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Obviously not because there are no twin rotor helicopters that can continue to operate with one failed. However twin helocopters operated PC1 or PC2e mean an engine failure is rarely the cause of an accident.
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Shell Management,
However twin helocopters operated PC1 or PC2e mean an engine failure is rarely the cause of an accident. HT |
Now that is a VERY interesting question. C'mon SM, which of your contracts are operating to PC2e offshore. More to the point, which are not - and why??
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... to be fair SM....
singles never crash due to combiner gearbox failures.........
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For the record, it wasn't an accident. An L4 was just climbing out when there was a compressor stall due to ingesting a tree frog. The pilot put the aircraft down about 100 yards from the end of the runway under partial power.
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You mean .... the engine croaked?!
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Croaked - A deep raspy sound or implying death - In this case it was more of a "ribit."
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Assorted answers
HeliTester Obviously yes. PC1/PC2e is an essential part of 7/7=1 which Shell launched nearly 6 years ago. Obviously it took time for the OEMs to put procedures in place and to get higher performance machines in place. Combiner gearboxes simply do what MRGBs do and what I said about rotors applies to them. However they fail less then engines. Frogs are a well know hazard in the GOM and managening them should feature in any competent safety case. Failing to miss FOD in an intake, even if its green and croaks (and added alerting feature:)) speakes volumes about pre-flight inspections. |
For those that don't yet have the Herpetology addition to the RFM - a couple of pointers. The little green tree frogs (hyla cinerea) are extrodinairily fast little buggers. They can jump 6-8 feet in a flash. Nothing like having just removed the inlet pillow and spotting one the little creatures and trying to shoe it one way only to have it leap towards the inlet. They are also pretty quiet, no croaking or ribiting when you're near.
Unfortunately replacing the pillows until your ready to start hasn't always worked. There are still a number of minutes to get strapped in and the check list done before the start not to mention the loading of passengers. Like avoiding a bird strike, avoiding our little amphibian friends (they eat lots of mosquitos) is constant and never ending. |
Frogs are a well know hazard in the GOM (I know he was Austrian, but the Frogs put him there ... ) |
js0987
So the frogs (as in Freedom Frogs not Cheese Eating Surrender Frogs) can approach the aircraft unseen and unheard and jump 6-8 feet straight down an intake in the short time after removing the intake blanks and inspecting, then cling on, to release themselves into the compressor at 100ft? avoiding our little amphibian friends is constant and never ending. |
Out of interest what is actually done to avoid them? In reality, they do little damage, other than causing a startling *POP!* and surge from the engine. Some pilots shrug and keep going on their way; others react harshly and put the thing down "off-airport" so to speak. |
GOM pilots preflight and untie in the darkness, to be ready for a sunrise takeoff. Some pilots shrug and keep going on their way; others react harshly FTW97LA016 FTW97LA016 NTSB Identification: FTW97LA016 . The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division Nonscheduled 14 CFR Accident occurred Monday, October 14, 1996 in VENICE, LA Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/23/1997 Aircraft: Bell 206L-3, registration: N21497 Injuries: 4 Uninjured. On October 14, 1996, at 0720 central daylight time, a Bell 206L-3 helicopter, N21497, owned and operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., was substantially damaged during a precautionary landing near Venice, Louisiana. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 CFR Part 135 air taxi flight. The commercial pilot and three passengers were not injured. A company flight plan was filed. The flight was originating from the Shell Heliport at the time of the accident. According to the pilot, the helicopter was approximately 50 feet AGL during takeoff when he heard a "big pop and the helicopter was shaky and noisy." He initiated a "deceleration to land "due to the wires in front of the helicopter. During the landing, a 2-foot section of the tailboom which included the vertical fin and tail rotor gearbox, separated from the tailboom. Throughout the forced landing he had tail rotor pedal control. The passengers reported that on takeoff they heard a noise like a "backfire," and then the helicopter began to shake. According to the operator, the damage to the helicopter resulted when "a main rotor blade flexed down and severed the tailboom." An examination of the engine by the operator revealed that frogs had been ingested. The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:a loss of engine power due to frogs being ingested into the engine as a result of the pilots failure to perform a thorough preflight, and the pilot's improper touchdown technique. |
Sox 6. Actually yes. They don't make noise and are small enough to easily miss. To expound on what FH 1100 wrote; preflights are done in the dark with a flashlight. Examining the inlet area is fine, but our little friends can stick to anything, so finding them on the side of the fuselage or even the bottom of a rotor blade has happened. More than likely, its the frog that ended up on the doghouse or the top of the cabin that ends up getting sucked in once the airflow breaks him loose. Using your flashlight, you try to look everything over but, like the bird strike, it's possible to not see it.
