I'm not sure. I may have been lucky, as the instructors I've had are generally guys who have a significant amount of experience, and in Norway at least, most were guys who had lost their medicals. I have had instructors not familiar with offshore flying, but all have been very receptive to input from guys with extensive experience in the field. As a rule, someone fresh from the sim, new to offshore, for instance, will still be subjected to extensive indoctrination training on the line prior to flying with regular Captains.

Hi john

If 4-per, then definitely way out of the sample rate. You have to sample at twice the maximum frequency you want to recover, that would be at least an order of magnitude faster than the actual FDR sample rate.

I'm sure there is yaw pedal position on the FDR, it comes (as for all the control axes) from the parallel trim actuator so is pilot's control position, ie without the effect of the series actuators or even collective mixing. On the 225 there is also the total control position (ie pilot + series actuator) but iirc this is not on the L2.

The AFCS is digital and does had some memory, but I think its limited to fault codes etc rather than a real-time data stream.

HC - CAE have not delivered ANY recurrent training to CHC Scotia pilots.

I know, my point was about how it looks from the outside and what is says about the company top brass's priorities, not the actual reality for recurrent training. Plus I would say the loss of control of the Aberdeen L2 sim is relevant for the reasons I mentioned.

So are they going to be renaming that Facebook page to "Destroy the pilot's"?

Possibly, but no point because the poor guys will already be destroyed.

Indeed. And, let me emphasize, no disrespect intended.

HC - your post #1945

' Of course its not "required" to have your own sim, but when you do, to sell it is a big backwards step that says a lot to an outsider about your attitudes. '

I think your statement reflects more on your attitude as an old school pilot trying to manage a global company and not a new broom manager trying to move the industry on from old habits?!

I don't agree tis tis, the problem with the industry these days is that its all run by bean counters. There needs to be a few more "helicopter" people in management, not just those intent on cutting costs.

You won't achieve safety from a spreadsheet of calculations, sometimes, you have to have been there and done it.

Helicomparitor
If this turns out to be true, then the Captain should never have left the ground. If a Captain does not have 100% faith in the co-pilots ability to do his job there is no point in flying with him? Is this the root cause - lack of experienced pilots?

I agree the 2 crew will be destroyed - they did not deliberately or wilfully crash this helicopter, and it is vital we get to the root causes. I don't think the offshore workforce will be blaming the pilots, unless like everything else in life a tiny minority may. It was a minority who started the other page as well, and most of the posters had probably never been in a helicopter.

However, this report will do nothing but increase the anxiety of those who are nervous helicopter travellers. All that seems to have changed so far is change of procedures (which hopefully will be a big step forward? - although you don't all seem to agree) and Sumburgh have to improve sea rescue capability.

Sorry rotorspeed I didn't say that. I said an ATPL/CPL needs to be warned that a basic 3-axis AP in ALT/VS with depart controlled flight due to loss of AIRSPEED if the collective is lowered (and held too long). Not as intuitive. Let me guess - you have never tried it - it is extremely subtle until it suddenly goes. And no, I haven't just mucked about while flying, it was done under controlled conditions to see what happened. Let's be honest flying with collective for speed is not intuitive.

I do think dumb 3-axis autopilots (not latest EC in EC135 for example) are more dangerous than they are worth - I'll say it again, an AP shouldn't be able to take the aircraft into a dangerous flight condition, certainly not on Public Transport. GM

@GipsyMagpie
I have some experience on the Bombardier CRJ-900 (as well as a few thousand hrs on the L2). Our CRJs do not have auto-throttles, so the approach is 3-axis. The crew have to mind the airspeed.

Do you think this is dangerous?

I am afraid then when you are recruiting pilots with 200hrs TT this is inevitable to a degree. The knock on effect lasts for years. You end up with silent deviations in SOPs because for whatever reason the captain does not fully trust the copilot until he has been in the company for several years. This in itself is no bad thing, but the recurrent training and SOPs ought to reflect this. Complacency as we know is always one of our biggest enemies, but close behind him is lack of confidence in our peers and SOPs. Perhaps the discussion on Captains monitored approaches should be looked at again in certain conditions?

Exactly, and I think even referring to it is unhelpful. A fixed power with an exponetially increasing power demand results in an exponetial increase in rate of descent.

HC, I can't see on the FDR trace the key for the discrete that runs accross the top of the plot - any idea what it is? Also, I'm puzled by the DME trace shape - is it a function of low sampling rate? Surely it would otherwise be a straight line?

I see, also, that the selected V/S trace drops off at about 40 KIAS, is that the AFCS being decoupled automatically? (The S92 does at 50 KIAS and below, for non-radalt modes)

212, good spot but I too can't see what that discrete is. I don't think its worth trying to guess.

The DME is only recorded to the mile, not decimals of a mile, hence it changing in steps of 1 mile. So its a resolution issue rather than a sample rate issue.

On the VS trace, I can only guess you are right and (not having been involved in the L2 for 7 years) I can't remember how the AFCS behaves once you go below the min speed for a mode. On the L, it remains engaged. On the 225 it drops out (though the vertical modes all work down to zero kts). Not sure about the L2.

industry_insider post #1959

I understand from where you are coming ...... but surely beancounters have not stifled our policy or procedures on how to maintain control of the aircraft?

Throttles = speed, so no I don't. It's dangerous when you are swapping axes (collective = speed) and an engaged mode will fly you into danger. If you haven't got autothrottles it cannot. You now there is no AFCS controlling speed so you are active hands on controlling it. In the case I mention, you have a mode engaged which is controlling what is normally the collective's job and if you put the collective in the wrong place, you reach a point where you lose control. In your CRJ, you leave the throttles at the back and:

a. You get a stall warner - pretty sure there isn't a vortex ring warner!

b. You are used to firewalling the throttle if it goes wrong and hopefully it drags you out. In a helicopter you pull in power, it makes it worse.

So no, in a CRJ, not dangerous.

GM you raise a valid point about stall warners etc. I have previously said to EC that despite the wonders of the 225 autopilot, there are only visual clues when a failure occurs that causes a mode to drop out or otherwise require pilot intervention. For a visual warning to work, you have to be looking at it. IMO there should be an aural warning of some sort (not too "in your face") when a mode degrades, drops out or when the heli goes out of the flight conditions within which the mode is allowed, just to make you look in the right place. It wouldn't seem too hard to implement even as a retrofit.

It's the very fact that such failures virtually never occur on the 225 that makes it all the more necessary.

The S92 shouts "Decouple" whenever a mode is deselected - intentionally or otherwise.

You can argue until the cows come home but the buck stops with the two guys up front.

It appears no one wants to point the finger of blame but in my book they were paid to transport workers off an oil rig to home and messed up badly.

They have not had the decency to speak about this disaster in public because in my opinion they only care about the outcome.

I would have a lot more respect if they had faced the public from day one.

As for defending them by saying they'll never fly again what about the four passengers who lost their lives. I'd rather be alive sans career than dead in the icy waters off Shetland.

I sometimes despair when I read reams of rubbish defending pilots who make big mistakes.

The Air France threads are a classic example.

Four people who depended on this company,helicopter and crew lost their
lives but the families are having to cope with the grief of the loved ones they will never see again.