I've worked fields where there were ~50 of these in one block, 3x3 sm, plus a few larger ones. 100-150 landings/day, every day, ~9000 in ~7 months. I often just hovered from one to the other, but if I could I flew around long enough to get some air moved through the cockpit.

If you had a problem on one of these, you would call base who would in this case, have to get a boat out to you!!! god knows how long that would take!! I used to dread being marrooned on one!! always had lots of provisions though!!:ok:

On August 16, 2007, at 1513 central daylight time, a single-engine Bell 407 helicopter, N433PH, was undamaged during an emergency landing to the water in the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial pilot sustained minor injuries and the passenger was not injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters Incorporated, of Lafayette, Louisiana. A company visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the on-demand air taxi flight that departed the East Cameron 109 (EC109) offshore platform at about 1507, and was destined for the West Cameron 98 (WC98) offshore platform. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 flight.

In a written statement, the pilot reported that he departed the EC 109 platform and climbed to an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet and filed his flight plan with the operator's communications center. Approximately five minutes after departure, the engine chip light illuminated and the pilot immediately turned back to the departure platform. While in the turn, the pilot reported hearing a "high pitched grinding noise" and a "pop" before the engine stopped producing power.

The pilot entered an autorotation to the ocean as he made a Mayday call to his company's communications center. Approximately 75 to 100 feet above the water, the pilot initiated a flare to slow the helicopter's descent and attempted to deploy the emergency floats; however, he did not pull the handle hard enough. The pilot made a second attempt, which was successful, and the floats deployed when the helicopter was approximately 10-feet above the water. The pilot "pulled pitch" and the helicopter landed safely on the water with the floats fully inflated. Shortly thereafter, a large wave impacted the helicopter and broke out the right windshield and rolled the helicopter inverted.

The pilot and the passenger were able to exit the helicopter and deploy one of the on-board life rafts. Once both individuals were in the life raft, the pilot activated the EPIRB and another PHI helicopter was able to direct a nearby shrimp boat to the life raft. The pilot and the passenger were taken onto the boat and were later recovered by a United States Coast Guard helicopter.

The operator recovered the helicopter the following day and transported the helicopter to their maintenance facility in Louisiana, where representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), PHI, and Rolls Royce examined the engine. The engine examination revealed signs of an uncontained engine failure near the area of the third stage turbine wheel. The engine was further disassembled and initial investigation confirmed that the third stage turbine wheel had failed, which caused rub on the peashooter, which caused the turbine spline adapter to fail, and subsequent failure of the first stage turbine wheel. The third stage turbine wheel was shipped to Rolls Royce, for further metallurgical examination.

A review of maintenance records revealed that the third stage turbine wheel (part number 6898663, serial number X536938) had accrued a total of 1,904.7-hours and 3, 208-cycles. The turbine had been overhauled 283-hours and 439-cycles prior to its failure, due to a lightning strike. The maintenance records reported that the turbine was zygloyed at that time.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate for rotorcraft-helicopter with a helicopter instrument rating. In addition, he was also a certificated flight instructor for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter. The pilot held a current second-class FAA medical certificate and reported having accumulated a total of 1,855-hours, of which 139-hours were in the same make and model.

The pilot reported the weather as wind between 180 and 220 degrees at 20, gusting to 25 knots, visibility 10 miles, broken ceiling 2,000 feet, and seas 6 to 10 feet.

It seems like a job well done by the pilot.:D:D

"zygloyed" ??
 

In the sentence:
"The maintenance records reported that the turbine was zygloyed at that Does anybody know what is the meaning of "zygloyed" ?
thank you by advance...

Two more
 

One, missing from this thread was a PHI Sikorsky S-76A++ N22342
http://www.phihelico.com/News%20Rele...20Incident.pdf
NTSB issued a probable cause during the summer that seems to have gone unnoticed here: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...01X01599&key=1

The helicopter was inadvertently flown into the water while the attention of both crewmembers was diverted to arming the emergency float system and activating the windshield wipers.

