EC 225 Return to REAL Service
 

It has been almost two months that EASA lifted the ban to ground the Ec225. Initially it was a joy...in my company we activated the recurrency program to get all the pilots ready. We were expected to be operational within a week. Somehow the customers did not see it that way...still waiting for the AIBN report and most important the ROOT cause of the accident. As a result of this we are still not operational and I believe no major oil companies had started to operate the 225 again even though they could legally fly the machine.
Anyone out there heard anything on when most oil companies will accept the machine again?

This article says that Statoil will never use it again.

Statoil vil ikke bruke Super Puma-helikopteret igjen - Petro.no

At the risk of sounding daft. Might one enquire what exactly the 225 operators have done to make them safe to fly ? Did they change the dodgy overstressed gearbox which has a habit of departing from the airframe ?
Or is it really a case of let's all stick our heads in the sand and wait for the next tragedy to happen ?
knowing all of the above would you put your children or grandchildren in one and take them for a trip over some really inhospitable cold water for a few hours ?

Too many questions perhaps but having read most of the very interesting and educated guesswork regarding the 225 and it's safety record on this esteemed forum I don't have a clue as to why the north sea moggies ( all the tigers are either dead or retired now) would want to suit up and get in the back of another 225 .

Anyone who has the answers please let us know and expect someone to ask the "show me " question !!!

Cheers
B.G

Well, life is not always black or white.

For example, the 225M fly every day over inhospitable area without any problems.

And people don't react all the same about safety feeling's, I've even heard that there are some who pay to fly R22 !
.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-statoil-helicopter-airbus-idUSKBN13V0QB

As far as I can see BG they've ruled that one type of bearing must be used in the epicyclic module (as out of the two types available the other one had been involved in the two catastrophic failures) in addition to more stringent in-service inspections.

So no EC175 then?

The 175 is already operating in the UK North Sea with NHV and I wouldn't be surprised to see 189s arriving soon.

IMO the 225 is a great helicopter apart from its single fatal accident. However I appreciate it was a nasty one with echoes of the past. I just wanted to mention that it's just as well this attitude isn't applied to the pilots. Look how many of them have crashed, killing plenty of folk and scaring many more. But for some reason we accept that, or at least we don't condemn the human race as the brains in the machine. So in answer to BG's question above about whether you would allow your nearest and dearest to fly in it, I think I would based on pure probabilities. The chances are fairly similar that they would die from the rotor head falling off, or die from an error made by a pilot or technician. In bother cases, the probability is pretty low.


But of course the industry isn't rational and so I accept that the 225 is unlikely to see a return to service in the near future if at all. Shame. At least one thing is certain, the next fatal crash will be a different type!

Commons Select Committees - Transport - 2014

Offshore helicopter safety

"27. Super Puma variants make up some 60% of the offshore helicopter fleet, which means that it is unsurprising that they are involved in more accidents than other models."

That was still true when LN-OJF crashed.



Hands up who thinks the S-92 is so good that it will never crash no matter how much you sweat the asset?

Hands up who thinks a new type is always the answer?

Jimf671,

From the same parliamentary report:

“21. Since 2002, the UK offshore oil and gas industry has suffered 38 fatalities. The five most recent accidents (since 2009) have all involved Super Puma variants and three of those accidents were caused by problems with the gearbox”.

Those figures are from 2014 and therefore exclude the 2016 LN-OJF fatal crash, bringing the total fatalities to 51. So we now have the six most recent accidents all involving Super Puma variants and four of those accidents were caused by problems with the gearbox, the other two being concluded as crew error.

For a type that makes up 60% of the fleet it seems to be suffering a disproportionate 100% of the accidents, certainly the fatal ones. That is not irrational. It is a statement of fact.

The argument that the SP range is ‘tried and tested’, that we ‘know more about it’ than other makes/models falls flat because it has not translated into lower accident statistics. 60% presence is just 3 out of 5, not 5/5 (or 6/6).

Face it folks....the 225 is like that proverbial Parrot that Mr. Cleese and Company were on about. It is not napping, taking a Kip, ....it is as they said about the Parrot....it is DEAD!

Rather than admit they had a problem....the Maker refused to stare reality square in the Face on the problem and did themselves in by doing so.

Even if they do manage to cobble together a "perfect" Transmission....no one is going to ride in the thing.....as they have an Albatross around their neck and not a Parrot on a Perch.

One Man's Opinion here.

Statoil made an announcement that the 225 is through with them, Reuters released it earlier today. Tango123's link makes it look to me like there is no going back on that particular relationship. Interesting quotes form that article: Really? The ban is a reflection of the frustration with your support of the aircraft. Yeah, blame it on Brexit. Clever gambit. Pawn to Queen 4. Check and mate.

Why are the military still placing orders?

