|
Video released for Aust Army BlackHawk crash
Sorry I don't have the link as it was only released today, however the military has released footage of the BlackHawk that sank off Timor after crashing off the back of the Navy ship. Pilot Error and Strong Tailwinds were blamed and apparently a landing should have never been attempted in those conditions.
The aircraft literally bounced off the deck after hitting at a massive rate of knots, tail snaps off downwards and it bounced off the side of the ship. At first glance it appeared to be travelling at 20-30 knots. The video only lasts for around 2-3 seconds. |
|
It was off Fiji.
|
... and it wasn't attempting a landing.
|
The above video link appears not to work? Is there another source for the same please? So if the PIC was not attempting to land what was he trying to do? Or was it a mechanical failure?
|
:mad:
So what was the point of releasing the video? does it add anything to the BOI? does it help the bereaved family? or does it, in a half-ar*ed way show how open and transparent the BOI is....:yuk: I don't blame the Army for trying to 'supress' it as it's basically morbid curiousity at it's worst, leading to speculation on the part of uninformed pruners. |
Why should the Military have the privilege of suppressing the info, if it were a civilian operation it would not be? Yes it was a very sad tragedy, a senseless loss of life. There may be some learning in this tragedy for pilots to learn more about managing a safer operation & for raising safety awareness there should not be suppression.
|
Rotors88
I agree- but how about waiting for the investigation to be complete- I don't see BASI/ATSB etc releasing details of their investigations before it's finished... |
Too true, valid point
|
... and it wasn't attempting a landing. sad , for sure very sad. no conjecture could be had without at least the previous several seconds as well. at least most of those close will know the irrelevance of some of press comments that went with it. |
Black Hawk crash footage released
Monday Jun 18 18:00 AEST By ninemsn staff with wires Shocking footage of an army Black Hawk helicopter crashing into the deck of the HMAS Kanimbla has been made public after it was shown at an inquiry earlier today. Two soldiers were killed when Black Hawk A25-221 crashed and plunged into the sea off Fiji on November 29 last year. RELATED LINKS VIDEO: Shocking impact The CCTV footage shows the helicopter slamming into the ship's deck before uncontrollably spinning into the ocean. The inquiry heard that wind conditions on the day meant the helicopter should never have attempted the landing it had been briefed to conduct. The inquiry is being conducted by retired NSW Supreme Court Justice David Levine QC at Sydney's Randwick Barracks. Four crew members and six passengers were on the helicopter. Nine of the 10 were rescued before the Black Hawk sank but the pilot, Captain Mark Bingley, later died of his injuries. In March, the helicopter wreckage and body of Special Air Service Trooper Joshua Porter were recovered from the sea floor at a depth of almost 3km. Counsel assisting the defence board of inquiry, Commander Jack Rush QC, said the Black Hawk was undertaking a "high-risk" training exercise in tail winds of 10-15 knots when it crashed into the deck, severing the tail rotor from the main body. Cdr Rush said the brief of how to conduct the exercise should have been altered to take into account the tail wind, which would have made it difficult for the pilot to control the helicopter's descent. "The evidence before the board foreshowed there was a critical lack of risk management processes," Cdr Rush told the inquiry. "As briefed, the flight should not have been authorised. "Specifically, changes should have been made to the brief to allow for the wind." He said changes should have included an adjustment to the speed at which the aircraft approached the ship. The inquiry was also shown graphic video footage filmed by a trooper sitting in the back of the helicopter. Both videos showed the helicopter colliding with HMAS Kanimbla. The family of Trooper Porter, including his widow Carinna and one-month-old daughter Madison, along with the family of Captain Bingley, also watched video footage of the salvage operation of the Black Hawk from the ocean floor. The inquiry was told by Major-General Anthony Fraser, head of the army's helicopter systems, that a decision had been made not to fit flotation devices to Black Hawks as it would have increased their weight and could slow escape from a sinking helicopter. However, he said they would also have lowered the speed at which the helicopter sunk. The inquiry continues. ©AAP 2007 Very sad indeed. Not having flown a Blackhawk and without any familiarity of same, would a 10-15knot tailwind really have such a dramatic effect on such an aircraft? Please let me make it clear that this is a genuine enquiry and nothing more. Cheers Gotagivitago P.S Can I also just say how tremendously impressed I was with the way Captain Bingley's wife has conducted herself throughout this whole affair. He must be extremely proud of her and rightly so. In saying that, I mean no disrespect to anyone else as she was the only widow I saw on the news |
Hi Gotagivitago,
