UH-72 to Rucker ? What's the Army thinking?
 

I have never flown a UH-72 (EC-145) but its a twin with a rigid rotor system and non-standard tail. I have no first hand experience on the aircraft. Will this really make a good primary helicopter trainer? Does anyone else in the world fly it in this role as an initial trainer? I am having a hard time understanding the logic of a complex, twin engine helicopter in this role.

From last month's Rotor & Wing:

No (the USNTPS has five, but not for Initial); the closest is probably the German Army, which uses the BO105 as its initial trainer (likely to be replaced by the EC135 as the 105 retires). The Australian Defence Force is also about to replace the Kiowa with a twin (reportedly the EC135) as its sole RW trainer, following in the footsteps of the JMSDF, which is in the process of replacing its OH-6Ds with the TH-135.

I/C

Doesn't the RNZAF now use the A109 as it's basic rotary trainer?

RNZAF - A109 Light Utility Helicopter

Good catch.

I/C

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Swiss army

20 EC635

Basic training and utility

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Like the rumor I heard at HAI 2013, and confirmed in the article a few months back,

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/cd482ee4bf70

Going back to an article in Shephard Press, Defence Helicopter several years ago, a training special about the DHFS. The then CO who was AAC, aired out that graduates go onto multi-engined platforms and potentially the School could just have a sole multi engined trainer as with the current Bell 412. He also stated in his day, as with the Gazelle, he did all his primary and advanced on the type he went to after competing the APC.

Going back even further to the German Heeresfliegerwaffenschule at Buckeberg, in the late 90s, who went a radical way changing their training. They retired their Alouette II, and went into more emphasis on PC based and the 4 axis flight simulators and EC135. Their view was with the introduction of the NH90 and Tiger, the pilot' / gunner would become more of a mission manager.

W.R.T to the RNZAF (here's my pic from Farnborough '10 ) was a (first) NZ exchange instructor pilot to Buckeberg a few years back

http://i57.photobucket.com/albums/g2...r/DSC09649.jpg

in the art of learning to tech M/E so he could take the experience home in preparation for the Power and NH90 entering service.

Cheers

They are not thinking. This is the Utility and Attack PM's protecting their programs which are under threat of being downsized at the expense of the warfighter. No one can deny the 206 is the best entry level trainer and no one can deny the 58D has shown to be the best ground troop support helicopter in the Army. With the new laser guided 2.75's there is really no need for the 64 unless someone can find a few hundred tanks to launch an attack. If they do they will probably have an easy time as the 64 will be in system checks while the front line is overrun.

Those who care about the warfighter should try to save the 67, the 58D and tell the Air Force to save the A-10.

The Sultan

You must travel in some limited circles.

Other than the 67, how many semi-rigid underslung rotor systems is the Army flying these days, Sultan?

How many steam-gauge helicopters is the Army flying these days, Sultan?

You could make the same argument for the 57 at Whiting and you'd be equally wrong.

Both those machines have been overtaken by technology, no matter how robust the airframes and how good the customer support from Bell.

The entire training model needs to be reviewed, because the 206 variants are no longer cutting it, because you can't train how you fight in them, in any service.

I'm guessing you never worked in a training command, but you've been at Bell a long time.

Sorry, Lifting, I think you're completely off on this one.
This is not about dog fights but basic training, i.e. learning to hover etc, etc.
Even an R44 would suffice.

$3000 of tax payers money per hour for hover practice ?:ugh:

Suppose we ought to throw out all the AT-6s for fast mover pilot training, as the USAF doesnt have a single front line turboprop fighter aircraft!

Someone with experience in "training command" should understand the value of "steam gauges" and simple airframes/rotors to teach basic rotary wing airmanship (without spending a fortune on flight time and risking hugely more expensive assets with zero-hour RW pilots)

Bingo. GoodGrief got it in one.

Navy and Army have to decide how to do their instrument training and primary rotary wing training, if the venerable 206 is getting long in the tooth and support costs continue to go up.

Problem is, do you buy a "one size fits all trainer" as the Navy has now gotten? The TH-57 used to be a VFR only bird, with the TH-1E/TH1L being the instrument / advanced bird. In the 80's the Navy got a mod to some the TH-57's for instrument training. IIRC, it was a military cert.