The military may have a different risk assessment matrix than the off shore oil business. From some of the PPRuNe 225 threads it seems that they have a shorter removal/overhaul cycle than the for profit personnel transport business.


That's a guess, though, not something written on a stone tablet.

You seem to be very quick to forget two other recent EC225 accidents where the MGB main shaft sheared in two. Thankfully they didn't end up with fatalities.

Sasless,

Make that two men's opinions.

NEO

Same principle for the MRGB. It is fundamental and critical to every helicopter so why would it not have a prime position in the accident record.

Most major medium/large types with substantial service have had a hundred or two accidents and several hundred fatalities. The S-92 and EC225 are well on the way to setting a completely new standard in safety. If we all ignore the numbers and go in a spin like an offended millennial at every significant event then the industry will be permanently in chaos

Some good debate and clearly 2 sides of which i am with SASless and Neo so make that 3 mens opinion.

HeliC couldn't agree more all humans behave irrationally and the offshore bear is no different. The manf telling us that one type of bearing is safe after all their previous statements and misinformation doesn't cut it any longer and sadly they will not be trusted by the people who make the decisions as to which helicopters are used offshore.

Jimf671
The offshore logistics industry isn't in chaos and we seem to be coping quite well without the 225

GNOW to answer your question in simple terms ...wheel them out, polish the windshields and feel free to do your check rides etc but your going to be very lonely sitting up front perhaps doing the odd freight run when someone offers a cheap deal to get you airborne.

BG

Of course. But then, this is just the closing paragraph of Chapter One.

Apart from the tragic loss of life, the worst aspect of this whole saga is the manufacturers cynical and dishonest handling of the issue.

Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice shame on me.
I hope I'm never asked to fly an EC225 again. My preference would be never to fly a French helicopter again. I love flying them, but proven liars are just that. These lies can be fatal. :yuk:

Read it for yourself - Statoil Report

Interesting if you "read between the lines" of some of the inferences.

Particularly the sections on contracts and performance and why they have been brought to light.

You want to dramatise it by saying "main shaft failure" but I would call it "oil pump drive failure" which is what it actually was. But I appreciate that sounds far less theatrical and thus doesn't suit your agenda. I seem to recall the precious S92 had its share of oil pump drive and design failures but you've conveniently forgotten to mention them.

And is a controlled landing on the water an "accident"? I guess it depends on your jurisdiction.

Under ICAO they would both be classified as accidents as bot aircraft were damaged beyond economical repair, or written off in old language.

Twist and Shout emphasises my original point, the oil and gas industry no longer trusts AH. As has been said before, the market has re balanced. There is even a surplus of S-92s now.

HC,

From an engineering perspective it ought to be appreciated that the main shaft in the 225 gearbox is multi-functional. It is supported in 3 bearings, 2 near the top very close together (possibly even contacting) and one near the bottom but above the oil pump drive. That bottom (radial) bearing appears much bigger than needed to react oil pump loads only. It locates the main shaft radially and reacts a moment due to the eccentric contact between the input drive and the axis of the main shaft. Indeed the proof of that lies in the cyclic bending stress that propagated the fatigue cracks, severing the shaft above the lower bearing. If the fatigue loading had come from the oil pump drives the shaft failure would be expected below the bearing.

With the shaft broken not only is drive lost to the oil pumps but the 2 upper bearings and their supports are subjected to loads which I very much doubt they would have been designed for. Evidently, and fortuitously, they survived long enough for the ‘precautionary’ landings on water but can anyone say how long they would have lasted without lubrication and cooled only with a 30 minute spray of glycol?

Wow. You really have been endoctrinated and blinded by the Eurocopter lies. The main shaft in the main gearbox sheared in two. How is this trying to dramatise things? Arguably (and highly fortuitously), the occupants were saved due to the erroneous indication that the EMLUB system had failed.

And I think you've got me pegged with the wrong 'agenda'. I know full well that the S92 has got it share of issues (and I'm personally very glad that I don't have to fly it). However, I was responding to your post that seemed to imply that the EC225 has only been involved in one serious accident.

And, yes, regardless of a particular jurisdiction's definition, when an aircraft has to ditch in the sea due to a broken gearbox, it is definitely an accident.

Yes I know all that, but the fact remains that the sheared shaft only caused loss of oil pump drive and the remaining bearing showed no signs of distress. My point is that you could present this in one of two ways, either as a loss of oil pump drive which, with functioning emlube, allows 30 mins at Vy (which of course probably doesn't get you very far, 40nm still air minus the time taken to land). Or you could present it as "main shaft sheared, rotors nearly fell off shock horror" except of course that the rotors didn't nearly fall off.

It's all down to how emotive you want to be.

