Weren't an Engine Fire....but when the backs of my Hands bubbled up and burst....that convinced me the fire was far more serious than I had first thought.

That we were IMC over mountains (pre GPS Moving Map ) with some decidedly unfriendly locals...whence the Fire... also played into the decision making.

When you experience a Fire for real...no matter what kind....it is far different than Tea Room Stories and Sim Training experiences....It is REAL and not just philosophical.

That is when you have to slow down, focus your thinking, and make good sound decisions after properly considering all the evidence.

The Bournemouth crew's experience demonstrates that in a very clear manner.

That and everything does not conveniently follow the Check List sequence and fit nicely into the boxes.

It was a dark and stormy night.....................that's exactly what it was, flying out of Bergen after midnight on a three stop shuttle, with ARAs to each deck on minima and no discernible horizon. The third deck was a semi-sub and the wind dictated that it was to be my landing and take-off. For my poor SFO, who was very competent, there was nothing to see outside until we were within the helideck circle.


Our S61 could not be accommodated in the company hangar at Bergen and had suffered several spurious electrical warnings as a consequence of being rained on almost constantly almost every day for a couple of weeks.


I briefed for the final take-off from the semi-sub for the return flight to Bergen, lifted and on rotation was immediately on instruments. Within a second or so of having called "committed", the SFO called "Fire engine one" and I heard the audio warning. Instantly he reached for SSL1 and asked if I wanted it retarded, while I was concentrating on getting a heavy S61 to register a convincing rate of climb on two engines while accelerating slowly through about 50 knots.


Mindful of the large waves just discernible in the landing light beams and having significant doubts about the believability of the fire warning system, I opted to instruct my excellent SFO to leave the SSLs forward and suspend the EOP until we'd passed 500' rad alt. Sure enough, within seconds and as we were passing Vy, the fire warning lights started to fade.


Once checks were completed and the aircraft secured, we reviewed what had just happened and agreed that damp electrics was the most likely cause. An uneventful flight was continued to Bergen, followed by appropriate tech log entries and report writing.


Not my first engine fire warning in flight, but the most dramatic. The others were attributable to hot gas leaks. Never had a real engine fire in a long career and on balance I would think that it's nearly always better to check for visible signs before proceeding through the EOPs.

Colibri
 

Thanks Calibri, more tales like that please. I just want a realistic approach to this problem.

Whilst discussing it with colleagues who have a fixed wing background they had an interesting take on the situation. They said they would do exactly as I would and NOT immediately descend into the mountains with the FIRE WARNING light still on. However their interpretation of LAND IMMEDIATELY was to proceed to the nearest airport where a safe instrument (or VMC) approach could be made. In my book that amounts to LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Either way it's the right answer as far as I am concerned.

Unfortunately I know from my SFI experiences that there are pilots out there that believe the QRH/ECL is 'god' and must be obeyed so those guys WILL take on the immediate descent unless the advice given is amplified.

Your experiences that night bring to mind our other outstanding debate about launching into what is effectively IMC below the Vmini which if my memory serves me well is 50 knots in the S61. How have we managed that all these years without some kind of written authority?

G.:confused:

Another interesting false indication
 

While flying a S70 (BlackHawk) over the Grose valley in the 90's fighting Bush fires west of Sydney, about 500AGL in amongst the orange filtered light produced by the smoke. Admiring the very tall flame fronts exploding from the the superheated Eucalypt bush below, the #2 Eng Fire light illuminated……Just what you really don't want to see at that point.

The Grose Valley being very rugged and absolutely no place to even look like landing ASAP. The immediate actions taught back then and I would recommend where possible on any type ..particularly if the FIre detection system is an Infra Red based system as it was in the BlackHawk, was to immediately turn in the direction of the indicating engine, get the crewmen (which we normally carried) to check for any visible smoke and/or other confirming indications by looking/leaning out.

The action of the turn thankfully removed the spurious ray of sunshine which had come through gaps in the engine cowl and with the added effect of the orange filtered light caused the infra red fire detector to illuminate the Fire warning system for that engine……..there was no fire. There was no gas leak….except from my rear end at the time:O

Once the turn had commenced, the sunshine was removed from the detector elements and the indication ceased….thankfully..

So pay heed to the TYPE of fire detection that you have installed and understand how it works a little better is one of the fundamental ways in better handling an actual Fire Indication situation. It better enables selection on the best course of action for any given set of circumstances…whether environmental factors (rain/smoke/electrical) which may effect possible indications and/or the added risk of making your current situation a whole lot worse by blindly following a check list when you simply don't have enough power to safely continue flight in your current situation on one engine.