Getting a civil certified instrument bird to replace the TH-57 will be an interesting exercise in both acquisition and requirements re-definition, but I think that's where the Navy has to go as the support for that old version of 206 fades, or just gets too expensive per hour.

Since Army has a platform already bought and paid for, and is trying to save money by eliminating an entire TMS (and since Bell and other vendors are not exactly supporting the old airframe with any enthusiasm) their decision makes sense from the level of "don't need to go through that acquisition cycle again." Their biggest issue will be long term, and the cost per hour increase GoodGrief mentioned. That and how many sims to buy, what mix, etc.

I imagine one could get into a two tiered training system, with the first 10 or 15 or 25 hours in a Robinson to teach people how to hover and do basic helicopter flying things ... then off into the land of turbine driven twins.

But I don't think the Army wants to buy another new line of aircraft, so Mr Robinson's order book probably won't get that massive spike such a move would see.

That of course being a fully-burdened O&S figure in line with DoD FMRs, hence the S-92-like cost. The EC145's variable cost ($1390/hr) is still twice that of the JetRanger, but not quite into "Mercedes-Benz" territory.

Robinson Sr. was always very proud of not being seen as sucking on the government teet. (Well, other than indirectly through the Maverick and Renegade programs...)

I/C

I certainly could be wrong, I often am.

LW covers a few of my thoughts on procurement and some other things I thought about as well in his post that appeared while I was hammering out this abomination. I too think the solution for the Navy will be off-the-shelf. I also think it will be a single-engine turbine, and it will be bigger than the 206 and less than 7000 pounds, articulated or rigid head, with skids. The cabin will be able to seat 4. It will have at least some glass in it. There's my prediction.

GoodGrief-
Sorry, but you're mistaken there. The reasons are too many to put here, but it's not going to be Robbies across the board, and I'd be happy to lay a few hundred €, £, $ or other legal tender of your choice (or a splendid dinner) on it. The airframes are simply not robust enough and the drive train on the recips are too flimsy. If you know the physical training model (where the airfields are located, maintenance model, fueling locations, and other logistics), there are a dozen other reasons why Robbies won't be chosen. These are not sleepy flight schools with a half-dozen aircraft. These are airfields with 100+ airframes putting out 250-300 helicopter sorties per day using a system of stage fields scattered over a broad area.
Now you could be partly right, but only if a two-tier curriculum as LW mentions is developed for the purpose of teaching basic helicopter airwork, perhaps by civilian instructors. I suppose that's possible, but I couldn't say how likely that might be. My guess would be not likely, but that's only a guess.


Sans-
I am personally somewhat in agreement and sympathetic with you here, but the facts don't really care whether you and I agree. Steam is very nearly dead in Naval Air, and that is a major consideration, rightly or wrongly. The 53D is done, the 46 is done, all the Marine Corps machines are now partly or mostly glass. The Navy is all glass in the 60 community, mostly glass in the 53E. All new fleet procurements are glass. Whatever new trainer goes to the Navy (and probably the Army) will have some form of glass in it.

When I was fresh out of the training command as a student, I likely would have been more in agreement with each of you as to what was needed, because that was what I knew. When I had spent some time there many years later, I recognized that fleet needs had changed and were not being met (though nothing actually changed substantially in fact during my time there).


I can't speak in an informed fashion to Army needs, but my guess is that the Army is thinking somewhat along similar lines, but also probably has a surplus of UH-72s they can't quite figure out what to do with and they're coming up with justification for a twin because that's what they have on hand and they know very well how long the procurement process takes. What they may do with their TH-67s is a good question, as they are somewhat younger than the Navy's TH-57s.

I quite deliberately didn't say what machine I thought was best (or if I even have an opinion), but I do know what's being looked at, and it's not the R-44, and I seriously doubt they'll spin up the 206 production line again with all the powertrain and other grounding issues the TH-57 has been having.

As to the T-6, I have a passing familiarity with the T-6 and know why it was chosen and the compromises that were made during the process by the two very different primary customers in the interest of a common airframe. I know who wanted a jet, and who wanted a turboprop and why. Lots of heated arguments during that process by intractable parties. Nobody got all they wanted.

