GOM PHI Crash May 2012
 

Reports of a PHI 206L accident in the GOM. No more details.

PHI aircraft crashed 30 miles south of Grand Isle. The Pilot was the only occupant, sadly the body was recovered in the aircraft.

Thought the safety was first priority, so how can they use single engine turbines for that? Excuse my ignorance :confused:

Simple Maths really....when you lose them one or two at a time....it makes your statistics look much better than if you lose them a cozen or so each time. Having one engine means you have half the chance for an engine failure....and it eliminates problems on landing and takeoff trying to fly a OEI profile.

Add in the GOM guys prefer VFR to IFR.....again...makes things simpler and safer.

Condolences to the family and friends of the pilot. A Lafayette news station
identified him Arthur Lebron. RIP

Dauphin dude, there is almost no excuse for your self-admitted ignorance. I've been watching this accident closely - being an ex-PHi guy and all, and so far NOT ONE BLESSED THING has indicated this was an engine-related accident. So just shut up, mm'kay?

.....and two engines didn't make any differance at all in the 2009 S76 accident.

Why are you GOM people so defensive and obsessed with the number of engines? It is well known (at least in the real world) that the majority of GOM accidents are related to poor CRM and flying VFR offshore - not the number of engines.

Multi-engine offshore helicopters operate IFR with 2 pilots and therefore have fewer CRM and and VFR related accidents. They just happen to have 2 engines as well.

Here we go again, and again, and again, and again..........................:ugh:

I take it you are referring to the monotonous regularity of these seemingly baffling accidents Darren?

EP...the GOM in general is a whole different kettle of fish than the North Sea.

The nature of the task is different, the climatic conditions are much different, and the mindset of the government, operators, and oil companies are much different.

Over time....kickiing and screaming....the GOM is slowly improving. It certainly could not get much worse than it was not so many years ago.

Are the GOM aircraft fitted with autopilots? I'd rather have a decent autopilot than an extra engine.

ASN Aircraft accident 28-MAY-2012 Bell 206-L4 LongRanger N7077F

This FAA Notice was included in the above link.

http://www.faa.gov/data_research/acc...a/02_7077F.txt

From a safety standpoint...
 

There isn't much of a difference.

Acoording to OGP Stats in their 1998 report singles have the lowest accident rate per 100,000 flight hours, followed by heavy twins.

According to HAI stats over the past 10 years twins have slightly lower fatal accident rate than singles. (.83 per 100k for singles vs .72 per 100k for twins)
(It shows singles have a significantly higher non-fatal accident rate 4.45 per 100k vs 2.67 per 100k for twins) Much of the difference is successful autorotations.

http://rotor.org/portals/1/safety/2005/4.pdf

have to do your own math to get 10 year numbers.

It is noteworthy to add that these are US helicopter fleetwide, not just oil and gas, so your single engine stats include ag, powerline, animal capture and other higher risk flight profiles.

As SASless said different environment. shorter flights, calmer water, as well as the often touted different government, customer thing.

I fly singles, (not in the gulf) and would feel no safer in a twin. I would however, feel less safe on any type that has only a million hours under its belt. Greatest new technology or not, there is value in 30 years of refinement, and an element of uncertainty in anything new.

Look at the EC 225 the S-92 the AW 139 and the EC 135, all NEW aircraft certified unther the new, more stringent regs and the source of many of the worst accidents in the past few years. All growing pains I'm sure. And I have no doubt at some point they will be safer than the models they replaced, but we wont know that point until we've passed it, and I'm not sure we have on some of them.

I agree with what the other guy said about the second pilot, I think that helps a lot more than a second engine.

Shy.....Having the autopilot is absolutely a plus.....but there is no such thing as a "spare" engine. The first one belongs to the Operator....the subsequent ones belong to me!

A good basic autopilot in the GOM 206's would have saved a lot of lives over the years!

