Hand flying an ILS on standby instruments!!!!!!!!!!!OMG don't let HC know about that......how could that possibly help you manage your automation;);):E

Anyone would think you were trying to keep your pilots skills up:ok:

FNW;

I think he got the usual level of thanks the MD gives out! Have a good New Year, and go safe.

Crab;

I used to fly A320's. Skill fade was a problem in the early days, we are just seeing it happen later in rotary. I love all the stuff that makes it easy, but when it goes wrong I like to be able to fly it properly.

SND

CRAB
 

I try to include a total screen failure, manual raw data ILS on the ESIS (S/by horizon system) when doing a TR on the 139. It is primarily a way of convincing the candidate that the instrument is easier to use than they might initially think and is a confidence booster. The ILS is a usually a bit ragged but as HC so rightly says anyone who has trained on a basic ILS system retains that basic skill to a level that will get you home safely even if it might make the IRI cry a little.

:E

Just read HC, next contribution and have to agree wholeheartedly

No, this is clearly a good idea and something I've certainly done on the L2, after all what's the point of having standby instruments if you can't use them? The only trouble is that they are usually orientated for RHS only and also it's not a mandated item so if you get them to do it and they make a mess you can't fail them. You probably will demoralise them though. On the other hand if they do it well it's a confidence booster. So for me it was a judgement call and only do it if you think the pilot is likely to succeed.

But once again I'd suggest that it should be done in a realistic failure scenario. So for the 225 it's hard to think of something short of a complete aircraft electrical failure that would require reversion to the standby instrument (the standby instrument's data can be put onto the normal screens). So if you are down to the standby instrument only, that means no AP at all. Tricky to then fly an ILS not least because the ILS receiver boxes will be dead! But fortunately an extremely improbable scenario that you would have both a complete electrical failure and a desperate need to fly an ILS.

SND and Geoffers - with you both 100% - train hard fight easy - ASE out ILS was part of a standard IRT on the Sea King - often not pretty but proved the basic skills worked.

As my old Polish instructor used to shout as I was wracking it around on the buffet to ram or avoid being rammed.

"Do not let the aeroplane fly you. You fly the aeroplane, YOU are the master."

Train hard and fight easy - so you ARE still in the mil after all!

Nothing wrong with proving basic skills work, but why not spend the time doing that AND doing it in a feasible scenario. So yes that probably was a feasible scenario in a 1960s era helicopter but it isn't in many 21st century helicopters.

Put it like this the next N Sea crash won't be a consequence of an inability to fly an ILS AP out. So why waste valuable training time on it with the consequence of limiting time on the scenarios that ARE going to be the cause of the next crash?

HC and Crab
 

The conclusion we are forced to come to given the conflict between resources and requirements is that we have to compromise. That means that we recognise that HC is right about training for extremely remote (black swan even) events and focus what little we have in the way of training budget on building RESILIENCE.

Resilience is going to be the new watchword because we cannot train pilots to practice every one of the close to 300 failure modes the new generation of helicopters is capable of generating. It's pointless to even try for the machine is capable of throwing up just as many that aren't even in the manuals.

The current training and testing methods are incapable of either delivering resilience or propagating it for they are generic and do not, for the most part relate to the daily work environment.

Scenario based training is the key for it allows (a suitably trained instructor/examiner) to see beneath the veneer of acceptability and get a feel for the underlying competency.

After doing the same exercises with close to 400 students I can tell pretty quickly if they will have the kind of resilience I am talking about. By exposing those that are weak in this respect to mind-developing, skill-expanding scenarios with comprehensive post-flight discussions we can raise the standards across the board and replace mind-numbing irrelevance with focussed, challenging and high quality training and testing.

There is only one hurdle to overcome, and it's a big one. The sharp end of aviation management is dominated by individuals who have never taught in a modern flight simulator day in day out so they need to understand something very important. The simulator is not a magic box, you don't send people to 'the box, put them inside, set the timer for two hours then when the 'dinger' goes 'ding' bring them out 'cured'. What makes the difference is what goes on inside the box out of sight of everyone but the three people inside. The quality of training is totally dependent on the quality of the instructor and his instruction. To achieve high quality the SFI/SFE needs to be valued, trained to a high standard, and given the recognition and respect by management that they truly deserve.

Happy New Year


G. :ok:

Geoffers - completely agree with your comments ref sim instructors - I have benefited for many years from outstanding instruction in sims both mil and civil.

In particular, the THALES staff at Valley produced excellent, informative, challenging yet realistic scenarios to combine aircraft malfunctions with day and night SAR scenarios.

The problem is that as a sim instructor, you need to see people regularly to assess how they develop and how that resilience is being built - not a constant stream of training sausage machine once or twice a year for repetitive box-ticking - in that respect I sypmathise with what HC has said about making what training time is available well spent and correctly focussed.

Good luck in 2016 and Happy New Year to all aviators.:ok:

Amen to that!


It is a sad fact that, whilst this doesn't apply to any contributors to this thread afaik, to be a Sim instructor just requires a relevant type rating. That it doesn't require one have any flying instructor experience, any role experience, any experience actually flying the type or any familiarity with the SOPs and Ops Man of the trainee's employee, is criminal IMO.


Just to re-iterate fortunately most SFI have way above the minimum requirements, but unfortunately not all.

It is important to remember that a simulator instructor generally does two main types of training: Training for a type rating, and recurrent training.

