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-   -   S61 at Humberside, offshore engine failure! (https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/346875-s61-humberside-offshore-engine-failure.html)

helimutt 13th October 2008 19:27

S61 at Humberside, offshore engine failure!
 
Well done to the guys flying the S61 today. :ok: Managed to bring it back to HUY single engine after sufferening what i'm led to believe was a single engine failure on final approach to it's offshore destination.

They even had one of their own as wingman!

atcomarkingtime 13th October 2008 21:23

wow...news gets out fast in pprune world....S61 had left the ANG freq.....came back on with a pan....and the AS32 shadowed it to HUY....all low level too!!

helimutt 13th October 2008 21:41

edited to remove speculation. :ok:

Whirlygig 13th October 2008 21:47

HM, you missed out the bit about narrowly missing a school and being within seconds from bursting into flames. You'll never make a journalist!! :}

Well done chaps!

Cheers

Whirls

Brilliant Stuff 14th October 2008 13:23

Well done Chaps!!!:ok:

Outwest 15th October 2008 00:39

Congrats to the crew :ok:

Anyone have any specifics? I.E. Gross weight, OAT, wind, fuel jettison, cause of failure.

I had a 61 donk fail once offshore.....pencil shaft sheared.......but the old girl brought me home safe

leading edge 15th October 2008 01:34

Outwest

I also had one in 1981. Happened just on rotation taking off from a platform with 23 pax + cabin attendant. The old girl bought me home safely as well. A bit of wind helped to get to Vtoss but slowed down the journey home somewhat!!

unstable load 15th October 2008 12:30

Well done to all involved! Good job!

NavyTorque 15th October 2008 18:59

S61 Engine Fail - SURGING
 
I was flying the S61 in question on final approach to Energy Enhancer - A "Jack Up" rig approx 85 miles NE of Humberside.

We had just commenced the turn onto finals at approx 400' 70 kts when a classic bang bang bang (although much quieter than I had always expected) was heard with the associated torque split and then fluctuations.

It was recognised as a surging number 1 engine (T5 was subsequently seen on HUMS as having peaked at 945 prior to it's shutdown) and the aircraft was turned away from the rig and the situation was dealt with as per the many times we have all done it in the sim and OPCs LPCs!

Company traffic that heard our Pan Call offered to divert to us because obviously we were only able to climb very slowly and were not showing on Anglia Radar. Also it is always nice to have a comfort blanket.

I can post the weights, fuels etc if any one is really interested - but will need to get out the flight log!

These events always get you thinking - no matter how experienced you are; Most of the return trip to Humberside was flown at 70 kts due to limited power. We had a ground speed of about 60 kts - now IF the winds had been what they were last week - then our ground speed would have been 25kts.

As always - perhaps the real heroes of all of these incidents are the radar controllers - and again on this occasion of particular note was how calm and professional Anglia Radar were:

1. No hassle after acknowledging Pan Call until we had sorted out aircraft.
2. They responded to the offer from the other company helicopter with a DR estimate of our position pending a GPS update from us after we had sorted out the problem.
3. RT was spot on - not too much, not too little and completely calm and accurate.

I telephoned Anglia Radar afterwards to say thank you to the obviously "Experienced Controller" to be told that he was a controller "Under Training" - hopefully he passed that assessment!!

On speaking to the Passengers afterwards they said they were still 100% confident in the S61 and perhaps even more so now that it had been proved to them that the old girls CAN fly on on engine even at perhaps the most critical point of flight!

Thank you for reading this.

RT

helimutt 15th October 2008 21:48

Thanks for your input. Always nice to get the info first hand.
I always wonder how it will go if it ever happens to me. :hmm:
The fact I also fly out of Humberside makes me think the chances of it happening again out of the same airport in the near future are slim, so I should be okay for a while at least!
Glad to see it all worked out like it should, no matter if you are the competition.;)

I see the 61 was flying the next day. Quick engine change and Roberts your fathers brother!:ok:

Outwest 15th October 2008 21:52

Thanks very much for the info Navy Torque and a big pat on the back to you and your crew. :D

I agree with your pax, the old girl can still hold her head high.

Would be interested in the weights and OAT and if you had fuel jettision available, if not to much trouble.

Leading Edge,
well mine was 10 years later and a lot less exciting....cruise flight, inbound to base with a light load......actually a non-event.

