Loss of visual references
 

Sounds like they scared themselves fartless - due to poor execution of a valley turn and the belief that the automatics will save you.

As a well known American Redneck Comedian likes to say....."Here's your Sign!".

Seems there was some very good airmanship in retrieving what had become a very bad situation.

The basic question I have is why the first response to the Hikers was the Helicopter and not the Ground Rescue Team?

I googled the general location and see from the Sat View there are easily discerned trails in the area.

The Accident Report noted the Hikers had Torches that were seen on the FLIR.

No mention was made of any injury to the hikers or why they felt they needed rescue.

The Report stated the aircraft notified the ground team and they then went to the Hikers and walked them out on foot.

Well said - it will unfortunately not generate any sort of epiphany - for that you require insight... They can't teach that I am afraid not even in RAF SAR.

Crab - you could try and rein it in a little from time to time - maybe take up painting or yoga. Pprune sadly continues to be a rubbish place to openly discuss anything meaningful such as this...

Anyone care to explain the AFCS panel ;ALTA;MOT,WTR,TD/H....please....
Personally I would not be tempted to use a `Baro ht,or a radar alt coupled mode in that terrain....
ed. Can you set a specific height for the baro/rad alt to capture,like f/w autopilots ie a/f 4000...?

I dont see anything contentious about:
" Sounds like they scared themselves fartless - due to poor execution of a valley turn",
and I am guessing if you asked the crew they would agree that pretty much hit the nail on the head. ... However, I also agree with SASless:
"Seems there was some very good airmanship in retrieving what had become a very bad situation." - Once they regained their situational awareness, the crew were discilplined enough to review their decisions including automation modes, and fixed the situation. Could be an interesting case study for my next CRM training event!

DDW - do get off your high horse - they were doing a tricky job but they made a mistake - and if you don't think climbing in a valley turn when you want to descend and use your escape route is an error then I don't want to fly with you in the mountains.

I suspect the crew debrief contained a similar critique once they got back to base.

I have done plenty of night mountains in skoshie weather as have lots of others but very few end up like this so to pretend it is OK is to do everyone a dis-service.

Can you not see the incorrect use of AP modes when the IAS is too low for engagement is an error? - a simple wings level and max power would have been quicker than trying to use GA and TU.

I feel sure the crew would take my comments as valid rather than jumping on the outrage bus as you have done.

No-one said night mountains was easy.

I do wish I knew who you are so I can can give an appropriate amount of credibility to your comments

Sycamore - ALTA is Altitude Acquire, dial in an alt and press the button and the aircraft flys you there at a preset rate of climb or descent.

MOT is Mark on Target, used to initiate an automatic letdown, usually in two stages to end up in the hover.
-
WTR is Winchman's Trim - the winch op can fly the aircraft in the hover using a hand controller since he can see what is directly under the aircraft. Good for night wets.

TD/H is Trans Down/Hover - in the 139 you press it once to take you to 200' and 80 kts and then again to get you down to your desired hover height.

The HOV referred to is the Hover mode available below 60 kts (if it is the same as the 139) which automatically couples the RHT (Radio Height Hold) - the HOV speed and direction can be set by the pilot to maintain a slow and controlled movement.

The GA is Go Around which also (If like the 139) is the same button on the collective that can initiate a go around from an instrument approach or a Trans Up (TU) from the hover.

Nigel - you are from Yorkshire, you should be used to people being direct:)

SAR crew debriefs were always direct and to the point - there is nothing to be gained by just fluffing people's egos but perhaps that is the brave new world.

If you know the cloud above you is thin and you will get VMC then up is better but you then might not be able to complete the rescue.

It is a natural reaction to pull the nose up as you turn, especially with the ground coming up towards you but the valley turn was taught in a specific way to stop this happening - I and others used to teach pilots to push as you turn - you didn't actually push but it was enough of a prompt to prevent climbing into cloud next to the granite.

The PM could have been briefed to fly the turn since all the references were on his side but I don't know the relative experience of the crew, he may have been a new co-pilot/FO.

