Some operators implemented the following as SOP:

"Before first flight - Delete all user waypoints and all user routes from memory..."

Kind regards, learner . . .

It is also possible with the FMS fitted to the S-92 (UNS-1) to automatically delete all User waypoints/routes on power down. That was how I had ours set up in my previous role, so that only Company waypoints and Routes (plus, the Jepp NAV Database) remained - neither of which are modifiable. This meant that the User database remained solely for tactical use during a specific flight.

The SOP was implemented to avoid mishaps operating a fleet of 'mixed' manual/automatic deletion, (de)pending modification . . .

is that a question or a statement? I'm quite familiar with why we implemented the procedure (which occurs automatically once set up in the menu) - I instigated it!

212man, It is a statement!

The SOP was implemented because only part of the fleet was set up for the 'auto delete'!

I was talking about the situation where nav units (that were randomly set up or not set up for 'auto delete') were: (a) to be set up by the supplier on request of the operator or (b) to be modified by the operator nav-ops for the automatic deletion set up. Which, in my recollection, was/is not modifiable by the flight crew by means of the menu.

We probably have similar reasons for the auto delete. Amongst others: Without positively identifying the origins, some crew were activating waypoints/routes, inserted by a previous crew, that had utilised (with their reasoning!) some convenient, nice sounding, user-invented, questionable, random, identifiers. Previous crews sometimes inserting less precise coordinates, or even totally different coordinates for equally sounding identifiers.

Kind regards, learner . . .

However the route was generated and whatever it flew them towards there is still the issue of accepting flight over a RADAR return at very low height above the ocean.

Surely the Golden Rule is we shalt not fly over ANYTHING unless we have visual contact with it prior to DR. As such any target in front of us becomes the intermediate destination and the MDH/MDA and DR rules should apply. Or go round it leaving the required safety margin.

The CVR is confusing and not at all clear that they "see" Blackrock" on the RADAR before the impact. Unless I have mistaken this.

DB

So far, (correct me if I am wrong) all I have found is one occasion, calling out two separate radar targets, which was done by the PM, as reflected in my post #1535:

- The first and only radar target call by PM appears to be for two targets, at 6 miles only. In relation to track and heading, the "Ok, so, small target at 6 miles, 11 o'clock" appearing to point to the Duvillaun More Island, the North confinement of the 'safe corridor'. The other "Large to the right there" appearing to indicate the South confinement of the 'safe corridor'. Both radar targets are beyond Blackrock. No mention, indication or remark that anything closer would appear or be searched for. (The "1.3 miles to run to Blackmo..." remark appears to be based on waypoint/nav indications.)

Kind regards, learner . . .

Can you explain?

212man

Ok, I Understand the confusion.

The radar targets are beyond Blackrock . . .

Changed that in the previous post #1641, as well as in #1535 . . .

Thanks for the heads up . . .

I'm struggling to see how 76/200A relates to the accident chain. Is there a suspicion that the data load to the FMS was corrupt?

On the FMS topic, there appears to be a number of users here, can any one answer whether the particular FMS allows altitude constraints for a WP or leg?

well, since they mention this accident specifically and then go on to wash their hands of any responsibility for the accuracy of such databases, it sounds like someone is making sure they aren't to blame should it turn out the database was flawed and was a significant contributory cause.

Yes it can but the AFCS has no VNAV function so any adherance is to the crew. The PFD and FMS display guidance though.

Crab - Mr Zotov rears his head!!

G

DB

As noted in #1535 and #1641, in addition to the, so far, one and only known 'radar target presence call' by the PM, mentioning the two targets beyond Blackrock, I have not found any other 'radar target presence calls' in the CVR transcript that could be indicating that the crew would have been "seeing" Blackrock on the radar at any stage during approximately the last minute of the flight.

I realise that some may think, I may be going a bit too deep now at this stage, in which case I apologise for that. But, triggered by and in response to your post I wanted to sort out something that is going through my head for quite a while now: "So far", from the above, I thus assumed that there would be NO more (when looking for obvious) indications possible that could indicate that Blackrock may have been "seen" on the radar by the crew.

However, the absence of (obvious) indications that Blackrock has been "seen" on the radar by the crew does not necessarily preclude or rule out that Blackrock may well have been "seen" ON the RADAR by one or maybe both pilots.

The following may also explain two other possibilities where the:"just a small little island, that is BLMO itself" remark may have originated from.


Whether valid or not, we may not exclude and must consider also other than CVR possibilities, possibly indicating that Blackrock may have been seen on the radar: = Seeing the 'Blackrock radar targets presence' indicated or pointed out by unmistakable, noticeable or even just mere gesture(s) of either crew member. =


Subsequently, (possibly, if not for the "Altitude! Altitude!" alert or, perhaps even combined with that alert) at least one of these 'gesture occurrences', if there had been any:

(a) may have been triggering the: "just a small little island, that is BLMO itself" remark, as a response by the PF to a gesture of the PNF towards the radar.

or

(b) may have been accompanied by the: "just a small little island, that is BLMO itself" remark, which remark in that case could be considered as a spontaneous 'radar target presence call', by the PF who at the same time was doing the gesturing towards the radar.


