System failures
 

How many more aircraft will be lost before everyone understands the importance of land right away?

What could be worse than this outcome, if they had set it down as soon as they had a problem?

Maybe bringing the fire to the rescue scene is not great, but getting out in one piece is more practical if you try it before you crash.

KB4TEZ at Live ATC
“video in the link, I've attached the short clip of the emerg audio.“

Audio Link

https://forums.liveatc.net/atcaviati...2-to-hospital/

It will be interesting to discover if he did the shut down drills on the failed engine or just assumed it had turned itself off and didn't need further attention.

A pretty standard action post any engine malfunction would be to check for dangerous indications.

For want of a simple mounted mirror on a stalk or a camera, so the pilot can see the rear of his aircraft.
Rather like the Puma had to see the intakes, but mounted so they could view the rear of the helicopter..

Well, as I think has been made abundantly clear, the crew were unaware they were on fire! Had they been aware I think there's a fair chance they would have landed sooner.

Not sure what you mean by "how many more aircraft...." - it's not exactly a common occurrence!

… or a simple ‘S’ turn as part of the ‘any indications of fire’ check post an eng fail.

I’d have thought that if it shredded a turbine blade, or something similar that would affect or destroy other systems, there would be quite a disturbance to the rear that may have been reflected in the radio transmission.

Cat A ops requirement only. Never seen fire suppression connected to IFR ops requirement.
Part 27 helicopter. Not all are IFR equipped either.

Pressing the fire button when lit cuts off fuel to the engine.
Would that influence the pilots decision to press it over a built up area?

Both the visual and the audio warning for fire are way too inconspicuous and can be missed very easily when faced with a lot of other indications that come with an engine failure. So it's a scenario that a fire indication was not recognized and fuel not shut off.
On the other hand I don't think it's "abundantly clear" that the crew was unaware of the fire, based on the communication with the tower only.

According to googled images N109BC seems to have had the hole in the cowl aft of the battery door. The hole that's there in order to read the fire bottle pressure indicator. I don't know if that hole is always there or only on machines equipped with the fire suppression kit.

not if they already lost the engine, and shouldn’t for a twin anyway.

Of note - engine containment is the engine manufacturers purview.

Looking at the various media it seems the fire is from both sides? Imagine one engine had an un-contained wheel failure which would destroy the firewalls. One has stopped and you have 2 x FIRE warnings? How many buttons do you push? What does LAND IMMEDIATELY mean when you have just left the airport?

The FIRE button in the 135 will shut off the main fuel valve only. If ENG FIRE EXT is fitted the system will release when the following logic is present - an active FIRE warning, N1 < 55% and the main fuel valve is closed - from memory. You have one shot for either engine with the standard fit.

Next time you have an engine fire keep the 5 minutes in mind.

I have seen the result of a few turbines burst over the years - two happened on the ground - B206 RRA 250 #1 Wheel shed all the blades and they went down through the engine tub, through the baggage compartment floor and onto the ground. AS350B Arriel 1 shed the PT wheel and as the aircraft was in long grass.......................not much to see. AS355 NP turbine burst at about 500' - land immediately and the TRDS was hanging by a thread.

An old instructor on a check ride once told me - if you have a fire and secured everything make a gentle turn and look over your shoulder behind you.

Unfortunately the Puma mirrors were only installed as an interim mod prior to the polyvalent intakes. They were there to extend the flight in potential icing conditions and as Nutty mentioned, they were initially angled to look at the engine intakes. But they were convex mirrors and could be angled to see down the sides of the aircraft.

When the PV intakes were fitted they were removed, despite Squadron pilot requests (especially myself) for them to be retained. For exactly this type of scenario. Part of the engine failure checklist was to check for signs of fire. Easy with mirrors, but without them the only way was to turn the aircraft and see if it was trailing smoke.

Here is a video we did with BSO and their EC135 - some of the footage might give a clue as to what equipment in the back might have caused this - if any. From first look doesnt seem to be anything that sticks out.

Do you think they were possibly taking the quickest route to safety and clear ground over a built up area knowing it was bad and turning to check for smoke may have reduced their chances and increased the time in getting there, with the possibility of causing deaths on the ground?

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....d0180fba84.jpg
Some more perspective

Closeness of the airport could possibly a distraction in itself; plenty of sports areas and open areas in which to land immediately in the area of the 180 for options, (not clearly shown on the above map screenshot). Having said that, an immediate landing wouldn’t necessarily be on the cards for a twin following an engine failure anyway, especially if no other dangers were perceived by the crew.

My 135 experience in this area is a night sortie with the smell of burning and smoke becoming apparent in the cabin <5 mins from BHX, with recced night landing sites along the way if that option was taken. However, a hurried but thermally scanned recce of a school football pitch ‘underfoot’ saw us land and shut down safely. The cause was found to be dry grass in the heating system, but we weren’t to know it wasn’t anything more serious at the time.

Be interesting to read how a fire that apparent from the outside, was perceived from the inside. Thankfully, all our thoughts will be put in their place with the investigation and first hand accounts.

In addition, there is also the avionics rack tucked up in the roof.

Glad crew ok and speedy recovery, my first thoughts were, reminiscent of the early accidents with Robinson R22 , tail snapping off due to pulling back too hard on cyclic and chopping tailboom off. Then hang on, its a semi rigid head...what the hell could have cuased fire..

Anyhow this was a P3/T3 equipped with Helionix, there are cameras below fuselage and I think in tailboom (my pic playing with D-HECB 6 years ago at Le Bourget)

https://scontent-lcy1-1.xx.fbcdn.net...qA&oe=6515DD2C

How old is this BCSO Fire Ec135? When was its last inspection / G check??

cheers

Am not current on any type, although I operated 135s for several years. Having seen the effects of a thermal runaway on an aircraft battery, I shall be interested to see if this is a contender.

As for survivability, kudos to the designers. Looking at the rate of rotation after tail-boom separation, I very much doubt whether any pilot would be able to keep hands/feet on controls under those centripetal forces, so there goes the option for double-engine shutdown.

Thanks RVDT I assumed it was required for IFR certification, it should be….
That is the problem with the option, some guy in an office decides it hardly ever happens and the system costs a lot. “We can’t account for everything”

The pic you posted is telling not many options before the airfield which was close.