Perhaps this is what you should be concentrating on when teaching Engine Fire situations….There is rarely a "Text Book" scenario in real life. The "text book" fire drill if for teaching basic fire drill responses….ab initio type endorsement stuff. The next stage should be creative reproductions of real events experienced through that aircraft type. I guess this is limited to the quality of Sim instructor and his experience or syllabus of training that he has been given to operate to in that Sim

A little more understanding of the systems, how they work, how they don't work and common problems unique to individual aircraft models.

And then teach real Risk Assessment…..(I fear not the B/S being touted through aviation at the moment). Believing if we fill in a tick and flick check sheet some 30-60min before flight, that will make us all nice and safe is living in a fools paradise.

Risk Assessment is an ongoing process which changes from minute to minute and cannot possibly be captured in a check sheet…..

Risk Assessment should be being performed every minute of the day by every individual….That is why you aircraft Captains are paid the "big Bucks'. To provide effective, real time, on-going risk assessment to keep both himself and his aircraft safe. By default, if both those elements are kept safe, then everyone else (Pax/Crew) has a very high probability of being kept safe as well….not too many sane Captains have a death wish.

This should be fundamental in Simulator training….developing a Real time, situational based Risk Assessment Mentality. It is the best place for this type of training as so many different scenarios can be created and presented.


My two bob's worth…I hope it makes sense...

RG

Thank you Ring Gear
 

.... for reminding me of a old Bell 204/205 trick (haven't flown those for about a 100 years)

These aircraft also have the infrared fire detectors. When flying early morning or late evening when the sun is low and shining from the left or right rear quarter you can get a false fire indication.

If the springs are bit worn the step covers in the engine cowls deflect inward allowing the sunlight to shine through and trigger the indicator.

If you can turn 90 degrees and fire light goes out that's the likely cause.

And I absolutely agree there is a time to chuck the checklist and use your head. A delaminated main blade on a 212 taught me that. There was major damage to the aircraft from the shaking but we did manage to get her on the ground right side up.

My rule for dealing with stuff that ain't in the checklist goes like this:

(1) Do something.
(2) If that makes it worse - stop doin' it.
(3) Try something else.
(4) If that makes it better - keep doin' it.
(5) If nothing you have tried works - keep trying new stuff until you hit the ground.

In my few years of flying I had numerous engine fire warnings. The only genuine one I had was in a Bell 212 offshore Port Said on Bastille day in 1982. There was no wind, temperature above 30C and a full load of passengers, so not much power in hand. I had just rotated nose down departing from a drill ship 60 nm offshore when the No 1 engine fire warning illuminated. It became apparent that this was for real when the engine started running down towards idle. The copilot pulled the T-handle and fired the first bottle. The warning light extinguished, but after a short time re-illuminated. The second bottle was fired and the light again extinguished, though we were still less than 20 feet above the sea with airspeed around 20 knots and Nr below 85%. Then, in something like Hoffnung's Bricklayer's story, the No 2 engine chip light illuminated. My copilot , having sent a text-book Mayday call and carried out a perfect set of ECL fire drills, at this stage decided that I was going to ditch (I wasn't), leaned over and pulled the manual float inflation handle. Sadly, our Haskel booster back at base was unserviceable and float bottle pressure was a little low (though I was assured by engineering that there was enough pressure to fully inflate the floats :\ and the floats were only partially inflated) ......... however, I managed to nurse my wonderful 212 up to 1,000 feet and managing to achieve a magnificent 60 knots safely landed at Port Said some 1 hour later with the No 2 chip light still illuminated, having been accompanied for the last 20 miles by the Heli Union Alouette 3 (which had been on the ground undergoing maintenance at the time of our Mayday call).
The lock-nut holding the engine oil tank cap locking plate on had sheared (we found it in the filter) and the locking plate must have vibrated around to the unlocked position and fallen off, allowing engine oil to escape from the tank over the outside of the turbine. There was quite a lot of heat damage from the fire and paint had burned and blistered on the engine and gearbox cowlings. I'm rather glad I didn't have a rear-view mirror as the view may have been somewhat alarming :}
As one of my 'Newfie' passengers had an illicit bottle of Canadian Club whisky, he poured liberal measures of it into my post-flight coffee and the mix of champagne, ouzo and retsina at the Forasol base manager's Bastille Day party that evening meant that I woke up the following morning with an inexplicably bad headache :}
When I was a trainer and a sim instructor, I always tried to introduce one or two emergencies which were not covered in the ECL and required the pilots to use their technical knowledge to deal with it (or not, as was sadly too often the case).
I like oleary's rules for dealing with things not in the checklist!