Shades of the ERA accident. Again a cheap AVAD could have helped (and yes IF it were an new aircraft and IF it had been shipped with a more expensive EGPWS then that would have helped too but lets not loose sight that this was avoidable with current and mature technology if only people are prepared to learn the lessons from overseas).

The 'rescue' is even more amazing:

The seas were 5 to 6 foot swells when the helicopter sank . Both crew members remained in the vicinity of their impact with the water for another 30 to 40 minutes. The flight crew then elected to swim toward an abandoned platform, which they believed to be approximately 2 miles from their position.

The crewmembers swam for 2.5 hours to reach the abandoned offshore platform. The platform had been abandoned following damage sustained during hurricane Katrina. The crew found water, food, medical supplies and shelter until a helicopter made visual contact and reported their position. Both crewmembers were rescued by a Bell 407 helicopter and taken to a hospital in Houma, Louisiana. The flight crew was reported to be suffering from severe fatigue as a result of the egress from the wreckage and their 2.5 hour swim. The copilot was treated for a puncture wound to his right thigh and remained in the hospital overnight for observation.

Severe fatigue - really?!

Meanwhile another single ditched a week ago off the Texas coast , 3 POB, all recovered. http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/a...a/J_1009_N.txt:

http://sjdrimages.com/Mb/UserUploads/q74Xpc0ONi5L48.jpg

Ironically enough, that exact ship was flown on the search for the Era S76 on the night it went down. It was fairly well equipped, with dual radar altimeters which provided both aural and visual warnings of descent below the set DH, and digital altitude display at the bottom of the ADI. What you failed to mention was that the PIC hadn't flown in the GOM in several years, the SIC was brand new, both put in that cockpit to fill in for striking pilots, and that they were flying visually in poor weather. With only the two pilots aboard, it wouldn't have been that difficult to fly the trip IFR, but I doubt it was even considered.

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 10/12/2007 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 3899C Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 10/06/2007 Time: 1300
Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: GALVESTON State: TX Country: US
DESCRIPTION
AIRCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES, NO INJURIES, 77 MILES SE
GALVESTON, TX
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: UNK
OTHER DATA
Activity: Unknown Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 10/09/2007

Just for you SAS (See No. 116), a photo not of one of the Ubits but a very old unmodified Oso of the same generation - it'll make you feel right at home again, wood, rails and all!
http://i197.photobucket.com/albums/a...oOriginal1.jpg

edited due incompetance and spelyng

NTSB Identification: DFW08IA002
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Saturday, October 06, 2007 in Galveston, TX
Aircraft: Bell 206L-1, registration: N3899C
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On October 6, 2007 at 0801 central daylight time, a single-engine Bell 206L-1 helicopter, N3899C, sustained minor damage during a forced landing to the water approximately 13-miles south east of Galveston, Texas.

The helicopter, registered to and operated by Air Logistics, Inc., of New Iberia, Louisiana. The commercial pilot and two passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight for which a company flight plan was filed. The flight departed from the Galveston 190A off-shore platform, in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 13 miles off shore from Galveston, Texas, and was destined for offshore platform HI 138, located approximately 38-miles to the northeast.

The operator reported that the floatation system was deployed and the aircraft remained upright and floating following the water landing. The pilot and two passengers were able to egress onto inflatable life rafts that deployed normally.

The initial investigation was conducted by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector on October 6, 2007. His investigation included interviews with the pilot, passengers, and base personnel at the Galveston, Texas, location. An engine examination was conducted by a FAA inspector on October 11, 2007, with the assistance of representatives from Rolls Royce and Air Logistics maintenance personnel, at the operator's maintenance facilities in New Iberia, Louisiana.

Weather reported at Scholes International Airport (KGLS), near Galveston, Texas, at 0752, was reported as wind calm, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 2200 feet and a broken cloud layer at 2900 feet, temperature 27 degrees Celsius, dew point 24 degrees Celsius, and a barometric pressure setting of 29.93 inches of Mercury.

Regs
 

Question (hopefully not already covered in thread)…

Do any air operators/oil companies have local P&P's covering emergency landings onto platforms?

Can’t imagine I’d be very excited if I was an employee/s (I’m assuming the bigger rigs) watching a 407 with full-fuel & 5 pax attempting an auto (under the best of conditions) meters from my bedroom.

