Bob, would you care to re visit your 'all of you over there' quote. The British contributors to Rotorheads are not all of the British helicopter pilots, what's more not all of the helicopter pilots who do contribute to Rotorheads necessarily take the view that we're always right and you're (as in you and your fellow cousins) always wrong :) .....(that's me drummed out of the country).

Bob Boudreaux .... French surname, Cajun food, who cares what else

They drive on the correct side of the road ... for their country ... housing, roadways etc .... it's no different from the driving skill required

You choose to ignore the world norm of metric .... it's effin easier to use than the mickey mouse system you stubbornly stick to .....

At least I like you trying to stick to the judgment in hand ..... but the Glasgow aircraft was in the air .... this latest incident was a choice made on the ground.

Makes me feel I shall in future ignore these pages ............

Training Issue ?
 

My bet is the collective was not being locked, this is the most likely explanation. Maybe this guy wasn't aware of the significance of this for an AS350. Keep in mind there are no type ratings in the US, so any Robinson pilot can hop into an AS350 and legally fly it. Not sure how much training this guy received on type. Maybe someone working in this area can comment on this.

It's easy to forget an item in a check list (especially when you are in a hurry), but you gotta know the critical ones by heart. Always lock the collective on the ground on any AS350, no matter whether you are inside or outside the helicopter !

Bob, now you are tarring everyone with the same brush re the Darwin remark.

There is no need to turn this into a transatlantic squabble and it is quite clear he was operating inside the FAA rules (unless the procedure is not allowed in his RFM).

The whole point of many posters here (especially the Brits) is that just because something is legal, that doesn't make it a good idea in every circumstance - in this sad case it appears, that for whatever reason, he was caught out making an unfortunate choice.

Surely, as an experienced aviator, you should be counselling those less experienced who aren't (or weren't) aware of the possible consequences of leaving the aircraft unattended.

We are supposed to learn from accidents so that others might avoid the same pitfalls in the future - that is how flight safety evolves.

Third time lucky?
 

More learned folks might disagree.

And then there is this:

§ 91.13 Careless or reckless operation.
(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.

Administrative law judge gets to decide if its careless or reckless.

I have repeatedly.

Read your FAR Part 135 Regulations then get back with us on that comment. You are quite wrong.



if there was no violation of FAR's and the RFM for that particular aircraft did not have a Restriction re Leaving the Controls and the Operator's FAA Approved Training Program and FAR Part 135 OpSpecs did not ban that practice......you would find your Case very weak indeed. Those Administrative Actions are subject to Appeal to Federal Court should the Defendant feel the Judgement is in error.


So getting back to the original argument: Who knows what happened in the Canyon that day? Does anyone know what the RFM for that aircraft had to say? Does anyone know what the Company's Training Program and OpSpecs had to say about Leaving the Controls unattended? Did the poor fellow simply make a mistake somehow although operating within the Operator's SOP's and FAR's?

This happened in the USA thus American Law and Regulations apply, not EASA Rules. Shift gears guys, it really is easy if you try. You may not agree with it, or like it, or think what is permissible is good practice, but apply the Law, Rules, and Regulations that apply.

Until someone comes up with a more appropriate flight manual;
http://helicopterindia.com/yahoo_sit....241201933.pdf

FLIGHT MANUAL AS 350 B3 Arriel 2B1

2.1.1 TYPE OF OPERATIONS
The helicopter is approved to operate :
- by day in VFR.
- by night in VFR, when the additional equipment required by
operational regulations are installed and serviceable.
The following are forbidden :
- Aerobatic maneuvers.
- Leave the aircraft with no pilot at the controls while rotor is
spinning.
- Flight in freezing rain or icing conditions.
- (visible moisture and temperatures conducive to producing ice).
- In flight engine power reduction using twist grip control except for
engine failure training, emergency procedures referring to it, or for a technical flight.
2.1.2 OCCUPANTS
- Minimum flight crew ................. : One pilot in right seat.
- Maximum number of occupants
(including flight crew)................ : Six

:=

Find us one that is current and FAA Approved then I will listen.

This happened under FAA Rules as you may recall.