Lots of pilots would like autopilots in single-engine aircraft, and lots of operators would also, and would install them immediately if they were available. Unfortunately, none are currently available, AFAIK. Light, reliable, and relatively inexpensive models are essential, and there's the rub. Any piece of equipment that costs as much as the airframe may as well not even exist, but I'm not aware of any available at any price. Work is in progress, but it's far from ready to install.

No, more about the monotonous regularity of the 2 v 1 engines discussions brought on by an accident in the GOM. Nobody knows what happened yet.

Well that is certainly not my point. It seems that only EASA think that turbine engines fail on a regular basis but we who fly and maintain them know that is not the case. It is the way that helicopters are operated that cause the accidents.

Sasless points out that the GOM environment is 'different' to the North Sea. That may well be the case but 2 pilot, IFR helicopters are the norm for offshore flights almost exclusively these days in all parts of the world - even the Third World.

Mini-STAB and I believe a 2-cue autopilot was/has been installed in some Longrangers as part of IR certification. Weight? The loss of a revenue seat for the whole gig? Less if you don't need full IR, "just" stabilisation with alt and heading hold. No doubt impractical for a B206, but what held up implementation (and development) in more Longrangers?

Light Helicopter Autopilots
 

In the early 80's almost all the 206's I flew were autopilot equipped.

In those days Collins adapted one of their popular fixed-wing autopilots, the model 841, for helicopter use and it became the 841H. Bendix-King also began production of a helicopter autopilot, the KAP-150H and together with the Collins unit these were probably the two most popular light helicopter AP's during the 80's.

In the 90's, and due to the relatively small number of sales, Collins and Bendix stopped producing these models along with SFENA (the firm who had supplied AP's for the US Navy's TH-57 'Sea Ranger' fleet).

However, while the American avionics manufacturers ceased production of light helicopter AP's France's SFIM Industries (now Safran, owned by Sagem) has been producing 'specifically helicopter' AP's (AFCS) for years - check here for the Safran site.

As a side note; my godfather had been working on the development of a specifically helicopter autopilot system with Ferranti's Aircraft Equipment Division as a replacement for their SAS unit but, alas, the programme was axed when the Ferranti group ran into financial difficulties and the division's new owners (GEC-Marconi) did not wish to pursue the project.

I have no clue what the minimum equipment list is for GOM ops avionics but one supposes this would be nice:

http://www.copters.com/pictures/L3InstrumentPanel.jpg
206L III panel

The LIII above is fitted with: Dual attitude indicators, HSI, RMI, 3 axis autopilot, rad alt, DME and M3 approach certified GPS.

Of autopilots and single engine operations .. Ron Bower (1996 Around the World Helicopter Speed Record holder) said: "I expect it saved my life many times during marginal-weather low-altitude ocean crossings and reduced ground-reference flying at night."

Description aircraft crashed into an oil rig in the gulf of mexico.
 

The statement from the preliminary, quoted above, is depressingly familiar as fairly common contributor to GoM incidents.

Having recently flown in the GoM, I can assure you that the mindset of the operators has changed significantly since 1998 - the report is 7 years old and based on 14 year old data.

I would think that those flying in the elsewhere would be a little more conservative in their reaction taking in to account the recent heavy and medium incidents in the past year or so.

Wait for the cause of the accident to be been determined before getting on the multi-engine high horse.

Lets all show respect for a fellow aviator and wait till the cause is determined.

Condolences to his family.

Just... wow...


This is indeed the basis of my initial question...

ShyTorque - despite being a dyed in the wool twin engined guy myself, you say that an autopilot can sometimes be better than a second engine rings true for me. PHI practice EOL's to the water and are a first rate organisation. I have not followed this accident closely enough. Seems like your commonsense is shining through again - you old pelican! If all the operators pushed for AP's life would be better for the GOM guys I am sure. UG

I'm an EMS guy who came up the civilian track so I started in piston singles, now I have a shiny EC135 which is the third twin I've been paid to fly and my favourite so far.

That said, faced with the choice between a second engine and an autopilot, I'll take the autopilot. The chances of it becoming my best friend while I sort out how I got into this pingpong ball and how I get to the airport I can no longer see far outweigh the chances of having to autorotate - which I've done a good few times as a fright instructor.