The math’s would take me to the water every time but others are a little bolder (younger).

Thanks

Gomer
 

EVERYBODY!!! TIMEOUT!! Helos are tools.. differnt tools for different jobs.. no point arguing over this issue twin/single/platform size etc... one set of you are in balmy 25+ degrees of water surrounded by boats, platforms and friendly traffic - possibly with babes in bikinis cruising by??, the others are in 5 minute survival temperatures miles away from anywhere in freezing fog and rain... (scottish babes in bars in woolly jumpers too far to swim to!!). It is what it is... Ditching in GOM isn't ditching in Norway. Temperature makes a big difference to lifestyle. Annnd .... Relaaaxxx..
Gomer, Just wondering.. When you didnt have time for entering names/weights etc..Whydu not just put board in front of each seat with two columns..name and weight and get your oily Pax to each shout out their weight.. you will know your limits... all done and tick a box on your lap before pulling off? Surely you had to know you c.g / tow for insurance?

You are right, during my fortunately very brief stay at the GOM there were days it was so hot and the fishing boats around Port O'Cononr had bikinis on board, that I kinda actually wished the engine quit . . . . that way the rest of my day could have acutally had something interesting happen.

Latest recommendation from the NTSB:

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/A07_87_88.pdf

Extract from the paper:

"Accident Statistics for Air Taxi Operations in the Gulf of Mexico

A review of the Safety Board’s accident database for 2000 to 2006 found that Part 135 and Part 91 helicopter operators were involved in 62 incidents and accidents in the Gulf during that time period, resulting in 38 fatalities and 25 serious injuries.According to a safety review conducted by the Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC),offshore helicopter operations in the Gulf served approximately 2.8 million passengers annually between 2000 and 2005. A December 2004 study presented by Shell Oil Company to members of the HSAC indicated that 67 percent of offshore oil industry helicopter accidents occur in the Gulf and forecasted that, if the accident rate continues, there could be an equivalent of 250 fatalities from all offshore helicopter operations in the next 10 years."

Recommendations
 

It might be more appropriate to post the NTSB Recommendations:Jim

Jim L

Some of the larger operators in the GOM equipped their fleets with a centre float mounted liferaft system during 2004 as a safety initiative. After float inflation, the liferaft (contained inside the float bag) inflates and can then be detached from the aircraft. I believe that PHI was the first to install the system made by Apical.

What is the most ditchings one individual Pilot has suffered in the GOM?

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 12/19/2007 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 407AK Make/Model: B407 Description: Bell 407
Date: 12/15/2007 Time: 2104
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: GALVESTON State: TX Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N407AK, A BELL 407 ROTORCRAFT, SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AN OFFSHORE
PLATFORM, EXPERIENCED LOST OF ROTOR CONTROL, FLOATS WERE DEPLOYED AND
ROTOCRAFT LANDED IN THE WATER, ALL ON BOARD WERE RESCUED, ROTORCRAFT
PRESUMED TO HAVE SANK, GALVESTON, TX
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: NOT REPORTED
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 12/19/2007

Not so quick!
 

This might be so near shore during nice balmy days but think about a Mid-January/February late afternoon flight in gusty winds with ten foot seas with breaking tops on the waves and you are heading for the rig and you are now about 150-200 miles offshore where the rigs are a bit scarce.

You are sat there in your plumbers uniform with the flag on the shoulder and a wonderful Swiftlik life jacket with no EPIRB.

The air Temp is 45F and the water temp is 54F....the wind is blowing 25 knots....ten foot seas....and Ms. Allison goes on a sit down strike.

What is the odds the helicopter is going to roll over?

What is the odds of everyone getting into the raft?

What is the odds on you getting picked up in the next 30 minutes?

Any one care to tell how many GOM pilots get rescued by the USCG Helicopter fleet?

Anyone care to describe the fleet capability of the USCG in the GOM?

What if.....as can happen sometimes in these things....you get hurt during the transition from aviator to flotsam?

NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On December 29, 2007, at 1531 central standard time, a single-engine Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, impacted the water in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of control during approach. One passenger was fatally injured, while the commercial pilot and two other passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter was owned and operated by Air Logistics LLC., of New Iberia, Louisiana. The flight originated from offshore platform Chandelier 63 and was destined for offshore platform South Pass 38, both in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. All times in this report will be based on central standard time using the 24-hour format.

In a telephone interview with the NTSB, the pilot reported encountering a "sloping cloud deck" as he approached the offshore platform for landing. The pilot added that while in a left turn to final approach, he began slowing the helicopter to 20-25 knots and encountered a tail wind. The pilot noticed a settling tendency and reduced the left bank. Additionally, the pilot reported experiencing vibrations and shaking from the helicopter. The pilot added forward cyclic and increased power. The vibration and shaking became worse and the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event. Due to the low altitude, the pilot was unable to recover the helicopter or deploy the emergency floatation devices prior to water impact. All four occupants survived the initial crash and egressed the helicopter.

A life raft was not deployed prior to the helicopter sinking. The four personnel attempted to swim to the unmanned platform located approximately 100 yards away and were separated by the 8 to 10 foot wave swells. Personnel were located by local boats and the United States Coast Guard. The pilot, who was the last survivor to be rescued from the water, was in the water for approximately 2 and 1/2 hours.

The helicopter sank in approximately 115 feet of water. The helicopter was located and recovery is in progress. Upon recovery the helicopter will be transported to a secure facility pending examination at a later date.

The pilot reported the weather at South Pass 38 was estimated to start at 500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility and reduce to approximately 300 feet ceiling and one mile visibility on final. At 1751 an automated weather reporting facility located about 22-nautical miles to the northwest reported winds from 030 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 1,000- feet, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 51 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.05 inches of Mercury.

Hmmmm... not quite the same time or conditions as the initial reports and posts indicated. Imagine that.

Ahhhh . . . . SWP!

That mysterious phenomenon that seems to happen to guys who fly a helicopter that lacks the power to hover OGE and the TR control authority to keep the nose pointed where it should be a high power setting . . . . . . . downwind.

:rolleyes:

Another one:
Chopper Makes Emergency Landing In Gulf - Dauphin Island Us Coast Guard Helicopter Crash - WKRG.com
Regards
Aser

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 518RL Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/11/2009 Time: 1800

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
HELICOPTER RPM STARTED TO DECAY, PILOT ADDED POWER BUT COULD NOT STOP
DECAY, INITIATED AN AUTOROTATION AND LANDED IN WATER, GULF OF MEXICO

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 3 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: UNKNOWN

OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Cruise Operation: Air Carrier


FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 06/12/2009



Actually:
Model: 206L-1 Year built: 1978
Construction Number (C/N): 45183

Curious description - how do you "add power" in a 206 to regain RPM? You could "take away" power by lowering the collective, and eventually end up in an autorotation, which he did.

Malabo,

You are talking about the FAA here.....they have been known to make a few mistakes in the wording of these things....and dates...locations...aircraft types....etc.

This is worth a read for offshore pilots/operators - salutary lessons to be learnt.

Look particularly at the highlighted section - this has always provided astonishment in Europe. This is a good example of a chain of events leading to a fatality - it might have been avoided if any of the links had been broken.

NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/15/2009
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.

According to an interview with the pilot, while en route to an unmanned offshore platform South Pass 38 in the Gulf of Mexico, the cloud ceilings were about 500 feet and the visibility was about 5 miles. However, as the helicopter neared the destination platform, the flight entered deteriorating weather. The pilot estimated that the cloud ceiling was about 300 feet and that the visibility was about 1 mile when he began circling to land on the platform. Although the weather conditions did not meet Air Logistics’ operating minimums, which required a 500 foot cloud ceiling and 3 miles of visibility, the pilot decided to continue to the destination platform, despite having the option to divert to another station.

About 1 mile from the platform, as the pilot was maneuvering in an attempt to reduce the airspeed, the helicopter began an inadvertent descent and then entered an aerodynamic buffet that hindered the pilot’s ability to maintain straight and level flight. The buffet was most likely caused by the helicopter entering transverse flow effect (unequal lift vectors between the front and rear portions of the rotor disc) and by a reduction in lift vectors, which resulted from the tailwind that was present. After encountering the buffet, the pilot was unable to maintain control of the helicopter or to stop the helicopter’s descent before it impacted the water.