Fortunately alligators are too big to fit in the inlets so we're safe there. |
The alligators do fit on the BBQ though!
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Don't forget comfortable boots.
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Tree frogs can easily cling to glass or any other smooth surface, even if it's overhead. It's simply not possible to inspect the intake of an engine and detect any possible tree frog. You can't see every nook in there, no matter how hard you look, and no matter how much you pretzel yourself around to try. You just do the best you can and hope for the best. Most operators start using the baffles at the start of frog season (early spring) and keep using them until late autumn, but it's never a certain proposition. I've also had problems with birds. Mockingbirds can be very persistent, and I've had them start replacing nests in the intake area within minutes of removing the previous one. They like to use sticks and bits of safety wire in building their nests, and they're a real danger. I once fought a pair for days, finally keeping the intake plugs in during the day, and thought I had won, but the pilot of the BO105 on the pad next to me found a huge nest inside his aircraft the next day. If it ain't one thing, it's another. Preflighting in the dark, with a flashlight, isn't the best solution, but I've been royally chewed out by Shell dispatchers for not being on the pad at their dock when the top arc of the sun started appearing above the horizon. Shell talks a good safety program, but it's just talk. They, like the other companies, care only about short-term profits, and safety is important only when it's convenient.
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If you have any problems with Shell dispatchers not complying with the Shell Code of Conduct you must contact Shell Aircraft immediately - thats actually a contract requirement.
SAI are at (713) 241 7700 17231 JFK Blvd, Houston, TX, 77042 Or use the confidential helpline if you prefer: Shell Global Helpline - About Shell You can read more on the code of conduct at: Shell Code of Conduct - About Shell |
Yeah, right. And the tooth fairy will leave money under my pillow, too.
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So much for ADS-B as a big success in the GOM as the FAA's ability to technically oversee the programme is called into doubt.
U.S. DOT IG Chastises FAA on ADS-B: AINonline The U.S. DOT Inspector General (IG), the FAA’s fiscal watchdog, recently issued a report titled “FAA faces significant risks in implementing the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast program and realizing benefits.” The IG examined key risks to the FAA’s ADS-B implementation and assessed strengths and weaknesses of its contracting approach. But the IG questioned the FAA’s resulting in-house technical oversight capabilities due to “knowing very little about a system that is expected to be the foundation of NextGen.” |
Just seen this on the wire.
PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LA (WAFB) - A helicopter leaving a rig in the Gulf of Mexico flipped into the water when an engine went out Thursday afternoon. According to a witness, a "chopper in the water" alert went out over a loud speaker on the oil platform just before 5 p.m. He said it was so random everyone was on edge. The Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHI) chopper went into the water in an area known as Main Pass, which is just off the coast of Boothville. A PHI worker who was on the oil platform pulled out his cell phone and recorded the aftermath. Petty Officer First Class Kelsey Thomason with the U.S. Coast Guard reported three men were on board. "They were getting ready to take off and there was some kind of malfunction and it flipped over on its side," Thomason said. According to Thomason, the chopper was floating on the water on a pontoon, but the guys could have been seriously hurt. "It is dangerous. We did have a helicopter up doing a pollution flight, so we quickly diverted it to the rig and quickly recovered it," he explained. A PHI worker said within 10 minutes a vessel pulled alongside the helicopter to rescue the three men. Thomason added they were taken back to the platform and treated by PHI medics. The helicopter was tied to the platform to keep it from floating away. Copyright 2011 WAFB. All rights reserved. |
Aircraft in question being a LongRanger.
http://wafb.images.worldnow.com/images/14317849_BG4.jpg I/C |
Last year was the first year since 1984 (records were not kept before then!) when there were no accidents in the GOM.:D:)
That is no doubt due to the IHST's promotion of SMS.:ok::D However the dirty little secret remains, namely there were 3 ditchings, one due to a tail rotor failure and two due to engine failures. :\:( The NTSB, who seem busy scrambling go teams for every TCAS RA thesedays, don't treat those as accidents and ignore them.:ugh::= |
The definition of an accident is well established on this side of the pond. The NTSB cannot call it an accident if it doesn't meet the definition.
