My thoughts exactly after waiting over two years for the report on an accident that claimed two lives, one of which was my fiance. The final report consisted of a single sentence...the same one that appeared in the NTSB Prelim issued over two years earlier! Of course, there was no investigation because there was "no one of importance" on board.

Jesus! What an unprofessional and undisciplined world you inhabit, crab.

"no one"? No one!!!! Where Professionals come from reports like that are the norm...

Hadn't you noticed aviation safety (leave alone Professionalism) has progressed somewhat since the gung-ho days of 1950s RAF fast-jet hooliganism?

meleagertoo - Crab has said it and and he is so right. Your little silly rant adds nothing. Disorientation is a quick killer and only complete trust in your instruments and a competent scan will save you.We have all frightened ourselves fartless on many occasions and only talked about it to our closest.

I remember stories from my father who was a B17 IP before he went to war. Needle, ball and airspeed. All you need to stay upright and fly around a bit until you can get either better conditions or climb out of it. I got my instrument ticket in a Cessna 182 with a guy who was an F111B simulator instructor and he would never have signed me off for a check ride if my partial panel skills were below his standards. That was an expensive rating even in 1982, it took me a long time to make par with him. He was an SOB but the words " Don't fu@k with the raidios.....fly the damn airplane" have helped me out more than once. All the new stuff is great and I think all 135 helicopters should have all the bells and whistles, plus fdr and cvr if flying passengers for hire. That being said, you shouldn't need it to stay alive. Clear and simple, training and currency on basic flying skills might have prevented this whole thing. Now the lawsuits and congressional hearings will be the "solution". We'll see I guess.

​​​​​ Thought the same and when comparing his tone from the the first transmissions in my opinion you can clearly here it....but maybe it's just me too.

So very sad.

WuW

Roscoe1 - have you flown instruments in a helicopter? FW is soooo much easier since the platform is inherently unstable. Rely on needle ball and airspeed (most helos don't have a turn needle anyway) and you are dead in an unstabilised helicopter in cloud.

Meleagertoo - UK Mil flying is pretty professional and very discplined but Georgina gets the reality of life as a pilot, you seem to have some fantasy about pilots and admitting mistakes..

Yes, I've flown helicopter IFR and of course it pushes the flying skills of most folks to go iimc in a helicopter with no SAS or autopilot. If you think going inadvertant in an unstabilized machine has to have a bad outcome beyond needing a change of underware then that is your opinion. Not saying aany particular person including me would survive but with all the attitude info available in an IFR certified helicopter it should not matter if there is not a turn and bank gyro. Unstabilized? SAS, autopilot, even force trim...this was not an unstabilized ship and my point was that he should have seen it coming, flipped some switches, made a stabilized climb and confessed. You don't need that much to survive unless bad calls have already piled up.

I had to ask because you made the idea of instrument flying in a helicopter seems very straightforward, even without a decent instrument fit - I wouldn't want less experienced pilots to think it is easy and chance their arm in marginal conditions.

I have flown IFR in a completely unstabilised single (military) and a number of full IFR twins - as much as the automatics will help you, they will only do so if you press the right buttons at the right time and know what to expect from the aircraft when you do press those buttons.

There is no substitute for a good IF scan and that has to be learned and practised regularly.

Is a 'big screen' of synthetic vision a substitute
 

Is a 'big screen' of synthetic vision a substitute for a good IF scan (which will only save your bacon if it was learned and practised regularly)?

I know I have asked this question here twice already, and nobody is biting. Can it be that the factually correct answer would be seen as 'politiically' incorrect? It seems obvious on the other hand that none of the measures that media and populistic politicians (is that a a tautology?) are demanding would have prevented this accident:

- Stricter legal limits (while the problem is the non-observance of existing limits)
- TAWS: Terrain Awareness (while the pilot knows they are close to terrain, as they are dodging clouds and can't go any higher without losing visual reference to the ground), and
- TAWS: Traffic Warning (which screams "PULL UP, PULL UP" while the pilot is already spatially disoriented and doesn't know anymore where "up" is)
- CVFDR (that in the best case could help with the accident investigation in explaining the mishap but not in preventing it)

By definition, there is almost no overlap between the group of pilots who are at risk of inadvertently entering IMC, and those pilots who do not only have and maintain an IF rating (like our mishap pilot) but also regulary practise IF in their daily operations, in real IMC conditions.

