Unless you have been listening to different reports from the NTSB, the only way the Piper had a "right to be in that corridor", as you put it, would have been in an emergency situation.

The Piper was cleared from Teterboro to Newark, so unless you know something that you are not sharing with the rest of us, the Piper did not have a right to be in the corridor unless it was an in-flight emergency.

while it really doesn't matter

I remind you that an airplane/aircraft in distress has the right of way over all other aircraft.

some of you have said that something was wrong with the piper//don't really know.

ps

birrddog...to my knowlege, the piper was not given a clearance for anything, other than takeoff from TEB.

we must be accurate in our use of words. a clearance is a very specific thing.

Yes I do know something and obviously you don't. Who do we believe, you, or this report from the AP?

If you quote, please quote the full story, continuing on from what you posted.

The VFR corridor stops at 1100 MSL, above that is controlled airspace and why he needed to switch over to Newark.

Anyway, these are not the full transcripts, so we don't know everything that was said, and exact clearances given.

toptobottom

We probably agree on more than you think.

I guess my responses keep getting deleted for some reason... Have NO clue why? Censorship at its best I guess.

Maybe the moderator who deleted my post could kindly let me know why.........


Gordy,

Your (and other) posts discussing operations over Las Vegas were removed as being off topic. Moderation, not censorship: staying on topic is the solution.

Senior Pilot

toptobottom I don't know a single UK citizen who admits it.

.

Nothing indicates he was above 1100 MSL, he was not in controlled airspace, and therefore he didn't "need" to switch over to Newark, until he was ready to call them. Certainly he would have made the switch immediately, because TEB had terminated their communication with him, but he was not "handed off", and Newark would not necessarily register his presence until he contacted them.

There is the possibility that he had reason to return to TEB, and was making a 180. In which case he would advise TEB and Newark as he returned. In the absence of a flight recorder, we could never know.

PE.com | Southern California News | News for Inland Southern California

So sad.

Yes it certainly is very sad,

However the reporter turned out a well researched and very complimentary article. One can feel the strength of the report when she warms to the high calibre of her subject, congratulations to Beth DeFalco.

Jeremy's folks back home will take some comfort from the commendations of his peers, as will his fiance in years to come. Just now of course will be very hard and I feel for her dearly.

Danielle must remember that Jeremy was obviously a good and steady professional; with a great love of family.

I do sincerely hope that a higher degree of airspace management will result, see and avoid in heavy congestion is always chancy. That must be improved.

Our lives should be ruled by choice, not chance.

Flying uncontrolled under VFR
 

When flying VFR and in radio communication, it is important for readers to distinguish between clearances and instructions and advisories. After take-off, a VFR pilot in uncontrolled airspace is mostly involved with advisory communications with ATC, much of them initiated by the pilot as requests or questions or intentions, as long as he is not violating rules. ATC is usually very busy controlling commercial traffic. The facts as we know them in this case seem to be that ATC was available for the plane's communications, after his clearance at take-off. Of course, they never came.

Tfor2, there is no way ATC would have handled the Piper down the corridor. As he approached the river, all that pilot would have heard from a controller was, "Numerous targets in the exclusion at your eleven to two o'clock, 1100 feet and below, radarserviceterminatedsquawkVFRfrequencychangeapprovedbyebye ."

That Piper had every right to be in the exclusion. But it is very hard to see an aircraft ahead of and below you, especially against a built-up background like NYC. Especially an aircraft that is slower than you and climbing up into your flight path.

The helicopter pilot had a duty to scan the sky for traffic as he took off, turned southbound and climbed. We may never know if the Piper would have been visible to the Liberty pilot as the Saratoga came over the little hill on the Jersey side of the river. Perhaps someone will reconstruct the two flights like they did with the two ENG helicopters in the Phoenix, Arizona mid-air, which might give us some more insight into this one.

It's a busy corridor. I flew tours up there for a while, many moons ago. I've also flown up and down the corridor in fixed-wing planes. And I sure had my share of close-calls. As helicopters are among the slowest of the aircraft in that area, I used to press for better strobe lighting on the *rear* of our helicopters (TCAS had not been invented yet). Those pleas always fell on deaf ears.

