A very sad day. My heart goes out to all of those who have lost loved ones in this tragic accident.

Before the nutters and Super Puma haters get going, does anyone know of a similarly large/heavy type that has had 200+ in service across 12 years and 400000 flight hours before a fatal accident occurred? My recollection is that the history of other types in this class is somewhat different. On that basis, I would happily get in an EC225 tomorrow.

.

Jim, the various types of chinook are still going strong, just not offshore!�� Perception confidence and passenger power are everything!

very true, Cougar 91 etc and I am sure the risk of flying in either type is in reality very low. Problem in the oil industry is perception and even if this accident is completely unrelated to the previous issues (it is way too early to form opinions on that) it is undeniable that the reaction to previous incidents have given this type a bit of a reputation

That's understood, but that picture of the departed entire head is very, very sobering and quite shocking

My deepest condolences to all effected by this tragedy

What other fatal 225 accident has there been?

Sad to say but have just seen footage of the entire rotor head flying through the air having departed the aircraft in flight!
Local news footage here in Norway has eye witness footage.
So similar to the Bond puma it seems.

Only loss I am aware of is the French Air Force EC725 loss in Burkina Faso. Otherwise this is the first fatal commercial loss of a 225.

An EC725 was shot down last year. I don't think that counts.

Given that the MGB is virtually identical to that fitted to the L2, the discussions talking about only looking at EC225 accident history is perhaps short sighted. At the end of the day the H225 is simply the latest Super Puma variant.

Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.

Not sure being too specific on model designations helps that much - if we must talk specific model numbers the 225LP in this tragic accident contained a number of design features specifically designed to prevent a recurrence in the problems that affeceted what the press, industry and Airbus call Super Pumas.
Thus it is possibly even worse that some form of gearbox/rotor failure seems to have occurred again. Unfortunately public perception can often be more powerful than raw facts and this brand is going to struggle now - whatever the reason for this tragedy turns out to be. Those of us who spend a lot of time in aircraft know that 100% safety isn't realistic, accidents will always happen and when something dramatic happens in a helicopter's main gearbox/ rotorhead the outcome will usually be bad. We also know these are still pretty safe forms of transport and despite the recent accidents have saved many more lives than they have taken - but you won't be hearing about that from the tabloids

UK CAA have issued a Safety Directive which appears to ground the type except for SAR.

Sorry rubbish at links but I'm sure someone will provide.

SGC

The very similar Bond accident was an L2 but the gearbox shaft faults covered the EC225 as well so both types were grounded. Part of the perception issue is they all share the same fundamental Super Puma Type Certificate so no matter how much rebranding goes on they're still linked as a series. From a pax point of view they all look pretty much the same too. The 332Mk1 does have a very good safety record overall. That doesn't stop evolutions having design or manufacturing flaws (not saying that is necessarily the case here), especially when you are pushing the performance up.

Posted By UK CAA


29 April
201
6
Limitations of Operations Due to a Fatal Accident in Norway
on 29 April 2016
This Safety Directive contains mandatory
action that is required to restore an acceptable
level
of safety. It
is issued in accordance with
Article 15 of the Air Navigation Order
.
Recipients must ensure that this Directive is copied to all members of their staff who need to take
appropriate action or who may have an interest in the information
(including any ‘in
-
house’ or
contracted maintenance organisation and relevant outside contractors).
Applicability:
Aerodromes:
Not primarily affected
Air Traffic:
Not primarily affected
Airspace:
Not primarily affected
Airworthiness:
Not primarily affe
cted
Flight Operations:
All AOC Operators of
Airbus Helicopters
EC225
LP
h
elicopters
Licensed Personnel:
Not primarily affected
1
Introduction
1.1
This Safety Directive contains mandatory action that is required to establish an acceptable
level of safet
y.
It is issued in accordance with
R
egulation (EC) No
.
216/2008 A
rt
icle
14.1.
1.2
Recipients must ensure that this Directive is copied to all members of their staff who need to
take appropriate action or who may have an interest in the information, inclu
ding any “in
-
house” or contracted maintenance organi
s
ation and relevant outside contractors.
2
Compliance/Action to be Taken
2.1
The Civil Aviation Authority, in exercise of its powers under the Air Navigation Order (2009)
directs operators of any Airbus
Helicopters
EC225LP helicopter which is:
a)
registered in the United Kingdom or
b)
flying in the United kingdom or in the vicinity of an offshore installation
to comply with the requirements set out in paragraph 2.2
.
2.2
Operators must not conduc
t any public transport flight or a commercial air transport operation
with
an
Airbus Helicopters EC225LP

That doesn't come as a surprise.

also we need to bear in mind that there are many failure modes that can cause a catastrophic separation so while the result may be very similar to previous incidents the cause may turn out to be entirely unrelated to the previous shaft problem - only an investigation will tell us that

That is consistent with the available flight history showing 5 short local flights 26th and 27th.

I just scrolled the AAIB website to check for the AS 332 to EC 225 LP family accident reports after 2000.
Found 5:
G-REDL crashed with rotor hub separation,
G-REDW and G-CHCN went down under controled ditching following MGB lubrication system fault,
G-WNSB and G-REDU crashed following loss of control or references.