AviatorAtHeart 15th October 2008 23:26

A rotary enthusiast speaking here...

Great to hear everything worked out well. I was really curious about the landing tough - did you guys have enough power to bring it to a hover and land or was a run-on required ?

Cheers..

[email protected] 16th October 2008 05:46

Aviator - since they flew back at 70 kts due to limited power, I think it very unlikely that there would be enough to hover on and the safest profile (in case the other one quit) would be a high level VMC transit followed by an autorotative approach to a flare recovery and running landing.

Navy - are they P and W engines in the 61?

ScotiaQ 16th October 2008 06:00

Are they P & W Engines ?
 
Crab,

No they are General Electric CT 58-140.....and usually very reliable.

unstable load 16th October 2008 06:06

Crab,

General Electric CT58-140-2 most likely or the 140-1 maybe.


Outwest,

I have not worked in UK but the ex North Sea ships I have worked on all had fuel dump fitted. I believe it is a UKCAA requirement.

Well done again, Navy Torque!

helimutt 16th October 2008 06:58

AviatoratHeart, just to let you know, from reliable sources who witnessed the run on landing, it was 'textbook'!! :ok:

PS Twice a year, this sort of engine failure training, and lots of other stuff, is carried out for exactly this reason. Comforting to see that it works.

JimL 16th October 2008 07:45

Crab,


high level VMC transit followed by an autorotative approach to a flare recovery and running landing.
That was tongue-in-cheek wasn't it?

Jim

cmwangs 16th October 2008 08:01

Engine Failure.
 
Well Done, Son!!:D:D:ok:!
CMW

simfly 16th October 2008 13:37

Well done Navy torque....

ps, check you pm's!

Variable Load 16th October 2008 14:02


Crab,

Quote:
high level VMC transit followed by an autorotative approach to a flare recovery and running landing.
That was tongue-in-cheek wasn't it?

Jim

Everything Crab says is a joke, isn't it :E

NavyTorque 16th October 2008 15:40

Most Questions Answered amongst yourselves!
 
Yes aircraft had fuel jettison available - elected to keep what we had since we could maintain a gentle climb if required and only engine exceedance reported on GOOD engine was a slight prolonged T5 exceedance - we assume that this is due to the possible slight difference between what is displayed on the gauge and what is recorded by Hums and because we were using nearly all the T5 availble to us within Intercon. We flew back at 690-695 Intercon limit T5 - torque was in region of 100% most of way home

Engine question answered by others.

Detailed fuel, HUMs figures - well feel free to PM me for fear of boring you all.

No not all S61s on North Sea have dump - the BIH cab currently working Donegal Doesn't have it! (yes it does work the North Sea at times).

You are right - there was not enough power for a hover landing.

Regards

NT

gribbs 16th October 2008 15:42

I sincererly hope that Crab's comment wasn't meant to be taken seriously. Hopefully nobody will heed that advice; I can't think of a more dangerous way of making a single engine approach in a '61.

NavyTorque 16th October 2008 15:48

Oh Sorry - One more thing!
 
Sorry but the aircraft wasn't flying agian the next day - it was G BDIJ the ex SAR machine, we took the passengers out the next day - we carefully briefed the oncoming pax at the rig in case they were overly concerned.

On approach back to Humberside we heard a whistling 1R that sounded very benign - like loosing a strip of blade tape on the Sea King. The noise then stopped and became a very slight 1R whistling with NO associated effects on the controls or feedback or change in flying characteristics or power required etc.

Upon inspection on landing we had lost the complete underside of one of the blade pockets - ie you could see the spars and formers!!! That happened much to anyone else???

Is the good Lord trying to tell me something.

NT

JimL 16th October 2008 16:18

One further point before all become weepy-eyed about the capability of the S61; if 'Navy Torque' was flying it and his account is accurate (as I assume he was and it is), an engine failure at 70kts (very close to Vy) and just about 500ft is as benign as it can get.

Without discounting the trauma of any engine failure; there should have been very little droop and, providing the topping was correct (which it seldom is), the power should have settled with little speed adjustment and there should have been 150ft/min climb performance at the intercontingency power.

An engine failure at below 35kts and closer to the rig might have yielded a different outcome.

Regardless, the crew are to be congratulated on performing the drills as required and recovering the aircraft in one piece to Humberside.

