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PHI lose S76 in GOM
I hear that PHI lost an S76 in the GOM yesterday. Reports are that it had just 2 crew on board and they escaped unharmed. I don't know if the floats didn't work, but the reports I've seen say the aircraft sunk and that it took 3 hours to rescue the crew.
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NTSB Prelim Report
Posted elsewhere on the web.
************************************************************ ******************** ** Report created 10/23/2006 Record 1 ** ************************************************************ ******************** IDENTIFICATION Regis#: 22342 Make/Model: S76 Description: S-76, H-76, AUH-76, SPIRIT, EAGLE (HE-24 Date: 10/22/2006 Time: 1230 Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Minor Mid Air: N Missing: N Damage: Destroyed LOCATION City: EUGENE ISLAND State: LA Country: US DESCRIPTION N22342, A SIKORSKY S-76A ROTORCRAFT, WHILE ON A REPOSITIONING FLIGHT TO OFFSHORE PLATFORM, CRASHED INTO THE WATER AND SANK, THE TWO PERSONS ON BOARD SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, EUGENE ISLAND, LA INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0 # Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 2 Unk: # Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: # Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: OTHER DATA Activity: Pleasure Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER Departed: AMELIA, LA Dep Date: Dep. Time: Destination: EUGENE ISLAND, LA Flt Plan: VFR Wx Briefing: Last Radio Cont: Last Clearance: FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 10/23/2006 |
From the FAA -
IDENTIFICATION Regis#: 22342 Make/Model: S76 Description: S-76, H-76, AUH-76, SPIRIT, EAGLE (HE-24 Date: 10/22/2006 Time: 1230 Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Minor Mid Air: N Missing: N Damage: Destroyed LOCATION City: EUGENE ISLAND State: LA Country: US DESCRIPTION N22342, A SIKORSKY S-76A ROTORCRAFT, WHILE ON A REPOSITIONING FLIGHT TO OFFSHORE PLATFORM, CRASHED INTO THE WATER AND SANK, THE TWO PERSONS ON BOARD SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, EUGENE ISLAND, LA INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0 # Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 2 Unk: # Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: # Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: OTHER DATA Activity: Pleasure Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER Departed: AMELIA, LA Dep Date: Dep. Time: Destination: EUGENE ISLAND, LA Flt Plan: VFR Wx Briefing: Last Radio Cont: Last Clearance: FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 10/23/2006 |
The FAA preliminary data is often garbled, confusing, and just plain wrong. I've seen Eurocopter accidents reported as Bells with no correction for weeks, and the reports are often just comical, apparently written by someone who has never seen a helicopter. Do not rely on anything in an FAA preliminary accident report.
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From two sources....no mechanical problem prior to the impact. Customer reported the aircraft missing to PHI....well after the crash. Captain is fine, Co-pilot was in the hospital overnight.
Crew was not IFR checked or approved on the S-76A+ aircraft but were VFR rated for Part 135 Flights. No IFR flight plan had been filed....thus no IFR Clearance...lots of questions are raised by the accident and loss of the aircraft. The good news is the two pilots survived, and are standing up to their responsibilities. The failed approach was made in heavy rain and very poor visibility....apparantly below company VFR minima. The Captain recently arrived in the GOM from an EMS job in Indiana....the co-pilot was a new hire and new to the GOM. Perhaps those closer to PHI than I am, can provide more details....what say you REV, INSIDER, and WRENCH1? |
Still nothing on the NTSB site.
Whoose B407 ditched the following day? |
Originally Posted by sox6
(Post 2933666)
Still nothing on the NTSB site.
Whoose B407 ditched the following day? |
Heard a rumour:
The NTSB will not be investigating the accident; that the accident has been classified as an incident; that there is very little public information available; that the crew lost control due to a microburst on the tail end of an instrument approach below minima and ended up in the water. As a '76 driver, I sure would like to know if there are any aircraft related issues that caused this accident... Anyone think that the lack of information is related to the current labor situation... |
how can this not be classed as an "accident"? can you imagine the CAA doing that?!
