Yes TM but the limitation is associated with the ditching approval:

Sea State 4 (which is the base line approval for most medium offshore helicopters - and some of the larger) is a significant wave height of 1.25m - 2.5m (4ft - 8ft).

It was this that was being referred to.

Jim

So does the sea state limitation apply to a land based destination where the approach is made over water, such as Sumburgh? If so, how is the sea state measured there considering it varies so much with depth of water and exact position. If not, surely it is not addressing the Sumburgh L2 accident?

If you look at the 5 accidents, only one (the ETAP) could possibly be impacted by this new rule. So it's hardly going to create a step change in safety! It seems to me to be mostly a PR excercise.

It's the design certification standard for large rotorcraft. Detailed guidance can be found here, including a lot of information about floatation gear certification:

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...updates%29.pdf

I think that quote wins the "rose tinted spectacles of the week" award!

That's how I interpreted the intent (and the reference to arming floats).

Certainly the arming floats bit. But I'm not so sure about the onshore destination sea state limit. After all, there is no sea state at a land destination. And which airports and runways are you going to include and exclude? For example, Aberdeen presumably not, Scatsta maybe, Sumburgh yes on the instrument runways. Wick probably not etc. No, I don't think they mean to include onshore destinations in the sea state rule, but it needs to be clarified!

I fear not every recommendation is as well thought through as they might be....

Yes, AMS 8.0 (I think) will introduce auto-arming. The FSI simulators already have the 3 position switch installed.

What are the criteria for auto-arming?

It will use an IAS sensing switch to physically arm the floats (at 80 kts) but I don't know much more than that. I think the SOP will be 'select auto' when coasting out, and leave it there until coasting in. The EICAS will show the actual status. A 'manual arm' position is still retained.

back in the bad old days people would fly out in overalls and (maybe) a life jacket

Now, especially in winter, they have so much survival gear on that even the slimmest person looks like a Michelin Man

I'm sure it is good to have if you can get out of the helicopter but you have to get out first

I am not believing what I am seeing here!

Sea State applies to the body of water you are flying OVER....where or why you are flying over it has naught to do with business....just the mere fact you are exposed to a qualifying Sea State at any point in your flight should be the Criteria.

If this is the level of understanding as an indicator of how some folks think....Lord Help Us!

As to having a very slow Ground Speed on Approach....in the old days we saw that as not being a bad thing especially in really bad weather. You are flying a Helicopter.....Remember?

If you feel the need to whistle down the glide path at near Warp speed....perhaps you might rethink the capabilities and advantages of flying a Helicopter.

SASless,

Could be a matter of accountability.

Jim

SASless
 

.... well I'm glad it's not just me, I managed Sumburgh Airport a good few years ago and am dumbstruck by suggestions of sea state criteria perhaps not applying to flights to land-based destinations?

Care to expound upon that a bit, Jim.....as that short statement leaves us unsure of what you are actually saying? Do you mean some form of "counting" or as a device for "eluding responsibility"?

Auto-arming floats, Cat A rebreathers, slimmer passengers, smooth seas - NS problems solved - phew, there was me thinking this could take a while, thank goodness we have the CAA and NDB holds.

Why is the majority of this report actions regarding survivability of a crash? Are the CAA saying that a crash is inevitable? Are the real safety issues being addressed or is this the CAA (government) looking for a good way to pacify our passengers? Limits on sea state were introduced after two of the recent incidents by all three companies I think, but the first week it impacted on commercial ops, the restrictions were deemed unnecessary. Who were the pilot group that were consulted? Does anyone know of someone that was consulted outside of management? Is the CAA as the regulator really in touch with what actually happens and if so, why have all their actions been after the event? They can't claim to be short of cash judging by how much they charge for an outdated licence document, just as an example.

We had spoken up about sea state, night bow decks, Dacon scoops (good prospect of recovery...WTF) and the like but nobody wanted to listen after each incident/accident. Even now, decisions we make are still being questioned and that is something that would surprise our passengers. Do I think we have moved on? Yes, a little, but the regulator's intervention is aimed incorrectly and is too little too late. The current mini-boom creates a whole new raft of problems which they had better get a grip of quickly. As someone who has contributed significantly to the coffers of the regulator I am a little disappointed. Our fixed wing brethren must be having a good giggle. As for BALPA...:eek:

I thought that the object of using helicopters was to access the installation under all sea conditions. When I started we did crew changes in Bell 47s
with two to four passengers.
If the authorities knew what they were talking about we would not be running into this ludicrous situation.
I sure SAS will agree that real pilots should cope and that passengers who don't think that they are Nurth Sea Tigers and just people going to work in often pretty basic jobs and just do what they are told. The Leggoland helicopter dunker trainers don't help!