DauphineDude,

But they all have only one MGB.... 3 out of the last 4 accidents in the Northsea/atlantic were MGB problems, 2 fatal, and the last one everything was working 100%, had 2 crew, but still ended up in the drink...
Do we ever hear the same kind of sofa-expertise as to why it all went south then?? No, as there was 2 pilots, and 2 engines and the worlds best maintenance, etc, bla bla bla.... things like "we should wait until the AAIB has issued..." and "don't speculate" is what is being preached from day 1 then.

I kind of get fed up with people that scream "twin and multi-crew is the solution" every time there's an accident with a single-pilot, single-engine aircraft and points fingers very early. It is the rule, more than the exception.

So, we should wait until the AAIB/NTSB has issued it's findings and not speculate....

Condolances to the family.

UG, thanks, I know you're only saying those kind words since I bought the beer.. :E

Twins for me too, not just for engine performance reasons (not always as good as it might be, especially when the type of engine emergency you experience "can't happen" - "Oh yes it can!" as we both know) but for the duplication of other systems they usually bring as part of the package.

Engines thankfully rarely fail these days but the human animal is still based on a stone age design, which wasn't meant to operate with both feet off the ground and so it gets easily confused in cloud. The machine doesn't know it's in cloud and so it carries on regardless of the lack of visual cues. Autopilots are essential for low viz ops, day or night, shame they don't come as standard in every helicopter.

FAA preliminary reports are often inaccurate. I've seen all sorts of egregious errors posted on them. FWIW, this one says it was a 206B, while the FAA's registration database says it was a 206L-4, which is much more likely. Given that, the statement that it crashed into a platform is somewhat suspect, and I'll wait for more definitive information before I rush to any judgment.

DauphinDude

Shell Oil operate twins in the GOM very sucessfully. Again some oil companies can care for their employees and still make a profit:)

Its sad to see pilots who clearly fear they would not be able to cope with a twin trying to justify an unsafe status qou.

I applauded you SHELL MANAGMENT for your insight. It takes bold actions by leaders in industry to change the status quo, don't you agree.

Seeing as SHELL is such a bold leader and has the whole oil and gas industry under its wing, heck all aviation, why does SHELL not simply say that they will not use any vendor that that has any single engine aircraft in their fleet? Inaddition SHELL should lobby to pull all airworthiness certificates for single engine aircraft, because over land or sea, a single engine failure has a high probability of resulting in an accident. Further more, why not mandate that all helicopters have a redundant main transmission, tail rotor system and that all red falcons or birds in route be eradicated before flight.

You do not know the cause of this accident, please keep your musing to your self till the investigation is complete.

NTSB Identification: CEN12FA321
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Monday, May 28, 2012 in
Aircraft: BELL 206-L4, registration: N7077F
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On May 28, 2012, approximately 1610 central daylight time, N7077F, a Bell 206-L4 helicopter, was substantially damaged when it collided with the Ensco 99 oil rig derrick while on approach to the South Timbalier (ST67B) production platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial pilot, only occupant, was fatally injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by PHI INC, Lafayette, Louisiana. A company visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that originated from its base in Grand Isle, Louisiana, at 1514, and destined for the Mississippi Canyon (MC397) and ST67B oil platforms. The pilot landed at MC397 at 1541, dropped off a box, and then departed for ST67B at 1543 to pick up a passenger. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the on-demand offshore flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

The ST67B production platform is a permanent structure equipped with a 24-foot-long by 24-foot-wide helipad with a 3-foot-wide solid safety fence. The Ensco 99 oil rig, which is a mobile jack-up rig, was connected on the northside of the ST67B platform and had been in place for approximately four months. The Ensco 99 rig, which was being operated by Ensco for Energy XXI, was also equipped with a helipad that was 65 feet in diameter. At the time of the accident, the Ensco 99 oil derrick was positioned over the ST67B helipad by approximately seven feet. The height above the helipad to the bottom of the derrick floor was approximately 30-35 feet. There was also a lift boat, the Alliance I, stationed at the southeast corner of the two rigs. The boat was staffed with a captain, first mate, and crew.