The TH-57 is the ONLY current primary or advanced training aircraft in Naval Air that is not glass and doesn't include a FMS, to include the T-6. Just because the T-6 has a spinner on the nose doesn't mean it's not a big technological leap from the T-34. It is. The TH-57 is also the only turboprop or turboshaft in the Navy training mix that is not PT-6 powered.

Rotary is the only pipeline where the students make a retrograde technological step when they move to advanced training.

In the U.S., fast-mover training prior to award of wings involves two distinct aircraft (three, actually). Helicopter training in the Navy system involves two distinct airframes, only one of which is a rotorcraft. That rotorcraft is currently configured in two different ways. One is a basic VFR configuration, the other is a non-conforming and uncertifiable IFR configuration that is running out of spares.

A significant portion (about 7%) of the curriculum is tied up in transitional flights between helicopter airframes, and a significant portion of the FRS for fleet helicopters is tied up in familiarization with FMS and glass because a very large portion of the advanced rotary curriculum has to be retaught in the fleet. The rotary curriculum also involves a fair bit of time in the cruise transitioning to a number of stage fields in a helicopter that can carry two pax at best.

Anyway, all that transition & familiarization stuff has to be done somewhere, in something. So you can pay for that with a ground trainer, sims, and a moderately expensive aircraft at the training command or you can do that at the fleet level with a larger pilot pool making use of the order-of-magnitude more expensive hardware. But you do have to pay for it at some point. It's just a question of when and what it will cost.

Not all these issues are resolved, so far as I am aware, and my finger is definitely not right on the pulse, but that's how I see it shaping up. Again, I could be totally wrong. I guess in a few years we'll see if any of us are right.

But at the end, if you don't know what the end customer (Naval or Army Air) wants, you can't back track to determine the appropriate tool to deliver that end product in the form of an aviator.

German army uses EC135/635 for basic training. The Bo105 is only used for the emergency training block (autorotation).

I dont think it's a bad idea to use this level of complexity if you not are going to fly older 'analog' helicopters at all. You'll miss some of the handling training, like secondary effects on the controls.
A modern heli is supposed to be easy to fly, is it possible that it 'masks' a weaker student by being so easy to fly ?

With the Bell 206 out of production, there are a lot of good single on the market for less than $1000/hr.....Bell 407Gx, AW119Kx, AS-350, EC-120, Bell SLS ..... just to name a few. Starting to sound like the Army needs a home for the Lakota and is putting a square peg into a round hole just to make their aviation re-alignment plan work out; at the taxpayers expense.

The TH-57/67s are tired and somewhat irrelevant to DoD fleet helicopters anymore. For example; All naval aviators start out in T-6B which is a glass environment, same as 95% of DoD helicopters and tilt-rotors, and then go backwards to analog just to get through the helicopter syllabus. Not to mention the characteristics of a two-bladed rotor system, which are no longer in DoD service either, are significantly different than a multi-bladed rotor system. Both are negative learning points. So the current aircraft are an anachronism going forward.

So the Army is going to do full contact autos, and let guys with 0 hrs learn to hover in a complex helicopter that cost 5x more per/hr to fly? :ugh:

Stinger, I went from a TH-57 to a Huey to an SH-2F.
What people do nowadays is go from the TH-57 to, for example, the CH-53E.
No intermediate step at a Huey. Oddly enough, they seem to figure it out.

The monkey skill adjustment for me was the AFCS and the weight, and the significantly worse visibility from Huey to SH-2F.
I later went to the SH-60B, and cannot say I liked to fly that as much as the SH-2F, and that is due to the trim response on the Seahawk being less agile than on the SH-2F ... just as the Force Trim system in the Huey was more agile than the AFCS on the SH-2F. You do adapt to any new aircraft, of course.

T-6 as a primary trainer (when I was working JPATS issues) moved quite a few instrument flights into simulators, with good results.

Any new Army or Navy follow on to the 206 based trainer would be well advised to invest money in robust sims to move some of the instrument training into the the sim and out of the aircraft. Back in the day, helicopter sims were Crap. They have improved in the last generation or so.

I went from a TH-57B to a TH-57C to a HH-65A, which had a starflex rotor that turned the other direction, a fenestron, real AFCS, crude FMS, Marconi gauges, and a wee bit of primitive monochrome glassy stuff. Other than being appallingly underpowered, it had little in common with the TH-57.