Currently, my normal commute to work in the car involves a one-hour drive on fairly flat, fairly straight, two-lane country/farm roads with 55 mph speed limits (and most of us do 60 or a little better). Not long ago, there was a head-on collision on the road I take every day that killed two young people in one car and an older guy in a pickup truck. The young girl driving the car inexplicably crossed the line. The old guy wasn't able to avoid her.

I think about this collision often as I drive those very same roads, sometimes on my motorcycle. If someone were to veer even slightly into my lane at a 120 mph closure rate, I might not have time to get out of the way. But there is no "safer" way for me to get to work. It's all backroads.

Accidents like this NYC mid-air are always tragic. But at the end of the day, they are just that - fluke accidents. Let's not make more of this than it is.

My heart goes out to all involved.

msnbc.com has a movie of the collision explains most of it.

The Sultan

Found this video tonight.

NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams: News and videos from the evening broadcast NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams: News and videos from the evening broadcast- msnbc.com

I fly in the exclusion on a fairly regular basis, once or twice a fortnight. And I don't think there's any need for more restrictions. The pilots that fly there are generally really good with their radio calls and keep the chatter to a minimum. It feels safer in there than the average busy uncontrolled airport with multiple aircraft in the pattern. Just gotta keep your ears open and eyes peeled.

Having watched the video on MSNBC I have a question (I am a fixed wing PPL student of 4hrs so far).

Greg Freith (the former NTSB guy) stated that the piper flew into the path of the helicopter - in the UK the presedence is to give way to the right so would the chopper not be in the wrong - is this different in FAA land? (This question is not to apportion blame but to understand why he said what he did).

Regardless of what aviation law says, I find it hard to believe that in VFR conditions if either had seen the other that they would have proceeded on a heading without observing what each other where doing (as in you would always work on the basis the other has not seen you).

A very sad incident which is another expensive lesson in life which hopefully has the silver lining that we learn from it.

Ooooops

© 2009 The Associated Press
Aug. 13, 2009, 8:00PM

VIDEO: moment of impact Hudson River Mid-air
 

All the baloney about whether or not the Lance pilot should have put the gear down was covered many pages ago in this thread. The gear on that airplane is hydraulic. With one wing gone, the hydraulic system would have been open, the fluid gone in seconds. The gear then free-fell. Pilot had nothing to do with it.

Then why resurrect the issue? No one else has.

SP



This thread really has deteriorated to a state where the most "knowledgeable" posters are maybe a student pilot with four hours, the rest certainly don't belong on "a haven for professional helicopter pilots." Sad.

The posters on this thread include many helicopter pilots with intimate knowledge of the area. They have the good grace to answer questions from "4 hour student pilots" without criticism of the poster. We also have the good grace to accept that not everyone posting here is a "professional helicopter pilot".

SP



Oh, and Gordy, I don't know where the AP gets its information, but there were no ATC people "handling" either of those aircraft. Both were well below radar coverage in the area and were flying in VFR-only airspace. No positive control possible.

I suspect that the AP get their information from the FAA in the same way that you (as a journalist) get yours. It is already well established that the light aircraft was handed off by ATC: other than trolling, I don't understand your issue here.

SP

Jofm5,

Same in the states with regards to "right-hand-rule" however from the last footage I am under the impression that the plane is turning into the helicopter from behind. The aircraft that is overtaking another, does not have the right of way even if it would come from the right (ie. should pass behind in that case)
For a helicopter-pilot to see and aircraft coming up from past 3 o'clock, as it looks in this case, is not easy. When I fly, my general scanning is the 180 degree arc in my path of flight, unless I have been warned by ATC about approaching aircraft in proximity in the process of overtaking me.
Also, the plane was climbing, so the helicopter clipped the right wing of the plane instead of the left one that was the closest.. This makes me think that the helicopter would easily come in a blind-spot for the pilot of the plane. Nose higher than in level flight, turning + factors as scanning his map, changing radiochannels etc.

Just my two cents

Why focus on the Piper?
 