The captain and first mate of the Alliance I witnessed the accident. According to the captain, he was sitting in his office on the boat when he heard the helicopter approaching. It alarmed him because the noise of the helicopter was so loud and he thought the ST67B helipad was closed because of the oil derrick's position over the pad. He watched as the helicopter approached the pad and he could see a worker on the Ensco 99 rig trying to wave the pilot off from landing. Due to the relatively close proximity of the helicopter to the boat, the captain thought he saw the pilot trying to "pull back" but "it was too late" and the main rotor blades struck the southeast corner of the oil derrick. The helicopter then spun rapidly and the tail boom separated from the fuselage. The helicopter flipped and descended into the water inverted. The Captain immediately sounded the general alarm. The emergency floats on the helicopter were not deployed and the helicopter began to sink. In less than a minute, rescue boats were in the water but the helicopter had already sunk from view below the surface. The captain said he had never seen a pilot make an attempt to land on the ST67B helipad before.

The first mate said he was in the boat’s wheelhouse when he heard the helicopter approaching. He looked outside the window and saw the skids of the helicopter going by. He said was concerned because he thought the ST67B helipad was out of service due to the close proximity of the oil derrick over the helipad. The first mate was watching a person on the Ensco 99 rig trying to wave the pilot off from continuing the approach when he heard a “pop, pop, pop” noise. At that moment, he knew immediately that the main rotor blades struck the base of the oil derrick. When he looked back at the helicopter it had spun around suddenly and he thought the tail rotor struck the helipad. He said, “The helicopter jumped violently and the tail seemed to fold and the chopper fell along the northeast side of the platform…” The first mate then assisted the captain and other parties in an attempt to rescue any survivors. The first mate said that he has never seen a pilot attempt to land on the ST67B pad before.

Another witness was working on the north side of the oil derrick when he heard the helicopter make two passes around the oil rig. He then heard the helicopter approaching the ST67B helipad and it sounded "normal." Shortly after, the witness heard the main rotor blades impact the base of the oil derrick (rig floor). The witness then rushed down a set of stairs on the east side of the rig floor and looked over the railing. At that point, he saw that the tailboom had separated from the fuselage, and both sections were descending into the water. The witness stated that he had been stationed on the Ensco 99 rig for approximately four months and he had never seen a helicopter land on the ST67B helipad.

According to the Ensco 99 Offshore Installation Manager (OIM), the passenger that the pilot was to pick up was waiting in the Ensco 99 waiting area, which was just south of the Ensco 99 helipad. He also said that the oil derrick had been positioned over the ST67B helipad for approximately 3 months since they were drilling on a specific well. The OIM had been stationed on the Ensco 99 for approximately 4 months and had never seen a helicopter land on the ST67B helipad. He said that the pilots always used the Ensco 99 helipad.

According to PHI, a Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs) declaring the ST67B helipad "closed" due to encroachment of the oil derrick had not been issued prior to the accident. After the accident, PHI issued a NOTAM that stated the helipad was closed. In addition, Energy XXI had a red "X" painted on the helipad.

The helicopter wreckage was recovered several hours after the accident and transported to PHI’s facility in Lafayette. The wreckage was examined on May 30, 2012, under the supervision of the NTSB investigator-in-Charge. The helicopter sustained impact damage on the left side of the nose and along the left side of the fuselage. The roof of the fuselage was partially crushed into the cabin and the skids were spread.

The tail boom had separated from the fuselage at the point where the tail boom attached to the fuselage. The tail boom exhibited minor damage. The tail rotor assembly and both blades were not damaged; however, the main rotor blades exhibited impact damage and were fragmented. Both main rotor blades remained attached to the mast, but only about four feet of each blade remained. The missing pieces of the main rotor blades were not recovered. Flight control continuity was established for all flight controls to the cockpit.

