Readiness rates from 2004 GAO data:

CH-47D/F: Goal: 80% Actual: 69% (as high as 75% in 2001)
CH-53E: Goal: 70% Actual: 64% (62% in 2000, 59% in 2001)
CH-46E: Goal: 80% Actual: 75% (79% in 1999)
AH-1W: Goal: 85% Actual: 70% (76% in 2000)
AV-8B: Goal: 76% Actual: 68% (64% in 2000 and 2001)

It's not that it's twice as fast, it's that it's twice as quick! What the V-22 can do in 1.0 hour the 53E takes 1.6 and the 46 takes 2.1. That's reinforcements and supplies in the zone where they need to be, not on the way.

John Dix

You forgot to mention that the 53 has been involved in the Mayquez disaster do solely to the platform, the Desert One disaster due to the platform, the worst helicopter crash in history in Israel due the platform. The V-22's track record is infinitely better than the 53's even if you add ten years of grace to the 53.

Maybe Spielberg can help to right a better spin.

The Sultan

usmc helo,

As you probably know better than I, the Osprey was never intended to replace the CH-53E, but rather the less complex CH-53D. As has been pointed out before, it's always dangerous mixing selected readiness rates and MC rates, but for what it's worth HMH-463 claimed an average MC readiness rate of 89% during their first 7 months in theater.

I/C

IC,

I couldn't agree more. I felt the 53E was a fair comparison since so many on here seem to make that comparision and some feel we should get rid of the V-22 and replace it with the 53K.
Also remember that the CO of VMM-266 (in Defence Helicopter) pointed out that if depot level maintenance had been available for the V-22 at Al Asad as it was for the 46's and 53's then his numbers would have been higher also. But some on here probably believe that he also has "sullied his honor" and "drank the cool aid" by saying so.
As I've pointed out before I've been in squadrons that reported over 80% MC but for some reason only 2 out of 9 aircraft could fly.

Sultan......you don't know squat about what you are talking about!

Mayaquez....Flying Fortresses would have been shot down in all of that hostile fire.....the losses were due to enemy fire. Brave men died there.

Desert One was pilot error....pure and simple. Again...Brave Men died!

The size of the aircraft determines the number of casualties....the 22 will never kill as many in one go as can the Chinook or 53 because it carries less than half as many as do the helicopters.

Please try to add to the discussion please......and not your usual poor contribution!


Lessee....if a CH-53 totes 55 troops....and the V-22 totes 24.....how does that play with numbers of troops per hour?

Some 53 History
 

Must be a coincidence, Sultan, but this past weekend I went to the wedding of a daughter to one of Sikorsky's Senior Test Pilots, who was the pilot of the USAF H-53 that was shot down in the Mayaguez incident. A USAF Academy graduate, he nonetheless followed the dictates of many other air cavalry types in similar situations: he dismounted his H-53 and fought as infantry with the USMC troops he had on board. Don't know how one makes that out to be an H-53 induced disaster?

As SAS pointed out, the Desert One crash was a clear cockpit caused accident.

With regard to the Israeli accident, one of the factors, in fact THE factor, was that the aircraft was being used way outside of the usage spectrum upon which component replacement, and component overhaul times, were based. As I recall, the Israelis were using the USAF H-53C usage spectrum, but their mission spectrum wasn't at all represented by that spectrum. They knew what the spectrum was.

John Dixson

SAS and JohnD

Facts are facts the 53 was the centerpiece of two miltary disasters.

Desert One without a shot being fired. How many crapped out just trying to make the first refueling stop eight or so years after entry into service. The operation failed solely because of the reliability of the 53's. No other reason. The collision occurred after the decision to abort due to too few helicopters being left to continue on.

Relative to the Mayaguez:

Knife 13 was brought down by a rotor failure before the assault without any enemy fire. I guess those 23 souls do not count in your minds. As to the "flying fortresses" you are admitting the 53 was as good as 40 years older technology. SAS hard to believe you would admit some sandle wearers could defeat one of your dream companies products.