The video of the crash shown on NBC News makes a private pilot shudder. There he is in his family plane, maintaining a steady course and altitude, perhaps chatting with his brother and son, keeping a wary eye out for traffic, staying in his imaginary lane, believing that the rule of the road is to keep to the right if on a collision course, serenely believing all is well.

Suddenly a helicopter appears in front, totally unexpectedly - what to do? Keep to the right? Go up? Go down? What will the traffic do? No amount of training will help here.

There seems to be little information and discussion about the helicopter pilot, a seasoned professional, and his actions. Was he in touch with ATC? Which one? Did he announce his intentions? Did he need a clearance to take off? Are there recordings of his radio communications? What was he doing at the altitude and in the observable flight path of a less manoeuvrable fixed wing plane?

(And isn't a common shared frequency urgently needed?)

As for those poor guys being disciplined back at the TEB ATC, they were out of it. But I'm sure that the operator would have responded quickly to any radio'd call-in, and the authorities have to show they're doing something.

The press and the public read these posts, not for spin, but for facts. Let's provide them.

"The press and the public read these posts, not for spin, but for facts. Let's provide them" says Tfor2 who writes: Which parts of the above are known facts? :confused:


That's the time to get worried.
Knee-jerk legislation when 'the authorities' (aviation and non-aviation) feel they ought to be seen to be doing 'something' rarely produces anything of value. The product is usually greater (and unnecessary) restrictions of freedom and greater inconvenience with little real benefit - if any.


FH1100 Pilot Exactly.
Well said. :ok:

FAA suspends controllers over rotor crash
 

This from CNN:


FAA suspends 2 air traffic controllers over Hudson crash - CNN.com

If the Hudson corridor is a VFR corridor, under, but not included, in Controlled Airpsace, why is ATC even invoved after the clearance to maintain VFR over the Hudson not above 1,100 ft, has been issued and acknowledged ?

Should an ATC operator hear an exchange between two pilots on a common broadcast frequency, that might indicate a conflict, then of course one would expect them to try to interject, but this is not a 'flight following' route - or is it ?

Surely ATC had little interest in the progress of the Cherokee, except to perhaps expect a call clearing the corridor, and a request for further clearance at that point ? Are VHF pilots required to give an ETA for the corridor clearance, or can they undertake any activity they like, for as long as they like, within the zone, below 1,100 ft ?

Sorry about my ignorance of detail, but it would appear to me that ATC have absolutely no responsibiity in this case if a clearance to transit within the parameters laid down has been issued ?

Flying lawyer:
How do we yet know this was a 'fluke accident'?! As a 'lawyer', I would have expected you of all people to want to be in possession of all the facts before passing such a flippant comment.


Debbie Hersman (NTSB Chairman) quote:

Now THAT was well said :ok:

It's pretty clear that neither pilot saw the other, and whilst looking at a shaky video is always subject to interpretation, my sense is that on those trajectories, there's a pretty good chance that neither could have seen each other.

If that's the case then there's really only one solution - to make the corridor controlled airspace, still accessible by GA, but subject to proper control. No-one likes to see that, but unless you're prepared to see one of these 'flukes' every few years, then that's the only way out.

Imagine if the London or Paris heliroutes were a free for all, of course sooner or later something like this would happen.

someone implied that without radar, positive control was impossible.

well, I remind all of you that non radar methods of seperation do exist and are practiced regularly on much of oceanic airspace.

I haven't seen the NBC video, but the only video that would mean anything would be radar tracks...which may or may not be available.

the wingspan of the piper was less than thirty four feet, tip to tip...think if even one second difference in takeoff of either craft had happened...a miss is as good as a mile.

toptobottom

You're entitled to your opinion; as am I.

Yes, I am a lawyer (with considerable experience of aviation matters) and if I was expressing an opinion in a professional context I would have qualified it by saying that my opinion was based upon the information available to me at date of writing.

For some reason, you left out the sentence immediately following the passage you quoted:My primary concern is that incidents/accidents such as this can lead to increased regulation because those in authority feel that 'something must be done' (or be seen to be done) even when there there no real need to do anything.