The accident helicopter was equipped with externally mounted floats, which could have been deployed by actuating a trigger mounted on the cyclic. The helicopter was also equipped with two externally mounted liferafts that could have been deployed either by pulling an interior T-handle near the pilot’s left leg or by pulling one of the two externally mounted T-handles on the helicopter’s skid cross bar. According to a supplemental type certificate for the helicopter, a placard was only mounted near the interior T-handle.

According to a pilot interview and a written statement obtained by Air Logistics, the pilot did not attempt to activate the helicopter’s flotation system or liferafts before water impact because he was preoccupied with recovering from the buffet. The accident pilot provided no indication why he did not deploy the external liferafts using the internal T-handle when the helicopter entered the water, even though he had received training on external liferaft deployments. Air Logistics’ training program and operating manual expected company pilots to deploy the floats before water impact but did not address pilot expectations in the event of water impact without floats deployed. Lacking additional guidance, the pilot reverted to his water survival training and immediately exited the helicopter.

All of the occupants survived the impact, exited the helicopter, and inflated their lifejackets. The pilot was unable to reach the external liferaft T-handles on the skids and attempted to direct the passengers to deploy the liferafts. However, because the pilot had not conducted a passenger briefing (including instructions on how to deploy the liferaft system), the passengers did not know that liferafts were available externally and did not understand how to deploy the liferafts using the external T-handles before the helicopter sank. Under 14 CFR 135.117, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to ensure that, before flight, all passengers on flights involving extended overwater operations are orally briefed on ditching procedures and the use of required flotation equipment; however, the accident flight did not meet the 14 CFR 1.1 definition of an extended overwater operation because it was operating within 50 nautical miles of the shoreline.

Per the Air Logistics flight operations manual (FOM), a passenger briefing was required that would have included the location of emergency equipment, such as seat belts, exits, lifejackets, and fire extinguishers. The FOM did not specify that liferaft locations were to be part of the briefing.[2] Regardless, no passenger safety briefing was provided before departure. Air Logistics passenger briefing cards, which were stowed in a pouch on the cabin sidewall for each passenger seat, provided directions on how to operate different emergency equipment; however, the briefing cards did not provide guidance on which equipment was installed on the helicopter. In addition, at the time of the accident, there were no placards to aid in recognition of the external liferaft activation handles.

The passengers and the pilot attempted to swim to the platform, which was about 100 yards from the impact location, but were separated by high waves and were moved away from the platform by the current. About 1551, an Air Logistics radio operator mistakenly recorded the helicopter as “landed” in the company’s flight-following database. Because the helicopter was placed in the “landed” status, the flight-tracking program did not trigger any overdue notifications. About 34 minutes later (1 hour after the crash), the error was discovered by the Air Logistics base manager in Venice, Louisiana, because the pilot had not reported his status before sunset. As a result, the company diverted a field boat toward the offshore platform to search for the helicopter; however, the field boat was too far away to aid the survivors.

The weather conditions precluded the launch of another helicopter to assist in the search. About 1 hour 15 minutes after the crash, the crewmembers of a shrimp trawler contacted the U.S. Coast Guard to report that they had retrieved two survivors and a deceased passenger from the water. The water temperature near the accident location was about 49 degrees Fahrenheit, and the passenger died of hypothermia secondary to asphyxia from drowning. A Coast Guard ship rescued the severely hypothermic pilot more than 4 hours after the estimated time of the crash.

The pilot did not report engine power loss or control malfunction. The passengers did not report seeing any warning lights or hearing any aural warnings before the accident. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded safe flight or the production of engine power.

On October 20, 2008, the NTSB issued two recommendations pertaining to this accident. Safety Recommendation A-08-83 asked for the installation of a placard for each external T handle on turbine-powered helicopters with externally mounted liferafts that clearly identifies the location of and provides activation instructions for the handle. Safety Recommendation A 08-84 recommended that all operators of turbine-powered helicopters be required to include information about the location and activation of internal or external liferafts in pilot preflight safety briefings to passengers before each takeoff. Both recommendations are classified “Open—Response Received.”

