|
Helicopter EMS Issues in the USA
A very good article discussing the US Helicopter EMS Industry and its woes, trials, and tribulations. It also notes being a Pilot in that role is just about the most dangerous occupation in the country with a very high on the job mortality rate.
http://www.sltrib.com/portlet/articl...007&siteId=297 A great interactive study of helicopter EMS accidents and historical events such as FAA actions and Medicare Funding changes that have affected the EMS industry. Fatal Flights: Fatal Medical Helicopter Crashes Since 1980 (washingtonpost.com) |
And when compared to the EMS operations north of the 49th parallel, it's even more eye opening. Much could be learned from the success of les Canadiens, who haven't had an accident in years...
|
I would be the first to admit that the US HEMS industry needs a makeover.But , this comparison with the Candian system drives me nuts.800+ helicopters versus 20+. Government run vs for profit.All this makes the comparison moot. It's like comparing peaches to a watermelon.
Alt3. |
Comparing zero accidents to our dismal record does need looking at to see what factors influence their success at avoiding all these fatalities. May be there are no lessons to be learned but perhaps it is worth looking at.
For sure we have no bragging rights on safety performance.....at least as I see it! |
Perhaps the reason the Canadian system is so much safer is *because* it is so different? I really don't understand why the FAA don't grow a pair and regulate the industry properly.
From the article: "Shortly after midnight...a medical helicopter pilot, started across Choctawatchee Bay to pick up a hospital patient and transport him to a facility 60 miles away. Palcic, 63, was just two minutes into the flight of AIRHeart-1 when his crew radioed a dispatcher that he was turning back because of the thunder and lightning. Moments later, Palcic's helicopter banked in clouds and plunged 700 feet into shallow waters, killing him, a flight nurse and a paramedic. VFR at night over water with known thunderstorms in the area? And, this was a hospital to hospital transfer. Pure craziness. |
Very interesting article.
There are some interesting differences between the way the whole setup is put together in the USA and other places. Not really to do with flight safety, but the article's description of a "golden trout" is exactly the opposite situation to the UK. For the receiving hospital in the USA, the patient is a revenue generator. In the UK it is exactly the opposite: a drain on effectively fixed resources. It is obvious that in the US hospital management is keen to receive HEMS. In the UK it is pretty much exactly the opposite. |
Vee r,
Once again, I would like to dissent. The problem is not a lack of regulation. Part 135 is pretty comprehensive. Besides, the society in the US is allergic to govt. intervention in business and the FAA has to walk that fine line between regulating and promoting air commerce.The companies are ruthless. They will cut corners in equipment,salaries and aircraft maintenance as far as possible to maintain the 1:475 ratio of earnings of worker to CEO that has become so much a part of the US captalistic culture.Also, a suddden spurt of onerous regulations mandating equipment that is expensive and,given the dubious helath care reimbursement rates here,will probably put a lot of companies out of business and put a lot of pilots out in the street. Once again, a prickly scenario which the FAA is loath to get into. What is the solution? Self regulation. Foremost by us in the trenches,followed by the companies,individually and as a group and possibly, an agency (not the FAA) that can oversee HEMS ops. Kind of like the USFS does for the firefighting industry.Not great but better than what we have now. SASLess, With due respect, comparing the accident rate of a low volume, low risk tolerant nation like Canada with the high volume,high risk tolerant nation like ours is a non starter. The accident rate of Sun Country Airlines compares very favorably with that of American or United or Delta or Continental. Does it mean that Sun Country is safer or does it mean they don't fly a lot given their fleet size compared to the legacy carriers? Alt3. |
Perhaps the question should be why is it more acceptable in the United States to accept higher risk, treat workers like "Cannon Fodder" then it is in the rest of the world?