Can the FAA really override something that the manufacturers have forbidden?
I find that very surprising :eek:

Do you accept there might be differences between a CAA approved RFM and an FAA approved RFM?

You reckon the EASA approved RFM would have to comply with EASA Rules and Regulations while the FAA Rules and Regulations might be different thus the FAA Version of a RFM might reflect those Rules exactly in the manner the EASA Approved Version must and does?

I don't know what the FAA Approved RFM for the 350B3 has to say.

I would find it a bit odd for it to be much different than the EASA version but until we see one, how do we know?

Until we see one then, instead of posting worthless questions, please answer my earlier plain and simple question;

Can the FAA really override something that the manufacturers have forbidden?


I reckon, despite what you may dig up, the all covering FAA paragraph will say something such as;

"A pilot operating a civil aircraft (rotorcraft) must comply with the operating limitations specified in the approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual."


;)

Sid, Answer your own question. Did the Factory forbid it for technical reasons or did they do so because of the EASA Rules?

We have been told by those who fly the things that it varies from Model to Model.

Perhaps someone who knows the right answer will help us out here.

Ooo, Bob and his Maieutic games .... yawn, night night :rolleyes:

And the maturity level continues too climb......:D

Bob,

The FAA RFM is the same as the EASA one if you believe the FAA TCDS H9EU.

The catch here is the Limitations Section in the B3 RFM.

Why? Obviously someone knows but that may be the hard part.

EASA land is not much different to FAA land.

Contrary to what many perceive you can actually leave the aircraft when it is running
if not overridden by other documents depending on their weight and Ops Manual etc etc.

The real reason for this statement and definition thanks to the Swedes back in 2005. Maybe it gets lost in translation with some folks.

Maybe there is something on the B3 that comes under "inappropriate because of the construction of the helicopter"?

I am no stranger to this practice myself, yet maybe more aware of the basis.

I haven't flown the B3 but the collective lock on the twin Squirrel I operated for three years was very basic; it consisted of a spring steel plate with a hole in it which had to engage on a landed steel button on the end of the collective. It was easily disengaged if the lever took a slight bump, which would then move upwards, increasing torque all by itself. This would occur on start also. I developed the habit of trapping the collective lever under my left knee on start, so I could feel any tendency for the lever to move upwards. I still do this today, even though it was thirteen years ago and now fly a totally different type.

Grand Canyon Accident: Pilot killed in AS350 rollover
 

Yeah I fly 350 series a/c all variants, with quite few 1000's hours on type plus quite few more thou on other products. Most of 350 time remote, mountains, Arctic, High Arctic ya da ya....the 350 across the board totally safe to idle and get out...long as you put friction on AND lock collective. It should be standard training TC, FAA, EASA whatever...if trained properly. That's where your argument BBob falls apart...there be no type ratings below 12000lbs in US.Was pole lock drummed into ya man? Don't know...don't care, is with me every time I land, collective gets the tad extra down and click...simples. This last month was doing ops in high Arctic... At 6500ft in rocks Ellesmere and Baffin long lining...so maybe 10 refuels a day. Hot refuel...yes sir, on own..yes sir, feel comfy shutting down while packing .338 as protection against polar bears....no sir but the risk I have to take. Oh and I'm a Brit....so there goes the Brit/Anglo argument.....Crab et al...yes understand it not legal in UK, bet your life it is done 24/7 elsewhere. A very sad accident...RIP man, could of been any of us. TC yes loser...had respect mate you did Halifax water course...should know better...**** happens, no Darwin...safe aviating boys...fire season just begun!!!

The B3 manual does not have the restriction that the B3 2B1 does. A more appropriate manual would be the B3 manual.

Late last year we flew with Papillon on AS350s into the Canyon, passengers were loaded and unloaded with rotors running, loading was professional and well organised.

I'll cherish the look on my sons face when we dipped into the canyon, such flights give hundreds of passengers a memorable experience of the joys of flight.


Regardless of the legality, or best practice, if a pilot spends all day, every day with passengers loading and unloading with rotors running I could understand why it could be human nature for him to also exit with rotors running.

In the AS350s on our fights the two seater bench was installed beside the pilot, on the flight into the canyon the pilot position was on the right and on the flight out, in a different AS350, the pilot position was on the left.