Safety Recommendation A-07-88, which the NTSB issued on October 19, 2007, also applies to this accident. In the recommendation, the NTSB asked the FAA to require that all offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide their flight crews with beacon-equipped personal flotation devices; Safety Recommendation A-07-88 is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Response,” based on the FAA’s plan to consult with operators on the best ways to increase the chance of survival in a ditching and the issuance of an information for operators that describes recommendations to mitigate the risks and hazards for helicopters that may have to ditch in the Gulf. As a result of the accident, Air Logistics has initiated a program requiring that each pilot be provided a lifejacket equipped with a 406-megahertz emergency position indicating radio beacon that has full two-way voice capability and that is waterproof to 10 meters. This program requirement is consistent with the intent of the recommendation even without the FAA requiring it.

Additionally, personal locator beacons (without two-way voice capability) have been installed in Air Logistics liferafts. Air Logistics also has started installing water-activated switches on the flotation system and liferafts for its Bell 407 helicopters; the switches are being installed during each helicopter’s next maintenance or inspection visit. Placards have also been placed on the underside of aircraft showing the mechanism for manual deployment of liferafts when the aircraft is upside down in the water. To standardize the briefing information given to passengers, the preflight briefing checklist, passenger briefing cards, and passenger briefing tapes have been revised to include information on the location and operation of liferafts.
In addition, the company produced an initial and recurrent training video to include more detailed information on how to deploy the flotation system and liferafts installed on its helicopters, including footage of an actual deployment, and has revamped its aircraft type-specific briefing videos for passengers. The training and briefing videos are shown to all first-time passengers before they depart their shore base. Air Logistics also has a separate video specifically on raft and float deployment, which includes manual deployment from outside the aircraft; according to the company, this video usually runs continually in the waiting rooms at the shore base. Thus far, Air Logistics pilots and passengers have given positive feedback on the training and briefing videos.

To address the problem of misreporting helicopter status, a senior company pilot now assists the radio operator with oversight of helicopters, and helicopter pilots are required to provide position reports every 30 minutes, regardless of whether their helicopter is airborne or has landed. The radio operator and the senior pilot monitor any pilot who requests a longer delay to eat lunch or take a restroom break, for example. Also, to eliminate inadvertent changes in helicopter status, an additional keystroke has been added to confirm that a helicopter has landed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot’s decision to continue to the destination landing platform in weather conditions below the company’s weather minimums and his failure to maintain aircraft control during the approach. Contributing to the passenger fatality and the severity of the occupant injuries were the lack of a passenger briefing on how to deploy the liferaft, which was required by the company but not by the Federal Aviation Administration because this flight was not an extended overwater operation; the pilot’s failure to deploy the liferafts; and the company radio operator’s misreporting of the helicopter’s “landed” status, which delayed the rescue response.

More than 50 miles from the shoreline is only half of it. It's also more than 50 miles from any offshore platform. In the GOM, that covers almost the entire offshore area, out to well beyond 100 NM. That said, I know of no operator or oil company that allows any offshore flights without wearing lifejackets and having rafts onboard, and requiring passenger briefings. This is usually included in the operations manual, which is regulatory, and/or in the ops specs. CFR 14 is written to cover broad areas, and is as unrestrictive as possible, in accordance with the historic US philosophy. Just because it allows something, that doesn't necessarily mean that all operations are that permissive. Many restrictions are covered under ops specs, not just the general regulations.

Another one:
 

2 hurt in chopper crash in Gulf off Galveston | AP Texas News | Chron.com - Houston Chronicle

GALVESTON, Texas — A helicopter crash on takeoff from a platform in the Gulf of Mexico left two men injured and the aircraft in the water.

A spokesman for Broussard, La.,-based Rotorcraft Leasing Co., which serves the oil and gas industry, said Monday the cause of the crash is sought.

Operations director Gerry Golden told The Associated Press that the accident site is about 75 miles southeast of Galveston.