I see the same trend in forest fire operations. In the United States more forest fire fighters are likely to die in a single fire season then in 20 seasons in Canada. |
AL3,
I would suggest Part 135 is pretty restrictive.....but enforcement of 135 in the EMS world is pretty well non-existent. Neither the operators or the FAA really do a decent job of living to the rule. The problem is the conflict between complying with the rule....and getting the job done. Simple case in point.....Night VFR surface light reference requirements. There's lots of very dark places in the country and how many of us ignore the requirement to have that bit of help from the lighted objects on the ground and just cruise on over those dark places knowing there will be lights at our destination? Everyone of us are illegal to do so but we do it (I have to use past tense for me as I am now happily and safely retired.). How many times do you break the rules before the odds catch up with you and turn you into a statistic? |
Night surface reference
SAS,
You might try a legal interpertation search for night helicopter surface reference. There is a legal interpertation dating back to about 1992 from the FAA in D.C that states if the aircraft is equiped with the flight instruments required by Part 135 for night or over the top operations it may be flown with out surface light reference. The aircraft does not have to be IFR certified. A literal interpertation of the surface reference requirement would prevent night ops with S92's EC225's ect unless they were on an IFR flight plan. In spite of all the above there has to be a better way of operating at night than is currently in use. The Bond EC225 and the most recent EC145 accident in Forida would indicate that technology by it's self is not the answer. When is the last time you witnessed a VFR operator conduct any training or flight checks at night. At the very least an inprovement in training and testing is in order. JHR |
What does your OpSpecs say.....that would be the first hurdle to get over then you might try to fall back on the information you suggest.
But.....this is what the Regulation states: Code of Federal Regulations Sec. 135.207 Sec. 135.207 Part 135 OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON-DEMAND OPERATIONS AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT Subpart D--VFR/IFR Operating Limitations and Weather Requirements Sec. 135.207 VFR: Helicopter surface reference requirements. No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter. |
The last 6 words are what counts. There is sufficient light until there isn't.
|
The Canadians provided an NPA in 2001 that attempted to address this situation; the explanatory text is illustrating:
Issue: Aircraft operating under the visual flight rules (VFR) are required by the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) 602.114 - Minimum Visual Meteorological Conditions for VFR Flight in Controlled Airspace and CAR 602.115 - Minimum Visual Meteorological Conditions for VFR Flight in Uncontrolled Airspace, to operate with "visual reference to the surface". The term "visual reference" is not defined and there have been many accidents where aircraft have crashed due to pilot disorientation caused by a lack of visual cues. These situations typically occur during night VFR flight or flight over featureless snow covered terrain or frozen lakes. Justification for Change: The single most important instrument for maintaining aircraft attitude is an attitude indicator. As can be seen from the regulations above, any aircraft may be operated during the day without an attitude indicator and a private aircraft operated at night without one. In reality, virtually all aeroplanes have attitude indicators, as do most helicopters. The problem more likely lies in pilot training and judgment than in equipment shortcomings. There is a common misconception that if the minimum visibility criteria are met, then conditions are suitable for VFR flight, particularly during daylight. There is also general agreement among pilots that flight in conditions with any reduction in visibility on a dark night over uninhabited terrain is not VFR. The difficulty in rationalizing these different points of view is in determining what constitutes visual reference. Some jurisdictions have used the concept of a "visible horizon". The United States’ Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 135 (equivalent to CARs subparts 703 and 704) mention "surface reference" only for helicopters as follows: "135.207 VFR: Helicopter surface reference requirements - No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to control the helicopter." Jane’s Aerospace Dictionary uses the following definition: "visual reference - Earth’s surface, esp that clearly identified and thus giving geographical position as well as attitude and orientation guidance, used as a reference in controlling flight trajectory, if necessary down to touchdown." These two references address the aircraft’s attitude and orientation with the Jane’s Aerospace Dictionary definition additionally requiring geographical information. The CARs, Part VII, Regulations for night VFR indicate that electronic means of navigation are acceptable and the terrain and wide expanses of water in Canada may make determining geographical position by reference to the surface difficult. Transport Canada has been addressing the issue of pilot judgement in various ways and these hopefully will have an effect on inappropriate use of the visual flight rules. It is felt that clarification of the term "visual reference" will have the effect of preventing flight when conditions do not fit the intent of these rules. There will no doubt always be an element of subjectivity when assessing if visual reference is adequate, however, incorporation of the following suggested change may assist in guiding pilots and supervisors in conducting operations in difficult conditions. No person shall operate an aircraft in VFR flight within uncontrolled airspace unless (a) the aircraft is operated with sufficient visual referenceto enable a pilot to maintain the aircraft’s attitude and orientation with reference to the earth’s surface by the use of visual external cues; ... The amount of external visual cues is also related to the handling qualities of the aircraft. As has been stated in the 'EC225/New Procedures' threads, an aircraft that has sufficient flight control augmentation can be flown safely with very few external references. To paraphrase Gomar Pylot 'there are sufficient visual references until there aren't'. Jim |
NTSB to issue a report soon.....