Is standardising the pilot's position desirable in a multi craft company?
More chance of fouling collective on exit if pilot position is in the left seat?




Mickjoebill

:D:D:D. Newfieboy

That is quite correct.

The statement was that One could jump into any helicopter and fly it. The statement holds (somewhat) until you get to Commercial Ops under Part 135 then you have Minimum Training Hours and Syllabus and a Check Ride before you can fly for hire.

The Accident occurred on a a Commercial Part 135 Flight thus training both ground and flight required prior to the Check Ride.

http://flightsimaviation.com/data/FA...t_135-244.html

Surely the most appropriate would be the B3e.
Someone here must have access to one!

And while you're searching, is there a more up to date version of;
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_polic...cumentID/23152

Crikey - juicy thread eh?
Post 60 says it all really (and DB we must not continue to sing from the same hymn sheet!).

No-one has mentioned this aspect yet:

Let's say this gentleman elected to get out to check the "fluid levels" as advertised and in so doing the cab rolled over killing the pilot AND the shrapnel from the flailing helicopter kills a little boy and his mum who had recently deplaned.
Now can someone tell me the justification (or difference) for doing this?
The implications are beyond comprehension. The FAA would eat the hire company for breakfast. The Insurance company would be slammed with tens of millions of dollars worth of law suit. The pilot would be seen as a complete and utter f**kwit by everyone inside and outside the industry.
What is the difference therefore between what he did that day and what many other solo operators do during their daily job?
The difference is narrow but pertinent:
IF the operator genuinely believes that climbing out of an aircraft with rotors running is necessary to safeguard a situation - fair enough; but if the operator turns a blind eye to their pilots doing it to (a) save time, (b) save money, (c) have a piss......then they too are one and the same as this darwin rep.
Just because it appears the 'norm' for utility pilots in remote areas to practive this daily - doesn't make it SAFE or RIGHT.

We all do things 'differently'. When ONE makes the decision to depart from the guidelines/rules....one MUST accept one either knows better (which is extremely rare) or one has just thrown caution to the wind.
Sadly it appears (based on the reported criteria) this guy came from the latter camp - a definite Darwin candidate....but will ANYONE learn from this....I doubt it :rolleyes:
Pilots will cut corner's to make their trade work: There are those out there right now spending inordinate time inside the Dead Man's curve (we've beaten that conversation to death), there are those who take off in below minima weather, etc etc. It's all well and good IF you get away with it time and time again but it doesn't make it RIGHT.....does it? Think about the implications? CAN YOU JUSTIFY WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO DO -to the authorities? To the next of kin? To your boss? Life is a gamble and many pilots just love gambling..........................

Risk assessment
 

OK, TC has a point, whether or not anyone else agrees with it, although it's all about risk, surely?
If the risk is to the individual only, does he value his life enough to loose it?
If the risk is to the machine, does he value his machine enough to save his life & accept risk to the machine.
If there's any risk to others, especially if they've paid for a service, does he value his passengers lives; job; airframe; company; reputation; helicopter industry etc above that of saving a few moments / personal convenience?

Some of us who've been doing this awhile value the idea of landing safely, and getting home to the family at the end of a work period, more highly than anything else - and it's in the back of MY mind every time I consider doing anything that's close to the limits of either my machine or ability. Yes, there's risk inherent in aviation, and it's part of the thrill - or was when we were younger / less experienced. Every self-respecting pilot has, at some stage, looked to find their personal limit, or that of their machine - and probably exceeded one or the other at some stage and got away with it . . . and I know TC's no exception :=! It's the ones who aren't aware they've exceeded anything that will not be able to recognise the risk in doing it again, when another parameter may also be testing their skills and the two combine to provide the coup-de-gras. This thread just helps to remind those that remain that the risks are always there, and that ignoring them can be at your peril.

I've referred to the mantra before, but a reminder sometimes helps focus:
"Aviation is, of itself, not inherently dangerous but, to an even greater extent than the sea, it is very unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

Just because the pilot in question was a "pilot", does not mean to say he was free of culpability in the manner of his own demise. Maybe he just forgot about the risks?