There is some risk of accidents arising out of many activities but that is no reason to impose a grey and dull safety regime upon everyone.
It is impossible to live in a riskless society; I would not want to.


FL

Please forgive me for my ignorance. Firstly, having looked at the charts there VFR corridors look rather narrow. We have a couple in the UK (the Manchester LLR springs to mind) and they certainly require good lookout. Furthermore, everyone tends to fly at the maximum permitted altitude (for obvious reasons). It seems to me that the NY corridors are extremely popular and not necessarily for any other significant reason than sight seeing. With helicopters, fixed wing mixing in the same piece of sky it is always going to be difficult to deconflict aircraft. Is it worth consider some form of flow control imposition on VFR aircraft (ie no more than x aircraft in the airspace at any one time)? The RAF did something similar a few years back when low level fast jets kept bumping into each other; limit the number of aircraft in a block of sky and you manage the risk.

Please keep in mind that the Piper pilot was handed off to Newark. The only reason that would have happened is if the pilot were staying in the Class B airspace. As a previous poster pointed out, if the pilot was going to fly in the exclusion, he would have been directed to change his transponder to VFR and change frequency. This did not happen. So it appears that this pilot was planning on staying in controlled airspace. Just because the pilot indicated that he would fly down the river, does not mean he had to be in the exclusion.

Also consider that the piper pilot, if he had an engine problem, very likely had two very panicky passengers on board. As we know, this has the potential of greatly increasing the pilot's workload.

I go into the Exclusion areas upwards of three times a day. And for the most part everyone operating in them communicates their position and intentions clearly and in a timely manner.

Keeping all exterior lights on also helps. Pulse lights are bigger help.

As for changing the reg over to Euro style, we think we're the ones that got it right.

Rick, I was with you until your last sentence. Thinking you have it right (and therefore someone else has it 'wrong') is a foolish attitude in aviation. You should always keep an open mind.

Cows:
In respect to total helicopter operations in and out of West 30th Street heliport (KJRA), sightseeing is phasing out, moving to Wall Street (much more open and easier to access).
Not by choice of the operators, I have to add, rather by a court decision resulting from noise complaints:

So basically its already down to a maximum of 71 flights allowed a day (that's like 5-6 an hour during daylight) and will be less than 44/day next year. Actually Airnav .com quotes a statistic saying that in 12 month last year there where only 52 operations a day - not sure were that number is from.

Not saying that the total number of flights on the hudson river will go down, but the takeoffs and landings can be structured safer.



Will they shutdown the corridor? Very unlikely, the city officials themselves have a huge interest in the heliports, since they (and their "supporters" - read: lobbyists) are using the heliports themselves. As far as sightseeing goes, here is a quote from USA Today about the hard to ignore economics:
As far as positive control is concerned; it's not the first time the discussion flared up (believe it or not) and multiple studies showed, that it is almost impossible between radar shadows (buildings) and sheer amount of necessary traffic advisories (as someone stated earlier, the controller wouldn't stop talking) to safely conduct operations. It would probably be less safe, because a single set of eyes would be responsible for separation and since that person would constantly talk, nobody could warn each other, even if they fly see and avoid.

Can the current procedures be improved? Sure! But knee-jerk regulation resulting from a freak/fluke/random (whatever description suits you) accident cannot be the solution! :=

Cows
Re your response to Rick -

Like Rick, I think the FAA has generally got the degree of regulation right and aviation in the UK/Europe is over-regulated.
Is that a foolish attitude in your opinion? If so, why?
(BTW, my opinion is based upon having had to consider regulation in several European countries and the USA over many years, which has given me ample opportunity to make comparisons.)

Does 'always keeping an open mind' mean, in your view, not forming an opinion about which regulatory system is generally better?
Or does it include forming an opinion but being open to changing that opinion if the basis for it changes?

Oh yes, preconceived ideas, PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE, if one wishes to live to be an auld pilot.

an easy example is the colonial staidness syndrome, so easily seen in the backblocks of old cattle communities in places like North Queesnland.
Yer know, 'that's the way my father dunnit-anthat'stheway-I'm gonnadunnit, - like, Eh maite.!!. Ehhh.