So what is the solution? Good advice not to get into trouble won't crack it, as we know that there will be situations where people find themselves in trouble.

The really sad part of this discussion has been left in the dust. All the experts, all the opinions, all the legislation to come and the NTSB throwing up their hands when the FAA doesn't take their advice (again) fails to mention that this all happened in order to get a teenager to a basketball game. Granted, business is business and if people are willing to pay, there is not too much I can say that makes it wrong to conduct that business in this case. However, there was zero, or if possible less than zero, risk/benefit analysis going on here. Bear in mind I'm talking about passenger 135 operations, not all types of helicopter operations. I cut a lot more slack if prople want to risk their lives and machines by themselves or with others who understand what they are doing. That process should have started long before this flight. The primary question should have been, how important is it to complete this mission? It was a convenience, not very important at all, but it was treated as if it were a mission of mercy or disaster response. I am not at all saying helicopters shouldn't be used like this. I'm just saying that perhaps it should have been given serious consideration by the pilot before he pulled pitch, and certainly as things got dicey with ATC and the weather.

Maybe that is where the shortfall is - considering as you say all the other options listed probably would not have made a difference.

People need to be damn sure they understand that IIMC more often than not is equivalent to flying into the ground if you are not qualified to do it.

"Training" should be limited to showing just how "unsuccessful" you will be.

Giving pilots a few hours on "foggles" to teach them how to save them from their own shortcomings is actually misguided and has never made sense to me.

I think the basic problem could be just ego. Back in the days of training guys to line you had to make them aware of it and batter it out of them.

Ego makes you overestimate your abilities and is known as a "hazardous attitude" - pun intended. The trick is knowing it exists and how to handle it.

H&H wrote: “Good advise not to get into trouble won't crack it, as we know that there will be situations where people find themselves in trouble.”

Concur. It is then up to the leader of the operation to ensure that when the inevitable occurs, his folks are ready and able, and the equipment is the same. From what I’ve read from some experienced posters here, there seems to be agreement that meeting the bare minimum legal requirements does not insure the status extant in that first sentence. So, really two issues: 1) denier population that think you can always get away with VFR only; 2) leadership and funding to provide the needed skills/currency thereof.
This basic issue once existed at SA. Military rules required IFR currency but allowed it to be done in FW aircraft and thats what we did. Cheaper by far of course. It took some hard work by one of my predecessors to change that situation. Translate “hard work” into leadership.

How do you stop a Mormon from drinking your beer when you invite him fishing with you?......Invite two of them.....checks and balances.

Two Pilots.

Nope - it is just an invitation to push on into conditions that are not suitable for VFR flight.

Synthetic Vision
 

Well, Mr Bryant's pilot didn't need synthetic vision as an invitation to push on. He pushed on without it, maybe assuming that his [6-pack] instrument flying skills would pull him through.

It is unfortunate that the urge to give a politically correct answer defocusses the discussion. With your logic one should also disallow the attitude indicator in VFR-only aircraft, as indeed it is an invitation to push on into conditions that can become sketchy.

My question to the forum of experts was however a technical one:

- We all agree that good real visibility (=VMC) allows any reasonably proficient pilot (even if trained VFR-only) to successfully reject the illusions that cause spatial disorientation.
- We know that with degrading visibility, the illusions can become overpowering.
- We however also know that under 'foggles' the little remaining peripheral vision still allows the student pilot quite well to cope with the illusions (in all generality, peripheral vision would still give accurate perception of bank and of rate of turn).

The question therefore is: What properties and qualities does synthetic reality need to have in order to be sufficiently trusted by the pilot's brain to then reject the wrong illusions?

As stated before: From experience of less than proficient IF pilots (like in this mishap), we know the 6-pack isn't suitable. And it is self-evident that replacing all cockpit windows with HD TV screens showing what the pilot could see in VMC through the windscreen would do the trick. But where is the tipping point? What is the minimum 'instrumentation' needed that would give the pilot's brains sufficient visual clues to be able to reject the illusions even without owning proficient IF scan skills?