Did I miss something ?

DO

In 2009 a Super Puma lose the main rotor while inflight.
I do not know if this is related to this very accident but worth remembering
Report on North Sea Super Puma tragedy reveals 'catastrophic failure' of helicopter's main rotor

RIP

What strikes me is that it looks like there has been no apparent warning of a main rotor or MGB failure. Since the L2 gear boxes failures, early detection systems improvment (like position of chip detectors) seem to cover all aspects of a catastrophic MGB or main rotor failure (... sorry for beiing inacurate, but althought not qualified on type my company operates a number of them)
If there had been such a warning, I suppose the procedure would have been to reduce the power and/or descend to a "minimum safe altitude" ... In this case, the initial descend seems to be rather ATC related.

Mitchaa

If they left one or more oil jets blocked degradation could be quick with no chip warnings.

The Sultan

The whole load of the helicopter is suspended from the rotor head by the outer casing of the gearbox. This design was hailed as a huge advance that saved significant amounts of weight, improved payload capability and fuel economy and simplified some maintenance tasks. The only problem with this design is that the gearbox casing represents a single point of failure with no redundancy.

Her flyr rotoren på egen hånd etter helikopterstyrten

Don't know if this video is working outside Norway.

It is a private video of the rotor 'flying by itself' after detaching from the rest. Scary and shocking.

Video working for me (UK).

the BBC just showed the video of the whole rotor descending/rotating slowly to the ground after the helicopter had crashed

Do you have the link of this video?

It's in post #67

I would expect the PUMA to be equipped with HUMS - Healt and Usage Monitoring System. Accelerometers that will discover non standard vibrations before things get serious.

Chip detectors to detect vibrations? Surely by definition even you can figure out what chip detectors actually detect??? :ugh:

I don't know why, but I didn't succed to open it...

"A new gearbox is unlikely to fail, a newly installed recently overhauled gearbox is unlikely to fail."


not so. The majority of component failures come in the first 25% of component life since new or overhaul, followed by the last 25%. The middle 50% is the least likely to fail. That's why they run all components on the US presidential helicopter for 25% of its life on one of the other aircraft before installing it on the presidents aircraft. At 75% they pull it and scrap it. Sorry I don't have a source, (wish I did) but I've heard it several times and it aligns with what I have witnessed. A good friend of mine lost the C47 on his 407 last year with 80 hours TSN on the engine. #1 bearing was incorrectly pressed.

You are right - not chip detectors, but accelerometers.

Likewise with other complex machines. With cars, a good breakdown technician's first question will be 'Has this car been recently serviced?'

You might want to read this statement about the Helicopter in questions maintenance before you offer any more theory's.


https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandga...replaced-year/


Never let the facts get in the way of a good old lynching .

Exactly lowfat. I don't know where the rest of you come from, but yesterday isn't January where I come from.

I just wish there was another photo of that MR Head taken from the side unobstructed by the blade. It looks like the swashplate drive link has broken off (Swashplate stayed connected to the servos?), but it also looks like the rotor shaft is still there, which is a worry.

And for those saying how this is the first civil fatal for the EC225, that is quite true, but let us not forget the two very close calls that were had when the machines ditched and it was later found that there was a 360 degree crack in the bevel gear shaft weld. G-REDW and G-CHCN I believe. Failure was imminent and possibly could have resulted in the MR Head departing the aircraft complete with MR Shaft.

A sad sad day. I hope that lessons are learned and this never happens again.

My first captain always said: "airplanes are only dangerous when they go to mx and when they come out of mx"....

GOULI you are totally wrong.
The whole load of the helicopter is suspended from the rotor head by the outer casing of the gearbox. This design was hailed as a huge advance that saved significant amounts of weight...

The MGB of the EC225, like the others in the Super Puma family, uses 3 suspension bars which transfer the whole load of the helicopter from the transmission deck directly to the top of the MGB casing. Sikorsky use the method you have described, which is why their MGBs are so heavy.
The attached illustration is from the EC225 Technical Data Manual.

MTF's
 

Jimf671 posted:

Quote:
Originally Posted by Daylite http://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif
Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.


That is consistent with the available flight history showing 5 short local flights 26th and 27th.

Depending on local procedures, then, it is possible that everything from the gearbox mounting structure upwards was removed and replaced. Most ops would take the blades off the head to begin with. Anyhow, in the midst of doing all the removal/replacement, there are opportunities for human error. Reason I mention that is that if it was a gearbox issue which initiated the action, one would assume there wouldn't be vibration problems after the re-install, so what were the 5 maintenance flights for? I made the assumption they were MTF's because Jimf671 wrote that they were short.

Anecdote re a local practice that I ran into at Ft Rucker one day. They had a UH-60A which had driven evryone a bit crazy re vibrations and it had been down awhile. I went down with a dynamics engineer to see if we could help. Put the vib gear on and got ready to fly. Our engineer pulled me aside and told me that all the pushrods had no safety wire on. Asked the civilian test pilot I was to fly with and he told me they always did that and only safetied the rods after they were done. Told him that my insurance agent forbade me to fly without safety wire on the pushrods. There is more to this particular story, but although this would be a long shot, its one of the variations that might have taken place here.