Methinks that flying lawyer and a couple of others are doing an excellent job of answering queries, some of which have been put tiresomely repetitively before, and that it is time that we moved on.

what may have worked for decades did not work here, the proof is in.

one must be able to have a small airspace bust, accidental or for emergency, and not have fatalities.

Lets hope we all move onto better mental manipulation in our procedures and flight conduct to cover for this tragedy with better airspace management.

No!, no I don't think that anyone will disagree with any of that.

Also, I for one will not condemm a small "inappropriate" comment by an air trafficker.
That is often how these guys test the water to see if things are really as OK as they are being made out to be. They may not know that they are doing it, but you often hear it.

Let's hope that rellies, and others connected to the affected, do not have to suffer the inconsequental drivel of the last few repeated questions and perplexing sitreps, and that SP will close this thread off until a report comes thru from NTSB.

I say this for the sake of those affected who may be scanning these pages.
cheers tet.

High traffic areas are higher risk areas, whether controlled or uncontrolled airspace. Midair collisions occur in both: fixed-wing/fixed-wing; rotary/rotary; and combinations thereof.

The crash occurred at something like 8 nm into the Piper's flight from Teterboro to Ocean City, an extremely limited time to monitor traffic, self-announce as one exited a controlled airport, and merge into a very busy VFR corridor. Not impossible or unreasonable, but challenging and unforgiving of conflict.

It also appears to have been less than 2 nm from the helo's departure pad. That is not a lot of time to update traffic and it's too much time for a helo's pre-departure clearing turn information.

My best guess is that neither pilot saw the other aircraft at any point. The natural inclination is to direct most of your attention to the front, where you're going, and where the hazards close quickly with you. Looks to me like the Piper was turning to follow the published route at the point of impact.

It's hard to visually pick out traffic against visual clutter, even with electronic aid. If the traffic is low in your perpendicular, and with little relative movement, it's really hard. I'd guess that was the Piper pilot was pretty busy as he chose to enter a high risk environment. No blame intended by implication...

The helo was probably still climbing and establishing on the route, coming from one risk environment into another and the airplane approached in his perpendicular and blind side, perhaps from beyond his visual range from his clearing turn. My experience is that I'd be 2-3 minutes into the flight when I got to what I'd guess was the collision altitude. The airplane could easily have been out of the helo's visual field when the pilot was looking in his direction. My TIS is often not even updated or downloaded at this point, so much for that.

A position or controller's call would easily be missed or covered, and the stars are aligned for tragedy.

Flying Lawyer, I'm most certainly in the second camp. Do something, have a look at it, does it work, if not change it, look at it again. In basic terms, the Boyd Cycle (Boyd being a renowned American military aviator). My line with Rick was that he appeared to believe the FAA had the right answer and that was it. I'm sure the FAA are pro-active in assessing current procedures and balancing regulation against risk.

Not never, but too late I think. The helicopter was climbing out, has most likely not seen the Piper prior to takeoff - and probably never did afterwards (btw. Devil: there is not enough room for a clearing turn - correction: maybe enough room, but you'd be busy not putting your tail in the fence, rather than scanning for traffic).

To the best of my knowledge Libertys AStars are flown left seat (?); leaves a big blind spot to your right-aft quadrant.

Putting everything together: speed of the airplane, climb speed of the helicopter (indicates that the Piper pilot has not seen the helo take off the heliport - unlikely that the helicopter was underneath the Pipers wing during the whole climb-out, considering the climb speed of of an AStar) and the fact that the Pipers right wing instead of the left wing got cut off, indicates that the F/W pilot tried to bank away in the last second.

Yep now I did it, I guessed what happened based on what we know. As for determining if that's what really happened and who's fault it was, I leave that to the NTSB.

FAA smarter than it seems?
 

When I read about the FAA suspending two controllers after this incident, I had a weird thought: What if someone smart at the FAA were deliberately using the controller suspensions as a kind of stalking horse to discourage any other calls for "doing something"?