As to the people that were there glad they got out. Too bad they departed so fast they left three marines behind alive to fight and die alone.

The Sultan

V-22’s Iraq Performance Should Prompt Program Review, GAO Says
By Tony Capaccio
June 23 (Bloomberg) -- The V-22 Osprey’s performance during its 19 months in Iraq was substandard and the Pentagon should review whether the aircraft’s cost and reliability merit continuing the program, according to congressional auditors.
The tilt-rotor plane’s components wear out too soon, making it too costly to maintain and grounded too much of the time, the U.S. Government Accountability Office said.
The Defense Department has spent $28 billion on the aircraft developed and built by Textron Inc. and Boeing Co. and has bought 206 planes to date. It plans to spend $25 billion more on upgrades and the purchase of the remaining 252 planes in the 458-aircraft program for the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command.
Given the “significant funding needs” to complete the program, “now is a good time to consider the return on this investment as well as other, less costly alternatives that can fill the current requirement,” the watchdog agency said.
The report, scheduled for release at a congressional hearing today, is the first independent assessment of the V-22’s performance in Iraq. The aircraft has been in development for 20 years and Marine Corps officials say it is likely to be deployed in Afghanistan this year.
The Osprey has rotors that tilt, allowing it to take off and land like a helicopter. The military sees it as useful for long-range Marine Corps and commando missions such as those the Marines anticipate in Afghanistan.
Pentagon Response
David Ahern, a Pentagon acquisition official, defended the aircraft’s effectiveness in Iraq but said the GAO “properly identifies reliability and availability concerns.”
“Correcting the reliability and availability problems is a priority and actions are being taken,” Ahern stated in comments included in the report. “Neither the Defense Department nor the Marine Corps is satisfied,” he wrote in comments coordinated with the Marine Corps.
Ahern said the Pentagon sees no need for a reassessment of the program of the scope recommended by GAO, but “as more is learned about the V-22’s performance, future adjustments to planned quantities may be appropriate.”
Pentagon performance reviews of the Osprey in 2000 and 2001 criticized the aircraft for a host of deficiencies, including problems with its design, safety and reliability. Subsequent reviews concluded that the problems had been largely corrected.
No Heavy Combat
The V-22 didn’t face heavy combat conditions in Iraq. The first squadron of 12 arrived in October 2007, after the once- heavy fighting in Anbar province between U.S. forces and al- Qaeda insurgents had died down because local Sunni tribesmen had turned against the insurgents.
While the V-22 flew its assigned missions successfully, maintenance problems left the planes available for flight at rates “significantly below minimum required levels,” the GAO said.
During three periods studied during the V-22’s deployment from October 2007 through April 2009, the planes were available for combat operations on average 68 percent, 57 percent and 61 percent of the time, “while the minimum requirement” is 82 percent, said the GAO.
And these low rates “were not unique to the Iraq deployment” but were on par with other V-22 squadrons in the U.S., GAO said.
In addition, the 12 planes arrived with nearly three times the spare parts required, yet some parts wore out more quickly than expected, creating shortages that forced maintenance crews to cannibalize components from these planes or get them from Ospreys based in the U.S.
In addition to keeping the plane grounded, these constant repairs put the plane’s flying cost at $11,000 per hour, double the original estimate.
Design ‘Challenges’
The V-22’s continuing design “challenges have raised questions over whether the aircraft is best suited to accomplish” the full range of missions of the older aircraft it’s replacing, the agency said.
Ahern defended the V-22’s performance in Iraq.
“The aircraft was pressed into combat operations in Iraq at the first opportunity,” he wrote. “The V-22 is arguably the most survivable, versatile and capable medium-lift airframe in the Iraq theater” and “evidence in the report leads to a conclusion that the V-22 was operationally effective in Iraq,” Ahern wrote.
Providence, Rhode Island-based Textron’s Bell Helicopter unit co-produces the Osprey with Boeing’s Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, facility. Chicago-based Boeing makes the fuselage. Fort Worth, Texas-based Bell mates the wings and the tail to the fuselage and conducts flight tests.
Bell Helicopter spokesman Tom Dolney said that, while the companies haven’t seen the GAO report, “We have a plan in place and an ongoing program to improve the availability of the entire V-22 fleet.”
“We’ve been working with our customers and the Osprey industry team to identify components, support activities and designs that will improve aircraft availability. Several improvements are already in place,” Dolney said in an e-mail statement.
To contact the reporter on this story: Tony Capaccio at at [email protected]
Last Updated: June 23, 2009 11:48 EDT