Yes, one does adapt, but the learning curve was fairly steep, as it was for my contemporaries going into Sikorsky products. It's steeper now.

The jump from a clapped-out TH-57C directly to a 60 variant or a new H-1 is fairly huge.

Sims I suspect and hope will be a big part of any new training procurement. I need to jaw with the sim boss at exciting Whiting. He owes me a beer anyway.

AAKEE makes a good point about the possibility of an easy-to-fly modern machine masking weak handling skills. I would think that will be a real issue. So too may be a loss in the ability to fly raw data from needles and DME unless it is explicitly taught, which remains a necessary skill set for lots of stuff, such as SAR and mucking about with TACANs, if such crude devices still be used.

I went from the TH-55A to the UH-1 B/D/H to the CH-47A/B.

The step up to the Huey was ok....particularly the UH-1B.....with the side step into the D/H much easier....but it was a giant leap into the Chinook. The first time I picked the ol' Girl up to a Hover....it was intimidating. But within just a few hours it was a done deal. We have to remember we are training Pilots who will be Co-Pilots for Years...sometimes many Years before they are given command.

I will admit the hundreds upon hundreds of EOL's we practiced paid off handsomely later on. Are the Lakota's going to hold up to that kind of punishment? If they do....at what Cost?

Basic handling skills are just that....basic to helicopter flying....skip over some of them....omit some of them....and you are headed for disaster in the long run.

US Army Student Pilots never "Solo" a helicopter....they go with another Student and call it "Solo"....that is not a good thing in my book.

Simulators are fine for Instrument Training....even the old SFTS worked fine despite having no Visual Display at all. Little time in the real aircraft is needed for training....but some is needed for real world exposure but only as a validation of the training.

If the Army wants to use the excuse "but we have all these Lakota's you see....and since we got them....well you know....." then they have shed loads of Kiowa's of all models. Why not SLEP them back to Trainer Mod's and use the excuse...."but we have all these Kiowa's you see....and since we got them....well you know....".

In the time of tight budgets....the Army is going to try to convince Congress operating the Lakota's is cheaper than operating Jet Rangers (Kiowa's).:D

Basic Training on a Twin
 

Ref Post #9.

Not many organisations (especially those on a budget) would propose spending $3000 per hour on hover training. As noted, the RNZAF has introduced the A109LUH as it's basic and advanced RW trainer (and we have never been noted as being careless with our cash). What makes this affordable is the use of simulation. If you accept that an advanced trainer is required (as we did), you will probably also accept that simulation is a neccessity. The hourly simulator direct operating costs are lower than the dry lease cost of an R44 (I did the math). It therefore makes sense to use the simulator (which we have already paid for) to conduct basic training, as well as to support advanced (emergency, IFR, mission) training.

Had we elected to employ a separate basic trainer, we would have incurred the cost of ownership of a second fleet (or at least the operating cost of a leased fleet). Having done so, it is likely we'd only have saved about 15 hours off the current all-through course. We couldn't justify that to our taxpayers. Further, by selecting a platform that could also provide a light utility and observation capability, we got even more bang for our buck (by which, of course, I mean 'Pacific Peso').

Where do you get that number from? The highest figure quoted by the Army so far has been $2,500, with the service "think[ing] it can lower that cost to $2,100 per hour." As stated above, that $2,500 is a fully burdened cost, with the TH-67 hourly being over $1,000 using the same metric.

No, the Army was always planning to replace the TH-67s with a twin ("TH-XX").

The only cost argument made so far is that replacing the KW with the Apache is more affordable than funding CASUP or AAS. Yes, the Apache's hourly costs are significantly higher, but AMCOM's argument is that the $10 Billion spend on CASUP (and/or the $6 - 8 Billion spend on AAS) is avoided, or at least deferred until an FVL-L is available. The only argument presented for the switch from the Creek to the Lakota has been that it meets the service's pre-existing plans to switchover to a glass equipped twin for its training needs. I doubt Rucker would try to portray it as a cheaper solution, save that it avoids the need for a brand new purchase of twins.

$7 Billion.

Again, unless we're hiring Gisele Bundchen to do the training, it's not going to be $3,000 per hour.

Thanks for the update - interesting to know that the switch has already been made for BHT I. I knew the 105 is due to soldier on at Celle until 2017 but that makes sense, given that the active fleet is already down to 47 BOs (out of 79 on paper).