Part 830 NTSB says: an “Accident” is “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.” "Substantial damage means damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component." i guess the aircaft sinking to the bottom of the sea doesn't affect the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft!? |
Although this is a rumor network, beware of rumors!
The word on the street is that the pilot is a stand-up guy, and blames no microburst or alien hovercraft downwash. Poor vis, rain, and a tricky rig approach causing surprise water contact is the rumor I heard. Also, if any ppruner wants to bet me that the NTSB will not invesitgate this accident, I am on, because the NTSB will have their antennae up for any strike-caused laxity. PM me with the amount you want to bet, I will take on all comers! |
Heard a rumour: The NTSB will not be investigating the accident; that the accident has been classified as an incident; that there is very little public information available; that the crew lost control due to a microburst on the tail end of an instrument approach below minima and ended up in the water. As Nick points out, want to raise the level of oversight from the Feds, be it FAA, OSHA, etc; just try a strike! And it won't just be your local management doing the oversight either. If any one takes on Nick for a bet, count me in too. I'll offer some startling odds! NTSB definition of an accident. Federal regulations require operators to notify the NTSB immediately of aviation accidents and certain incidents. An accident is defined as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. An incident is an occurrence other than an accident that affects or could affect the safety of operations. (See 49 CFR 830.) |
With reference to the PHI accident, I was told that the accident occured whislt the Helicopter was circling the platform, in awful weather, and there was a conversation between the pilots about turning the wipers on. There was some confusion, and both pilots had there heads inside, then impacted with the water. Just what is being sad...:hmm:
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Is it or is it not an 'accident'
The perception this side of the water is that the official accident statistics do NOT contain those occurrences that, even though they may be investigated by the NTSB, are subsequently classified as 'incidents'.
If what the regs apparently say is true then this cannot be the case. If somebody in the 'know' reviews the stats can we see ALL those incidents that involved no serious injury/fatality reflected in the 'accident stats'. The reason I ask is because I was told by a source that I hitherto trusted that they were NOT included. A case in point was a Bo105 that ditched after losing one engine and all on board stepped into liferaft after power-on ditching. The aircraft subsequently rolled over and was damaged severely. I was told that this was not included in the accident stats for that year. Your help in clarifying appreciated. Geoffers |
The NTSB does not fully investigate every accident. They apparently have said that since they already know what happened, no further investigation is needed. At least that's the rumor in the Gulf. :ugh:
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Gomer Pylot,
Is there anything in the rumor that this wasn't an IFR crew? Why not? other than "meat in the seat"? When I left the GoM in '97 (Never flew with the PIC) PHI had long since gotten out of VFR mediums... |
Devil,
Nick L. got it pretty good above. Also, crew met all the requirements - and I commend and respect their professionalism during this matter. As for the NTSB, GP and Geoff are right - the NTSB has a matrix that assists in dictating the level of investigation. In reference to "substantial structural damage" - it depends how, when, where, etc. the damage was sustained - keep in mind the main trigger for the NTSB is the people side - serious injury & death. Most of the "substantial damage" was done during recovery. You will get differing definitions on "substantial" but from what I have experienced it is the difference between whether the operator or the manufacturer can fix it - providing the human factor trigger was not hit. W1 |
"Met all the requiements" ? As in, they were a 135 IFR crew?
If not, next question- Was PHI back to VFR mediums before the strike? |
I don't know this for a fact, but the rumor is that the PIC was not IFR current. From conversations with PICs who have flown with the SIC, he has about 500 total hours, and the consensus is that he was basically ballast. He does have a MySpace site using the screen name 'Crash'.
Before the strike nobody would ever be sent out as a PIC without a current IFR checkride, but with the current shortages I suppose concessions must be made. The PIC has emailed friends that there was no malfunction, and he just 'screwed up', and is uncertain whether he will continue to fly. I predict that he will. |
From my info - crew was IFR qualified and current - and a flight plan filed. I believe the SIC "500 hr" item is a reference his multi-time and he had recently upgraded to left seat so I do not know hours in type.