It's like this: People who have more emotion than brains call immediately for "doing something" after this very rare and unusual accident. They want heavy regulation, radar, ATC, bans on GA or helicopter traffic, yadda yadda. Someone at the FAA sees the folly and foolishness in acting on these irrational calls to action, so they look around as the NTSB investigates, and, lo, they find that two controllers at Teterboro were breaking the rules. So they suspend the controllers and issue a press release, emphasizing that these controllers were at the same airport that talked to the Piper in the accident, and mentioning that they probably had nothing to do with the accident only in the fine print.

What's the effect? The media latch on to the controller suspensions. This is presented and accepted as "doing something." Attention is diverted from calls for heavier regulation or other inappropriate actions. The controllers' mistakes had nothing to do with the accident, but that detail is deliberately understated by all. Result: No changes need be made to the airspace or regulations in order to "do something," since "something has been done" by suspending those nasty controllers.

Thus, it could be a very clever ploy to avoid much more damaging changes to the status quo, which has proven incredibly safe for many years.

As for the controllers, well, they lose. However, they WERE breaking the rules, and the actions taken against them are perfectly legitimate and justified, even if they had nothing to do with the accident. They took their chances by breaking the rules, and they got caught.

Am I giving the FAA too much credit?

When more than one aircraft is in the sky, the possibility for a mid-air exists. During my time as a tour pilot in NYC I had plenty of close-calls.

I remember when the NYPD helicopter and the floatplane collided over the East River near the Wall Street Heliport. But I also remember only two other mid-airs that occured - both within (what we used to call) the aiport traffic area of Teterboro, coincidentally enough. One was between a f/w twin and a Bell 206 with *two* pilots onboard! If mid-airs can happen around airports with working control towers, can we even hope to prevent all of them in "uncontrolled" areas?

During my 13 years in the GOM for PHI, I had some close-calls too. In fact, early in my career with the company we were averaging one mid-air per year. Some happened near airports or at the beach-in/beach-out points, but some happened out in the Gulf proper.

One day in 1998 my friend Andy was flying his speed-hobbled (at the time) 407, just cruising along fat, dumb, and happy when he heard a wierd noise. Looking around, specifically over his right shoulder, he was horrified to see a Twinstar bearing down on him. He banked hard left, but it was too late. The Twinstar's rotor cut off Andy's tailboom and the nose of his ship. If he hadn't immediately gone into a crouch position his feet would have left with the tail rotor pedals. Somehow...unbelievably, he got the throttle off and autorotated down. He lived. Sadly, the Twinstar pilot did not.

In another, more fortunate incident, my friend Greg was flying along in his 206B, fat dumb and happy when he got a strange feeling. Nothing seemed wrong in the ship, but when he looked over his left shoulder and around the broom closet, he was horrified to see another 206 (a faster L-model) overtaking him on a direct collision course, so close that Greg could see the pilot's head down (playing with the loran or gps?). Greg hauled aft on the cyclic and...somehow...avoided a collision. We're still scratching our heads over that one.

Bullets over a battlefield.

Sure, the Hudson River exclusion is crowded. Pilots who elect to fly in it must exercise proper diligence...okay, "extra" diligence. But that applies to all of us too, no matter where we fly.

I love my Zaon aftermarket TCAD. Even when I'm on the ground, as long as aircraft in the traffic pattern are being painted by radar, I'll see the replies from their transponders, displayed right on the screen of my Garmin 496, which is mounted up on top of the glare shield, where it should be. Foolproof? No. But it's a heck of a great tool.

Everyone enjoys the privilege of flying without unnecessary rules and regulations, but my point about this so called ‘fluke’ accident is that instead of accepting it as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of ‘GA flying risk’, it probably could have been avoided. I am not at all familiar with the very busy Hudson River area airspace and, like everyone else, I’ll wait and hear what the NTSB have to say in due course; hopefully, we will learn from this tragedy and there may well be new procedures imposed to help prevent a repetition. From reading the very informative contributions in this thread from those member who are familiar however, it seems clear to me that this was an accident waiting to happen and without some improvement in safety regulations, there is little doubt that a similar accident will happen again, sooner or later.

