While I agree Crab there was not a lot of time. My company requires engine shut downs to be done from ECL(believe it or not Fire drills too……)Works great for a chip light perhaps not for an uncontained engine failure with fire.
“IF” you follow the process it takes forever.

N109BC was a 1999 T1 SN 139 - so could even be a CDS "steam gauges" model.

Not to second guess their decisions as we do not know how bad they knew the problem was.

problem/warning—-start turn back ——carry out ECL items…call tower….by that time the open areas Just where he starts the turn back ——a baseball diamond and 2 athletic/football fields would probably have been out of sight behind him.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....7cf3120dd.jpeg



.

Battery boxes are stainless steel and about 15 times the thickness of the engine firewalls?

Is that some sort of alleviation from the RFM?

… and that potential little bomb is extremely close to the connecting flange.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....acbb8437d.jpeg
https://gama.aero/wp-content/uploads...klet_EC135.pdf

Internal video of the battery bay at 36:34 <~~ Click there.

No follows the RFM. You could debate if immediate actions are that or not. I know my view

Ass Ticket Job

However, as I recall it used the same Warning Unit which contained the fire warning indictor and bottle switches if installed.
Word from local pilots is the problem became apparent prior to the turn-around and a number of open areas would have been in view. The fact the crew let the fire department comm center know they could not respond to the call in the same time frame gives the impression the issue was not initially serious to the crew. The question remains in the local discussion what did the crew see in the cockpit. However, trailing smoke for close to 40+ seconds prior to the boom failure have generated more questions. Once the aircraft hit the roof the pilot and a 2nd medic were able to self- extricate and there are pics and videos of them moving across the roof away from the aircraft until a ladder was provided for them to get down. From what I've heard the answers to those pertinent questions will be forthcoming sooner than later.
While I don't personally know about this aircraft a number of operators have switched to AGM batteries on 135s in warmer climates. All the ones (30+) I was around in O&G and EMS had AGM installed when completed from the factory. Regardless, all that smoke was fed by something that didn't run out of quantity.

In the video just after the boom folds, There is something ejected from the airframe. It is smoking and falling rapidly to the ground.
It looks the right size for the aircraft battery.

The sports fields at the high school would be available, but all of those other open fields in that satellite view are currently construction sites for new residential buildings according to the most recent Google Street View shots from Feb 2023.

An electrical disaster in the Pelican rack is a distinct possibility - but this is the archetypal arrogant Pprune thread. Lots of input from expertise from folk who've never been thrown the keys and flown the damn thing.

I honestly think that even if they had a fire indication and the intention to land as soon as they could, there's a good chance they would have still picked the airport from that position. Yes the fields are closer and allow a faster landing in theory, but setting up a proper approach (on one engine no less) to those fields would still require some maneuvers. Then there's the risk of hitting unseen obstacles like wires without a proper reconnaissance of the site. And the availability of emergency services at the airport.

If you know your tail boom is about to melt off you'd just slam the collective down and land no matter where or on what, but they obviously didn't know that.

In an alternate reality, the article could also read "EC135 pilot panics after false fire warning light, and hits wires while attempting an emergency landing on a baseball diamond a mile away from a wide open airport. 3 little league players in critical condition "

Armed with hindsight and an external view of the machine, we all know what the right call would've been - get down anywhere and disregard potential damage during landing. That call is not so easy to make when you don't have all the information though. How many false fire lights has everyone here had?
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Looks like a machine with no AP and steam gauges - No Pelican rack required for the FCDM or AP modules?

One question I had is if it was on fire that close to the airport wonder why the tower wouldnt have seen it ??

Unfortunately, the safety logic and emergency handling protocols that have evolved following many instances of the 'flashing white glove' shutting down the wrong engine or selecting the wrong system off, mean that sometimes we will see malfunctions like this where the old school are shouting 'Do the drills from memory and shut down the engine because you don't know what else is wrong' and others are following company policy and the RFM because then you can't be hanged in court.

This guy was possibly caught between a rock and a hard place and just followed what he had been trained to do.

Bingo.......

I am still convinced that he didn't know that there was a fire in the back

skadi

Thanks for that Sir Korsky.
Not sure what the qualifying hours we must all have for input on this subject are, clearly my 2,825 hrs on the EC-135, both T&P, is not enough. I don’t recall keys for the 135, however I believe the MD902 had a set. But with only 946 hrs on that type, I wouldn’t be qualified to say.
:rolleyes:

In the absence of information, assume the worst and act accordingly.
Reminds me of one pilot that had a TR chip caution and parked it in the nearest carpark. Tourists were a bit miffed about the bus trip home and it turned out to be a false alarm.
Then there was the other guy who decided to return to base only to have the gearbox depart enroute.

You can over analyse and find reasons to justify any course of action if you try hard enough.
First priority should always be to save your ass, not to cover it.

I believe this pilot did things quite right - asking to land on unknown terrain a minute away from an airport is a long shot. It seems that he, his crew and unfortunate homeowners might be let down by this:

CS 27.861 Fire protection of structure, controls, and other parts
Each part of the structure, controls, rotor mechanism, and other parts essential to a controlled landing that would be affected by powerplant fires must be fireproof or protected so they can perform their essential functions for at least 5 minutes under any foreseeable powerplant fire conditions.

Presuming this was an engine fire. (It seems that fire was coming from underneath the engine, not direcly from engine itself, but hard to say.) There is also:

CS 27.863 Flammable fluid fire protection
(a) In each area where flammable fluids or vapours might escape by leakage of a fluid system, there must be means to minimise the probability of ignition of the fluids and vapours, and the resultant hazards if ignition does occur.
(b) ....

This will be interesting to follow, when relatives and their attorneys will try to blame manufacturer to get millions $.