The only possible VFR mediums that come to mind, maybe the EMS 412's on the east coast - but I believe there were other issues why they weren't IFR (?) W1 |
From the myspace blog of "Crash" who claims to be the 2IC of the S76 that went down
*disclaimer, I make no statement regarding the veracity of the following: On Sunday October 22nd I woke up at 0400 just like any other workday. I got dressed, ate a bananna with peanut butter and was on the rode by 0430 to the Morgan City base to preflight my helicopter. I met with my PIC (pilot in command) and he informed me we would be launching at daybreak to pick up one guy 60 miles offshore at Eugene Island 259C (EI259C). We watched the weather and waited for daylight. The day before I was the pilot flying and we attempted this flight twice, both times we decided to cancel the flight and turn around. Ok back to Sunday, after daybreak we got our last weather briefing the weather was good enough to make the flight. When we got to the beach the weather was marginal but once we got over the water our visibility cleared to 20 miles to the east and 10 miles to the west. There were thunderstorms all around but clear in our line of flight. The cloud ceiling was roughly 500-700 feet and solid overcast. As we made our way inbound to EI259C I made a 20 minute out call to let them know that we were inbound. The platform informed us they were experiencing low clouds and rain. I told them we would make a 5 minute call and let them know if we had to turn around. As we got closer the weather radar in the cockpit showed the platform and the rainshower they were experiencing. When we were approimately 5 minutes out I made the final call, the platform gave me a green deck that means we were cleared to land. As we made our way inbound rain started obscuring our vision on the windshield but still plenty of visibility. The pilot in command turned to the west so I could search for the platform out of the left window, soon the platform came into sight. We made our prelanding checks and started setting ourself up for the approach. The rain became moderate and the visibility was around 3 miles. The platform was in plain view, I stated to the PIC that he could turn to the left and set himself up perfectly for landing into the wind. The last call I made we were roughly 400 feet on the radar altimeter, the PIC called for windsheild wipers. I stated "windshield wipers" and reached for the switch. From that point it all seems like a bad dream. As I reached the switch we impacted the water at roughly 100mph. The windshield blew out and the cockpit immediately filled with water and flipped upside down. I was shocked and went into rescue mode, a calm came over me and I waited for the cockpit to fill to equalize the pressure. Once we were inverted and the cockpit was summerged, I pulled the emergency lever to jettison the door and then released my seatbelt and exited the aircraft. On the surface I could smell jet fuel and the only thing you could see was the belly of the helicopter with the wheels out. I pulled the inflate handles on my switlik survival vest. The vest inflated and I pulled out my EPIRB ( personal GPS emergency tracking device ) and activated it along with my strobe light. I didnt see my PIC and made my way around to the other side of the helicopter. He seemed to be ok and he was hanging on to the side of the helicopter. As the helicopter started to go under I stated that we should back away so it wouldnt grab an article of clothing and pull us under with it. We backed away and watched the helicopter dissappear into the dark gulf water. The sea state was about 4-6 foot waves and the temp was approx. 68-72 degrees. The storm moved over the top of us and was rain was pelting us. 4-6 foot seas are not huge but I found myself under water half of the time. I had on steel toe shoes that weighted me down but was uneasy about kicking them off so I could retain body heat. As I lay there in the water I thought to myself someone will be here soon to get us. I looked around and could see rigs in the distance with boats and choppers coming and going but too far away to see us. Now that the helicopter was at the bottom of the ocean it will definitely be harder to see us. After failed attempts and dreams that someone would see us, I asked the PIC for his EPIRB. I set it off as well and thought well maybe my unit is broken and this one will work for sure. After 30 or 40 minutes I thought to myself how in the hell can we still be here and noone looking for us?? My P:IC said he couldnt feel his arms and legs like a hypothermic state was overtaking him. I was thinking to myself I felt fine but I can't let this guy go down. I made the suggestion to swim to a nearby platform about 2 miles away. We argued if we would be exhausted or not but I won by saying lets attempt to swim that way because the current seems to be pulling us toward it anyway. It gave us a goal to achieve so we would sit there and think about our impending doom. One hour into the swim me and the PIC started drifting further apart, didnt matter we were going the same direction but I kept an eye out just to see that he was still ok. Then I received a powerful strike to my right leg, everyones worst fears were happening to me.....I knew a shark had found me and this was the end. Then another swift blow to the stomach area. OMG I thought I am going to die. I didnt feel pain, just a sharp blow with about 20 pounds of pressure behind it. The strikes became more intense and more frequent. then one swam under me. It was a shark OMG!!! I was getting hit about 5 times a second but no damage no blood. I knew I must have received a cut or wound from the crash because the fish were way to persistant. I thought to myself "how can I live through an impact to the water, turn upside down under water, escape, and get eaten by a shark?" We all have our time to go and I thought this was it. I made my peace with God and knew I would never hold my child Kaiden in my arms again and he would grow up always wondering what his father was like" I began to cry out to god for help as the fish were trying to feed off of my body. I swam harder and faster to make my way to the rig. The weight of the steel toe shoes I was wearing was tiring me even more but I knew if I kicked them off I would have problems climbing the barnacle encrusted ladder on the rig. The rain stopped but the wind had picked up to 40kts or so. only a mile or less to the rig now and I wasn't giving up, I could see my PIC swimming in the same direction about 50 yards from me. I swam for about another hour and made it within 75 feet of the platform. I was then swimming against the current, I didnt know if I would have the strength to make it the last 50 feet. Every time I would make it 10 feet or so the waves would push me back. I rolled over to my back and used my arms and legs to propel me through the water. 2 hours and 30 minutes I had been swimming when my hand got a grip on the the rung of the ladder. The barnacles sliced into my hand and I smiled, that is the best pain I had ever felt. I climbed up the ladder to the mezzanine and got on my all fours to praise god for helping me have strength to make it to this platform. My PIC also made it and we started searching the rig for food, water anything that would help us be rescued. We found a bunkhouse that had two beds, blankets, pillows, 2 cases of coke, a case of water, peanut butter, spam, and tuna fish. We could last for a few days out here if need be. I took off my clothes to dry them and saw why the fish were after me. My right leg had a puncture wound 1 and 1/2 inches wide and about 2 inches deep. It was bleeding down my leg to my foot. I found a first aid kit and sterilized the wound, put betadine on it and wrapped it with a compress. My PIC was shaking almost in a state of shock, I made him drink some water and gatorade. He wrapped up in blankets and laid down on the bunk. I made my way up to the helipad to see what was around. I tried to wave my survival vest at them and turned the strobe light on but I was too far away they couldnt see me. I went back down to the first deck to check on my PIC and find some paint to make an SOS sign on the helideck. My PIC was ok and I continued to search for paint. I found no paint and decided to go back up top and spend the rest of my day trying to get help. I attached my survival vest and pants to the helicopter tie downs on the deck so if anyone flew over the deck could see we were there. I waited on top for roughly an hour and no one even attempted to find us. This is crazy I thought, we have two GPS tracking devices and a communication center with 20 controllers that should be in contact with us. I began to lose hope that we were going to be rescued that day. Ohh I forgot to tell you that this one platform was damaged by hurricane Katrina so there was no power or people on it. Finally in the distance I saw a helicopter heading directly toward us. I got up and unbuckled the safety vest and waved it side to side so the helicopter would see me. Of course how do you miss a fat kid in his underwear jumping up and with a bloody bandage on his leg? The helicopter made a circle back around to see what I was doing. They saw I needed help and pulled into a hover. I gave them hand signs to call for help they gave me a thumbs up and then took off. Within minutes there was an S-76 and a 407 there to pick us up. The 407 landed and loaded us up and took us to the hospital. The 407 landed on the hospital helipad and the nurses met us up top. In the hospital many people were there to question us and nurses are starting I.V.'s , blood work was being drawn and heart moniters were being hooked up, I was happy to be there. The doctor examined me and came back to tell me they were keeping my overnight. My CK level was 1200 and that was a little high. Your CK level shows your muscles are starting to breakdown. The two and one half hour swim took a toll on my body. He said that they wanted it to come down before I was released because if it stays high or increases it can send you into kidney failure. They set me up in a bed in the ER because the hospital was full. One benefit to this is I got to take a shower in the nurses lounge WOOHOO! I am at home now waiting on the investigation, they recovered the helicopter and I have a few meetings that I will have to go to. I will go back to the company I work for and I will fly the 76 again. Thanks for all your love and support |
Very well done! Here's to speedy recovery! hope to see you back in the gulf soon.