At the risk of incurring another ‘civil rights’ backlash, surely nobody can disagree that better control in this specific vicinity would be a good thing; it needn’t be onerous and needn’t affect other areas necessarily. There have been suggestions around separate tracks/heights for RW and FW, or a single frequency for all GA traffic, for example. Whatever, I don’t understand why my fellow aviators would rather continue to run the gauntlet than have extra controls introduced, even though these controls could protect them from a similar situation.

Puntosaurus mentioned the London heli routes earlier; these are very accurately plotted both by track and height to provide the safest route possible for single engine machines, and to avoid mid airs between GA traffic as well as with City and Heathrow traffic. The documentation to support these heli routes is extremely detailed and pilots navigating them need to be thoroughly trained by someone with experience. The result (as far as I’m aware) is a faultless safety record. Compare that with the NTSB declaration that there have been 8 accidents in the Hudson River area in the last 14 years and introducing new procedures would seem to be a no-brainer.

TTB

just read an update on the ntsb investigation...seems that both piper and copter were on radar and that newerk asked teterboro to resolve a possible conflict

urge you to read the following:

NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

August 14, 2009

************************************************************

NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE MIDAIR
COLLISION OVER THE HUDSON RIVER

************************************************************

In its continuing investigation of the midair collision of
an air tour helicopter and a small plane over the Hudson
River on Saturday, the National Transportation Safety Board
has developed the following factual information:

On August 8, 2009, at 11:53 a.m. EDT, a Eurocopter AS 350 BA
(N401LH) operated by Liberty Helicopters and a Piper PA-32R-
300 (N71MC) operated by a private pilot, collided in midair
over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The
certificated commercial pilot and five passengers onboard
the helicopter were killed. The certificated private pilot
and two passengers onboard the airplane were also killed.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight
plans were filed for either flight. The local sightseeing
helicopter flight was conducted under the provisions of 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part 136. The personal airplane
flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 91.

The helicopter departed West 30th Street Heliport (JRA), New
York, New York, for a sightseeing tour at 11:52 a.m. The
airplane departed Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New
Jersey, at 11:49 a.m.; destined for Ocean City Municipal
Airport (26N), Ocean City, New Jersey. The airplane pilot
requested an en route altitude of 3500 feet.

According to preliminary radar data, the helicopter turned
south from JRA and climbed to 1,100 feet, with a transponder
code of 1200. According to witnesses, the pilot of the
helicopter had transmitted a position report of "Stevens
Point" (Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New
Jersey) on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF),
123.05.

On the day of the accident, Teterboro Air Traffic Control
Tower staff consisted of five controllers. At the time of
the accident, the tower was staffed with two controllers:
one controller was working ground control, local control,
and arrival radar, and was also acting as the controller in
charge of the facility. The second controller was working
the flight data/clearance delivery position. Two other
controllers were on break and the front line manager had
left the facility at about 1145.

At 1148:30, the Teterboro tower controller cleared the
airplane for takeoff on frequency 119.50. The first radar
target for the airplane was recorded at 1149:55 as the
flight departed runway 19.

The tower controller advised the airplane and the pilot of
another helicopter operating in the area of each other and
instructed the pilot of the airplane to remain at or below
1,100 feet. At this time, the tower controller initiated a
non-business-related phone call to Teterboro Airport
Operations. The airplane flew southbound until the
controller instructed its pilot to turn left to join the
Hudson River. At 1152:20 the Teterboro controller instructed
the pilot to contact Newark on a frequency of 127.85; the
airplane reached the Hudson River just north of Hoboken
about 40 seconds later. At that time there were several
aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of
the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of
which were potential traffic conflicts for the airplane. The
Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call
at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential
traffic conflicts. The Newark tower controller observed air
traffic over the Hudson River and called Teterboro to ask
that the controller instruct the pilot of the airplane to
turn toward the southwest to resolve the potential
conflicts. The Teterboro controller then attempted to
contact the airplane but the pilot did not respond. The
collision occurred shortly thereafter. A review of recorded
air traffic control communications showed that the pilot did
not call Newark before the accident occurred.