Source: V-22?s Iraq Performance Should Prompt Program Review, GAO Says - Bloomberg.com

Goodness! Not more government bashing of this fantastic flying machine!
 

MILITARY: New government report slams Osprey
Findings raise questions about scheduled 2010 sitings at Pendleton, Miramar

The U.S. Marine Corps' troubled V-22 Osprey aircraft has failed to live up to its billing in Iraq and continues to face a multitude of reliability issues and rising costs, a new government report concludes.

As a result of heavier troop equipment, the tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter and flies like an airplane can only carry 20 troops, not 24 as was originally intended.

And the planned installation of a gun in the aircraft's belly to improve its defense could further cut the troop number to 18, the report from the Government Accountability Office finds.

The Osprey's ability to perform well in Afghanistan, where thousands of additional Marines have been assigned in recent weeks and mountains soar above 12,000 feet, is questionable because of the aircraft's problems with its de-icing system and 10,000-foot operating ceiling, the report says.

The 41-page report prepared for Congress and released Tuesday recommends Defense Secretary Robert Gates direct a study to determine whether the Marine Corps should continue the program as designed.

It also suggests the Marine Corps should consider keeping a large fleet of older-generation CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters to ensure all its missions can be fulfilled.

The Government Accountability Office findings fly in the face of consistently glowing Osprey reports from Marine commanders and aviators.

The report also comes as Camp Pendleton and Miramar Marine Corps Air Station are getting ready to place 114 Ospreys on those bases and phase out the CH-46 and CH-53, which have proven to be reliable workhorses since the Vietnam era.

That scheduled 2010 transition to what is supposed to become the primary troop mover could be put on hold.

"I would be surprised if the Defense Department doesn't accept the recommendation to take a new look and perhaps scale back the program," said Phil Coyle, an Osprey critic at the Center for Defense Information in Washington and a former assistant secretary of defense from 1994 to 2001. The center is staffed with former members of the military and analyzes defense issues. "With its high maintenance costs and low readiness rates, the review being called for is appropriate."

The Marine Corps has spent $28.8 billion to date to develop the Osprey, which first flew in 1989. Its development was set back several years by a series of crashes between 1991 and 2000 that claimed the lives of 27 Marines, including 14 from Camp Pendleton and four from Miramar.

Government auditors say the cost of flying the aircraft, which is manufactured by Boeing and Bell, is now $11,000 per hour, more than double the expected price and twice the hourly cost of a CH-46. Research and development costs have ballooned from $4.2 billion to nearly $13 billion, despite the reduction in the number planned for purchase by the Marine Corps and Air Force from 1,000 to 500.

The cost for a single Osprey has skyrocketed 148 percent, from $37.7 million when the program was launched in 1985 to $93.4 million. About 250 Ospreys remain to be built.

"The issue for the Marine Corps is they can buy four conventional helicopters for the price of one Osprey," Coyle said. "I've always felt that the Osprey could be used as a truck, but it's a pretty expensive truck."

A Marine Corps spokesman defended the Osprey while acknowledging the service still faces an array of issues with the aircraft.

"The performance of the Osprey in Iraq has given the ground commanders everything they've asked for, and done so faster, farther and safer than any helicopter could do," said the spokesman, Maj. Eric Dent. "But we know there is still work to be done to improve reliability and maintainability of some components to enhance readiness. We are fully engaged and partnered with industry on this."

