Mismanagement of automation
 

I made the mistake of including this in my previous post about Vmini so it was lost along the way. Now it has it's own thread.

I get the impression that the EHEST team is more familiar with the Airbus AP systems than they are with the AW139. There are dangers in generalisation I believe.



G.

Why, specifically? Is this really how the aircraft is flown in practice, or a 'simulatorism' to assist accuracy in training? As an example, we used to get pilots back from FSI with their new S92 ratings who tried to lift into the hover using the collective beep trim and their feet on the floor!

Apart from any discussion about the ability to release the controls and return to wings level trimmed flight (sounds like a reasonable concept to me), there is the practical reality that pilots tend to spend too much time looking in at the ADI to check the angle of bank and then 'tweeking' the beep trim back to wings level.

212
 

S92 story - horrific. The SFI's teaching that need a word in their shell-like. I hope someone has spoken to FSI about that. We had a similar problem with instructors removing the TAWS CB because the 'TAIL LOW' audio warning was driving them nuts when trying to teach in the hover. We then found that students were taking this bad habit away with them thinking it was the OK thing to do. We have to be alert to this kind of problem.

Refers to the notion that recovery from unusual attitudes can be assisted by the AP. If the AP's are not functioning then all this technique does is delay recovery at a time when things are becoming divergent - rapidly!

I spend less time checking the angle of bank because the AP will manage this for me if I have HDG engaged. Even without once set it will maintain until you get to the heading required allowing you to attend to your lookout. :)

Flying against the springs is OK but do it for too long and you get a "MISTRIM' CAS message. letting the springs roll you out is also OK but that's not how the aircraft was designed to be flown.

The beautiful thing about the AW design is that the beeper trim does not move the cyclic, just the aircraft attitude.

Looks like the Airbus guys went in one direction and AW in another.

G.

The problem with this fascination with automation is that pilots rely more and more on it and lose their handling skills - look at airline pilots as an example.

I'm not saying that knowledge and use of the AP systems (whichever flavour you have) is bad, it should be encouraged so that pilots don't get lost in the levels of automation but regular practice in the 'raw' aircraft should be equally encouraged.

I expect my pilots to be able to hold an accurate angle of bank manually and roll out on specific headings the same way - but also be able to use the higher AP functions to achieve the same thing when required.

The whole point of an AP is to reduce the workload on the pilot but if that workload becomes so low that there is no arousal level then reacting to something like an unusual attitude will be slower.

If a pilot is in the habit of letting the AP drive him round the sky and stops monitoring the AI, it doesn't take much turbulence in actual conditions, especially if he is head down reading a plate for example, to induce the leans.

Frankly the issues of trimming or not trimming into the turns will depend very much on which flavour of AP you have and your personal preferences as a pilot - trying to dictate which is 'right' or 'wrong' isn't an argument you can win.

Is the 'official' Agusta advice? If so, I imagine that a lot of AW139 TRIs need to be informed.

How is AP loss annunciated on the 139?

Quite a few old duffers on here then! I am with Geoffers on the principle that a lot of old hands in high places resist progress. You are not a real man unless you can fly the whole IR AP out etc.

However I would question why on earth you would want to fly a turn in IMC manually? This is what HDG mode (or higher level) is for. The HDG mode ensures the bank angle and rate of turn is correct, the exit heading is set and cross checked between the crew, whilst the PF is concentrating on the big picture. I suspect those who like to fly IF procedures manually also like to go home and whip themselves with nettles.

If you look at the FMEA it's effectively impossible to lose HDG mode whilst the AP continues to work normally in ATT so there is no need to maintain such a Luddite and pointless skill.

Whilst the 225's AP is excellent in nearly every way, it is surprisingly difficult to hold a steady angle of bank against the springs, much harder than the L or L2. Apart from anything else it tends to be quite wobbly-uncomfortable for the pax and a moments distraction risks large angles of bank. It is ABSOLUTELY NOT the way to fly safely.

Trim into the turn if you must, but why bother?

Personally I always flew visually with the cyclic trim pressed (if I was moving the controls) and if IMC, I used the buttons, which is what they are there for.

"Autopilot" voice + either an AP FAIL or a few other miscellaneous AP related cautions.

Torquestripe: There is a fix for the AHRS mounting, which should fix the problem of the AP tripping out with vibration. Ask your freindly neighbourhood engineer to fit it!

CAR42ZE
 

Actually there are two types of CAS message '1 AP FAIL' if the AP has failed in some way, plus the audio warning and a second CAS message is possible '1 AP OFF' if the AP system has not been selected ON. In both cases the audio warning will occur - 'AUTOPILOT - AUTOPILOT', and a second CAS 'AFCS DEGRADED'.

G.

because we are supposed to be pilots and, if the AP fails IMC who is best placed to make a safe recovery - the pilot who has practised AP out or the systems manager who hasn't

It's an extraordinary thing.....
 

.... but guess what? The passenger in the back does NOT expect you the pilot to be practicing ANYTHING on his flight from Timbuktu to Walumboola Base. He expects you to be doing everything in your power to deliver him/her/them without fuss or bother, as smoothly as possible. So please don't tell him.her/them that you plan to practice your AP out flying at any stage during the flight or he just might say something to your boss .... and when your boss finds out that you have been practicing your driving skills on a public transport flight he will dump so much CRAP upon your head so as to be extremely UNKIND.

Please save your practicing for training flights and not when doing your normal daily job. I suppose if you have never had to carry VVIPS or even VIPS around you won't have much idea about their capacity for being UNHAPPY with excessive attitudes, angles of bank greater than 20 degrees and for heavens sake don't go anywhere near those blasted CAT A profiles which scare the **** out of the head honcho's wife and kids and and don't please his girlfriend much either.