The helicopter departed from the 30th Street Heliport at
1152 for what was planned to be a 12-minute tour. The
initial part of the tour was to be flown outside class B
airspace, so the pilot was not required to contact air
traffic control before or after departure. The first radar
target for the helicopter was detected by Newark radar at
about 1152:27, when the helicopter was approximately mid-
river west of the heliport and climbing through 400 feet.
According to recorded radar data, the helicopter flew to the
west side of the river, and then turned southbound to follow
the Hudson. According to Liberty Helicopters management,
this was the expected path for the tour flight. The
helicopter continued climbing southbound until 1153:14, when
it and the airplane collided at 1,100 feet.

As noted above, immediately after the Teterboro tower
controller instructed the airplane to contact Newark tower
on frequency 127.85, the Newark controller called the
Teterboro controller to request that they turn the airplane
to a heading of 220 degrees (southwest) and transfer
communications on the aircraft. As the Newark controller
was providing the suggested heading to the Teterboro
controller, the pilot of the airplane was acknowledging the
frequency change to the Teterboro controller. The Teterboro
controller made two unsuccessful attempts to reach the
pilot, with the second attempt occurring at 1152:50. At
1152:54, 20 seconds prior to the collision, the radar data
processing system detected a conflict between the airplane
and the helicopter, which set off aural alarms and a caused
a "conflict alert" indication to appear on the radar
displays at both Teterboro and Newark towers. During
interviews both controllers stated that they did not recall
seeing or hearing the conflict alert. At 1153:19, five
seconds after the collision, the Teterboro controller
contacted the Newark controller to ask about the airplane,
and was told that the pilot had not called. There were no
further air traffic control contacts with either aircraft.

The role that air traffic control might have played in this
accident will be determined by the NTSB as the investigation
progresses. Any opinions rendered at this time are
speculative and premature.

Radar data and witness statements indicate that the aircraft
collided at 1,100 feet in the vicinity of Stevens Point.
Most of the wreckage fell in to the Hudson River; however,
some small debris from the airplane, including the right
main landing gear wheel, fell on land within the city limits
of Hoboken. The collision was witnessed by numerous people
in the area of the accident and was immediately reported to
local emergency responders.

The helicopter was recovered on August 9, 2009. Most of the
helicopter components were accounted for at the scene, with
the exception of the main rotor and transmission. The
airplane was recovered on August 11, 2009. Most of the
airplane components were accounted for at the scene, with
the exception of both wings. The wreckages were subsequently
transported to a secure facility in Delaware.

The pilot of the airplane, age 60, held a private pilot
certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land,
airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane. His most
recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on May
14, 2009. At that time he reported a total flight experience
of 1,020 hours.

The pilot of the helicopter, age 32, held a commercial pilot
certificate, with ratings for rotorcraft helicopter and
instrument helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class
medical certificate was issued on June 16, 2009. At that
time he reported a total flight experience of 3,010 hours.

Digital photographs and a video recording taken by witnesses
to the accident have been provided to the NTSB. In
addition, a digital camera was recovered from the
helicopter. All of these were sent to the NTSB Vehicle
Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC for further
examination. Global Positioning System units were recovered
from both aircraft and also forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle
Recorders Laboratory.

The recorded weather at TEB at 1151 was wind variable at 3
knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 24
degrees Celsius, dew point 7 degrees Celsius, altimeter
30.23 inches of mercury.

###

NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway
(202) 314-6100

Is it me or is this conflicting advice -> fly in the VFR corridor ("remain at or below 1,100 feet") but switch to the controller of the class B airspace above.

"Remain above 1,100 feet and switch to newark" would have been more appropriate... especially seeing that:
FWIW, I once had a TEB controller vector a departing Lear with a course intercepting mine, after they cleared me in for approach. I needed new underwear, and by the look in the Lear pilots eyes I think he did too. Luckily we saw each other in time (and were aware each other were in the area, and thus paying attention) and took avoiding action.

Not banging on the controllers at TEB, just saying making the corridor radar controlled is not going to stop human error, it will just move it from 2 pilots down to 1 controller to make a mistake.