Thanks for the compliments on the CHC ECL.

I can recall one real engine fire on a 332L a number of years ago in Aberdeen (it wasn't me). Fire warning just after TDP on a maintenance check flight post engine maintenance. Casual glance in the mirror, which showed significant flames coming out of the starboard engine cowling. Fire drill followed by rapid return to land. The airframe had significant damage below the engine bay including melted aluminium. I think the cause was a loose fuel pipe union on the FCU.

I have a similar story to Colibri49. Flying a very heavy S61 in Thailand at +30C so any of you know who flew the old girl knows that means single engine performance was lets say, less than spectacular.

Offshore enroute to a jack-up the Fire Light came on. So I was faced with 2 choices, follow the ECL drill and attempt to make my onshore alternate at maybe 60kts and 500' or delay the shutdown, continue the extra 5 miles to the deck and land AEO. I had the flight attendant check for any signs of smoke/heat/fire in the cabin, checked in the gratefully installed rear view mirrors and having considerable time in the old girl and knowing and having experienced more than one false fire indication, I decided that the risk of flying 90 miles OEI outweighed the risk of 5 miles with a fire light. An uneventful landing on the rig and subsequent discovery of a pinched fire detection wire followed.

What I did at the time was contrary to the ECL, as at that time there was no provision to "check for secondary, or confirm the fire" By chance I was the Type Tech pilot for the 61 at the time so I added that to ECL at the next revision.

I should add that today, in the 139 with its helium vs the 2 wire organic salts detector and the OEI performance my decision would be different as to shutting the engine down. Now ditching without confirmation is another matter.

Outwest;

One of the other great bits of the S61 system was that in the event of a real fire the lights and aural warnings came on faintly to start with and then got brighter and louder. A hot gas leak, or a fire wire which an engineer had trodden on brought the whole on very quickly. The one real engine fire I've had was on a S61, as the lights got brighter and the lady started to shout the oil temps and pressures were going round the clocks, but the engine was making real sounds of distress. A look in the mirrror confirmed the worst (There was an awful lot of smoke) so it was shut down, fire the bottle and RTB. The first bottle coupled with the FRC shut down drills worked perfectly, unlike in this case; https://assets.digital.cabinet-offic...990_G-BEID.pdf

I spend half my time now on the S76 and cannot get an answer from anybody as to why after firing the first bottle you only wait 10 seconds before firing the second. It just doesn't seem enough time to ensure the first bottle has had time to work.

SND

Yes, that was a good thing about the 61 system, unfortunately in my incident I was the PNF and the PF was an inexperienced FO. I had my head down doing paper work and when I looked up and seen the light the first thing I said to the PF was " how long has that light been on?" He had no idea, never noticed it :rolleyes:

This thread is very interesting esp Colibri's posting. I just came out from a heated debate at a meeting. One of the points in our take off brief (on the EC225 LP) was "No engines to be secured below 500 ft except in the event of engine fire ". My point of argument is that in a powerful machine on AEO we reach 500 ft in about 40 seconds from rotation. It will be better to handle the fire after 500 ft and at Vy rather than tackling the fire and trying to fly away on OEI. I think this is what sensible pilots will do but there are some I beleive that will not hestate to carry out the fire drill at below 500 ft on take off. I had recommended that the phrase "except in the event of fire " to be deleted.

Sadly I was shot down in the meeting!

gnow;

Our standard brief is no emergencies to be dealt with below 1000' except for double engine failure or a fire. fire is dealt with above 500' with AP on heading and a suitable single engine ROC set with 1000' above MSA selected.

I've watched an engine fire dealt with perfectly (in the sim) followed by CFIT into a nearby mountain as no-one was actually flying the beast, and an engine fire below 1000' on a hand flown ILS to minima (different crew, same sim) where the ILS went way out of full scale on LOC and GS and the crew ended up going round with the warnings still going, eventually they sorted it but it was messy. There are times when ignoring the warning and ensuring that you are safe to deal with the problem are far more important. The crew who flew the go-round were about 55 seconds from touchdown and ended up flying another ten mins over poor terrain, single engine and having to hand fly another approach to a very high degree of accuracy.