Golden says the helicopter was bound for another platform and people nearby witnessed the crash Sunday morning. He says the chopper's floats deployed and a boat helped rescue the pilot and the passenger.

A Coast Guard helicopter was dispatched to transport the pair to the University of Texas Medical Branch for treatment of back injuries.

Golden says both men sustained non-life threatening injuries and remained hospitalized for observation.

Rotorcraft leasing put in the water just after taking fuel. Apparently they did not get far from the platform as shown in the pictures... which i only wish i new how to post.

Here is a pic of that last one . . . .

I heard that Airlog had just sold it to RLC and it was one of the first flights with RLC. Maybe next time Airlog will at least put it in the contract that the color scheme needs to be changed before the new owners fly it!!!

http://homepage.mac.com/helipilot/PP...itchingRLC.jpg

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On November 1, 2009, approximately 1040 central standard time, a Bell 206L-1, N272M, registered to and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company LLC, was substantially damaged when it impacted water following a loss of engine power shortly after lifting off from an oil drilling platform. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The non-scheduled domestic passenger flight was being conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger received minor injuries. The flight had just originated from platform High Island A442A, and was en route to platform High Island A515, both in the Gulf of Mexico.

According to the company, the helicopter had landed on the platform and was refueled. It then took off with one passenger. Shortly after lifting off, the engine lost power and the pilot made a forced landing in the water. Just before touching down, the pilot inflated the pontoons. The helicopter settled in the water and rolled inverted.

The helicopter was later recovered and taken to the operator's base in Broussard, Louisiana, for examination. Preliminary information indicates the Pc line was loose.

Once a heliciopter gets flooded with salt water as in the picture in the above post is it a total write off or can it be flushed out with fresh water and placed back into service?

They're refurbished all the time. If properly treated beforehand with CorrosionX or similar, there will be minimal corrosion. Without treatment, I've seen aircraft that just had blown spray on them corrode very quickly. IME, most helicopters that go into the water are recovered and refurbished. As the old saying goes, as long as you have a data plate, you have a viable aircraft.

transverse flow
 

Hm. Not sure I like summarizing transverse flow effect in this manner. We're talking about a longitudinal change in the flow pattern, coupled with a 90 degree delay in response. Causing a rolling motion similar to a cross wind. Agreed? We all deal with it on every take-off, and don't even think about it. Now, when we're slowing down, the reverse. Okay, got that.
Must admit though I never would have thought of that aspect of this accident pilot slowing down into that airspeed area leading to buffeting. Buffeting makes me think of "settling with power". But perhaps it is a combination of more than just settling with power. So slowing down into a state of transverse flow, the opposite of take-off, also contributed to the buffeting this poor pilot experienced?
Rightly or wrongly, I see transverse flow as a gradual, smooth phenomenon. I don't think I'd put buffeting on top of the list of observable symptoms.
Dammit, I do all this stuff and I've quit thinking about it. My brain hurts already.
;)

An opportunity to display a 'just culture'
 

The cause of the crash on 1 Nov of the Rotorcraft Leasing Bell 206 LongRanger appears to be confirmed as the 'PC line' on the engine being loose. See the excerpt from AIN below.

As it is such a well documented cause of failure and it is fairly well covered in the maintenance requirement I hope someone is going to get 'their bottom smacked'. We cannot have pilots and passengers repeatedly hurt by inadequate engineering standards and continue to talk about a 'just culture'.

Does anyone know if the maintenance organisation has taken any disciplinary action as a direct result of this accident? What about the insurers are they really going to pay the claim? And dare I be so naive as to ask what the FAA will do about it?

Do you honestly believe anybody cares what you Think......

The rumor is that the A&P who did the work was fired, and his A&P license suspended by the FAA.

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 6/18/2010 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 108PH Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/10/2010 Time: 1634

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Substantial

LOCATION
City: PORT O'CONNER State: TX Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N108PH, BELL 206L-3 ROTORCRAFT, DITCHED INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO, NEAR PORT
O'CONNER, TX

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: CLEAR

OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER


FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 06/18/2010

So I suppose in your book twin rotor helicopters are inherently safer than single rotor helicopters? :ugh: