Thanks ummmmmm

Good post!

Garfs - you said that, not me.

Considering the Spain, it is an European Country, so Spanish Operators shall take seriously training, safety and all other aeronautical aspects.
Spain is under EASA regulations that are very strict!

EASA.... Wah wah wah wah.... of course the standards are higher than everywhere else... My arse :ugh:

I totally agree that Savoia's table is too simplistic; those who have been involved in the exercises to re-consider recent accidents (IHST, EHEST etc.) will confirm that each consisted of a large number of factors which contributed in some way.

The introduction of HFACS to the European model has illustrated that human factors is always involved - even when the most important contributory cause is the failure of a mechanism, part or design.

Probably the single most biased statement is the one that attributes 'pilot error' as the cause of the accident (as was the case in several entries in the table at one time). The fact is that the pilot is almost always there when the aircraft crashes. It is always far more complex than that.

Equally the statement (sorry to quote you 'aegir') that is all too simplistic. In no European State are Operations yet conducted under the auspices of EASA Operational Regulations - they are not yet finalised nor accepted and, even when they are, SAR will still be regulated by the State, not EASA!

Without prejudice to the Spanish accident; what needs to be examined is not the set of rules under which operations are performed but the safety culture within the organisation. Those of us who have been following these accidents will be extremely interested in the examination of all human aspects with respect to the HFACS model posted by 'Umm...lifting'.

Like a number of others, I welcome the discussion of these accidents - if only to improve the knowledge of those who fly the aircraft and who perform similar operations. What I would caution against is simplistic entry in a table which concludes the cause of the accident - in my opinion, no useful purpose is being served there.

I am not advocating the closure of the thread but let it serve the same purpose at those for the EC225 and S92 - a tool for education not a device for allocating blame or short-cutting due process.

Jim

A table is a table and I am surprised that anyone would consider it a substitute for a report or rational debate in which hopefully fact-based details are espoused.

Perhaps for those frequently engaged in 139 operations or who have followed the fleet's operational history over some time, including accidents, this is old hat and woefully inadequate but .. the table is for those readers who, like myself, are not involved with 139 operations, know little or nothing of the type's operational history but are keen to get a grasp on what has happened in recent years.

As I say, those who have been following the 139's history from the outset may yawn but newcomers, unfamiliar with even the basic details surrounding 139 incidents, will doubtless appreciate the tabled summary. When someone writes about a specific accident newbies (and perhaps even some infrequent readers) may not readily recall the basic details of the event. Now that there have been several more 139 accidents a 'quick reference' should come in handy for those wishing to locate 139-related incidents within the context of the type's accident history.

Moving on, if these discussions should be fruitful, then might I pose a question regarding the extent of the 139's 10 day factory course given that one Rotorhead has communicated his conviction that the existing course is inadequate. For those environments/cultures (corporate that is) where training is perhaps in question wouldn't this be a starting point in reinforcing 139 operational efficiency. I mention 'starting point' as there are clearly numerous measures required in establishing and sustaining safe and professional operations but, strengthening initial proficiency might be a place to begin. Is the 10 day course sufficient and how effective are the methods used to measure this sufficiency on a person by person basis?

Reliable aircraft???
 

When a pilot crashed an aircraft in a CFIT accident,I do not see how we could blame anybody else!whatever conditions we have,when you are at the control,it is up to us to avoid accidents and very easy to blame anybody else.It is like when our media are saying an aircraft was down because of weather,well the reality is, the pilot who decide to fly in this conditions was not able to manage it.
Yes,it is a complicated aircraft,but the main problem is,it is not reliable.The number of Caution lights we got on this machine is creazy.The worst is,you shut it down and restart it and the light goes off.How can you trust this machine? We had one of our machine down for a week because they had to verify all electrical connections,it was not done properly at the factory(well,Agusta blamed another company who was doing the job???)So,you can have multiple failure created by the computer system who make your life difficult at the wrong time.

Arcal76 - the 'logic' in your first para could be undermined by your second para. In this day an age I'd hope we don't just blame a pilot after a CFIT but try to find and fix all the reasons it happened which might include aircraft system problems, inadequate training, fatigue due to a poor roster and so on.

Savoia - it might be a simplistic table but it still has a use - so thanks for taking the time to collate it. It would be great if it had a hyperlink to the investigation reports available.

@Epiphany

Maybe not, but it was definitely implied...

Reliable Helicopter
 

To have a good picture if AW139 is or not a reliable machine perhaps we should compare with other helicopters accidents history.
Try to check S76 A B C D.... with the missing MR blades or S365 and his fenestron, Puma, S92, EH101.