I/C

With the Bell 206 out of production, there are a lot of good single on the market for less than $1000/hr.....Bell 407Gx, AW119Kx, AS-350, EC-120, Bell SLS ..... just to name a few.

...But only one of those has "power by Pratt & Whitney"...

Coming from an era of aviation similar to SASLess and LW50, I felt compelled to comment. Our services should look to exactly what they are attempting to achieve with their pilot training curricula. My era we flew 4 different aircraft each more complex as we progressed through each phase. During basic training in the T-34 we were not even required to communicate on the radio. We then advanced to the T-28B/C where I believe the task was intimidation. (i.e. blower shift going through 12,000 ft IFR under the hood) was more than intimidating. Then on to helicopters. The TH-57A humbled an aviator with almost 100 flight hours but achieved a transition to an ability to hover. We finished up with the TH-1L. Many like me flew the UH-1D. This provided a feel for an operational machine, while also providing IFR training. Yes, IFR in a machine with only a stab bar. The UH-1D didn’t even have a turn needle and ball in front of the instructor. This system met the requirements of the times.

Today is different. The entire fleet is comprised of only heavy multi-engine complex machines. The curricula has not kept pace with this transition. Look to Lufthanza’s facility in Phoenix. They provide very specific training in machines specifically equipped to meet their operational requirements. The US government needs to follow this model. By comparison, the operational costs of most fleet machines, machines like the EC-135/145, Bell 412/429 or even an S-76 are a drop in the bucket when compared to the cost of operating any aircraft in the fleet. The end product would be better equipped to handle today’s fleet with less time required at the final transition.

Who can claim Bell doesn't support the 206's? Bell support of its products is still #1 in world.

Basic training is suppose to be how to fly not manage glass. Going to the 72 which has crappy autorotation capability will result in auto's not being needed because of hull losses. So what do you get? A bunch of AF447 pilots who look for the glass to save them instead of the drilled in training to make auto's in their sleep. Do not need to auto in a twin? Tell that to those killed in Glasgow!

The Sultan

The Air Force primary helo trainer is essentially a souped up UH-1H. While the addition of glass and its management is a bad thing in my opinion (primary helo training should be heavily focused on clock to map to ground type skills) and I think the exposure to actual touch down autos was valuable, the "simple" rotor system is a detriment. The under-slung, high inertia rotor system teaches bad habits. A young guy who can hover the Huey by shaking the crap out of the cyclic will make me vomit once you toss him into a Blackhawk.

The issue I see with something like the Lakota is the rigid rotor and breaking things when a young kid who can barely hover tries to set it down, and suddenly all those forces get instantly applied to the mast once the skids hit the ground and the fuselage can't move.

But it is what it is, there is no money for a new acquisition, the current trainers are apparently unsustainable and the Army has these "extra" aircraft hanging around. Maybe square peg round hole but it's probably cheaper given the frame of mind that they'd be operating the Lakota anyway, whether it's in a pilot training role or whatever the Guard does with them.

As to the concept that the Kiowa is better at supporting the troops than the Apache, harrumph, it's more complex than that.

The maintenance personnel at NAS Whiting Field can claim that. And do.

We've all read the R&W surveys and know what they say.

Many people agree with you on the purpose of basic training, however, those who are determining future fleet direction are typically not among them. That may be unpleasant to hear, but it happens to be supported by the facts.

If you believe the future of Naval or Army helicopter training remains a steam-gauge 206, go ahead and float that proposal.

DoD rates for 2013 show the TH-67 around $700/hr , and UH-72 around $2500/hr. Again. Is there a benefit to learning to fly on a complex , twin that is worth 3x more the hourly costs when you fly over 100k flt hours annually? The TH-XX, I have never heard of before, and as of 6 months ago, the Army's postition was they didn't need a new trainer. The Navy, who frankly would have more reason than the Army to train with a twin, doesn't want or require a twin either. There is no good justification for it.

I still contend this is the tail wagging the Army dog. The Army needs to find a home for Lakotas so the rest of their re-alignment works, so they are creating requirements to justify the HIGH hourly costs to operate them.

Understand the acquisition money excuse, but if you fly 100k flt hours a year, and the Lakota costs 3x as much per hour, how many years would you have to fly to pay for a new fleet at $3M per for a good SE helicopter? Its about total ownership costs.