CRAB - we, most of us, inhabit a world where the guy down the back pays and he gets treated to the best our expensive AP can deliver including modifying the RoC and RoD to no more than 500 feet per minute.Even the SLF we call BEARS get that treatment because they are GOOD GUYS and deserve the BEST. I guess SARBOYS carry people who are grateful and don't care much what their carriage looks like or smells like or if the head set ear covers are snow white.

One day, when you get to work CAT with non-mil pax you will find out what I mean.


G. :)

You miss the point. Setting aside the fact that if you ever get to fly a modern helicopter you will come to know that the levels of redundancy are such that AP failure is almost inconceivable, there is only any point in training for a scenario that could actually occur. As I said, on the 225 at least, it's not feasible to have a failure where HDG doesn't work but the AP works normally in ATT mode (ie the mode it's in normally, without any other "upper modes being engaged). So why conduct lots of training in ATT mode? A complete waste of time.

Certainly, train for realistic failures such as SAS mode and complete autopilot out, but let's target training on what could realistically happen, not just on something "because we've always done it that way", ie mindlessly.

As an aside, the primary and as far as I know only ever occurring reason for loss of AP functionality on the 225 is the pilot pressing the AP disengage button accidentally. I've certainly done it! So as well as training for that specific event (requires PM to swiftly re-engage the AP) why not put a bit of effort into making that event less likely to happen.

Helicopters crash for various reasons, often on a repeating theme, but these are not single engine failure nor an inability to fly with the normal AP engaged but without use of the upper modes. So why do we continue to expend so much training time on these things and so little on the things that repeatedly cause crashery?

Geoff, You are exactly correct! In todays world they the SLF will report back to their manager, supervisor or higher of anything they deem to be irregular. Which intern means the crew gets called into the Chiefs office the very next day to explain.

Hand flying is fast becoming a lost art in the offshore environment. On a 2.5 to 4 hour flight how much does a crew actually jiggle the wiggly bits. Well FDM data show about 3 to 4 minutes at max if you abide by the written procedures in most of the procedures that I have seen and witnessed on highly automated aircraft. To state that you can practice this in training or on training flights is again incorrect. When was the last time your organization allowed you to take a large offshore heavy aircraft out a training flight. I can tell you that it does and will not happen in our part of the world, again economics.
As for the practicing hand flying on simulator missions given the structure of syllabuses as of late most of it revolves around use of automation and CRM. Which is fine but the times allotted are no suffice to cover everything especially handling without modes engaged. The funny part is most of this is being driven by outside entities ie: the customer / aviation advisors but yet they are the ones whom are first to challenge the company or crew when there is a excursion of any form. Facts be known the operators are losing control of how to manage their own aircraft and crews and the big oil folks are dictating who we will all fly our aircraft.

Off topic but the SAFETY word is becoming a huge joke now in the industry in North America anyway. We are finding that we are more worried about what boots, protective eyewear, proper and approved undergarments, following the right pathway to aircraft, correct high vis outwear to get to aircraft, fatigue management scores the list goes on and on. Yes, these are all important and valid concerns but during audits or reviews by big oil they seem more focused on these issues then the REAL issue – FLYING. All of our training budgets are predicated on the contracts we have agreed upon with the client which in turn means lowest price wins, hence training is always a major player in the cost. Given the current economic crisis the oil companies say they are in (joke) I can only forsee more things becoming more degraded as we move forward.

HC

To prevent inadvertent removal of both AP's why don't we ask the designers to put a relay in the line such that the first button push on the SAS REL (remember that on the AW139 this removes both AP's) just one AP is dropped and on the second button push the second AP is removed. This would go someway to prevent simultaneous, inadvertent loss off both AP's.

Goose

Unfortunately there is a real world out there and very little of it can even spell 'Cat A' let alone understand it. In the global helicopter pilot context most of the time spent teaching Cat A is wasted.It's easy to forget that to be Cat A compliant you must not only be at the correct WAT weight for the prevailing conditions and use the appropriate profile you must also know how long your take off area is, your reject area is and the height and position of every obstacle with the FATO. I'm afraid that's just a little too much wishful thinking for most.

SK92

The fixed wing world are getting to grips with 'Upset Training' following the spate of accidents related to pilots who cannot fly manually. I think you are absolutely right and more time should be set aside for good old manual flying but then who is going to pay if it is not mandated by the regulator??

G. :ugh:

Geoffers, regarding the AP out button they have done something similar on the EC175 ie IIRC the first press puts it into SAS, the second press dumps it altogether. It sounds a trivial change but I suspect there are some certification issues at play. After all, why have the AP cancel button under your thumb unless it is requirement to be able to quickly dump the AP?

I suspect that once again it stems from old fogies who don't trust new-fangled electronics whilst maintaining that of course the pilot should never screw up!

I have wondered as well why we have that button, is it in fact a certification requirement?

Probably not a certification requirement as such, but certification requirements often relate to the outcome rather than the way to achieve it. So for example there might be some requirement relating to safety being ensured with some sort of AP runaway, and an easy way of achieving that is to have a fast disengage button. So it's probably a means of compliance rather than a requirement in itself. But if you have "hung your hat" on that as a means of compliance, it could be difficult to find another means.

Which could be why Air Asia and Air France aircraft ended up in the sea for no reason other than the crew couldn't fly the aircraft in manual.

Yes it's funny, there were never any accidents when aircraft had to be flown exclusively manually.

Anyway sarcasm aside retaining relevant manual skills is important, but no more important than good management of automation which in general stops you getting into a situation where your superior manual handling skills are required.