•Safety Recommendation letters - Safety Board proposes 19 recommendations regarding Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS). These recommendations addresses various safety issues including pilot training; safety management systems to minimize risk; collection and analysis of flight, weather, and safety data; flight data monitoring; development of a low altitude airspace infrastructure; and the use of dual pilots, autopilots, and night vision imaging systems |
What provoked that is obvious to me. The FAA started allowing the use of NVGs, and thus had to issue regulations concerning them. When they didn't allow them, there was no need of further regulation. Time marches on, along with technology, and thus regulatory requirements change. Once there was no need for regulations concerning the use of VORs.
I see no good way out of allowing pilots to exercise some judgement. IMO, I get paid for my judgement, not for anything else. If I can't use that, then why not just use pilotless drones, controlled from a central location? Some people will always exercise bad judgement, and good judgement comes from making bad decisions and learning from them. If someone else always makes all the decisions for a pilot, that pilot will never become a safe and proficient pilot, because (s)he will never learn to make decisions, and inevitably a decision will be required, because not even the FAA can anticipate everything. All that can be done, IMO, is to set out the minima and expect pilots to comply, and punish those who don't. I don't believe there is a magic bullet, and the only way to completely eliminate all risk is to immediately destroy every aircraft that exists, and never even consider flying again. I'm not in favor of that. Everybody dies eventually, so we may as well accept that and stop the panic attacks. |
I find it interesting that the EMS industry in the U.S. fully supports safety, the efforts of the IHST, etc. Unless it impacts the bottom line. The number of single pilot, unaugmented (SASless and/or lacking autopilot), VFR certified rotorcraft point to that.
Sure, pilots are paid to use their judgement. But what pilot wants to say "No" to a mission in which he could save a life ... even if the weather is marginal, at night, and near the end of his duty day? I'm curious as to how much "judgement" an EMS Op Specs allows a pilot to use, without fear of losing his job? And how many accidents have occurred when the injuries were not life threatening, and a ground ambulance would have been more appropriate. Clearly Part 135 doesn't work, as written. Surely there's at least one lesson to be learned from the Canadians (who, by the way, modeled their system from a public use operation in the Lower 48). |
I can't speak for all operators, but we say no all the time, and I know of many others who do. If you're in this business to save lives, you're in the wrong business. It's just another for-profit business, and I don't think about lives other than mine and the med crews. Our weather minimums are the highest I've ever flown to, by far, and if the weather is below those minimums, we just don't go, and I've never been questioned about it. We won't get fired for declining flights, but we will get fired for flying in weather below the minimums. If we land enroute because of poor weather, that's better than flying on and dying, but we may be questioned about why we flew in the first place. I'm confident that at least the major operators have seen the light and are enforcing the weather minimums, and not firing any pilots for turning down flights for weather. Pilots being humans, though, may feel self-imposed pressures to fly, but those who do need to be weeded out, and will be eventually, one way or another.
|
Sure, pilots are paid to use their judgment. But what pilot wants to say "No" to a mission in which he could save a life ... even if the weather is marginal, at night, and near the end of his duty day? I'm curious as to how much "judgment" an EMS Op Specs allows a pilot to use, without fear of losing his job? I don't mind leaving for a call if my duty day is nearing it's end though. If there's time to get a patient to a hospital that's fine. We just inform dispatch that if we turn into pumpkins on the hospital roof, the machine isn't moving until our relief arrives. Wouldn't be the first time I've left a helicopter on a pad and gone back to the hangar in a taxi. It's a pain in the butt, but the mission was completed and no one violated duty limits. It may sound callous, but I'm with Gomer too when it comes to allowing the patient to enter into the equation. I don't let their welfare go past idle curiosity in my mind, otherwise my brain is in the wrong part of the helicopter. |
GOM and Canuck,
How do you achieve "peace" with your med crews when you think as you do? I took the same view as you do and seemed to be confronted with the "we are here to save lives attitude" and "what do you mean we are just in a medical patient transportation business?" attitude by the Med Crews. The industry is full of those types who see themselves engaged in noble, angelic, heroic battle with death types. |
IME, most of the med crews don't want to go as often as I do. They're all former ground medics and ER nurses, and they fully realize that people die, and they don't want to die in a helicopter. I've never had any issues at all from the med crews about turning down flights, but I have aborted a couple of flights that I considered rather routine when the med crew decided the weather was too bad. Our med crews simply don't get rabid about saving lives. Ambulances take a lot longer, but the patient's car wreck isn't our fault, and we aren't going to die to get them to a trauma center a little quicker. The only medical personnel I've met who are really gung-ho about saving lives are newbies, and we don't hire any of those.