Overreliance on the automatics is a well documented issue in modern aviation - the modern helicopter AFCS is very capable but sometimes you just have to fly the aircraft.

I would have added....."At all times you must be prepared and capable of flying the aircraft.".

Crab...thanks...

From the conclusion and safety recommendations section at the end of the report so despite DDWs abuse, someone clearly decided there were lessons to be learned from that incident and took exactly the right action.

DDW - the difference is that I make remarks based on the organisation, the equipment, the SOPs or the incidents yet you and others just hurl personal abuse because you don't like what I have to say.

I may have gone OTT sometimes in the past but only because I care about UK SAR - I still work with experienced SAR operators, ex-RN, er RAF and ex-Civ and we routinely discuss such incidents as this one and my opinions don't really differ from theirs.

Re Bristow criticisms - I have lost count of the times I have been told by ex-colleagues that some of my concerns about civilianising SAR were correct, especially in the early days of the contract.

I am quite aware that the service is maturing nicely and getting the job done well - as it should with the latest aircraft and equipment.

If you don't like my 'nasty self righteous nonsense' then fine but don't just call me names, counter my arguments with facts - like you failed to do with the pay scales issue. The report on this incident seems to support my initial comments.

Feel free to PM me to remove your anonymity so we can have a proper discussion but I don't expect you will.

I'm struggling to see where my professional criticism is 'nasty' and your personal jibes aren't.

You started the personal spat by the way - you could have made a less emotive post by simply disagreeing with what I said and stating your reasons for doing so.

Exactly. It remembered me an old Bell's ROTORPROP publication (80's) about the concern about evolution of the automation and aircraft capabilities up to a point on the aircraft flight envelope above human manual handling habilities. And, if the automation fail, how the pilot will take control?
Of course I'm not raising any doubts on this crew airmanship (errors do occur and debriefings, reports, training and so on help to prevent them to occur again) neither we are flying helicopters beyond human capacity or the automation failed. Just the issue of overreliance in automation (and the concern about erosion of handflying skills in highly automated cockpits) on a very demand task have made this old article to come again.

Fully agree.
I know the pilot, and he's an excellent one. Surely with the lessons he has learned from this incident he's even better now. And we all could learn as well.
Perhaps trying to keep that excellence made him and his crew to push the limits too far.
Saying NO is the most difficult for a SAR crew, we tend to try always, and sometimes we shouldn't.

IIMC is a constant threat in the mountains in poor weather, day or night, which is why the use of escape headings is important and having a plan before you commit to the inside of a feature is equally important.

They clearly did have a plan which was a 180 out of the bowl and down the valley - something they had executed well in their previous attempts to get to the climbers.

The weather does change rapidly in such terrain and getting caught out is always possible - there is a often a second or two before you acknowledge it isn't just a little bit of random mist or low cloud that you won't pop out the other side of and that you need to take action.

Perhaps this is what happened halfway through the valley/bowl turn but it appears they climbed which may be cause or effect, only they know for sure.

Whatever the reason, they ended up in a very scary position, IMC inside a mountain feature and having to rapidly transfer from NVIS to instruments (not easy in the best of conditions).

I understand the reasons for trying to use the AFCS upper modes to help but they became a further distraction and prevented a roll out on the escape heading. Thereafter the only solution was wings level and pull power - which essentially is what they did.

ODEN - in answer to your first question they were trying to get to the climbers and would have identified the bowl feature as accessible before they went in - I presume the intention was to achieve a hover inside the feature and then assess the feasibility of a further hover-taxi up the side of the mountain.

As I mentioned before, the Bristow training team clearly thought this was a scenario worth repeating in the sim for other crews to learn from. Pilots make mistakes - it's human nature - doesn't make them bad pilots and the best pilots I know learned from their and others mistakes - you just have to be bold and honest in identifying the error and the prevention.

I get back to my earlier question....."Why were they there to begin with....if ground teams walked the hikers down off the mountain?".

Two main reasons SASless - the first is response time, If the climbers are stuck or hypothermic or slightly injured, perhaps just plain lost - their condition may worsen or they could step off a cliff.