Before anyone shouts about hand flying it was a S61 which only had SAS and no auto-pilot, at least these days I've got AP as well.

SND

55 Seconds from Touchdown on an ILS.....are you guaranteed to break out and land?

If at the Standard DH....insufficient visual cues were not present would you (a) continue the Approach until you either saw enough runway to land or had to make a late Missed Approach Procedure or (b) executed a Standard Missed Approach and deal with the Fire situation during the Climb Out?

I consider having a real Fire an Emergency Situation thus there is nothing "normal" about that....and as the PIC....I have certain discretions available when it comes to my decision making.

I know I am right in my reasoning but I have to try very hard to "sell " my idea to the rest of my comrades!!!:ugh:

SAS;

If it was me for real, my concentration would be on the get down bit. If the weather is overcast at 200' then frankly that is our national minima, and lights will be visible at 200' if it is overcast. A call to ATC to let them know by the PM what is happening and then sheer bloody concentration to keep the needles crossed I believe are more required than hands and eyes checking the right lever is being pulled. I would never criticise a pilot for continuing. Here in EASA land the visual clues required at DA are "elements of the approach lighting system" As someone once told me each light in an approach lighting system has two elements, therefore at DA if I can see one light I can see elements......................

SND

Absolutely....if you are only 30-60 seconds from landing....that would beat the other Option by far.

In this day of fancy autopilot systems....I would imagine George could be convinced to get you down to 50 feet and 60 Knots dead smack on the centerline.

The weather would have to be awfully bad to prevent a landing from that point.

SAS;

My thinking entirely:ok:

SND

About 15 or 16 years ago an AS355 operating in the police role suffered an engine fire caption at night while returning to the base airport. The pilot followed the emergency checklist which included shutting down the affected engine and operating the first fire bottle. This was all done, "i.a.w".

The fire caption did not go out so the second bottle was used. The fire warning light still did not go out. The crew also experienced smoke and fumes in the cockpit so the pilot elected to carry out an OEI landing short of the airport, in a field.

Thankfully, no damage was done to the airframe or its occupants. It proved to be a false engine fire warning but the smoke and fumes were real enough! They came about because of an unusual and misunderstood item in the RFM/checklist, which was a translation from French. The note stated that the fire extinguisher buttons should be "unlatched" after being operated. There was no further explanation given. I was flying the type at the time this occurred (my first job flying it) and I had previously asked our trainers what this meant, but no meaningful explanation was forthcoming.

What actually happens when the FIRE button is pressed is that a squib operates electrically, via a control circuit board, to release a sealing cap which normally holds back the extinguishant. The fire button/switch (a "STACO" type), is not of the perhaps more widely used type. Most others are a simple spring loaded button which pops out again when released.

However, these particular fire bottle buttons are held in the "IN/energised" position by an internal latching mechanism. The button has to be pressed again to release the latch.

Now, as the squib fires, the small filament inside is designed to burn through, giving an open circuit once it's done its job. However, experience showed that in some cases, the squib fired but the element did not burn through. If this occurred, as it did in this case, the circuit board would overheat, giving smoke and fumes in the cockpit (it's by the pilot's left knee, in the centre console)!

So, a spurious engine fire warning can result in the crew inducing a real, but small, cockpit fire. Just what you want, especially at night..

After the investigation, the CAA recommended that Eurocopter undertook to replace the fire bottle switches with a non-latching type (straight swap and presumably not expensive). They refused, saying that the incident was a false warning! The CAA did not follow this up so those buttons are probably still out there.

gnow,

Have another read of this accident report that was posted earlier (S61, vicinity Bournemouth UK, 2002 (AW FIRE) - SKYbrary Aviation Safety) and consider if you would be happy to have a potential fire burning away for 40 seconds.

Gnow,

Your SOPs are trying to keep things simple, but there is a danger in classifying events purely in terms of 2 options: " if there is a fire, do X,, if no fire, do Y." If you experience a straightforward flameout, then generally it will be safer to not touch anything below 500'. If you have something more catastrophic, (which could include fire, driveshaft failures, runaway up, turbine separations, etc,) then it MAY be prudent to take some action below 500'. I am guessing your SOPs do not mandate action below 500', in the event of fire, they just don't forbid it! That is the decision the captain gets paid for!

I had an engine fire in a Bell 212 when I was working in the Middle East.