|
JHR
SASLESS
The legal interpertation from the Fed's. They think 135.207 does not limit a helicopter from flying over the top with out surface reference. Day or night they don't care. It's my opinion that the US FAR's only define IFR as operating with less than the required basic cloud clearance. Dark night, no horizon is still VFR. We as pilots are supposed to not get into flight conditions we can not deal with. I certanly do agree to many people are losing thier lives with the operating rules that are in place today. I also wonder how many operators either EMS or utility actualy train or give check rides at night. The company I work for has OPS's spec's for day and night VFR and IFR operations, the ops's spec's just authorize the operations, they don't tell us the conditions that have to be met to make the flight. JHR March 3, 1992 William K. Comee Dear Mr. Comee: This is in response to your letter dated September 13, 1991, withdrawing your request for exemption. In your withdrawal request you asked for a confirmation in writing that the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) permit a properly equipped multiengined helicopter with an appropriately rated crew to fly VFR over-the-top. Your request apparently was initiated because of some confusion over FAR Sec. 135.207. That section states: No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter. You correctly cite FARs Sec. 135.211, 135.181, 135.161 and 135.243 that allow for aircraft to fly VFR over-the-top. The term "aircraft" as used within the FARs includes helicopters. "VFR over-the-top" with respect to the operation of aircraft, means the operation of an aircraft over-the-top under VFR when it is not being operated on an IFR flight plan. (14 CFR 1.1) "VFR" means visual flight rules. (14 CFR 1.2) If the agency's intent was to preclude VFR over-the-top operations in FAR Sec. 135.207 it would have stated so. It must be presumed that the drafters of the regulation were aware of the different terms as evidenced by their use in other FARs that pertain to VFR over-the-top operations. Section 135.207 does not mention VFR over-the-top operations. We therefore conclude that FAR Sec. 135.207 does not preclude properly equipped helicopters and instrument rated aircrew from flying VFR over-the-top. We trust this satisfactorily responds to your request. Sincerely, Donald P. Byrne Assistant Chief Counsel Regulations and Enforcement Division |
You are absolutely correct when you note VFR/IFR is based purely upon weather conditions alone. The visibility minimum only applies to the distance one can see "If" there was something to see.....such as lights. horizon, terrain. Anyone that has flown offshore at night knows what the difference is.
I have always maintained that in reality, if one must rely solely upon the instruments to control the aircraft you are no longer "VFR" despite the regulation saying you are. The issue in my view is the regulation does not adequately meet the Kool-Aid Acid test of reality....and thus sets up a very dangerous situation where un-qualified, non-capable ( I hate to use the word "incompetent"...) pilots can suddenly find themselves in grave trouble. |
Just to muddy the waters some further, realizing of course that these regulations do not apply to civil operations.
I believe, SASless, but do not know, that the intent of the definitions below is in keeping with what your opinion is. OPNAVINST 3710.7 (series), NATOPS GENERAL FLIGHT AND OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, which is the governing publication for all U.S. Navy and Marine Corps flight operations defines some terms a bit differently than the FARs and other civil regulations with which I am familiar. While there is a provision for VFR-on-top or over the top or whatever you want to call it, in practice it is almost never used because it's rare to be on top and have a horizon. The obvious question might be... "If you have visibility but no horizon, what do you put in your logbook?" The answer is... "Actual Instrument Flight" Actual Instrument Conditions. Conditions external to the aircraft in flight that do not permit visual reference to the horizon. Instrument Meteorological Conditions. Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from clouds, and ceiling less than the minimums specified for visual meteorological conditions. IMC conditions exist anytime a visible horizon is not distinguishable. |
NTSB issues safety recommendations for Medical Helicopters
NTSB issues safety recommendations for Medical Helicopters | Pilotbug
The NTSB has issued 15 safety recommendations to various government regulators and helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) operators following a dramatic increase in accidents. Among them are the creation of scenario-based pilot training curriculum, installation of flight data recorders for aircraft, the use of an autopilot in single-pilot operations and use of night-vision equipment for pilots. According to the NTSB, of the 55 mediflight accidents which occurred in the last 3 years, of which 41 were helicopters, 29 could have been prevented with the adoption of these recommendations and the others contained in the press release. As a result of the increase in accidents, a 4-day hearing was conducted in February by the NTSB with testimony from the FAA, the Helicopter Association International (HAI), the Association of Air Medical Services, the Professional Helicopter Pilots Association, the National EMS Pilots Association, Air Methods, and CareFlite. The following was determined to be the focus of the hearings:
|
Ems & Sar Crashes
Wassup with the glut of EMS and SAR crashes going on in 2010?