The helicopter was equipped with an Intellistar engine monitor, which was removed for further examination and download.

The emergency external float system was intact, so it was manually activated from the cockpit during the wreckage examination. All but the middle float on the right rear expanded fully.

The pilot’s seat (front right) was intact and no visible damage was noted to the seat frame or box. The front right door was not damaged and functioned normally when tested. The pilot's 4-point seatbelt/shoulder harness assembly was intact and both the lap belt buckle and inertial reel system worked when manually tested. According to information provided by the company that recovered the helicopter, the pilot was found upright inside the cockpit of the helicopter and his seatbelt/shoulder harness assembly was not fastened.

The pilot was wearing his company issued life vest at the time of the accident and the two bladders were found outside of their vest pockets. The life vest was retained and examined. The vest had two bladders that could be inflated manually by pulling down on two pull-tabs on the front of the vest (one for each bladder). When the tab is pulled it activates an 02 cartridge. Once the cartridge is activated, a red locking pin built into the system is sheared. Examination of the O2 cartridge on the left side of the pilot's vest (which feeds the front bladder) revealed that the red locking pin was sheared and the O2 cartridge had been activated. Examination of the front bladder revealed a 3-inch-long diagonal tear on the front left side of the bladder. The tear appeared to have been made with a sharp object. The seams of the bladder were inspected and no other tears/leaks were noted. Examination of the red locking pin on the right O2 cartridge assembly (which feeds the rear bladder) revealed it was intact and the cartridge had not been activated. No tears or leaks were observed in the rear bladder. The O2 cartridge was then activated and the bladder filled immediately with air.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate for rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument helicopter. His last Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) First Class medical was issued July 18, 2011. A review of company records and also one of the pilot’s logbooks found in the helicopter, revealed he had accrued approximately 1,645.1 hours; of which 363 hours were in Bell 206-L3/4 model helicopters.

Weather at Fourchon, Louisiana (K9F2), approximately 15 miles north of ST67B, at 1700, was reported as wind from 240 degrees at 12 knots, visibility 7 miles, few clouds 3,000 feet, temperature 32 degrees Celsius, dewpoint 25 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 29.87 inches of Hg.

My commiserations to the family of the pilot.

I'm not sure I want to comment on the accident directly apart from the fact that it is beyond my comprehension. Notwithstanding that the deck was not NOTAMed as closed, clearly it was obstructed, and marked as closed.

What I would like to comment on is the reported size of the deck on the ST67B - shown as 24ft x 24ft.

The length of the B206L-4 is 42.5ft and its rotor diameter is 37ft; even with the US regulations, which permit a deck to be based upon the Rotor Diameter ('RD') not the 'D', this deck appears to be smaller than the RD of the L4 - smaller than the RD of any version of the B206 (or even the R22).

If the size of the ST67B is as reported, it begs the question why and regulated by who? To discover this is particularly disappointing at a time when the Standard for deck size in ICAO Annex 14 had already been reduced - for helicopters with a MTOM of 3,175 or less - from 1D to 0.83D, and recently mooted that the reduction should be applied to larger types (for example, those in the North Sea).

I would be delighted to hear that this was a typing error; although my sentiments about the systematic reduction in deck sizes still applies.

Mars

Mars, I completely agree that the reductions in helideck dimensions is not acceptable. Unfortunately this trend is not limited to the GoM.

My understanding is that this helideck size was so small is because it was considered Private; Prior Permission Required (PPR) and requires that the crew is briefed on the hazards. FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5390-2A states that :-
Having worked in the GoM recently, is sad to say that very few NOTAMS are issued to the closing of helidecks or hazards.

New pilot....low time....mission lock.....tragic end to his life.

Notam or no Notam....you don't land on a helideck with something big, solid, and ungiving extending over your landing surface.

This one should be a Lessons Learned presentation to all new hires during their initial training.

I know this is a silly question to ask for the GOM....but....is there no requirement to speak to the rig/platform by radio prior to landing?

If not...why not?

If there is....what happened here?