I had just departed a refuelling stop, single pilot, in the Zakum field and levelled at 2500 ft on my way to a detached rig when I heard a thump from the back end, followed by an engine chip warning for the No 1 engine. On looking at the instruments for No 1, I saw the ITT indicating around 1200 degrees. I turned back towards Abu Dhabi, and transmitted a Pan call. I closed the throttle, and as I watched the ITT fall by about 150 degrees, the No 1 Fire warning came on. I operated the the Fire Suppression system for No 1 engine and started the stopwatch. I watched 30 seconds on the clock, and with the warning still illuminated, I fired the second bottle.

A minute later, as the fire warning was still illuminated, I transmitted a Mayday call and ditched in Zakum field, about 5 miles south of Zakum west. I had 6 pax on board at the time.

By the time we had landed in the water, the fire had just gone out and the engine was still smoking, with a large hole on the top decking above the engine. It turned out that the free turbine had exploded and trashed the back of the engine plus the cowling above it. In fact, when I later saw the free turbine blade, it resembled an old circular saw blade.

Now some might say I should have waited a little longer to see if the fire had indeed been extinguished, but at the time, at 2500 ft, with a confirmed instrument indications of an engine fire and when you have followed the FRC's, I know I did the correct thing. After all, I am still here, at the end of my flying career, to talk about it. Incidentally, the aircraft was recovered and rebuilt and I did he initial ground runs on it six months later before it returned to service.

A few years later I converted onto the S61 and I, too, have carried out the simulation of the S61 fire in Bournemouth, complete with a smoke generator in the simulator to add a little realism - Thank you, Keith. Makes you think!! :ok:

Helicopters are just like Metal Engine Shipping Containers.....to be used to protect the contents as required.

Sounds like you did just that!:ok:

FCOM - Fire warnings
 

If I were drafting the FCOM chapter on 'Engine Fire in Flight' it would probably look something like this.

As per the QRH as far as 'Confirm Engine Fire'. Then I would add a line that says;

Fire warnings may disappear after selecting EMS to 'idle'. If this occurs suspect hot gas leak. Situation may still be hazardous, LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE anywhere nearby suitable for OEI landing using lowest achievable ground speed if surface is unprepared or space limited.

If fire warnings remain illuminated then use the following as guidance. The aircraft commander may do whatever he feels appropriate to protect the lives of his crew and passengers bearing in mind the wide range of possible failure modes he may encounter.

Guidelines for dealing with continuing indications of engine fire.

If circumstances are benign (day, VMC),

1. Confirm appropriate ECL then select it to IDLE, then OFF
2. Arm appropriate fire extinguisher using the 'ARM' button taking care to select correct button.
3. Select FIRE BOTTLE to 'BOTTLE 1', start stopwatch.
4. After 45 seconds if fire warnings persist then select FIRE BOTTLE to 'BOTTLE 2'.
5. If fire warnings remain on there are other indications that a genuine fire exists then LAND IMMEDIATELY.

OR

If fire warnings persist and there are no other indications that a genuine fires exists then LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Monitor the situation closely for signs that the fire was genuine after all and LAND IMMEDIATELY.

If circumstances are critical (night or IMC with no hope of achieving VMC above the MSA) then consideration must be based on a risk assessment with the commander choosing what he believes to be the course of action with the least risk. His options are;

1. Continue flight and LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest suitable IFR airport.
2. Descend to achieve VMC and continue to immediate OEI landing if terrain permits or LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest available and suitable aviation facility.

If after carrying out the fire drill above there are definite signs of fire but the possibility of a safe immediate landing is remote due to the possibility of CFIT then LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest suitable IFR airport.

If circumstances are severe due to uncontrolled extensive on board conflagration then LAND IMMEDIATELY and attempt to use the navigation facilities available to descend into an area where it may be possible to achieve VMC.

Comments, suggestions welcome.


G.

Sounds great Geoff but if you're IMC with a fire, then there really aren't any rules or procedures. It's whatever it takes to walk away. It seems the hardest lesson for your SIM students is when they have to separate what matters from what doesn't matter. I couldn't care less about the aircraft, the FAA or my employer at this point. I'm doing whatever it takes to stay alive. I earn a good living from being a pilot, but if this means I have to go and drive a truck to pay the bills, then I'll do it. Took me a long to time to educate myself.

A simple fix??
 

The old saying "one picture is worth a thousand words". Get manufacturers to fit CCTV in engine bays and cargo bays etc.
Get a fire warning light - have a look at what is really happening.

on board CCTV
 

The 139 already has an option for a tail-mounted camera that provides a good view of the airframe and engines. An IR capability would allow hot spots to be seen too but there would need to be a demand for that from the industry before it became standard.
G.