100% agree with my country's road accident rate, I was actually referring to the legality of driving at 100mph in different countries.

Mick, ref the standardization of aircraft, I'm sure most operators like to do that, however, sometimes you have to play with the cards that you are dealt, if an aircraft is on lease etc, then they may get some with different pilot positions.

While having RHS pilot, might be good for the pilot getting in and out of the aircraft, it isn't as good, if the next day they need to do sling work as lots of us like to lean out the left side. Also depending on AC type, having a RHS pilot, also gives the passengers a chance to mess with the controls(being in the centre of the cabin), whereas LHS pilot position the controls are more protected from the pax(sitting hard against the pilot door).

newfie, thanks for that post, puts this in some perspective.

TC's point on crowd/mob reactions based on circumstances is worth pondering.

Quote:

---

"Aviation is, of itself, not inherently dangerous but, to an even greater extent than the sea, it is very unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

---

This is as true on the ground as it is in the air, particularly when those wings are moving at flight rpm. :(

The hypocrisy meter is now going into the red!:confused:

We all make mistakes, however, if my oppo who I have known for 30 years and who I can assure you is a bl00dy good egg is involved in any sort of incident/accident, then I expect you all to reserve judgement on what might have happened until the final result of whatever investigation takes place and a report is released. Even then, even if it seems that he/she was culpable, I will ask you to think of the families, the mates left behind and previous good character/unblemished record and show a bit of respect with any criticism you may feel you want to publish........

On the other hand, should some johnny foreigner or god forbid, civvy have an incident or accident, then I will go out of my way to be as offensive as possible, as soon as possible I won't need the result of any investigation to tell me what I already know. This is a forum where we discuss this sort of thing without fear or favour. If someone out there feels that I'm being overly hard on them, then tough. We need to learn immediately what the probable cause was and prevent anybody from making the same mistake again. We can only do this by judging the incident on the very limited information that we may glean in the first micro seconds after the incident has occurred.:mad:


Does that sum up the current rules of engagement?

I couldn't find any reference that the aircraft was an E model. Where is that?

Could we separate out two, for me, very different discussions

a) the discussion about the accident which started this thread. As far as I can tell, there is nothing in the accident report which states that the pilot was not following standard operating procedures, did not secure the controls etc.

b) a more general discussion, whether it is permissible in any circumstances to leave an aircraft rotors turning, and if so what those circumstances are.

Matthew

Naive question, borne from the fact that my limited experience is with 300, R22 and G2.

In a situation where you are working remotely and concerned about an engine restart, could you not release the clutch and so have the engine still running but the rotor stationary?

Matthew

No, because there is no clutch.

Fair enough.

Matthew

Post 7 of this thread :rolleyes:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/112285127/...-Flight-Manual


Page 11 shows no prohibition to leaving the controls unattended.

Perhaps this RFM thing needs to be considered more.

The Linked RFM also clearly states each Certifying Authority may vary from other Authorities.

It also notes some information in the RFM requires Authority Approval and some does not. It does not specify how to identify the difference.

Handy,
The NTSB preliminary report quoted in post 8 says;
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/Ge...R14FA195&rpt=p

It would appear that the NTSB find this relevant enough to put in the report.
The big question is, what does the FM for this ac actually state about leaving the ac with the ac running?

When we know that, we can answer mdovey's point 'a'.

Post #7:
I don't see any reference to the model AS-350 in that post.

Did you mean post number 8, the NTSB quote? If you are, I don't see any reference to a B3E there either.

Bob, apart from not being for the Be, page 11 (manual) page 36 (document) states a minimum crew of one pilot in RH seat.

FAA definition of crew;
"Crewmember. A person assigned to perform duty in an aircraft during flight time."
FAA Definitions

As flight time doesn't stop until the rotors have stopped ... :hmm:

jecottrell,
Sorry, it was post 7 when I referred to it.

It is now post 8 as you say. The report gives the reg number, which leads to being able to find out the type version :ok:

N840PA


Sure looks like a B3 to me.


All of our AS-350 aircraft' Hobbs meters stop registering flight time when the collective is bottomed out. Where does your definition of flight time originate?