I myself haven't made up my mind in this question yet. I am not yet convinced that embedding synthetic vision into the EFIS glass panel is the solution. I fear that solely increasing the AI presentation from a 3.5 inch round instrument to a 7 or 10 inch screen, and maybe adding some synthetic terrain, might not be sufficient to trick the brain into not succumbing to the other illusions. My hunch is that the 'balance' information is gleaned by the brain from peripheral vision, not from the central, in-focus view. The 'foggle' experience that we spoke about several times in this discussion, is a good support for this theory.

What do you experts think?

It wasn't a politically correct answer - just the truth based on years of experience. When NVG were introduced we saw them used by some to push on in worse weather at night than they might have done in non-NVG flight - if you can see more you will go further.

As much information as you present to the pilot in the cockpit, if they are not trained to use it properly and believe in it then it won't prevent somatogravic or visual illusions fooling their brain.

I would always have an AI in a VFR aircraft for that just in case moment - better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.

A standard instrument fit is more than enough to prevent or overcome the leans but you have to believe the presentation - that comes down to training, exposure to real IMC and practice.

If you push the limits and go scud running, and you don't have the skills or knowledge to execute a plan B when it goes wrong then WTF are you doing in a cockpit in the first place?

Aircraft state is more complicated than a pretty picture. Attitude alone is not sufficient especially in a helicopter. The full picture requires airspeed, trim, yaw rate, power, altitude, etc. What does the SV picture look like for a helicopter flying straight and level, but backwards?

In spatial disorientation, the vestibular system rules. The pilot believes they are turning when they’re not and vice versa. The vestibular has overpowered the visual. A pilot makes inappropriate control inputs based upon these false sensations. It’s worth repeating that inappropriate control inputs during an upset recovery can lead to a completely different upset situation. Game over.

The contradiction between sensed orientation and visual in the pilot’s mind creates confusion, and it’s only through training and experience (and dare I say proficiency) that a pilot is able to resolve this. As straightforward as it seems, just making the attitude indicator bigger doesn’t solve the underlying problem.

A similar issue is experienced by many in a simulator, but manifested differently. Even high-end simulators have an infidelity between the motion and the visual. However, when flying a simulator, the disconnect between the senses doesn’t create full blown SD, but rather causes many to become ill. Some even violently.

While there is belief that synthetic vision technology may provide improvements in SD recovery, the real benefit from SV is improving situational awareness, workload reduction (i.e. terrain and path-in-the-sky) AND UPSET PREVENTION.

But why keep asking for meaningless opinions?

MITIGATING PILOT DISORIENTATION WITH SYNTHETIC VISION DISPLAYS

SYNTHETIC VISION SYSTEM COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT DECK DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES FOR UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERY

Evaluation of Synthetic Vision Display Concepts for Improved Awareness in Unusual Attitude Recovery Scenarios.

Airplane State Awareness - Virtual Day- VMC Displays.

Airplane Upset Recovery. Industry Solutions for Large SweptWing Turbofan Airplanes Typically Seating More than 100 Passengers.

Prevent Loss of Control in General Aviation. NTSB.

How much would SV have helped this pilot?

Most of those links did not work, but I was able to search them out using the titles.

That's a great body of work. For the TLDR crowd it basically says synthetic vision is of little to no value compared to normal EFIS type attitude information.

Sorry, the forum software routinely scrambles my links, requiring successive edits to fix. I'm not sure why. I think I have fixed them now...

"Rotor Radio" podcast with Elan Head
 

Vertical Magazine "Rotor Radio" podcast with Elan Head where she makes some pertinent statements about how difficult it is even for IF inctructor rated pilots to fight those illusions:

https://www.verticalmag.com/news/rot...utm_content=V1

I have sometimes noticed that too. A fix seemed to be to quote the links. I mean after the fact. I always check links and if they are broken I "reply" quoting the entire post and post that with a short explanatory note.
As I recall 100% success rate.

I have not observed this for a while though ... ? Maybe you are seeing a different issue.