Darren |
The kid's account is interesting, but if it is accurate it raises one big question for me.
PHI's flight-following procedures dictate that flight plans be closed *after* landing. (Many pilots call "landing" prematurely, while they are still in the air in direct contravention of the letter and spirit of PHI's rules.) When an aircraft is overdue, PHI "goes crazy" trying to find it; by that I mean, they do not take these things lightly. If it is true that "no one" was looking for the S-76, then either two things had to happen: 1. PHI's computerized flight-following system failed to alert that a ship was overdue (which happens immediately at the ETA - the aircraft's call-sign turns red or flashes or something); 2. The flight-plan had already been closed while the aircraft was still in the air, meaning that the "two-hour check" rule was in effect and the company would not look for the aircraft until that time period had elapsed. Either way, there was a serious breakdown in the system somewhere and explanations are due. I don't even want to think about what would have happened if the helicopter was full of pax instead of empty seats. |
Reading that statement makes us all thankful that it turned out OK. Had they not made that platform, sounds like we would be reading obituaries instead.
I wonder what the people on the platform were doing? They got a 20 minute call, then a 5 minute landing call and then nothing. Did it occure to anyone on the platform that the aircraft they were expecting any minute never made it? His statement says they were at 400 feet with the platform in sight. Simple math infers that they entered a high rate of descent that they were unaware off. CRM classes these days, hammer home the term "situational awareness." I wonder if the two pilots had CRM classes, considering the rush to get pilots on the line. The PIC in his email, mentioned he's considering his future options and the SIC looks forward to returning to flying. I sincerely wish them the best, but have the feeling their futures won't be with PHI. In a case of ironies, they will have no organization to go to bat for them in the investigation (probably wouldn't matter much in this case anyway as companies almost always are deffered to in matters of safety). I fear Al will opt for termination rather than having to worry about another accident involving either pilot |
speed
Another question that comes to mind is why they were doing 100mph if the visibility was that bad? Wouldn't it be better to slow it down a little bit??
I know that's what i do when i fly in marginal vfr conditions. |
This "incident" could have easily been avoided by a simple AVAD system and appropriate bug/CRM procedures. Are helicopters in the GOM not required to have those?:confused:
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I've got to jump on the bandwagon with Nick here. We have a lot of technology readily available at a cost which is justified by the reduction in risk it provides. Yes, we can and have gotten by without it, but how close to the edge do we routinely walk without ever realizing it?
I've been in nearly identical situations a couple of times. In my case we had a bit of a scare, but, no blood - no foul. However, it wouldn't have taken much to put us over the edge. Then you'd have been reading about me and my copilot instead. You establish limits and procedures, you check the weather, you pay diligent attention to what you're doing, and still it happens. It happens because at some point you exceed the limit of what you can manage with the available resources. And until you get the task load back to a managable level you're relying on luck for a happy outcome. There's a bunch of stuff out there that will tremendously improve the margin of safety. Of course, the appropriate technology differs with the application. For marginal weather in the GoM it may be four-axis autopilots. For EMS in the mountains at night maybe it's NVGs. Whatever. But any operator that doesn't take advantage of the appropriate technology, and any customer that doesn't require it of their contractors, is opening themselves up to serious liability. I think you know what's coming next, "If you think the equipment is expensive, just think about the cost of an accident." -Stan- |
Wow!