Accident As defined by the NTSB, this is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft where as a result of the operation of an aircraft, any person (either inside or outside the aircraft) receives fatal or serious injury or any aircraft receives substantial damage. The occurrence is also not caused by the deliberate action of one or more persons and that leads to damage or injury. The NTSB definition, which is also used by the FAA, divides accidents into four categories: Major - an accident in which a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was destroyed, there were multiple fatalities, or there was one fatality and a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was substantially damaged. Serious - an accident in which there was either one fatality without substantial damage to a 14 CFR 121 aircraft, or there was at least one serious injury and a 14 CFR121 aircraft was substantially damaged. Injury - a nonfatal accident with at least one serious injury and without substantial damage to a 14 CFR 121 aircraft. Damage - an accident in which no person was killed or seriously injured, but in which any aircraft was substantially damaged. Serious Injury Injuries that result in one or more of the following conditions: Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from the date the injury was received, Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose), Involves lacerations that cause severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage. Involves injury to any internal organ, or Involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than five percent of the body surface. Substantial Damage Damage or structural failure that negatively affects an aircraft's structural strength, performance, or flying characteristics, and which would require significant repair or replacement of the affected component or system. Substantial damage excludes damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, and flaps. It also excludes bent aerodynamic fairings, dents in the aircraft skin, small punctures in the aircraft skin, ground damage to propeller blades, or damage to only a single engine. |
That was just a quote, and the same applies to Part 135. There has to be a serious injury or substantial damage to the aircraft before it can be called an accident, no matter what FAR covers the operation. No serious injury, no substantial damage, no accident. There is no wiggle room on that.
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Would have thought a dip in the Gulf was substantial damage, going to be big bill if not total loss.
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Actually the definition is HERE
Here are some relevant excerpts...emphasis added by me: Aircraft accident means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. Substantial damage means damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component. Just for clarification however: Engine failure..................not considered substantial damage'' for the purpose of this part. |
Boys...if the helicopter landed successfully on the water and then rolled over after everyone got out, then voila!...not an accident. That would be my story and I'd stick to it.
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FH1100, I have a LongRanger I'd like to sell you. Just had a compressor wash, detail and has 2000 accident free hours :E
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There have been lots of those flying around the GOM for decades. Some fare better than others. I remember one 206 which had a decel on takeoff, the pilot put it in the water on the floats and everyone got out and onto a boat, and then the boat tried to tow it back to the platform. By the time it was attached to the crane for lifting up, both rotor blades were broken off, the tailboom was broken off, the skids were pulled off, and the windows were broken out, among other things. There was certainly substantial damage, but I still wouldn't call it an accident, because the damage was all caused after the aircraft was landed and the engine was shut down, and there was no further intent to fly. It's not an accident if a tornado destroys an aircraft in a hangar, is it?
Corrosion-X is an excellent product, and has helped lots of helicopters continue flying after immersion in salt water. |
Any further information on this?
Mars ************************************************************ ******************** ** Report created 5/17/2011 Record 1 ** ************************************************************ ******************** IDENTIFICATION Regis#: 266P Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER Date: 05/13/2011 Time: 1600 Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N Damage: Substantial LOCATION City: MOBILE State: AL Country: US DESCRIPTION N266P BELL 206-L4 ROTORCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES OFF SHORE NEAR MOBILE, AL INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0 # Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: # Pass: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: # Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: WEATHER: 1553Z 17010KT 10SM SCT024 28/22 A2990 OTHER DATA Activity: Unknown Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER FAA FSDO: BIRMINGHAM, AL (SO09) Entry date: 05/17/2011 |
NTSB Identification: ERA11LA297
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter Accident occurred Friday, May 13, 2011 in Mobile Block 114CC, GM Aircraft: BELL 206-L4, registration: N266P Injuries: 2 Serious,1 Uninjured. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. On May 13, 2011, about 1120 central daylight time, a Bell 206L-4, N229P, landed hard in the Gulf of Mexico near the Mobile Block 114CC helideck following an in-flight loss of directional control. The helicopter was substantially damaged. The helicopter was registered to and operated by PHI, Inc. under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a passenger flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company visual flight rules flight plan was filed. The two pilots sustained serious injuries and the passenger was not injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. According to the operator, the pilot positioned the helicopter for a west-southwest departure due to prevailing wind conditions. After clearing the edge of the production platform helideck, the helicopter started a slow yaw to the right. The pilot added full left pedal; however, this did not stop the rotation. After 360 degrees of rotation, the rotation quickened, the pilot stated that he "didn't have a tail rotor," and lowered the collective and rolled the throttle to idle. The pilot deployed the emergency floats, and the helicopter impacted the water slightly nose low and in a right drift. The helicopter rolled over immediately to the right and stayed afloat. The pilot egressed the helicopter through the broken windscreen area, the left seat pilot egressed through the pilot's open door, and the passenger egressed through the left passenger door. The wreckage was recovered to the operator's facilities in Lafayette, Louisiana where an examination of the wreckage was performed on May 18, 2011. An inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration provided oversight for the examination, assisted by the operator and an investigator from Bell Textron. The examination of the engine, tail rotor gearbox, tail rotor drive shaft, main gear box, and main rotor system did not reveal evidence of a pre-existing mechanical malfunction or anomaly. |
Lazurus Twins?