I did write a detailed Tech Support note to the Pprune support forum. Here it is: (if the link is OK:-)

https://www.pprune.org/pprune-proble...l#post10588320

Edit:- I don't mean to moan at Pprune - just providing info for anyone who wants it. It's I assume a small site with limited resources.

I have experienced the cross-coupling of the balance canals on a NVFR flight near the coast. A nav over dark land, to a turning point over a lighthouse. The sea mist was just rolling in below us.

We got to the turning point, we rolled the aircraft to start the turn (1 canal) and pitched the aircraft through the turn (2 canals) and then I turned my head to look at the lighthouse below - its beams of light, like fingers rotating in the mist, totally stuffed me up - eyes telling me one thing and 2 confused balance canals, I felt like I was rotating backwards out of my seat, a very powerful feeling. Lucky I wasn't on the controls at the time.

Maybe something similar happened here, he starts a turn, introduces a climb, turns his head to look for a visual feature, feels he is falling backwards and pokes the nose down...

Hot and Hi - good link to rotor radio, Elan Head (cool name) talks a lot of sense. It comes down to training and practice in the end - as we all knew:ok:.

I have experienced the leans 'under the hood' but being in cloud is very different - you don't have the psychological safety blanket of being able to peek or just look up, you have to use the instruments and that can make it much more scary.

So add the fear factor to the vestibular illusions and you find yourself in a place that you need good, current skills to recover from.

Taking pilots who have only ever flown 'simulated' IF (under the hood or with foggles) into cloud is something I have done and still do on a regular basis - it often scares them fartless (no-one tells you it is bumpy inside the fluffy stuff) and taking control is another regular occurrence. However, once the fear dissipates and they gain the confidence of trusting the instruments and using the correct techniques, it is amazing the progress the students make.

If you want a challenge as an Instrument Flying instructor, try recovering from a student's 'leans-induced' unusual attitude where height, heading and speed (not to mention glideslope and centreline) have gone badly awry at 3 miles on the ILS, IMC with a 300' cloudbase. :)

I came to that conclusion from my personal experience early in the previous topic.

It is impossible to describe the sensation or to train for it, but good, current IF experience must help, and IF in cloud.

In initial flying training we had a week for aero-medicine. This included a session using a rotating chair, first to demonstrate the leans. Then, eyes closed and chin on chest we were spun again, quite slowly, and after a few seconds told to look up. Many of us flung ourselves from the chair trying to find where up and down were. This experience is rather like doing the dunker - it lets you deal with the real situation because you already know how terrifying it might be. Yes, I have escaped from a ditched helicopter, too. ;-)

With reference to what was said the blog, I think it is worth emphasising that these coriolis effects are quite different from the leans, which is itself dangerous enough.

I recollect being given unusual attitudes to recover from during IF training,

very unlikely to have done that in cloud - the requirement for UP/UA training is normally clear of cloud with a visual horizon just so the instructor can let the UP/UA develop further and recover it safely. The situation I was describing has happened to myself and colleagues when the students were trying to fly an ILS but not coping with real IMC very well.

It is one thing to recover when someone else puts you in a UP for training since you know it is coming - quite another to put yourself into one accidentally or have someone else do it because their scan has broken down.

fair comment but both produce powerful illusions and disorientation in a DVE so should still be considered in the same breath when talking about IIMC.

yup, exactly what many of us have been saying all along:ok:

Of course. Exactly as you describe. Nevertheless, pretty useful as a student. ;-)

Yes, probably the two standard ones - a low speed autorotative turn and a high speed, high power descending turn.:ok:

For experienced Sqn pilots I would get them to try and come to the hover on instruments and the resulting UP was more difficult to recover from as they had put themselves into it. It is quite representative of an IIMC encounter at low speed and low level and the larger yaw inputs and larger power changes of trying to come to a free air hover means that good recovery skills are required and it can be quite a confidence builder.

Crab - did you ever do this one which was quite fun. Come to the hover as you say with the ASE engaged - get the aircraft moving backwards quite fast and then hand over control. The student then puts his feet on the pedals, that disengages the yaw channel and the aircraft does a snap 180 degree turn and the nose drops dramatically!! You need to keep your hands near the controls as said student can start thrashing about a bit. Happy days.........................:eek:

No but I did reach out from the RHS of a Wessex and put my finger over the pitot tube as I gave control to my colleague in a UP on SCT IF. He pushed the nose forward assuming we were at zero IAS and then a bit more - we both got a surprise as I removed my finger from the pitot and suddenly had 115 Kts and rising quickly! Learned about messing around on UPs from that one:)

lucky the heater wasn’t on!