even so I used the IE, the video didn´t start. Back to your question. It´s a long time since I did my last deck landing and I have never flown a black hawk - still, I have done some decklandings - at more adverse conditions - like high sea state - night - pouring rain and darkend landing area. When approaching a ships deck you should always have some amount of forward wind. Any helicopter gets more or less unstable, when you have a tailwind component. Add to this a moving and wobbeling landing area due to the seastate and you´ll increase the risks of a deck landings by a factor, which isn´t necessary. With any amount of wind on the nose you need less power and get a more stable helicopter (as long as you avoid flying through the turbulences of the superstructure). The picture from the video does only show the area, where the ship was before, but where would have been the problem to go onto flying course, delivering some forward airflow? The problem is mostly in the minds of the shipcrew because they cant understand the effects of tailwind on a helicopter - or the effects of a sharp turn with the helicopter turning on the deck.... So its up to the pilot to refuse to land - and it´s a good habit to take the responsible ships officers to a joyride - and then show them the problems, which can occur on a flight deck. There have been instances, where only the chains keept the helicopter on the deck, because the bride did a sharp turn - vanisching the hole helicopter under water - when it reappeared, the engines where running down, the main rotor as well - while the tail rotor was already stopped..... Flight operations to and from ship decks have many additional risks you don´t have influence on - so never add risks, you can influence. Greetings Flying Bull |
As I remember my training long time ago ( I flew Navy Seakings ), ship approaches should be done with headwind and not direct inbound the deck. We were instructed to do the approach into a hover left aside the deck, so in case of a malfunction a go around ( or even a OEI landing in the water ) is much easier than with a direkt approach.
skadi |
More extensive footage of the accident was shown on the ABC news tonight, including a short clip taken from on-board the helicopter.
It shows the helicopter approaching the deck rapidly at a very steep angle, fast closing rate, and very high rate of descent, with coning on the main rotor disk evident suggesting very high power demand/output of the engines. The nose of the helicopter hits the helideck first, the airframe distorts causing the co-pilots door to swing open, the main wheel oleos compress fully and as the nose section bounces up off the deck the tail section pivots down causing the tail rotor to hit the safety netting resulting in immediate separation of the tail rotor pylon from the tail boom. Virtually instantaneously the cabin rotates 180 degrees to the right, the rapid rotational speed obviously due to the torque reaction applied by the engines at very high power. The helicopter appears to remain upright but spinning rapidly and pitching up as it disappears out of view prior to entering the water. From what was shown in the video it certainly was not a normal approach by any conventional standards, although the media report described the helicopter as performing some type of tactical manouvre. For what reason they did not elaborate. In any event, having seen the footage it is a wonder that anybody survived the initial impact, let alone extraction from the aircraft whilst under water. Testament perhaps to good training and an ounce of luck. The report went on to say that the flight data recorder was recovered and there were no indications of any systems malfunctions prior to the accident. |
For those having trouble with the video link, i've put a copy of something similar here http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk...?videokey=1614
V. |
What were they thinking |
Special assignments in aviation
As a previous crew memeber with over t 2000 hours on S70A operating in many diverse roles across oz and overseas, it was both horrific and gut wrenching to to see that footage today.
From my own experience those manurves involving special ops are practised and rehersed repeatedly by day and then by night to ensure all the skills and safety margins are acheived. Obviously there was not enough scrutiny of the safety margins on that given day. S70A will tolerate a tail wind component but at what acft weight and performance margin is the question?? This squadron is the pinniacle of a rotary wing operational flying career in the military and I am very pleased to have been a part of that unit. They do a fantastic job.... |
Vortex Ring
Vortex Ring is the apparent culprit here. Some may call this settling with power; it is the same phenomenon.
If a helicopter is flown on a downwind approach with a high sink rate and low forward speed it will assuredly enter a vortex ring state. The result is always thus; the descent will continue until the pilot reduces collective and increases airspeed, or where neither airspace or altitude allow, the helicopter must crash. The reports that I have seen on TV appear to say that the pilot was ordered to make that approach. I doubt that, for he must know that to do would constitute a kamakazi operation. No Australian pilot is going to be so mute - or obedient! Sorry to say this: pilot error, it seems. There but for.....etc The Kite |
What a load of b**ocks "thekite". Since when was VRS the same thing as settling with power??????
One is an aerodynamic effect, the other is a performance limitation.:ugh: Second: how on earth can you speculate on and conclude the cause when you see the helo for about 1.5 seconds prior to impact:ugh: God help us all:* |
One odd thing I noticed, that would question the whole tail wind scenario:
The stabilator is still in a fairly level setting, which would suggest high airspeed (at least 50 kts, if I remember correctly). So unless they had a stabilator failure or elected to disable the auto mode, they had to be going very fast for ship ops. Then again, there is barely enough time to ascertain the actual stabilator position prior to destruction. I don't mean to create tread drift, but I think someone is confusing "settling with power" with "power settling." Power settling is the one having to do with performance limitations, while settling with power is just another way of describing Vortex Ring State. |
ease up
What were they thinking, SERIOUSLY! they were there on a mission, SAS on board, performing mission rehearsals. they weren't stuffing about, those boys play hard |
Chill Thomas, VRS and Settling with power are one and the same.
The performance limitation you refer to is "over pitching". |
Gents / ladies,
I don't often get involved with PPRuNe threads as I tend to find the speculation and gross over simplification of matters such as this a little off putting sometimes but in this instance some of the comments really need some reigning in:ugh:. Firstly, I worked in this Sqn (prior to it being "re-badged" as 171 Sqn) in the mid to late 90's in the role that was being performed on the day. I say this only to lend a little credibility to my comments below. Suffice it to say, the personnel involved were / are all very well trained but the roles they perform can be extremely demanding and varied. Like anything in life, they were (and never will be) infallible. That should never detract from the fact, one can assuredly assume they have had a considerable amount of training and would have been assesed as being suitably experienced (this is often considerably less than what civvies would consider suitably experienced). In addition to the above, the exercises performed are generally extremely well briefed, rehearsed by day and then flown at night if applicable, and debriefed. They take what I would consider all "reasonable" steps to assure a desirable outcome. It doesn't mean errors or omissions can't occur.:= Hindsight is a wonderful thing but should not be abused. Comments such as "what were they thinking?" and the like again illustrate how enthusiatic some of us are to criticise without actually having a modicum of insight into what actually happened on that particular flight. That's why an investigation and then subsequent BOI is carried out.:rolleyes: The footage shows (for the most part) outcomes rather than causes. I find it incredible that fellow rotorheads out there actually think that the resultant flight regime as shown in the footage might be something they were striving for - clearly that would be ludicrous. So let's give them the benefit of the doubt and assume they were after a different result. It does appear from initial reports that the weather conditions of day (particularly the wind strength and direction) may have played a significant role and if so, the assertion that vortex ring may have been involved seems plausible if not highly likely. Looking at the footage (as ugly as it is), it appears the aircraft is not actually under control given its attitude, RoD, aiming point etc which would support the VR claim. Some of the comments provided seem to suggest that some of our brethren believe the handling pilot was actually "flying" the aircraft at this point. Hmmm...:= What is or will be more interesting to find out is whether the crew was aware of the conditions (one would hope so). If not, then a causal factor would have been identified. If they did know, and discarded this information, then things start to get really interesting. Let's have the investigation / BOI run its course to determine the real causes behind this. Experience suggests it's rarely just one factor a la James Reason's Swiss cheese model. As far as whether the footage should be made public or not, not everyone will be happy regardless of what stance you take. I myself would have preferred it to be released but after the BOI was complete. It would then serve the role of actually educating us all much more effectively than it does at the moment. In its present guise it's just "cannon fodder" for uninformed criticism. I acknowledge it must be distressing for those involved and their families and my condolences go out to them. However, my belief is if the issue of VR is again highlighted (assuming that it is in fact what has occurred), and it re-educates just one of us out there to think twice about the prevailing wind on finals (or indeed our finals profile), that must be a good thing. P68 |
papa 68, on what occassions would a downwind approach to a deck landing be called for in your experience?
|
I'm also genuinely curious as to when a tactical approach to a ship with a helideck would be made. Other than trying to deploy troops to a ship, to attack it (seems an unlikely scenario), the only other reason I can think of would be if the ship were under attack itself, and a dynamic arrival was required to minimise exposure (a bit like the run in and break FW technique). The ship would be manoeuvering fairly aggresively itself, though, in such circumstances: might that explain the downwind approach? (yes, I realise this was training, but for waht sort of scenario?)
