumption of competence was never a good thing.
it can go south quickly if the brain has a momentary glitch, and saying one thing and doing another isn’t unheard of.
Strangely though, the more experienced and capable the instructor, the more likely a Robbie is to avoid becoming baked beans storage. Lost count of how many hour building instructors have scribbled their craft:
(not that it is the case here)

And if you're an instructor with 285 -- or even 500 -- hours, there is a LOT you don't know...

Maybe, but you know everything your student NEEDS to know to become a licensed pilot,...and that's all that really matters at that point.

Nothing wrong with low hours instructors, but it's instructors motivation that is the problem.

New instructors are mostly just doing it to build hours, not as a career, and anyone else instructing post 1,000 hours is unable to get a "proper" job so they are stuck doing it.

Robbie, did I miss something constructive in your two paragraphs? Or a poor attempt to be amusing…….

I dont know. I wasnt there. What is on the record is that an assumed EOL for real resulted in both occupants walking away which in itself deserves congratulations. The aircraft can be replaced, Family members cannot.

Thank you at last a measured sensible remark which reflects the students mistake at low altitude on the approach which we can all learn from.

And if you don't know about CRM you shouldn't be flying - let alone be an instructor.

WMF - I see there being a difference between an trained reaction to an emergency situation - ie lowering the collective when the engine quits - and a deliberate selection of a switch/control as part of normal drills before landing.

In the first case the Select, Identify, Confirm is not suitable - in the second, it would have prevented an emergency response being needed subsequently as the carb heat and not the mixture would have been selected and no EOL would have been required.

I agree, **** does happen but when it does you have to be honest about the cause - in my case I was lulled into a false sense of security by a good student who then replicated (in a far worse way) a minor item I should have included in a previous debrief.:ok:

Robbiee - I completely get your point but single pilot CRM is important - in your case it would be a slight thinking pause before selecting the switch or control, no need for a comical schizophrenic conversation with yourself in the cockpit:)

That's rather an oversimplification of what happened - as far as they were concerned they were in a relatively low-threat condition (apart from being low level over the sea) so direction of the PM by the PF to adjust heading using the AP was absolutely normal - the problem came when the rearcrew identified an immediate and unexpected threat which they didn't respond quickly or appropriately to.

Many of us would have conducted that entire sortie differently but that's the benefit of 20/20 hindsight :ok:

I am not sure CRM is officially covered in the FI course, and it's not in the PPL(H) syllabus either.

Very few UK "employers" of instructors madate any form of CRM training for FIs.

It is basic airmanship.

Monitoring your student is CRM, making sure he is fit to fly is CRM, briefing lookout responsibilities is CRM etc etc etc

From Skybrary CRM isn't new, it's been taught in aviation for donkey's years - putting airmanship under the CRM banner just allows people to charge for courses teaching it.

Much of it is in the PPL syllabus under Human Perfornce and Threat and Error Management

Of all the Instructors and PPL holders I have met over the last 20 years, not one does any form of "verbally checking/confirming" before touching the carb heat control.

Well that is a pretty poor statement of training and piloting ability in the UK then.

I think there is a terminology difference going on here. Airmanship / CRM has somewhat morphed into TEM ( Threat and Error Management ) . All instructors and examiners have been obliged for years to brief on TEM . The verbally/ check/confirm is a military thing but is and should be briefed by the instructor, normally done in the sense of student explaining to the instructor what he is about to do. An example would be the 5 's on a confined area, student should be briefed to sing them out and in the case of a Robinson carb heat ( sorry dont fly them thankfully ) .
Having said all that it still doesnt stop the student doing something silly. Had a student doing advanced autos, well briefed in classroom, in the air re briefed for a standard auto as a datum. What are you going to do after HASEL check and practice autorotation 321 go, he told me "lower lever , right pedal and hold a 50 knot attitude by rear pressure on cyclic , the throttle is yours." Sounded good but was surprised after 321 to find the throttle snapped close, left pedal applied and lever pulled up !!!!! Moral beware

... and thereby helping them survive long enough to make the same mistakes as the rest of us !

Please, enough outrage !

I am not an instructor, but surely if you are teaching a PPL student how to fly single pilot operations, teaching them that critical switch action must be cross checked with another pilot is not teaching them how to fly solo? Teach them methods to avoid action slips for sure, and point out areas where they could occur, but ultimately, they have to be able to fly by themselves.

I tried it for a while during my self-fly-hire career, but quickly abandoned it when I started hearing a voice responding to me, lol.

What can I say Pal, I didn't grow up in the two pilot cockpit world, so this technique just tickles my funny bone.

It kinda reminds me of the "push in the carb heat on short final" thing. Sure I get why it exists, but its a mountain flying technique, so why are we doing it a Sea Level?