In other words:

Equivalent to and instead of 'voicing' a 'radar target presence call', the PM may have drawn the PF's attention, whilst only pointing with a finger to a target on the radar screen. Which, instead of (or perhaps in combination with) the "Altitude! Altitude!" alert, may have triggered the: "just a small little island, that is BLMO itself" remark by the PF as a response.

Even so, also the PF, may have been glancing from a distance on the PM's radar screen or even may have been bending over towards the PM's radar screen, every once in a while, and may also have been pointing to a target on the radar screen, spontaneously, as the equivalent of a 'radar target presence call' (so, not triggered by a 'radar target presence call' from the PM) whilst accompanying this gesture with the remark: "just a small little island, that is BLMO itself". (Again, instead of, or in combination with the "Altitude! Altitude!" alert.)

If either case would have occurred, Blackrock was "seen" as a valid target, but also here the actual elevation had then apparently not been appreciated.

Kind regards, learner . . .

Interesting to see your thoughts Learner. Often, it's the subtle nuances of body language and gestures that reveal what's truly going on. This is where the investigation will have to make some assumptions and might struggle to conclude exactly what happened.

Full respect for your depth and open-minded consideration Learner, but surely the concept of the flight crew relying on a gesture/s to signal something as fundamental as a radar return that could be an island, when at 200ft at night, is getting beyond the bounds of credibility? Given also that two other crew are in the back and supposed to be part of the team, surely too such an approach would be well outside SOPs, convention and common sense? The FLIR operator, who we think was the only one to detect Blackrock island (what should have been) early enough, clearly would have benefitted from being aware of any flight crew recognition of such a radar return - which would have presumably needed to be by voice.

Up until this accident, i'd have thought it would be beyond the bounds of credibility that a fully equipped, (apparently fully serviceable) SAR S92 could fly into an island at night, but unfortunately this is what happened. The investigators will no doubt have their hands full with this one, as will the operating company.

:sad:

Data base validation
 

Both FAA and EASA recognise the import of database integrity.
The following excerpt is an insight on the basic criterion.
"These Conditions establish:
(a) The procedure for the issuance of a letter of acceptance (LOA) for organisations that translate, format and/or integrate information that originates from State aeronautical information services (e.g. AIP) into electronic databases for airborne navigation systems.
(b) The rights and obligations of the applicant for, and holders of, such letters of acceptance.
A.132. Definitions
(a) Navigation Database - Data (such as navigation information, flight planning waypoints, airways, navigation facilities, SID, STAR) that is stored electronically in a system that supports an airborne navigation application.
(b) Data Service Provider – An organisation (not including the State AIP provider), which collects, originates or processes aeronautical data and provides a navigation database in a generic format (such as ARINC 424). Such organisations are eligible for a Type 1 LOA under these Conditions (see Guidance Para 5.7) showing that the generic database has been formatted under controlled conditions.
(c) Data Application Integrator - An organisation that incorporates either State AIP data or a generic database into a format compatible with specific target airborne navigation equipment with a defined intended function. Such organisations require an interface with the equipment design organisation, and are eligible for a Type 2 LOA under these Conditions (see Guidance Para 5.7). This provides a list of equipment models and part numbers where compatibility has been demonstrated to the Agency, permitting the supply of navigation databases directly to end users/operators.
(d) Data Quality Requirements - A specification of the characteristics of data to ensure that data is compatible with its intended use."

https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/rule_Op_01_05_Nav_database_supp_doc.pdf

ED76 and DO200A in my experience ensure the integrity not the veracity of the data. Therefore for a company route, the data would still have to be ensured by the operator. As for the terrain data it comes from a government authorised source. The procedures, to my eye, allow an operator to use processed databases without having to independently verify them.

Thanks 212man, I'll be interested whether the "company route" in the FMS made use of altitude constraints even if it was only a reminder on the control and display unit.

The investigators have the ability to superimpose the CVR data over an accurate map of the aircraft's position, height and heading. They may be able to achieve a better understanding of exactly what was being referred to, being in possession of far more information than is contained in the preliminary report.

Replicating the path of the accident flight with a similarly equipped helicopter and recording the cockpit displays, should reveal any shortcomings in the navigational or radar displays.

I can't help feeling that modern navigation equipment is perhaps too accurate and is capable of luring pilots into a false sense of security. The old hard learned lessons about flying to a position that is known to be offset from a waypoint to a certain extent appear to have been forgotten. Of course there is no need given GPS positioning to a couple of metres, except when that waypoint is a lighthouse above your current altitude. The apparent failure of the navigation system to be able to distinctly highlight the danger presented by Black Rock is inexcusable. The information may have been there on the screen, but it should not have needed to be interpreted in order to appreciate its significance.