Wow Wow! Well done good luck! |
Woolf
Of course, you are right. It could have been prevented by a simple AVAD system and some Standard Operating Procedures attached to Rad Alt use. After all, they have been in use on the NS for how long....20 years....no more like 23 I think. The Gomers have always been a bit slow to catch onto some of this "technology" and at last, its only the oil companies who have started to drive new aircraft acquisitions with improved equipment. Unfortunately, PHI has had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the 21st century. The Chief Pilot and Director of Operations in PHI have had little operational exposure outside of Louisiana. For example, until 3 years ago, the concept of looking at a graph and calculating a take off weight to give any kind of Cat A en route performance was totally alien. In fact, the attitude was "why do it, why not just load up to max gross and take off like a helicopter?" Obviously, this makes a S76 like a Bell 206. It was only a large oil company client who insisted that aircraft were operated to the equivalent of PC2 which started to drive some alternative thinking in PHI. It used to be said that if the throttles weren't on the collective, it couldn't be operated in the GOM!! |
Something missing?
Quote: "The last call I made we were roughly 400 feet on the radar altimeter, the PIC called for windsheild wipers. I stated "windshield wipers" and reached for the switch. From that point it all seems like a bad dream. As I reached the switch we impacted the water at roughly 100mph."
I'm confused about this part of the story. Granted, I don't fly offshore in an S76, but how can you impact the water from 400 feet while you are reaching for the windshield wiper switch? There seems to be a gap in the story. Would the SIC specifically leave out the info in this gap or could it have happened so fast he wouldn't know? I'm just curious if he may have left out that particular part because there is an ongoing investigation. If so, why would he publish anything at all? My heart goes out to the guys. The story is very similar to one I heard a few years ago from a friend of a friend who worked at Air Log (I think) - ditched off a platform and fought off sharks for a couple of hours, hoping a large one would finally end it for him. :eek: |
AVAD? Bug? What are those?
And the 'large oil company client' did not, and still has not, required compliance with PC2 procedures. It does require calculating whether a PC2 takeoff can be made, but will not download to comply with it. If you can't make a PC2 takeoff, you get off the best way you can, at your present weight. Do not even consider telling the dispatcher that you have to reduce the load in order to do a PC2 takeoff. |
GLS Night Pilot
I am amused by your feigned ignorance!! I think you are getting mixed up between customers. You maybe speaking of Shell but there are other PHI customers who do require PC2 performance on their S76C++ and S92s contracted from PHI. They even observe take offs at some heliports to ensure compliance. It remains undeniable that it is only the customers who are starting to demand improved operational standards in the GOM. Most older aircraft are poorly equipped and continue to be operated like a big 206. If the customers weren't driving improvements, the operations management would still be telling people that the 214ST production line should be restarted......like they did 3 years ago when asked about long range deepwater support! HH |
AVAD? can someone tell me what that is?