It sucks! |
single eng single pilot at night!
Why are there still some countries (the USA) still using single engine & single pilot at night for EMS in all kinds of weather.
I would also rather continue with a ground ambulance dispite the longer transport time. How many accidents and how many must die until they change their attitude about this? |
Good vibs,
Standby for the 'defenders of single-engine ops' who fail to see that it is not the number of engines but the fact that singles are invariably VFR. That means that they will be scrabbling around under the cloud at night and crash into hills or wires, or get disoriented. EMS is a job for twin/IFR machines but it just doesn't seem to be catching on in the US where these accidents will continue to happen. |
I am beginning to wonder what is going on in tbe US Helicopter industry of late.
Was it Phoenix where the A-Star EMS aircraft crashed in clear skies and during cruise....followed by the Kaman KMax logging crash....then the Hiller in Idaho...and now this JetRanger. Are we past Pilot induced crashes and now seeing mechanical failures or engineering failures as being the cause of fatal crashes? |
21 lives this year :sad:
Spike in medical helicopter crashes elevates safety concerns by Samantha Ptashkin Fox 11 Posted on September 2, 2010 at 11:58 AM TUCSON, Ariz.-- One medical helicopter down, three crew members dead. It's a horrific scene many people witnessed in Tucson in July and now a recent crash in Arkansas has elevated the concern for helicopter safety. Tucson Medical Center flight nurse Suzanne Knepper heads up in a helicopter two to three times a week to help pre-mature babies get the medical attention they need. "When infants are in distress, it's usually a very acute thing," Knepper said. "We have to get there right away and the time in travel in southern Arizona is quite long." Knepper says the medical chopper is vital in saving lives, but so far this year, helicopter crashes have also taken the lives of 21 people nation-wide. It's a sharp spike from last year. The latest crash happened in central Arkansas Tuesday morning. Three crew members died. That crash marks the fourth fatal accident this summer, among those, the LifeNet chopper which crashed down in midtown Tucson, also killing three crew members. "Any death is very significant and obviously a tremendous loss and we're very concerned as an industry as a whole about the number of accidents that result in fatalities," said Craig Yale, a spokesperson for Air Methods. Yale says the industry has taken more precautions over the past year, including the use of night vision goggles for crew members and warning systems which alert pilots of any obstructions. "We go through safety checks with our own equipment and then when we get up on the helicopter we make rounds with pilot and we all agree that what we've seen so far is safe and that we're all ready to fly," Knepper said. Despite all the safety checks, Knepper and her team know something can always go wrong. "Accidents happen in a helicopter, in an ambulance," said Flight Nurse Pat Brown. But they say they can't live in fear of losing their own lives. The minute they board, their focus is on saving the lives of others. |
Single or Twin
I have less than 100 hrs as co-pilot in HEMS H24 / SAR operations in Italy and so far, what I more like about the captains I fly with (former mil and civi), is their attitude in sticking to the rules, saying "No" when ops manual meteo minima are "no go".
So much noise about twin or single in so many threads. All of us (in this forum) know about differences of single and twin equipments and of course the flight crew experience, ratings and training, therefore their different capabilities. What is missing there is discipline and information. Set a correct "No go" minima for single engined machines and stick to it. Somebody will reply that even with twins there will always be the one who overevaluate the capabilities of his machine. VFR pilots also and not only IRated ones should be more informed about all dangers of IMC and night operations and try at least one time, not for training, only for demonstration, an unexpected IMC, disorientation etc. etc. and undestand that as SASless says, fog kills (and not only fog). Correct estimation of the risk (I'm sure nobody wants to die) would keep more pilots VFR/SE and IFR/ME far from all these dangerous situations. Moreover, when I read in the NTSB reports, I'm surprised about the numbers of accidents caused by lack of recurrent training or experience for night and/or IFR operations. This makes me think that CFITs happens for the same reason. Write the rules and stick to it. |
The single vs. twin argument should take a back seat to auto-pilot vs. no auto-pilot. The FAA took the low road when arguing for NVGs. Most US EMS machines are at best, marginally capable of flight in IMC. Having flown the full gambit of machines from VFR the B-206L and VFR AS 350B-2/3 to full single pilot IFR (SPIFR) B-230, A-109E and EC-135 it is my opinion that an auto-pilot does more for reducing pilot workload and enhancing safety than either 2 engines or NVGs. An autopilot takes the pilot out of the flight control loop and allows for the safe management of the machine while control is maintained. As stated in the OpsSpecs “ auto-pilot in lieu of a copilot for IFR flight”. A pilot in Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IIMC) has neither a co-pilot nor an auto-pilot. The outcome rest purely in the pilot’s ability to maintain control of the machine, while attempting to navigate and communicate.