It could be. In your opinion. However there area couple of problems with using sea state anywhere en route.

Firstly, who is going to measure it?

And secondly, we all know that helicopters only crash near the offshore installations whilst taking off and landing, that's why we have the safety vessels lurking there...... Er, well, that used to be the perceived wisdom anyway! How many out of the 5? Oh yes, just one, the ETAP!

Well the point is that helicopters aren't supposed to fall into the sea during an onshore instrument approach. They have sufficient speed to fly happily on one engine until over the runway. Whereas offshore, they have to slow down to below OEI flight speed before landing, whilst at the same time crossing over all sorts of nasty jagged metal bits.

OEI flight is, as we know, the only malfunction the CAA concern themselves with.

Which is just as well because if they contemplated the need to ditch immediately (not that this ever happens ... Ahem!) they would stop us from flying over land in weather where the cloud / fog was on the surface and especially over mountains when the cloudbase was below mountain top height.



Doh, I think I've blown it now...

Here is the thing I don't understand. Criticism of this initiative makes some feel smug but industry isn't doing any better, read for example the HSSG newsletters and - for example - the last time HUMS got a mention was 2012 to report nothing needs doing..... Super.

Yup, cat, pigeons etc

Do I hear that EASA apparently want to exclude Single Engined Helicopters to fly over Hostile Environments?
Doh They want unreliable, underpowered, weak tail rotor aircraft instead in the mountains? A twin Exposed is more than twice as dangerous as a single.

Over obsession with Engine Failure distorts methodologies.

Duplicating Engines might just be a good idea under some extreme circumstances but it is not the magic answer that people want it to be, evidently.

Set realistic and proportionate goals and let designers deliver using their initiative and skill.

Slide 5 for example.
 

Some interesting questions raised.

I always wondered about flying over mountains with the maybe just the very tippy tops showing....not rounded grassy tops but real sharp, jagged, granite like things....that even Mountain Goats avoid due to poor footing.

One beautiful Moon Lit night....VFR on Top in a Cessna Caravan....routing across an area in Washington State known locally as "The Alps"....a few craggy tops poking up out of the murk that ran right down to about a 1000 feet MSL....with elevations ranging from 4,000 to 9,000 or so. The destination was clear beneath an overcast so had no expectations of problems getting home.

Smack dab in the middle of the "The Alps", while star gazing and admiring a big bright Moon....and how it caused the granite rock below us to twinkle....the sudden realization that I was bore sighting a single PT-6 engine ruined a very pretty night.

Had that engine failed....it would have been fatal....and the quality of life from the instant it quit till we quit Earth would not have been very pleasant.

Helicopters are very much like that Caravan....One Main Gearbox.....and if it decides to experience a serious problem that requires an immediate landing....Things like Sea State, undercasts that go to the surface, and some other interesting situations should give us pause for thought.

We can always warmly note the Authority's definition of "Very Remote" or "Extremely Remote" however they label the concept that such things only rarely happen thus our risk of a sudden demise is not something to get concerned about.

So why should we get fussed about such issues.

The Cougar thing off Newfoundland was just a statistical fluke....as have been all the North Sea 225 Swim Calls.

What we do see....is the difference in the outcomes when Sea State is within the aircraft's certification level.

If a Rig Crew has to work over now and then....is it really that big a deal?

Spot on SAS

I find it really ridiculus to do crew change with gigantic waves beneath thinking:"is it really that important for the oil companies, to get Mr. B out so Mr. A can get in? Survival if we have to ditch now is impossible."

But that thought also go with: "this is what they are paying me to do, not only to fly Cavok, sea state zero, in day light...."

SASless,

The text was underlined to emphasize that the limit was on the certification status of the aircraft and not just SS6 (as HC has concluded).

As I tried to indicate (probably too succinctly), it is likely that for the whole of offshore operations, sea state will only be consistently reported for the offshore locations. Yes, there might be occasions when it could be worse at the onshore site (Sumburgh for example) but that would be an exception that would not justify the complexity that would be added to the regulatory regime by including it.

Cyclic,

It is not clear that you have read the whole report; the questions you have about getting to the heart of the problems are discussed and have resulted in Actions/Recommendations. You do need to read more than the press review and comments on PPRune.

The HF issues of automation will also be dealt with in an RAeS Conference on the 3rd and 4th July. This conference is intended to have all parties discuss:
By having presentations and discussions from the majority of the interested parties.

Jim

Did I read that only pax sat next to an emergency exit can be carried?

And if so is there a Body Mass Index associated with this?

SGC

Only if you stopped reading at that point.