:):):ok:yes, that would have been painful and even more embarrassing .

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....19bf3f7e8c.jpg
Crab - you have bloody long arms to do that!!:sad:

Not really - just look at where the pilot's hand is on the cyclic - not a big reach at all.

As a QHI I was teaching pilots to become Aircraft Commanders. They were in the LHS "commanding" and I was in the RHS being a "pilot". As we approached the airfield, I purposely went inadvertent IMC to see how the student would cope. He coped well. I, however, got an immediate case of the leans.

So, we're flying round the radar circuit in a Gazelle(so no aids) me fighting the leans, him grinning at me, knowing full well what's happening and asking: "Do you want me to take over?" Me, through gritted teeth: "No, I'm fine".

Joking apart, it was hard work.

"just look at where the pilot's hand is on the cyclic "

Cyclic? Woss that then.............I bet you were a great lover - at arms length.................:D

Not a reacharound though:ok:

Island Express blames ATC for Kobe Bryant crash
 

The Headline is deceiving as it has nothing to do with Vanessa Bryant, but it is actually Island Express now claiming that the Air Traffic Controllers caused this crash!

https://www.tmz.com/2020/08/25/vanes...icopter-crash/

KOBE BRYANT HELICOPTER CRASH - ISLAND EXPRESS SUES AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

8/25/2020 7:04 AM PThttps://imagez.tmz.com/image/aa/4by3...b367a1d_md.jpg
EXCLUSIVEIsland Express, the company that operated the helicopter that killed Kobe Bryant and 8 others, is suing the 2 air traffic controllers who they claim caused the crash.
The helicopter company claims the 2 air traffic controllers who were guiding the pilot to the Mamba Academy, Kyle Larsen and Matthew Conley, were asked by the pilot for radar guidance, presumably because of the heavy fog. According to the lawsuit, Larsen responded by saying, "I'm going to lose radar and comms [communications] probably pretty shortly so you can just squawk V-F-R [visual flight rules] and when you get closer go to Camarillo tower."
The company claims the controller denied the pilot the use of what it believes is life-saving radar, despite the fact that radar guidance had not yet been lost.
Conley then relieved Larsen and according to the suit, less than 2 minutes later the pilot radioed in, but Conley was unhelpful and uninformed.
https://imagez.tmz.com/image/32/4by3...552be4a_md.jpgMOMENTS AFTER THE CRASHLAUNCH GALLERYSWNSAccording to the suit, the pilot believed he was still operating on radar because the tower operators did not clearly say it was being terminated. Nevertheless, the company claims the helicopter did suddenly lose radio and radar contact in the fog.
https://imagez.tmz.com/image/e8/4by3...8825697_md.jpg
NTSBThe suit claims at some point -- presumably when the pilot was in the fog -- radio contact came back, and Conley tried reaching the pilot repeatedly, and that caused the pilot additional stress. What's unclear ... it would seem Conley was calling to guide the pilot.
Short story ... the helicopter company says the tower operators caused the pilot stress and distraction which ultimately caused the crash.

Failure by the pilot to maintain VMC was the very simple cause of the crash .
If the pilot had of stayed out of the ground based obscuration , his passengers would not have died in the aircraft under his control .
Sophiests playing word games . The decision of the Pilot to continue into cloud while "VFR" was the cause of the crash . Simple.
The Ambulance chasers always go after the deepest pockets in a shotgun lawsuit. Hence the ATC getting accused .
I have lots of experience scud running and would never enter cloud that close to ground , I have turned around and tried different routes when I have been stopped by a wall of weather while flying low level .
The Pilot did not take advantage of the aircraft ability to hover . He made many errors but the one that killed him was going into cloud below MSA.

There should be a minimum radar vectoring height chart for the area - a controller isn't allowed to give a radar service below that.

ot much doubt the aircraft would have been below the minimum level.