Perhaps by the end of that history record will find out that AW139 is a very reliable A model.

AB 139
 

Folks,

Just putting this out there for discussion, but how come we have heard virtually NIL about problems with this type in the USA? They have been operating it in the GOM for what, 10 years and no accidents?

Please correct me if I'm missing something, but were they not originally manufactured in the states under the wing of good old BELL?

Does that perhaps tell us something, or am I just the devil in disguise :E

Where's that good old reliable 412 gone :{

AW139 Production
 

SN: 31001 on - AW139 made in Italy
SN: 31201 on - AW139 made in Italy
SN: 41001 on - Assembled in the USA

Cheers, TP

Jolly Green

I could say it was your assumption. I have worked as a helicopter pilot in many parts of the world (including many of the countries where these accidents occurred) and my knowledge of safety and training throughout the helicopter industry is based on experience. That includes maintenance standards.

aegir

Does this mean that INAER are no longer using non-type rated co-pilots on two pilot contracts?

I don't know if Inaer are working unfair, in that case the Authority "should" intervene (in a perfect world, I know).
But what about the other Spanish Operators? Are all outlaw or we have someone the think safety it's important?

I didn't say that, but, compared to FAA for example in HEMS operations, EASA are more strict! The standard are high, sometimes too high and working it's not very simple...

My question still stands; can one assist those immersed in operating cultures where safety and performance standards are more challenging to meet and maintain by ensuring that initial type conversion for both drivers and mechanics is adequate?

One PM I received says that the ten-day factory course is insufficient. Who determines that a driver has adequately absorbed the lessons on the course? Would a more in-depth conversion/induction be appropriate or a more rigorous method of assessing student understanding of the training delivered?

Finally, what is the client's role in this: ie. Petrobras, would they have a flight standards officer or if not, how about bodies such as OGP, do they make any distinction between the method of operation between some of the legacy operators such as Bristows and CHC and other regional (local) operators and would it (could it) be their role to proffer recommendations in this area if it is felt there is need to raise the standard of 139 initial induction courses?

aegir,

The whole point of my comment was, that the "lack of training" of SAR pilots in Inaer was discussed in depth after the fatal 139 crash in Spain under EASA rules and requirements....

I believe there were some very strong opinions expressed at the time.

Would appreciate continuing recommendations as to the text used in the following (more detailed) table, in particular colums e, f and g. If you have more appropriate (but sensible) suggestions, please let me know.

FIRST DRAFT
https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-8...T%2525206a.png
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-a...T%2525206b.png

Notes:

1. This Table is not intended to replace or substitute factual accident reports. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of AW 139 accidents to-date.

2. This Table is compiled for the convenience of members of the Rotorheads community who subscribe to the professional aviation forum PPRuNe.

3. Columns 'e', ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with the assistance from members from the Rotorheads community and are a product of the recommendations and suggestions tendere

Indeed, but, there are precious few reports available (that I can find). Of the nine AW139 accidents seven of them seem to have occurred within the past 18 months or so. The only report I can locate is an 'Interim Statement' from the Spanish authorities relating to the Inaer operated ship.

In the meantime I have drawn-up a list of the accident threads on Rotorheads:

1. UAE 2 JUN 2008: PPRuNe Thread

2. QATAR 25 AUG 2009: PPRuNe Thread

3. SPAIN 21 JAN 2010: PPRuNe Thread / Interim Statement

4. HONG KONG 3 JUL 2010: PPRuNe Thread

5. SOUTH KOREA 23 FEB 2011: PPRuNe Thread

6. QATAR 2 MAY 2011: PPRuNe Thread

7. MALAYSIA 30 JUN 2011: PPRuNe Thread

8. CHINA 17 AUG 2011: PPRuNe Thread

9. BRASIL 19 AUG 2011: PPRuNe Thread

Com'on Sav,

Line 1 should read Abu Dhabi aviation, Abu Dhabi :{

DBX RF will definitely take offence :E

ah, yes! I perfectly remenber the discussion.

and this is the interim report of Hong Kong accident
 

Sav,

As ramblingrotors mentioned, there was also the loss of the first pre-production aircraft (I-ACOI) during autorotation testing in 2001, with the unfortunate death of Vincenzo Iellamo. Previous thread here.

I/C

Thanks for the various items of feedback both posted and sent via PM. Herewith is the 2nd Draft with as many of the recommendations as possible embraced:

2nd Draft
https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-I...T%2525207a.png
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Q...T%2525207b.png
https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-L...T%2525207c.png

Notes:
1. This table is not intended to replace or substitute factual accident reports. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of AW 139 accidents to-date.
2. Columns 'e', ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with the assistance from members from the Rotorheads community and are a product of the recommendations and suggestions tendered.
3. This Table intends no inference; either supporting or criticising the AW139, but seeks only to communicate, as effectively as possible, the most basic information surrounding AW139 accidents to-date.