The rest of the sentence says "...unless they are wearing a Category A rebreather" (or words to that effect).

What exactly is a Category A Rebreather, please? The only
ones I know of are SCUBA type which clearly aren't what is
mentioned.

Read this thread from post 26 onwards.

So JimL, a couple of questions..... Will this appy to the likes of NHV and DanCopter, who don't have UK AOCs but operate from the UK? And does any other jurisdiction (ie Norway) intend to adopt equally draconian rules in such a short time scale?

Don't get me wrong, I believe that each step provides safety benefit, but 7 weeks notice to reduce the capacity of every helicopter operating by between 30-50% is going to be problematic (understatement of the month) for oilcos and heliops. There is no Cat A EBS in use on the North Sea, at least not that I can find, and the training for whatever new device is selected with take a lot longer than the 7 weeks provided. Not even sure it can be done by the 2016 cut for for all occupants!

I assume the chaps in LGW Ivory Tower have considered all of this though, so I am sure they have a solution in mind.

Why a Class A 're-breather' when CAP1034 clearly states that they add to the buoyancy of the wearer when you need it least - ie, inside the cabin/cockpit.
Now a Class A Compressed Air device would be solution - and does not require 'special' training as how deep do you think you are going to use it?

Personally, not considering the pax (in this respect) as they have been equipped with a far greater level of safety equipment than my industry has afforded me.................

They write Rules....solutions are the Industry's Problem.:E

Sea states en-route
 

JimL,

I spoke to a very nice Met man at the Aberdeen Met Office about 15 months ago, who showed me the data that is now available on sea states/sig wave heights in UK waters. It is possible now, with satellite measured data, to show the sea states along a route from Aberdeen to, for example, the North Alwyn. When I asked why this wasn't available to me every day as a line pilot, he told me that was because "no-one had asked for it"!
It will probably cost the helicopter companies a little more, but on those days when sea states are an issue, it should be available.
And, as some have already pointed out on this thread, both the EC225 ditchings took place en-route, nowhere near an offshore installation.
No-one wants to see airframes in the water, but it will occur again despite all the training and improvements we are likely to see in the future. Surely, we owe it to our passengers (and ourselves!), that we cover all the bases and do all we can to ensure a safe outcome.

bondu

Bravo73,
Link not working.

Bondu.....ever the trouble maker!:D

Why is it I get the direct impression that the CAA and the Met Service eat at different subsidized Messes?:ouch:

What link?

I'm talking about this thread. The one that you're in. Try reading it from the beginning.

The Messes are different - one at Gatwick and one at Exeter.

Oh and the CAA subsidy has been removed.:ok:

SGC

Ok, for you professional types - I'm ready to be shot down:( and this may have been addressed already) BUT..

Reduced number of pax (30%) will require an increased number of flights (30%?). What does this do for the frequency of potential ditching. It occurs to me that, statistically, they should increase.

I don't know all of the details but, again, it occurs to me that we are dealing with survivability (and I'm all for that) , after ditching, without actually improving the fundamental issue of NOT ditching in the first place.

All with good intent, to learn

Hi Somesuch,

It would appear that the only means of achieving a level playing field (if you can have this in SS 4) would be with an airspace requirement - whether that would be the method of application is not known to me.

As the Report applied only to UK offshore operations, it is also not clear (to me) whether other fringe States would follow suit.

Bondu,

I'm sure all are aware of Sea State forecasts (it appears in Annex E page 25 of the report) along with this text:

I have to remind you that I do not speak (or think) for the CAA but am merely reporting what is contained in CAP 1145.

I find it somewhat bizarre that canteen practices always seems to be in the minds of some of the members. I wonder what Freud would make of that?

Jim

Hi Jim

I have read the report, end to end. I wasn't referring to the use of automation which I don't think is a huge problem or at least one that can be remedied very easily. You only have to look at some of the knee jerk reactions that have already taken place to see that a few topics have peen picked which aren't at the core of the problem/s. I really worry about the emphasis on post crash survival, the horse has already bolted. It needs to be reviewed and changed but isn't the answer to all the problems, nor is the use of automation. My reference is really to one of ethos, how we actually operate day to day and how we need to look with an open mind, a genuine will to thoroughly review gloves off. This forum shows how quickly "we eat our own babies" when it comes to a slightly varying point of view.

Most of the items in the review are blindingly obvious and ones that could have been implemented with a little vision long before the last accident. Why didn't we do it? Because, in my humble opinion, the ethos is not right in many respects.

Can't argue with you Slfsfu, it has also been mentioned on this thread earlier so you're not the only one. I don't have an answer though and neither does anyone here yet.

Si