I'm aware of the sort of tactics that might be deployed to storm an oil platform that has been taken over by terrorists, but that's a different scenario. |
I really don't think all this speculation is healthy.
I'm sure the BOI will come up with the right answer, via the surviving crew's testimony. Suffice to say that the Blackhawk is a heavy machine which develops a lot of momentum and will bite, under certain conditions... Let the BOI do it's job..... |
Papa68, well said...:D
How about everyone drops all the bull!!!! of being professional aircrash investigators. Some of you are talking an absolute load of crap and should be ashamed of your self's. What ever the cause two fine Australians have paid the ultimate price, the loss of there lives. ENOUGH SAID... Let the BOI run it's course but do try and show some respect...:confused: P.S - Thomas Coupling... Settling with power is the same as VRS. Get your facts straight before shooting your mouth off old chap. :ok: it could get you a knuckle sanwhich at the pub!!!! |
I have only seen the incident once very briefly on the BBC news, and like papa68 I have formed the opinion that the aircraft was not under control!
|
I have only seen the incident once very briefly on the BBC news, and like papa68 I have formed the opinion that the aircraft was not under control! |
The U.S. Navy (and Marines and Coast Guard?) sees the terms as being reversed. VRS=Power settling, and SWP=not enough power to arrest descent. |
Not to continue speculating, but I work around UH-60s every day and am very familiar with what the aircraft can do... and in my mind, the largest risk we run in a tactical operating environment is not the aircraft letting us down, its the aircraft being overflown by the pilots due to overconfidence in the machine. I am in no way blaming the two Australian pilots in this circumstance, however the vast majority of UH-60 pilots I work with have at least a slight feeling that the Blackhawk has been overdesigned to allow for combat situations, and that the aircraft will never bite you back no matter how hard you push it.
Case in point, and (at least in my eyes) a very similar accident, is this video: http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/vids/uh60vrs.flv Given having a bunch of "High Speed" troopies in back and doing a tactical exercise, I can very easily see the crew performing a similar flight manuver and thus leading to a simlar incident in Fiji. Just an idea. Mike |
Repeating my question: I can see the need for a tactical, dynamic, arrival onshore, but why to a ship with a helideck?
|
212man.
Perhaps they were pretending it wasn't a ship with a helideck - eg anti terr' ops against hijacked ocean liner or oil tanker? Whatever - i suggest you don't try it in your nice shiny new 92! |
whitecaps on the water
Whitecaps on the water - yes.
But do they not suggest a downwind condition? And yes again - the aircraft is nose down, clearly with very considerable power on. Exactly what you would expect to see on a last - minute frantic go-round. thekite |
... and it wasn't attempting a landing. nose going forward looks more like a go-round. sad , for sure very sad. no conjecture could be had without at least the previous several seconds as well. at least most of those close will know the irrelevance of some of press comments that went with it. Exactly what you would expect to see on a last - minute frantic go-round. Conjecture, conjecture, double bubble toil and trouble. Please don’t shoot the messenger here, his family, colleagues and friends are obviously going through enough as it is, but should they be? To go back to the Townsville nightime crash, was the system dealt with there or rather a messenger -- ???? --- low hour pilot --- ???. What of the system that allows an inexperienced pilot into such vulnerability, rather than the messenger who happened to be holding the sticks at the time? How on earth in that scenario could you have an inexperienced pilot being blamed for anything? I mean putting any rotary pilot with less than a thousand hours in close formation in distracting conditions and extremely limited visibility is like locking a mob of drunken bikies in a small pub with unlimited grog and loose iron bars, and thinking that nothing untoward will happen. Please don’t jump down my neck; I was close enough to that tragic situation to have known that the night of that accident was merely a practice for a subsequent operation and what that subsequent target was to be. In this scenario we have no information other than a fleeting video glimpse, but we do know that a BOI is operating. Its tradition is on the one side ‘it’ has a system, the other ‘scapegoats.’ Sorry, messengers or mistake makers, to be ultimately forgiven or unforgiven, be that in the eyes of the media public or the court room purveyors. But what of the system that put the ‘messengers’ into the public forum?? Do they close ranks?? Or, did they before the public haranguing started. Lots of experienced heavy metal drivers are on here, would your experience be better put to examine a fleeting glimpse of devastating footage or using your accumulated wisdom to bring to account the operational aspects of the “BOI System,” or more particularly the “system” that allowed the Townsville disaster and possibly this latest aberration to occur? To conject further, when we talk about “experience” it is all very well, and you can all say it of me if you like, to bask in the ultra world of low level manipulative peril and having survived then come out with some seemingly easy comments, but that is what I am talking about. This gentleman may be very well experienced in various endeavours of operational flying or his on board systems or his operational systems or whatever, but may NEVER have been put into the scenario that he encountered EVER before. Experience has to be quantified. If that is the case will anyone in the BOI process have enough ‘experience,’ to recognise that fact and give it due consideration, further, will it ever surface as a consideration? Perhaps even his closest and dearest will hark with misgivings in this area but be unable to surface with it. Or, will the “system” close ranks as an endemic protection mechanism and be blind? |
1) There are white caps on the water suggesting enough wind to perhaps rule out settling with power. |
This may be a rumour network, but serioulsly people if you have no experience in this particular type of flying. How about you shut the F**k up.
These people are at the pinnacle of military aviation, and dont take anything lightly. Mistakes are made, accidents happen its a part of life. Lets just let the BOI do its job, and lets stop witch hunting a fantastic pilot and a top bloke. |
212 man,
Re scenarios requiring such approaches to ships, I agree they would be isolated in nature. Having said that, we did practice such scenarios both as single ship and formation assaults fairly regularly. Why? By way of an example only, ships and the like allow for relatively easy accomodation overflow when all other accomodation options have been utlised e.g. the Sydney Olympics. Lot's of people concentrated together potentially constitute a high profile target for bad guys. There are a number of other scenarios which I won't go into here. TOT, I think I get where you were going with your thoughts. I was involved with the '96 accident and subsequent BOI so I won't provide my thoughts on the process then or its outcomes except as to say that elements of the Spec Ops (CT as it was known then) capability have improved as a result. Of note, the '96 BOI was headed up initially by a Brig and the entire board consisted of military officers. Recently, the ADF (as a result of real / perceived transparency within its judicial system) has changed its approach in this regard and the current BOI is being headed up by a civvy. Perhaps this will alleviate you of what I think are some of your concerns. P68:O |
212Man
The situation as I understand was that the ship was stationed off Fiji whilst a military coup was being threatened and then took place. The role for the ship and embarked roops was to be available if needed to assist with evacuation of non Fiji citizens from the airport and or port if the coup turned into a nasty situation (lots of tourists). Fortunately it was a non violent coup. At the time there was no where on land for the troops embarked to practice/keep skills up/stop boredom. Thus the only place to practice a fast rope tactical approach is on the ship. I have no direct knowledge but this would seem to be the most likely reason for such an exercie to the helideck. |
Gents. I too rarely post here anymore but I find that, in this case, its either post or punch the computer screen. (so appologies to all if this comes across as "a little terse").
The biggest thing that you people are missing here is that it appears that this was NOT an attempt to land. This appears to be a tactical assault of the ship. Not going into specifics, but the profile (which is performed/practised over and over to every concieveable target) involves low level, close formation and great speed to arrive OVER the target with the most shock and least warning to the enemy at the target. Obviously something in this case went wrong. (It looks like Bingas was trying to go around to me but lets not speculate heh). This is a high risk, no sh_t game these blokes play and I'm sure that reading various drivel on this forum is sorely tempting them to write their own replies (well done for not biting guys). These blokes do what they do because one day we might thank them for doing it. Their job is highly specialised, and the risks are managed as well as possible whilst still allowing the aim to be achieved. As was said after 96, if we want the blokes to be able to achieve this aim (special ops delivery), then we have to manage and accept the risk involved. I for one thank the 171 guys and feel for what they are going through. Lets give them a break heh and stop applying our lack of experience of their ops to our speculation. |
| All times are GMT. The time now is 00:06. |
Copyright © 2026 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.