Additional Comments:

There have been several requests to include details of one of the AW prototypes but I have been inclined to exclude this given that it was pre-production and a prototype. Having said that is there anyone with details as to what actually happened?

A list of the PPRuNe threads relating to all the AW129 accidents appears on the previous page and now, thanks to Aegir we have a second 'official' statement bringing the total number to two:

Interim Statement Spanish Crash

Interim Statement Hong Kong Harbour Ditching

Regarding the table I have now removed the comment re: possible bird strike (which someone had mentioned had come from AW) as the Interim Statement mentions nothing of this.

Having now spent far too much time on this and having read more than I ever intended about 139 crashes I have to say that the incident which I find most perplexing to-date (and in the absence of more detailed information on the recent accidents) is the Hong Kong Harbour episode. It will indeed be interesting to see what the verdict is on this one.

FYI fresh from the press ALERT TB AW139 Blades
 

BOLLETTINO TECNICO N° 139-265
The technical content of this document is approved
under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.005 DATE August 25, 2011


SUBJECT: PRECAUTIONARY INSPECTION AND QUARANTINE OF TAIL ROTOR
BLADES
REASON: to introduce a precautionary inspection and quarantine on tail rotor blades.

NOTE
This Bollettino supersedes BT no. 139-251
HELICOPTERS AFFECTED:
Part I: All AB139/AW139 helicopters equipped with tail rotor blades P/N
3G6410A00131 or P/N 4G6410A00131.
Part II: All AB139/AW139 helicopters equipped with tail rotor blades P/N
3G6410A00131 or P/N 4G6410A00131, having logged more than 600 flying
hours or more than 1500 landings whichever occurs first.

This almost mean the whole fleet.

DESCRIPTION: as a result of the first available information of the AW139 event in Brazil, while the investigation is ongoing and waiting for additional
information/analysis, as a precautionary measure this Bollettino prescribes
inspection and quarantine of the tail rotor blades meeting the criteria reported in the above paragraph.
In the meantime collection of all necessary evidence is going on in order to isolate the root cause and determine the final corrective actions.

South Korea additional Info (B-516 31264) confirmed
 

This is all I have on this accident, the source is very good.

about China accident
 

I quote parnaiocas
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461...ml#post6662137

I confirm!


Yesterday 24/08/2011 had a meeting in Rio de Janeiro Agusta, attended by operators in Brazil AW.

They are implying that the most likely cause of the accident was SEK even breaking blades TR.

So tomorrow will be issued a BT with more instructions to be followed by radical Mnt, even without the issuance of the accident report.

The Pilot Test Agusta emphasized that this type of emergency response should be taken immediately. Otherwise, the panic will not be identified correctly, you can lose control of the ANV due to the strong imbalance.

As for AW of China, then was recovered, but the government did not allow any information to be disclosed, since this was an operational failure. The pilot flew into the water during a rescue training. I saw the photo of the ANV being hoisted. Only the cockpit was damaged. The rest, including the TR, was intact.

And this is the response of Agusta:

http://www.agustawestland.com/system/files/139-265.pdf

What means SEK?

Capt 139, thanks for confirming the registration of the Korean aircraft. The available information is sketchy indeed - in fact all I have been able to ascertain is that the craft crashed into the sea at night.

VEMD, see accident No.9. SEK is the registration of the Brasilian aircraft which crashed .. PR-SEK.

During the compilation of the table I received numerous PM's providing various aspects of information relating to several of the crashes. I am now awaiting further detailed information on both of the Gulf Helicopters incidents as it seems the information I was sent was (unsurprisingly) incomplete.

From communications over the past couple of days is does seem as though a stronger case is being built for a possible generic problem of tail rotor blade shearing.

Frustratingly, in the Hong Kong Harbour incident the critical piece of the evidence (the blade which may have sheared) could not be found. Also, the other piece of evidence which could have helped (the HUMS memory card) was not housed in a waterproof receptacle and the chips, being corroded, could not be analysed.

Hopefully the Brasil crash will yield more immediate and conclusive information.

Epiphany - still feeling very safe in your 139 having read that bulletin?

Can't speak for Epiphany, Crab, but after 6 1/2 years on the 139, I'm still happy with it overall.

Until I get further details about the Brazil accident, I'll go along with Agusta's BT, which is basically an extension of the inspection done on the blades each day by the AME's, but brings in an early retirement as an extra precaution.