2 of my 3 all-time favourite helicopters are French, but no matter how many times they change the name, Sud Aviation/Aérospatiale/Eurocopter/AH have always had an arrogant 'we know better than you' attitude and the most appalling so-called customer service and dreadful spares support.
As far as the 225 goes, I'm with SAS, NEO et al

Statoil will not use type of helicopter involved in crash again - BBC News

Statoil will not use type of helicopter involved in crash again

An oil firm has said it has no plans to ever again use the make of helicopter involved in a crash which left 13 people - including an Aberdeenshire man - dead.
Iain Stuart, 41, from Laurencekirk, was among those killed in the crash off Norway in April.

The Airbus Super Puma H225 was flying to Bergen from the Statoil-operated Gullfaks field.

Statoil said it would not use the helicopter again.

The model in question has been grounded in the UK and Norway, but Statoil said it would not change its position when the suspension was lifted.
Air accident investigators found a fatigue crack was the "most likely" cause of gearbox failure.

I think that was covered in Posts 2 and 6....

I guess we won't be hearing offshore workers being told to pull on their big boy pants any time soon?

Never took mine off.

Correct me if I am wrong.....the Main MGB Shaft failed......right?

What was designed to be a single item became "two"....where I come from that is called a MGB Shaft failure!

No matter who designed it or what part number is on it.

Yes, I expected you would...But what shocked me was the AAIB report into REDW and CHCN revealing that the manufacturer’s designers apparently did not seem to know it at the time of certification (Ref. AAIB 2/2014, 2.6.4).

Between main shaft design and planet gear/bearing design, the manufacturer does not seem to have had a very good grasp of FEM.

Sasless being sasless. You are taking it too serious.

The old AS 330 had the transmission oil pump on the LH accessory drive on the rear of the gearbox although the pickup was still at the bottom. Civilian use required a back up system on the 332 so they designed this Heath Robinson system placing both oil pumps dependent on one drive at the bottom of the gearbox.

In retrospect it would have been far better to have put the secondary oil pump on the RH accessory drive together with No 2 Alternator and No2 Hydraulic pump.

Doesn't help when you reduce the planet gears from five to four.

Mee3......putting Lipstick on a Pig doesn't change anything as it is still a Pig.

There are certain mechanical failures that must be seen exactly for what they are.

There have been plenty of explanations why a failed Main Shaft in the Main Gear Box is a far more complex and dangerous issue than merely losing drive to the Oil Pumps.

As we have learned from the loss of Rotor Systems because of such failures should make that abundantly clear even to the most obtuse amongst us.

This is not another argument about the various merits of the 92 compared to the 225 as a few wish to make it.....this is all about a failed design of exactly one kind of MGB that kills people.

I suppose there are some that attend here that think by clicking some Slipper Heels together and making a wish that all will be well.....but that is not reality.

The reality is the 225 is DOA....dead on arrival in the Oil and Gas Industry.

You can make like a River Dance on Steroids but all the Heel Clicking in the World is not going to change that.

I do not think that "a failed design of exactly one kind of MGB that kills people" is supported by the numbers.

It would be lovely to live in an alternative universe where the perfect safe helicopter was possible but we don't. We edge safety to ever-greater levels as the technology allows. The current generation of rotorcraft in this weight class have done this quite successfully. That success continues.

Damning the 225 in the current circumstances creates a very real risk of replacing it with something worse.

The discussion starts t head in the inevitable Pprune direction...

I am self loading freight in these machines and so have some interest in them holding together.

Normally it would be considered very surprising for a manufacturer to state that their product was perfectly safe to fly - before the latest investigation report is delivered.
For a certification agency to support those statements and strongly suggest the aircraft is safe without modification or the report published is again very unusual - until you realise the national and commercial aspects of this case.

The vulnerability of the main shaft to failure started the concerns. Whilst virtually all the attention was there, the planet gears were apparently spalling and AH's understanding of the gearbox behaviour considerably lagged operational experience.

As to the comment that the replacement could or would be worst? Pretty unlikely you would have to step back to 1960s designs to see this level of componentry failure - which is not impossible but would mean any manufacturer would be toast - which may be where AH ends up.

The real disappointment is the certification system. Both the 225 and 92 have a significant level of 'grandfathering' in their approvals - with more of that happening in the 225's case. It has significantly undermined confidence in the certification process - the first 92 failures occurred at shockingly low fleet hours. Whilst the filter issues are now supposedly sorted I've not heard a fix to the gearbox foot cracking - is it all resolved now?

Pushing up power and weight and making incremental changes to compensate is the classic method to create engineering failures. The best example probably being bridges - where every concept has be enlarged and enlarged until the point at which it failed.

But back to the plot, I wish the best of luck to any management team trying to persuade their offshore teams that rotors flying off the machine is sorted - without a shiny new and much better gearbox.

gasax - Suggest you have a close look at the TCDS for the S92. Not sure I can agree with "significant level", not even close!