The commercial helicopter industry understands this and has figured out a way to make it into a REAL business. Hence the boom over the past 10 years. Its TIME DoD learned a few lessons like this. Acquisition costs are only the begining and typically smaller than the total lifecycle costs. JSF is a perfect example. The big aquisition number will seem small compared to what it costs to operate and maintain them over +30 years.

All the services are geared toward the easiest solution instead the best solution, which may actually take some inginutiy and work to accomplish. But its only taxpayer $$$$ right?

The military outsources just about everything else, why not just send the accepted students to the local rotorcraft school where the taxpayers could drop $12,000 and the students would have a private certificate plodding around in an R22. Just the basic flying and navigating skills.

Feel free to train them in anything they want after that, but for the basic hovering and flying skills, why have a new airframe acquisition and maintenance program when all that already exists in dozens of places throughout the US now?

I get the whole "the military is better" fever, but the military would then have plenty of time to indoctrinate the student into the "military" way.

Diethelm:

You are invited to review the results of the IFS program that the USN instituted back in the early 2000's to answer your question.

Actually the USAF still uses an IFS program, a contract company teaches basic flying and the AF way of structured learning in I believe DA-20s. Then those who can learn the way the way the AF teaches, don't get sick and don't quit because it isn't what they thought it would be, go to UPT.

But once again, you're talking about spending money on something new vs something already bought and while new might cost less in the long run something already bought is a possible solution that already has programmed costs budgeted for, and less uncertainty.

Ain't government spending screwy?

Is it surprising mil aviation costs so much money ? Surely you start on a simple cheap trainer, it is hard enough for most pilots to grasp flying let alone how a complicated glass cockpit twin engine helicopter works when you first start! What's the chop rate on a US army course ? When Brit army taught me we started on a chipmunk fixed wing, of 13 starters 3 were chopped before we got near a helicopter, basic rotary on a 341 another 3 went, By the end of advanced rotary another 2 had gone. That is 8 from 13, now if that was in a helicopter, an expensive twin wow that's a lot of money to show 60% of course is not suitable

busdriver, I was referring to the NAVY IFS, not the Air Force IFS, which programs are NOT conducted in the same manner.

Just having a program may or may not produce the results you seek. (See the T-3 deal at USAFA of a few years ago as an example).
How you implement such a program makes a significant difference. The Air Force IFT (which was linked to a PPL as a performance objective) seems to have answered the mail on UPT failures when it was in place. Won't comment on the USAF IFS as it stands now.

I see in this thread quite a bit of hand waving about 'send 'em to civvy school' and so on, but if you don't structure the program right, you aren't furthering the development of your budding military aviator. Providing that there are performance standards and the ability to fail, one should be able to weed out the unmotivated early on, and the unable by the time it is over.

Is government spending screwy?
Is water wet? :ok::}

EDIT:
Early in the Navy program's life (circa 2006) Navy Post Graduate School in coordination with the Naval Air Training Command looked at IFS as the Navy conducted it and found it to require significant improvement.
ROI wise, it wasn't cost effective. Is it cost effective now?
I'll see what I can find out.

How does this relate to the thread?

At 2500 dollars per flight hour, the UH-72 is an expensive primary trainer. The ROI numbers for the T-34C were just under 400 dollars per hour, for the T-37 Tweet about 1100 dollars per hour, and for the T-6 were (last I recall) about six hundred dollars per flight hour. (Will try to get some better numbers on UPT/T-6 costs, that may be off by a bit).
First hit: $2,235 per flight hour for the T-6??? Not sure if that is calculated the same as for the Tweet ...

I'd say there is ample room for a program that will give an ROI for introductory helo training, depending upon how the Army structures the program. I'd go to the USAF for advice on this one, as their approach seems to me to be more effective than how the Navy has proceeded. (It galls me to say that, as a Navy man, but results matter).

Is it just DOC costs you are considering or are you rolling the DACs in there LW?
The T-34Cs were around for about 30 years, and their acquisition costs were much lower then than a comparable type is today.

2500$ hourly cost for a -72 seems a bit high, but even 2000$ would be.

Do Airline Pilots start their training on 737's or Challengers?