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But... But... But... That costs more money! The poor oil companies are almost bankrupt, aren't they?
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Here is the summary of an interesting paper produced by 'Hopkins Center':
A new study by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy finds that helicopters that service the drilling platforms and vessels in the Gulf of Mexico crash on average more than six times per year resulting in an average of 5 deaths per year. From 1983 to 2009, 178 crashes resulted in 139 deaths, including 41 pilots and 3 co-pilots. Mechanical failure was the most common cause, leading to 68 crashes (38 percent of the total), followed by bad weather (16 percent of the total). While the challenges such as bad weather and long travel distances associated with helicopter flights in the Gulf related to oil and gas operations are recognized, this study is noteworthy for examining the circumstances of the crashes. The article is published in the September issue of Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine. Researchers from the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy, part of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, examined fatal and nonfatal crash records of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) from 1983 to 2009. Analyses determined that the most common result of mechanical failure in both fatal and nonfatal crashes was loss of engine power, which occurred in almost one-third of fatal crashes. The majority of forced landings following mechanical failure occurred in water, with 20 percent resulting in the sinking of the helicopter despite the fact that most helicopters are being equipped with pilot-activated flotation devices. Bad weather was the second most common precipitating factor for fatal and nonfatal crashes and was responsible for the largest number of deaths. In fact, bad weather was the only factor that significantly increased the risk of pilot death when a crash occurred. Pilot error was a major contributor to 83 crashes (47 percent), with poor decision-making the most prevalent error. For example, the NTSB conclusion for many of the bad-weather crashes was that the pilot should not proceeded in given the forecast or observed bad weather. “This study raises concern about the safety of helicopter flights related to oil and gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico, particularly during bad weather,” said Susan P. Baker, MPH, professor with the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy and the paper’s lead author. “Our findings suggest that efforts to reduce crashes and deaths must address mechanical failure, non-activation of flotation devices, and pilot error.” Baker is a licensed private pilot and received the Aerospace Medical Association’s Harry G. Moseley Award in 2010 for her work applying the public health model to aviation safety. The researchers also examined crash trends over the study time period and found an increase in the most recent time period, 8.2 annually during 2000 to 2009 versus 5.6 during 1983 to 1999. Following 2007, however, the researchers measured a decrease in crashes. “While the apparent deterioration in safety over time is alarming, I am encouraged by the most recent data,” said Baker. “Only time will tell whether this is a temporary statistical blip or the beginning of a positive trend.” Additional authors of “Helicopter Crashes Related to Oil and Gas Operations in the Gulf of Mexico” are Dennis F. Shanahan (associate faculty at the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy), Wren Haaland (consultant to the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy), Joanne Brady (Columbia University) and Guohua Li (Columbia University). The research was funded by the National Institutes of Health and by grant funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy. |
Mechanical failure was the most common cause Could this be because John Hopkins University included all ditchings? |
Very possibly.
There is a strong US lobby (certain GOM operators, their trade bodies, Bell and the less progressive oil companies) that are happy that cheap, low power, single engine helicopters (mostly 206s) fly two thirds of GOM flight hours and sectors. They will always use the weak US definitions of accidents to make their rates look better. See hear the fuss when the NTSB wanted to make blades strikes accidents! http://www.rotor.com/membership/roto...ing2005/18.pdf |
Are there any stats that show what actually makes up the GOM fleet and how many. ie:
206 x ?? 412 x ?? Etc. BOTW |
2010 data
SINGLE ENGINE 314 (mostly 206s and 407s with a few AS350s and A119s) LIGHT TWIN 43 (Bo105s, EC135s, B427/9) MEDIUM TWIN 103 (mostly S76s, AW139s and some B412s) HEAVY TWIN 23 (S-92s, 225s, 214STs) TOTAL FLEET 483 |
SM
There is a strong US lobby About a decade ago a N Sea S76 suffered a lightning strike that was quoted in the OGP stats as an accident, yet numerous fatal accidents in the GOM were not counted. The basis for inclusion of the S76 was the cost of the repair. The natural conclusion from this is that the OGP place no $ value on the life of a pilot! Shameful. |
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