Secondly, it is always hazardous to be on the mountain in those conditions and the mountain rescue team put themselves at risk - if that risk can be minimised or removed by using the helicopter then they are free to respond to any other calls. Even though they know the ground well it is still a bad place to be on a mountain at night in the dark with crap weather.

Crab.....you debate every thing and answer nothing sometimes.

My question was specific to this exact single event....and you threw in your tuppence trying to enlighten the unwashed or something else.

I looked at the Sat View of the area in question and noted it is not far from paved roads....has well worn trails.

The Report noted the Hikers had lights as seen by the Helicopter Crew.

It made no mention of the Hiker's condition....no mention of anything you listed in your reply.

It also indicated the Helicopter Crew contacted (or had contact made) with the MRT who THEN walked up and walked the Hikers back down safely.

Mine is a reasonable question....just as we query the problem of unnecessary EMS call outs....we should do the same with SAR Call Outs particularly those that put the Helicopter Crew in a hazardous situation.

No one seems to care about that as there did not seem to be any such questions posed in the report.

My questions are valid as the MRT "WALKED" the Hikers down....no mention of a stretcher, injury, or other reason that the SAR Helicopter was needed.

Sasless - they were there because they had been called out and asked to be there - the fact that the MRT eventually walked them down is irrelevant. That they had comms with the MRT is completely normal and it isn't unusual to have to hand the job over to MRT if the weather precludes the helicopter rescue.

Just because the climbers were walked down by MRT doesn't mean they weren't lost, scared, hypothermic or mildly incapacitated - you are reading too much into the phrase 'walked down by MRT'.

Similarly, your analysis of the terrain from the comfort of your armchair bears no relation to what they were actually experiencing on the night - my last night job in the mountains sadly ended up as a body recovery of a person who had wandered only yards off a marked trail in cloud and failing light and ended up over a 400' drop.

The short answer to your question is - they were there because they were doing their job.

I suspect that this is totally irrelevant, but this report instantly took me back some 50 or so years to a rubbish Wx, 202 Sqn callout for similar reasons. Similar initiation but in a Whirlwind 10, so NO fancy anything and the cloud was the base of a Cu Nim! They left the cloud at 12,000' - in pieces! R I P to them all - their lesson remains to be learned, it seems.

CJ - a big hand of respect to those who did mountain SAR in a Whirlwind!

I expected in the conclusion and in the safety action something about EGPWS and TAWS (switched off together with SVS) and turns "against the springs" with upper modes engaged instead of flying manually in attitude. Am I alone thinking those actions were an important factor?

is it really fit for purpose in that case?

Surely AW could come up with a software fix for that instability. I had heard that phase 4 software reduced that pitch instability a bit.

As far as I know / understand this is not a software issue but the pitch actuator is not good enough. The phase 4 software helped a bit but the AW189 still suffers with pitch instability. Don't know how much recertification if they replaced that actuator would be required but I don't think it would be easy / quick / cheap to do.

Fit for purpose you ask, well that is debatable but remember the government "stipulated" the AW189 for this contract to help keep Yeovil going, if I'm not mistaken.

not the first time that jobs at Yeovil have taken precedence over quality of procurement of UK helicopters.........ISTR they weren't actually built there, only assembled which was a bit of a con.

Strange that the 189 should have pitch instability problems where the 139 doesn't (don't know about 169) - different design of actuator perhaps?

Aw139 APs --》 Honeywell
AW189 APs --》 Agusta homemade
Completely different

Milo - I knew the software was different, is the hardware different too?

To the best of my knowledge the FCCs are different. The issues with pitch control on the AW189 can't be solved simply by "installing" a Honeywell software. In the other hand the 189 AFCS is better than the 139 one in some other aspects. Although you would prefer the latter if you are facing bad weather conditions.
However it seems that Phase 5 has improved the overall behaviour by a complete software new design... we'll see.

Thanks Milo - sounds like the Leonardo version of the Boeing 737 Max 8 - an unstable fix for an unstable aircraft:)