forgive my off-shore ignorance, but wouldnt there be some procedure for the SIC to countdown the rad-alt readings when descending in poor wx? and.. is it wise for this guy to post all this on his blog? i personally would be keeping quiet and only talking to the authoritories |
thecontroller:
I believe AVAD stands for "Automatic Voice Alert Device". One of the functions on this device will give you an aural warning when you reach a certain "bugged" height above the ground (measured straight down by rad-alt). Some will also give you other warnings like 100ft, gear up, fire engine 1, etc ... For offshore approaches most companies in the North Sea would have a bug setting from 50 to 150ft depending on the rig. This will then give you a bit of a "heads up" if things don't go according to plan. As all of the offshore flying here is done by IFR twins, an approach in low visibility conditions would most likely be a rig radar approach, which uses the weather radar to fly an instrument approach offshore. Cheers, Woolf |
Rig Radar Approach
Woolfie
Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'. Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries. And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode. Geoffers :ok: |
Geoffers,
I did a google before posting my last reply and most sources do refer to it as "automatic" although I did find one site with your suggestion (altitude). I did decide to go with "automatic" as other functions of AVAD (enhanced AVAD) are not altitude related. Maybe someone in the know can give us a definite answer? Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'. Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries. Even the JAA/EASA allow this procedure for CAT under JAR-OPS 3. In any case I would suggest, if done properly, it is a far safer approach in low visibility (see above). Cheers, Woolf |
upgraded to accident
NTSB Identification: DFW07LA011
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation Accident occurred Sunday, October 22, 2006 in Eugene Island, GM Aircraft: Sikorsky S-76A++, registration: N22342 Injuries: 1 Minor, 1 Uninjured. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. On October 22, 2006, approximately 0730 central daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76A++ twin-engine helicopter, N22342, registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. (PHI), of Lafayette, Louisiana, was destroyed when it impacted the water while landing near offshore platform Eugene Island (EI) Block 259, located in the Gulf of Mexico. The airline transport rated pilot was not injured, but the commercial rated first officer sustained minor injuries. There were no passengers aboard the helicopter at the time of the mishap. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 91 on-demand air taxi flight. The local flight departed PHI's base in Amelia, Louisiana, at 0658, and was destined for EI 259 to pickup a passenger. A representative of the operator stated in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1) that after takeoff from PHI's base at Amelia, the pilot-in-command (PIC) encountered a cloud deck at 500 feet and leveled the helicopter at approximately at 450 feet, with the visibility at approximately 10 miles. A call was received by the crew that EI 259 had encountered moderate rain, poor visibility and a low ceiling. The PIC responded that he was aware of the weather line of rain showers, and expected them to move through the area prior to their arrival. The crew called EI 259 about 20 minutes out giving their estimate time of arrival, and were told that it was still raining. At 2 nautical miles (NM) from EI 259, the crew could not see the platform due to the rain, so the PIC turned the helicopter to the West to circle the rain shower and called for the pre-landing check. At just under 2 NM west of the platform, the first officer saw the platform, and the PIC called for the floats to be armed and the windshield wipers to be turned on. At this time the, wind was from 340 degrees. As the PIC turned to final, he remembers his altimeter indicating 250 feet and airspeed 55-60 knots, and seeing the platform, but not seeing a visible horizon. The PIC estimated moderate rain, while noticing that the floats were not armed and that the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision. He asked the first officer again to arm the floats and turn on the wipers. The first officer appeared to be fumbling with the switches as the PIC looked down to see what was happening. At that time, the helicopter made contact with the water, rolled over, and began filling with water. The first officer escaped by jettisoning his entry door and the PIC escaped through the a missing windshield. Index for Oct2006 | Index of months |
Originally Posted by Geoffersincornwall
(Post 2942483)
Woolfie
Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'. Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries. And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode. Geoffers :ok: |
Originally Posted by havoc
(Post 2943298)
...Visual meteorological conditions prevailed...encountered a cloud deck at 500 feet and leveled the helicopter at approximately at 450 feet, with the visibility at approximately 10 miles... not seeing a visible horizon...the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision
At the risk of opening myself up to ridicule and harassment (nah, never happens in the land of PPRUNE) what are the VMC rules in the USA? Not trying to affix blame (never having flown for the oil companies in the Gulf) but something just didn't seem to add up for me with the above. Bottom line, glad they walked (swam?) away. HP |
Just for info, Era does OSAP's (Offshore approaches etc.) using GPS and radar down to 200 feet on the radio alt. This is based on the radar agreeing with the GPS, if its not calibrated correctly then the limits are 700 feet (I think). I am sure PHI has a similar arrangement as rick1128 mentions.
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Originally Posted by helopat
(Post 2943415)
Gentlemen,
At the risk of opening myself up to ridicule and harassment (nah, never happens in the land of PPRUNE) what are the VMC rules in the USA? Not trying to affix blame (never having flown for the oil companies in the Gulf) but something just didn't seem to add up for me with the above. Bottom line, glad they walked (swam?) away. HP Most GOM operators have or have had radar approach Opspecs issued to them. |
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