Training for a type rating is concerned purely with converting to type, and does not need familiarity with any particular role or operators SOPs. It leads to a skill test in a standard generic "commercial" environment to check that the pilot understands basic operation of the machine. Role training is a different kettle of fish, which needs to be achieved by very specific training using the appropriate procedures for the type of operation. Of course, if you can integrate some of that with the type rating training you can make the process more efficient.

Recurrent training is the area which could be much better targeted to give enhanced value. At the moment, much of it is generic: a re-hash of type rating training revising abnormal & emergency operations. There is plenty of competition out there between training providers, and operators should be taking the opportunity to demand more specific training for their own needs, which will give added value over and above basic type training.
The tragedy is that generally apart from a few savvy operators, nobody bothers: they just want their pilots to go away for a couple of days and come back with signatures in the LPC box on their licence!

Don't forget that as well as the initial type rating, these days there is also the initial operator conversion training. Anyway my feeling is that if the instructor has never flown the type, has no instructor qualification, just a type rating done in the sim, and if the SOPs, checklists etc used are not those of the operator, this can hardly be described as optimal use of a sim for type ratings.

Ticks the boxes though.

Fixed wing, but some of you may find it of interest re automation.

Should Airplanes Be Flying Themselves? | Vanity Fair

Again FW but very interesting from back in 1997!!!

Children of Magenta

No comment
 

TC report A04W0200

The report is here http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-report...0/a04w0200.pdf

Crab
 

Yes, that's our dilemma, compromise and be mediocre at everything or learn to handle the automatics so that you stay out of trouble and hope that basic skills learnt long ago will keep you alive if you run into a 'black swan'.

When you have formulated your plan your only headache is the execution thereof.

If you were unlucky enough to have poor instruction, partially or intermittently serviceable, out of date simulators and a management that doesn't understand either then I can imagine that you will struggle with even that meagre objective. I am fortunate in that respect..

The regulators are known for being reactive rather than proactive so maybe we need a few more accidents to prove the point.

As long as we believe that 'EASA/FAA certified' or 'EASA/FAA Approved' mean that everything is OK we will forever have problems. The next time my students pickle off the AP's in a rush to put the FD to standby I will remind them that the design was EASA/FAA certified and the system EASA/FAA approved.

G. :ugh:

There's been a certain amount of 'background noise'.....
 

...... following my original post which drew attention to a paragraph in the otherwise excellent attempt by EHEST to address the Mismanagement of Automation. I therefore feel obliged to amplify the notion that they are wrong to assert that 'flying against the spring' or 'flying through' as it known is a 'good thing' and adds to the pilots ability to recover from an 'upset' situation. It doesn't.

Everything has a context and the context relevant here is that pilots come to the AW139 from other twin turbines and a few from singles. With their previous experience comes their previous habits and one of those is 'flying through'. The AW139 is tolerant of this technique but it was never designed to be flown in this way. If we do not discourage this method of flying then we will actually increase the risk of autopilot mismanagement. How so? Let me explain.

The incident related in para 1 of the EHEST booklet was caused by holding the cyclic forward (against the spring) then engaging an AP mode in the mistaken believe that the AP datum has been reset. It wasn't, and such is the case on the AW139. The effects of this error are critical for when the cyclic is released the aircraft will pitch up, airspeed will be lost and then as speed reduces below 55 knots the AP modes will drop out. Combined with this will be the tendency to over react to the attitude change by trying to put the FD to S/BY and this is where the inadvertent selection of the SAS REL will pitch the pilot into a seriously uncomfortable 'AP out' situation. No amount of letting go of the controls will resolve that 'upset' so a very sound recovery technique is an essential 'tool' in a pilots 'toolbox'.

To be clear, an experienced 139 pilot can use the fly through technique with impunity so long as he is aware of the trips and traps. I have no problem with that but I do have a problem with teaching or encouraging it at the TR stage.

Other types have a cyclic button for cancelling CAS warnings (NH 90, some EC types) adding to the potential for confusion. Other types have a 'fly-through' system that DOES reset the AP datum but we just have to accept, in my opinion, that to to teach or encourage the 'fly-through' technique in a TR is to ignore...

a. the potential for dangerous situations is increased due to lack of familiarity with the consequences during FD management.
b. the fallacy that it in some way will enhance unusual attitude recovery does not apply in an environment where an otherwise perfectly serviceable and reliable dual AP system can be removed with a single touch of one cyclic button with (IMC) extreme consequences.

I am not a helicopter designer, nor a test pilot, I am just an SFI but one that has observed many hundreds of pilots at work in the AW139 cockpit. I hope that my experience has allowed me to remove any distortions the sim environment may have created leaving me with some fairly clear ideas about how pilots interact with this magnificent helicopter, the best I have ever come across, despite it's faults. I have yet to come across a pilot who isn't a fan of the 139 but at the same time they would also like some design issues to be addressed. What are those issues? Another time and another place. :)

G. :ok:

Geoffers,

I would argue that the incident that you refer to above wasn't an issue because the pilot was 'flying against the spring' but because he effectively handed over an 'untrimmed aircraft'.

You wouldn't hand over control of an untrimmed aircraft to another human pilot so why hand it over to the autopilot? A quick dab on the FTR before engaging the upper modes is all that is needed.

B73, I tend to agree with you. The 139 incident appears to be a repeat of Cougar 851 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-re...1/a11h0001.pdf).