Last time I checked they started on small single engine piston airplanes and then progressed to more sophisticated and complex aircraft.

The point about using a "cheap" simple helicopter to "weed" out those deemed unsuitable for continuing training would have a lot of merit before putting the successful candidates into the more expensive aircraft.

Tottigol, I am pretty sure the accounting rules changed between the time that T-34C was being put together to replace the T-28B/C, and the time that T-6 was to Replace both the Tweet (T-37) and the T-34C.

Back in the late 90's, I think the number I saw tossed around for "cost per flight hour, (burdened) for the Tweet was between 1100 and 1200 dollars, and that was from discussing JPATS issues with folks at AETC. At the time, the cost per flight hour for T-34C was around 350 per flight hour. The projection I saw for T-6, at the time, was 700-800 dollars per flight hour. Don't know what the actuals are. (Best I can estimate, these were DOC).

I don't think that either of those figures accounted for amortizing the initial cost of the aircraft, (DAC) but represented the annual O & M budgeting figure to get gas and maintenance funded to keep them in the air. (If someone has folded in recurring program cost factors for depot level repairs, that might explain some of the numbers).

As the price of fuel has gone up, numbers like the ones I was dealing with back then probably make no sense: since fuel prices have just about tripled since the late 1990's / early 2000's.

Also, my numbers are some years out of date.

A link to a USAF listing of numbers for a whole load of aircraft, from B-2 to T-6 are hopefully apples to apples comparisons, and only include the annual O & M funding lines required to keep them flying. That was where the 2300 or so per hour for a T-6A was grabbed.

When trying to represent the cost to operate, I am pretty sure one should not roll in Acquisition costs (DAC): you are mixing different colors of money. I recall from some classes many years ago that that you are not allowed to mix the streams. :E APN-1 and major acquisition money is not to be mixed with O & M money.

Then again, rules do change over time. I am not in that realm any more, and may have missed some rule changes on costing and estimating.

This leaves me scratching my head on cost per flight hour figures for a givne airframe. I'll keep looking, keeping in mind how expensive fuel is these days.

Lonewolf, wasn't meant to poke, just to point out the IFS concept is still alive somewhere in the DoD. I don't actually know too much about the current system as I went through the previous IFT program. As you said, it needs to be standardized, my experience was with a AF base flying club with mostly retired military pilots or maintenance NCOs (who subsequently earned a CFI) as the primary IPs, and they were excellent. However, I know guys who ended up training with a mom and pop organization and while they got a PPL within the required 50 hours (very easy when that is your only job) it did little to prepare them for military style and pace of instruction.

I don't agree with the continual "it's too complex for a basic trainer" mindset, as if two engines is some monumental shift, but it definitely is more expensive and there is probably a cheaper way to do business.

IIRC, the md902 was passed over in favour of the 145 for the 72 requirement. I wonder if that was such a wise choice, then much less now?

Yes it was, it is.

Given the requirement upon which the award was based, it was a "good enough" choice.
Indeed it is. As you pointed out, at a certain cost per flight hour for the "entry trainer" a "pre entry" basic course has shown that it can be of some value. (The IFT program showed for a while a reduced primary / UPT attrition for USAF).
The results of IFS for the Navy showed mixed results, at best.
I have been advised that the link I provided was as pretty a picture as could have been painted of the program, based on what it was believed would be achieved by putting it into place in the early 00's. This is from someone who is much more familiar with the program than I.

What the Army has to sort out is whether or not they can save hours, dollars and fatigue life on the UH-72 via a well structured IFT sort of program in ... Robbies? Enstrom? Schweizer? Jet Rangers?

When you look at the volume of pilots they may be running through a system, HOW one puts that program into place and maintains standards is non- trivial problem to solve.

Your point on just who is providing this IFS (and standards) is spot on.

No offense, but I think you guys are missing the point. IFS or no IFS, Army flys between 80-100k flight hours a year. That will not change dramatically ovet the next 10 years and by using the UH-72 it will cost , at a minimum, 150-200% more per hour. The will literally spend all the savings of not replacing the Kiowa on flight hours at Rucker? Why ? Because the UH-72 needs a home? They will also be, with the exception of German 105s and now EC-135s, the only ones to employ an EC-145 as a primary trainer. There has to be a smarter more pragmatic solution.