Jim

[email protected] 16th October 2008 16:22

If you have had a single engine failure in a twin engined machine, you are now a single engined helicopter with poor performance carrying fare-paying passengers. In case the remaining engine quits (and you don't know exactly why the first one stopped) you should fly a profile that allows for that to happen and still permit you to safely enter auto and carry out an EOL.
Now this might not be possible due to weather but I would love to hear the arguments against this course of action when day/VMC.

And no, this is not tongue in cheek.

JimL 16th October 2008 16:42

Crab,

There are profiles in the RFM should there be an engine failure; these are practiced during the OPC and the pilot is recommended to follow them.

If the reliability of the engine is 1:100,000/flight hour (as most of them are), the probability of one of two failing is 2:100,000/flight hour; the probability of one failing followed by the second (from independent causes) is 1 in 10,000,000,000.

Most pilots of twins do not (have to) practice autorotations; if they do they are never flown to the ground (there is no need and it exposes the aircraft and crew to unecessary damage).

Because you are an articulate and experience aviator, most on this site pay attention to what you say; for that reason alone, you should be guarded and considered about any advice you give.

Jim

Bertie Thruster 16th October 2008 18:00

What Crab suggested is standard military practice after single engine failure on a twin.

ie after a single failure fly the machine like a single and be prepared for the other engine to stop. (especially if dodgy fuel upload or heavy precipitation is suspected in the cause of the first failure.)

I've only had one single engine failure in a twin . The other engine stopped about 2 minutes later.

skadi 16th October 2008 18:21


In case the remaining engine quits (and you don't know exactly why the first one stopped) you should fly a profile that allows for that to happen and still permit you to safely enter auto and carry out an EOL.

I agree with that statement for the enroute phase of the flight, but ( even in my military training ) the final landing should be carried out according to normal OEI landing profile, no autorotation at all! ( and we practised ARs a lot)

skadi

Spanish Waltzer 16th October 2008 18:35

Have to agree with Skadi. I have enjoyed the priviledge of receiving and then later giving instruction within mil flying circles on single engine failures whilst flying a twin. Whilst I can see up to a point the concern crab raises I do not recall carrying out autorotative approaches during OEI training.

Crab - I would be interested to hear if the CFS training has changed or is this your personal viewpoint?

helimutt 16th October 2008 19:10

Nice to see the old 61's still required in service. Just to cheer CRAB up a bit, it would appear that the AW139 is now, for the time being, day only for SAR and the 61 is standing in. Now that has to put a smile on his face!

[email protected] 16th October 2008 19:57

Helimutt - that little snippet hadn't escaped my notice and you are absolutely right:)

Jim - an auto to a flare recovery (ie the hover taxy) should be a basic skill of any helicopter pilot but especially those flying twins since it is the closest they will come to practicing an EOL. One of the first things you learn in helicopter flying is how to autorotate and for very good reason. If you say this is hazardous then the training is wrong because having to complete a real EOL with no idea of the profile is far more hazardous. I am well aware of the arguments about the fatigue that autos impose on the airframe but profit (ie extending the aircraft TBOs) shouldn't affect safety.
If you want to let probability decide for you then be my guest - I am always ready for a single engine failure in my line of work so why shouldn't I be ready for the second one to let go as well (quoting probability in this case is like trusting statistics)

Spanish - the military teach a variety of techniques for single engine approaches but most are within a tactical ie low level remit and the basic SE approach will be from 500' or below trading speed for power until 10% (to pluck a figure from the sky) below your max available to reduce the groundspeed and hence the ground run (useful where space is limited ie not at an airfield). Airmanship, in a non tactical environment, can be superimposed on that teaching and lead you to surmise that floating around at low level on one engine could be a less than ideal scenario - the first thing I encourage people to do is climb to give you time and options.

roundwego 16th October 2008 20:51

According to Crab's logic (see his first post on this thread), in my single engine helicopter, every flight has to terminate with "an autorotative approach to a flare recovery and running landing" just in case the engine fails - What is this guy on?

Well done to the crew of this flight. I have circa 19,000hrs (99% twin) and am still waiting for my first engine failure. Does that mean the odds for me having an engine failure are much higher and you should avoid flying with me?