Single engine vs. multi-engine could be argued for the Tucson mishap where a for a low altitude (<500 AGL) engine failure over an urban environment resulted in disastrous results. :ouch: |
As long as ANY so called "Aeromedical Provider" is allowed to dictate rules to the FAA we shall continue to see an uncontrollable amount of crashes and accidents.
The FAA allowed HEMS operators to go the way of the cheapest possible expedient to make the public at large believe safety is being considered primary: NVGs. The US HEMS industry is again being allowed to regulate itself and we know that when profits are at stake self governing is tantamount to anarchy. Considering how long this crisis has been dragging itself, the FAA is just as culpable as those operators that crash on a regular basis. The causes are always the same. My prayers go the the surviving family members who in lack of a valid lawsuit shall only be left with the "usual" one year of pay to remember their dear folks.:( |
I'm somewhat bemused by the issue of single vs twin here. When was the last time an aircraft was lost due to an engine failure? Compare that to the number lost due to pilot error, weather, wires, and failure of items other than engine such as rotor blades, gear boxes and tail booms?
Is 'single' being confused with 'not IFR' here? |
Is 'single' being confused with 'not IFR' here? |
Yeah - and it's the same all over JAR land I guess?
But it is not the case under the FAA or the ROW is it? Whether a heavy AS355F1 is safer than an AS350, A119 or B407 is another question altogether! |
Vaibronco,
Your post seems to imply that all the wise things you suggest do not happen here.Setting minima,understanding and teaching pilots the dangers of IIMC,recurrent training. All EMS companies that are worth their salt do all of the above and sometimes more.So to suggest otherwise is offensive to some of us.Fact remains, that for every one (and that is one too many,admittedly) that makes the news, there are thousands of HEMS flights that operate routinely and safely on a single day. In fact ,I would wager, my company flies more every year than all the outfits in the the continent of Europe,put together.Besides, have you looked at a map recently and seen the size of this country? I can tell you, my friend, mine is definitely bigger than yours. So the attitude of your captains whom you so admire are not only restricted to your side of the pond. To the rest, the last three crashes (Oklahoma, Arizona and now Arkansas),seem to be aircraft related as opposed to pilot issues. So notwithstanding the "witnesses" who saw the aircraft "fly through a fog"--I shall reserve judgement.After all, 500+ "witnesses" "saw" the missile that brought down TWA 800. And, I have said this before, as long as Europe and Canada and Oz have government funded HEMS outfits, comparing that to the ones in the US is futile. Alt3. |
But it's not a performance issue, it's more to do with system duplication/redundancy and the sophistication of the stabilisation/autopilot.
I have flown single engined floppy stick helicopters i.e. no stick trim, let alone an autopilot, in IMC, quite legally, under military rules. I also used to fly a public transport AS355N (twin) with a "floppy stick", at night (normally in UK, by definition, under IFR as there is no VFR at night here). There was a likelihood that sometimes we might go inadvertently IMC at night due to the nature of the job, and we were required to train for that eventuality. However, it's all been outlawed now after some high profile accidents at night. Not before time. The FAA seem to be lagging behind, now to an alarming degree, it seems. |
I am sure I am not alone in this frustrating scenario.
More unnecessary deaths for what? Absolutely for what??? Can someone please confirm that: “night-vision gear” actually means “Night Vision Goggles” (NVG's) flown in Night Visual Conditions by qualified (NVG) Flightcrew? Do we expect the FAA must surely act soon? Nope. |
I am sure I am not alone in this frustrating scenario.
More unnecessary deaths for what? Absolutely for what??? Can someone please confirm that: “night-vision gear” actually means “Night Vision Goggles” (NVG's) flown in Night Visual Conditions by qualified (NVG) Flightcrew? Do we expect the FAA must surely act soon? Nope. |
I am sure I am not alone in this frustrating scenario.
More unnecessary deaths for what? Absolutely for what??? Can someone please confirm that: “night-vision gear” actually means “Night Vision Goggles” (NVG's) flown in Night Visual Conditions by qualified (NVG) Flightcrew? Do we expect the FAA must surely act soon? Nope. |
| All times are GMT. The time now is 06:06. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.