I'd like further info on the supposed vibration issue that SEK may have had previously and why it was on the ground for 3 days because of it, as reported by North&South (if this is true).

Pretty much every wide body aircraft we fly on to get to our jobs (those of us touring in the oil industry) has had a catastrophic accident at some point in it's life and we still travel on them. 747 center fuel tanks exploding, MD11 entertainment system fires, A330 pitot icing, 767 thrust reverser operating in flight etc etc. Not to mention basically every type of helicopter we travel in too.

Agusta will fix this, just like Sikorsky, Bell, MD, Boeing, Airbus and the others have in the past.

Not trying to play down the seriousness of what could be a major issue with the 139, but I'll wait for some factual evidence rather than jump to conclusions about what could be the problem. Yes, we know from Agusta that a TR blade came off, but WHY? That is the question I'm wanting the answer to.

Now, lets see how quickly Agusta can support their customers. There are going to be a LOT of tail rotor blades coming off very shortly, and oil companies don't like helicopters sitting on the ground! More to the point, if the tail rotor blade does turn out to be a potential point of failure, how quickly can they design a new one and get it into production? Assuming that is, that the tail rotor blade design is a factor, rather than quality control or operational use.

Hopefully all parties involved will be pressing on with getting this sorted one way or the other as soon as possible!

Yes thanks Crab. I flew 5 hours today (including 3 hours IFR, 2 ARA's, 6 deck landings) and will probably do the same tomorrow as most of our 139's have less than 600 hours.

The 139 must be the most popular new helicopter ever introduced to the industry with >400 airframes flying worldwide and with a flying and serviceability rate that the RAF can only dream of.

Of the hundreds of thousands of hours so far flown by the AW139 in geographic and climatic extremes; flown and maintained by operators, pilots and engineers from both ends of the ability spectrum there have been 9 accidents. 5 of them were very probably human error related and of the 4 still under investigation my bet is that a further 2 were human error. For me that leaves 2 unexplained accidents out of 9.

If reports already received of the Brazilian accident are factual I fail to see how the crew were able to declare an emergency, state that they were diverting and suggest that the problem they were experiencing was hydraulic related if the aircraft had thrown a tail rotor blade.

I am no fan of AW mainly because I believe that they show an arrogance that is breathtaking (much like your own), their training is unprofessional and the customer support abysmal. However, I think that the 139 is undoubtedly the best multi-role helicopter of it's class that we have ever seen.

After 30+ years flying and 10,000 hours in helicopters I for one am very happy to be flying it and fully expect to be flying it for the remainder of my career.

Excellent post Noooby.

True, but for example there have been more than 1400 747's built in the last 42 years, those have flown I can't imagine how many hours, but the AW139 has only what 400 built since 2003? how many hours flown, years in production, and # of acft, vs. acccidents?

That makes the accident rate of the 139 gigiantic by comparasion.

BP,

With only 2 confirmed mechanical failures, I don't think its as bad as the picture you are trying to paint. What is high for the type is the number of pilot error accidents, which to me squarely points to an alarming lack of proper training or plain absence of ability :eek:

That leaves me to conclude that, 1. Something seriously wrong with training given by the manufacturer. 2. Continuity training by those companies involved is pants, or 3. Big question mark over the standard of pilots being pushed into those right seats.

Ive seen all three :cool:

Some excellent comments in recent posts:

Fully Agree. :ok:

Again, fully agree. :ok:

Wish I had written that Griffo. I've seen all three too and for me that is the root of the problem and I fully expect there to be more pilot related accidents. The operators who have some kind of pilot selection procedure along with competent and regular check and training, annual dry-lease LOFT sim training and all the other safety barriers that I take for granted have yet to have a pilot-related accident.

Two thoughts come to mind:

1. Pilot Error - Not one for believing in coincidence, why is the AW139 currently proving to be much more susceptible to accidents than other similar sized twins. Is it just down to crew training and selection as inferred, or is there also a cockpit ergonomics issue here?

2. Design - Is there any correlation between airframe serial numbers that have (or we suspect) suffered tail rotor blade separation and the 6400 and 6800 kilo weight certification?

I heard on the radio today that Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) an operator of 3 airframes have grounded them until further notice.

Warwick Daily News

Mmmm ....

..... Design - Is there any correlation between airframe serial numbers that have (or we suspect) suffered tail rotor blade separation and the 6400 and 6800 kilo weight certification? ....

Problems perhaps have more to do with the accuracy and tenacity of the chaps doing the T/R Tracking and Balancing then anything else ????

With normal ops on this a/c being varied between 100 & 102% Nr depending on the ops requirement I would suggest the balancing of the major rotating components becomes paramount !!

:(