Fareastdriver 16th October 2008 20:53

Crab


Navy - are they P and W engines in the 61?
As unstable load said, CT58s, of which the RR Gnome is a licence built version. I thought you would have known that.

helimutt 16th October 2008 21:00

Roundwego, I would imagine that statistically you'd be the most likely to have an engine failure. 19,000hrs.? You been sleeping in them or something? :D

Whirlygig 16th October 2008 21:02


Does that mean the odds for me having an engine failure are much higher and you should avoid flying with me?
No, the odds are the same; engines don't know who is operating them and statistics have no memory!

Cheers

Whirls

HeliComparator 16th October 2008 21:50

My worst nightmare - having Crab as stude on an EC225 conversion. Can't get a word in for the "when we were in the military we did it like this..." (pauses to tie hankerchief with red spot round brow, enters auto on simulated single engine finals whilst pressing cyclic trigger and muttering dagerdagerdager under his breath). This is of course because the military are only trained to kill people, they are not trained nor allowed to carry fare paying passengers.

But sorry JimL I just have to pick you up on one point - the probablility of a second engine failure after the first one failing is not your further 1 in 100,000 or whatever, its greater than that because now you are running the remaining engine much harder than its used to. Nevertheless its still not that high and certainly doesn't warrant Crab's kamikazi dive.

HC

arandcee 16th October 2008 22:42

"This is of course because the military are only trained to kill people"

:rolleyes:

Bravo73 16th October 2008 23:25


Originally Posted by helimutt (Post 4465453)
19,000hrs.? You been sleeping in them or something? :D

Probably 'just' flying offshore for 20+ years. Might only be early 40s by now (if started at 18).

Brian Abraham 17th October 2008 00:20


would be a high level VMC transit followed by an autorotative approach to a flare recovery and running landing.
I can understand where crab is coming from. Had an engine failure at CDP on a rig take off which was accompanied by a massive explosion as the turbine let go. Once safely in the climb my major concern was had the "good engine" suffered in any way (it was that massive an explosion). A mayday had been put out, course set for home and altitude gained so that a comfortable auto could be carried out should need be. On land fall ensured that a suitable paddock was available for an auto and made a lever on the floor approach to the runway with a run on using available power (about 30-40 knots). The only reason for the steep approach in this case was the thinking I don't trust the "good" engine due possible inflicted damage from the failed engine. The line of thinking was primarily influenced by the massive explosion when it let go. I had plenty of previous experience of single engine landings flying the line (precationary shutdowns, particularly when the 76 was new to the industry) and in those cases flew the text book flight manual approach. While Speechless Two is correct in his "requirements of a civilian crew to abide by both the Flight Manual profiles and the requirements of the Company Operations Manual" at times you need to fall back on your judgement and experience and cut the cloth to suit the situation.

Practice autos (power recovery) were a feature of our regular base checks (six monthly) and one intrepid C & Ter on a one off basis would purposely "forget" to put the throttles up in the flare so you ended up with a surprise full blown auto to the ground (S-76).

roundwego, you are well overdue :p The above was my first full blown chew em up and spit em out failure. About 18 months later had an identical failure in the same aircraft but now the other engine. Although the mechanics of the failure were exactly the same (high power at take off and turbine letting go) this time it was accompanied by just a quiet almost inaudible "pop". And that was at about the 19,000 hour mark. Good luck and may the Gods continue to smile on you.

gnow 17th October 2008 06:05

Well Done Navy Torque and welcome to the club. In my 14 000 hrs plus of flying S61N,(total time now 19 000hrs) I had 6 engine failures on S61N including a reject at 20500 lbs from the airfield near to the CDP for a modified Group A departure (300ft/45 kts). They used to say I have arse luck but after so many arse luck incidents, I tend to be very careful and cautious!
You were right..and I have always given that a thought. On one engine at intercon power you are lucky to get close to 80/90 kts. in a bad headwind situation, we may not have enough fuel to reach home.
I had one incident which even Sikorsky did not managed to explain.We were cruising along happily at 2000 ft (and condeming the management as usual!) when suddenly the cross hatch symbol appeared on the fuel shut off valve. That means it has gone to a CLOSED position sudddenly(All this while the valve is physically opened). Within a minute the engine flamed out. Now all our manuals says that the fuel shut off valve will "remain in its last energised position no matter what happens..eg total loss of electricity).
The rule of this game is always try and be a good boy scout..BE PREPARED!


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