I had the same thought as Sas, I fly offshore in the Middle East where safety is far from a priority, but even there we are required to have radio clearance to land on any structure, rig or boat. Is it not the same in the GOM?

gwelo shamwari,

You are the first person I have known who can quote AC 150/5930; however, you have referred to version 2A - which has been superseded by 2B and then yesterday, 2C.

As I rarely, if ever, refer to the AC, I'm not even sure what the text in 2B or 2C mean:

First 2B:
Superseded by 2C:
If the AC applies to the GOM (which I somewhat doubt), what effect will that have on deck sizes?

Mars

People really do not understand the GOM. 24'x24' is the smallest heliport approved for use by PHI. Aside from that, there are just so many structures to land on and many of them are normally unmanned. If the platform is a 24'x24' then it is probably unmanned most of the time. Therefore no one would be there to "give permission" to land. Similarly, a small jack up rig would not normally have a dedicated person manning a radio. So no, it is not usual to secure permission before landing on a rig or platform.

Having said that, it is unfathomable that even an inexperienced GOM pilot would try to land on a 24'x24' with a rig derrick hanging over it when there was a perfectly good, useable helideck nearby. What was he thinking??

Mars, thank you, been a while since I read the AC and I was reading an old one that I had saved, anyway the new text is...

My understanding is that all that is need for a helideck for e.g. a B206-B3 (the A/C that at one point was considered the standard offshore workhorse) would be 11.5ft (EMERGENCY FLOWAT GEAR w/ AAI FLOATSTEP Length) x 2 = 23ft. In the GoM they round it up to 24ft for simplicity. As the heliports are elevated there should be no obstructions in the FATO (Final Approach and Takeoff Area) so all they then do is put a safety net around the TLOF (Touchdown and Liftoff Area).

However API also has it own guidelines for helideck design, "API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 2L" and requires the diagonal distance for a helideck to be the width of rotor of the largest helicopter to be used on it. So a diagonal distance for a 24ft/24ft deck would be 33ft which is still based on a B206B3.

You choose which guideline to use as I have had people reference both of them.

We should be using 1D or at the very least 0.83D. Sadly I fear that this will not happen as it would be cost prohibitive to increase the side of helidecks in a struggling GoM market.

Calling for clearance to land greatly depends on the customer. Most of the time it is only required on drilling rigs, however the Shell's and BP's do require several calls to maned platforms and rigs.

It has been a few years since I flew in the GOM, but24'x24' is a standard small heliport size. I used to do slingloads to them daily. Radio contact is not required, and not usually available on these platforms, and often not available to large production platforms. It depends on the operator and the operations. For those operated by small contract production companies, radio contact is seldom possible. They don't have enough personnel to do the required work, nevermind monitor the radio. I'm assuming (and I know all the problems with that, but I've been there and done that) that the pilot was told to pick up a passenger at ST67, and the dispatcher assumed the pilot knew that he would be on the drilling rig. It seems the pilot didn't. New pilot, job pressures, lack of information, and a tragic end. That may not be the actual situation, but I would bet some money on it. Putting out a NOTAM would have done no good, since it would have been more than 4 months old, and nobody reads those anyway. They may glance at new ones, but old ones are pretty much ignored. Too much useless information that doesn't apply to the day's work, so it's all ignored. I'm not defending that, I'm just saying it's the way it is. I always considered that I was paid for using my judgment, not for flying, and still do. I would have landed on the rig and made the passenger walk all the way over to its helipad if he was on the platform, but if I were a new guy, no real idea of how things worked, and worked in a rather hostile environment where I was worried about keeping my job, I might have seen things differently. It's clearly pilot error, but morally, the supervisory chain has to take some blame. I'll try to hold my breath until that happens.
:(

Mars, ICAO requirements and procedures may as well not exist in the GOM. That's foreign stuff, and anyone who even suggests that there might be anything worthwhile in any of them would be laughed out of the room. Louisiana is hard-core conservative territory, and they don't approve of anything European, especially Sharia law. :ugh:

Do they also laugh as loud at each new fatality?