Fascinating discussion.
Real life situation some (many) years back.
Wessex returning from long winter detachment 3 days pre Xmas. Penultimate leg Valkenberg to Manston. Wx crap, low cloud, strong winds, icing (no Anti-icing). I suggest routing via short crossing Calais - Dover-ish. Capt says NO! will go Hook of Holland - N Foreland. On startup, No 1 OK but No 2 starts to overtemp as the S S lever comes up to the 'dwell'. Same result with a couple of tries, so Capt leaves lever at start of temp rise position and says we'll go as is. Leave land at H of H and proceed low level over a 'boiling' sea. Approx halfway and Capt's hands operating like one-armed paper-hanger followed by hollow thump noise and glaring red light on panel. Nothing heard on my side i/c so ask Capt 'what's up' to be told No2 eng fire indication and bottle already fired. Get out FRCs and run drill with last line "Land at nearest available" (or something similar). Too low for radio contact initially but have to 'persuade' Capt that a "Mayday" might be appropriate!! Call made eventually and Manston scrambled to find us - very embarrassing as ex-student on duty crew!! Red light remains on and we proceed, eventually sighting N Foreland. Suggest to Capt that the in-view sportsfield on the cliff top would be a good idea but had to 'forcefully' argue case for that as against proceeding to Manston. Landing in sportsfield accomplished - red light was caused by fire wire being damaged by cowling closure.
Any comments would be welcome but worth mentioning that there were other, unrelated problems. ... On the previous day's leg into Valkenberg, similar weather, and needing to bypass Schipol, I had asked for an en-route landing on an island on the east of the Zuider Zee to check navigation (Yep, I was LOST!!) All sorted , but inbound to V'berg we were told to report to Ops where we were told that we had landed at the Dutch Foot-and-Mouth Research station and were, therefore, potentially contaminated!! UK's AG and Fish were not amused and had us slated for some 6 weeks isolation on return!
As said above, comments welcome.

Cornish Jack,

You/ve a long way to catch up with some of these Old Farts who have stories far better....if not quite as "Foot in Mouth" as yours.:ok:

Good thing there was no Rabies at that place or you could have had a Six Month absence from Operations.

Cornish Jack
 

SO... my fellow countryman.... must have been in the days when we were learning to spell CRM !!

G. :ok:

G - you'm right, my 'andsome! ... or perhaps it stood for 'Captains Rule Mate':E

Care ve, durdatha whye, a bleth os ta devedhys? Oll an gwella

Great thread!

I experienced several spurious fire warnings in the Sea King - in the hover at high ambient temps, dipping down around Rosie Roads mostly. Confirming an actual fire was part of our emergency response for sure but I can't recall if it was well laid out in the checklist.

I do recall having an actual electrical fire inside the sonar dome control box at the AESOP station during a practice IFR approach in VMC. Cabin filled with smoke and we declared a mayday and landed on a nearby beach. Of course, the base went nuclear, ringing the crash bells, etc. We were fine on the beach, where the Aesops hauled the box out and tossed it out the door and we sat with the rotors turning until it stopped smoking, trying to get comms with the base...

A couple of observations though:

I have noticed that some RFMs have excellent definitions of land as soon as practicable, possible and immediately and others are quite vague, also that some have just practicable and possible and no immediately.

I have also noticed that some aviation "communities" have great emergency handling theory and others do not. When I flew the big grey pigs we were taught to approach emergencies in a four part process:

1. Initial actions
2. Analysis
3. Corrective Action
4. Follow up

Initial actions were essentially "fly the aircraft" meaning get to a safe regime of flight where attention could be given to the emergency without adding risk.

Analysis meant "what do you see?" and involved calling the indications and deciding what the actual emergency was.

Corrective action meant getting in the checklist and following the procedures within.

Follow up involved determining what effect the emergency will have on the mission and where we would recover and how. It also included a discussion on what was the next worst thing that could happen so we could look through that checklist and choose our recovery plan accordingly.

Now, we were military and shipborne so this may seem an onerous process but I have used it since in several different aircraft to inject calm and order into a stressful inflight incident. Of course, some emergencies will leave you no time to work through these steps as a hands and feet response will be required RFN to save the ship! Oh well.

Bah, sorry this got so wordy! :O

V7

Objective Continuous Risk Assessment Process
 

O-crap. What is the biggest threat right now...