While the 12-aircraft Osprey unit in Iraq last year was able to complete most of its missions flying farther and faster than older-generation helicopters, none involved combat. The unavailability of replacement parts rendered many inoperable, and resulted in maintenance crews "cannibalizing" one aircraft to keep another flying, according to the report.

As for serving in Afghanistan, the report notes that the Osprey cannot live up to its promise of being able to fly day or night in all kinds of weather and at varying altitudes.

"Identified challenges could limit the ability to conduct operations ... at high altitudes similar to what might be expected in Afghanistan."

No Ospreys are now in Afghanistan. The military is relying on older-model heavy-lift helicopters to ferry troops and equipment.

A spokesman for Marine Corps reservist U.S. Rep. Duncan D. Hunter, R-El Cajon, a member of the House Armed Services Committee who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, said the congressman supports the Osprey while at the same time recognizing it has not yet been tested in combat.

"Congressman Hunter believes the V-22 should be incorporated into the combat mission in Afghanistan and tested in that environment," spokesman Joe Kasper said. "Until then, any criticisms or evaluations of its combat capability are premature."

Call staff writer Mark Walker at 760-740-3529.

Source: MILITARY: New government report slams Osprey : North County Times - Californian 06-23-2009

usmc helo: Please inform Maj Dent that the V22 is 'quicker' not faster. Thanks. Semper Fi

Two accounts of the action at Koh Tang Island....

RETAKING THE MAYAGUEZ - The final battle of the Vietnam War

Mayaguez

Knife 13, the aircraft that crashed shortly after takeoff lost a Main Rotor Blade.

perspective
 

Dan Reno post:
"Government auditors say the cost of flying the aircraft, which is manufactured by Boeing and Bell, is now $11,000 per hour, more than double the expected price and twice the hourly cost of a CH-46."

Therefore a CH-46 cost $5500. A CH-46 does 120 kts. If we assume a one hour mission (60 nm out and back, not counting time on deck) it will take the CH-46 1 hour, or $5500. The V-22 does the same mission at 250 kts and completes it in 29 minutes or $5280 for a savings of $220/hr.


Found the following numbers for the 53E from a brief:
-The CH-53E costs approximately $20,000 per flight hour.
–400+ maintenance labor hours per flight hour to operate.
–There are approximately 160 operational CH-53 helicopters.
–PMA-261(CH-53) spends $512M per year on maintenance.

I'm not sure if the $20K/hr number is an apples to apples comparison to the V-22 and 46 flight hour numbers. Using a similar comparison as above though, a CH-53 needs to cost $6600/hr to break even with the V-22.

Dan Reno, Unlike you I'm sure Maj Dent would understand the intent of my comment, but unlike you he knows what he is talking about.

Osprey delivers for Honduran villagers
by 2nd Lt. Mark Lazane
1st Special Operations Wing Public Affairs

6/11/2009 - HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. -- Unable to access remote villages in the mountainous areas of Honduras poses problems for many non-governmental agencies when they try to deliver life-saving supplies to villages along trails not accessible by conventional vehicles.

Except, of course, when the CV-22 Osprey, and its unique capabilities, just so happen to be in the area already.

The 8th Special Operations Squadron, along with their unique airframe stationed at Hurlburt Field, recently traveled to Honduras in support of ongoing operational missions.

While there, they contributed air power to a large humanitarian aid campaign taking place throughout the nation's rugged countryside.

Taking advantage of the Osprey's unique payload and lift-off/landing capabilities, three Ospreys each made three different deliveries of critical items, including non-perishable food items, hospital beds, and textbooks into remote villages in and around Puerto Limpera, a small village in the northeastern state of Gracias A Dios, said Lt. Col. Darryl Sheets, the mission commander.

"This was a 13-hour crew day, landing on a dirt strip, resulting in a "brown out" landing each time," said Colonel Sheets. "This was cargo that the American embassy in Honduras and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had been trying to get to the village for some time so all parties were very pleased with the outcome."

In total, approximately 43,000 pounds of goods were delivered.

The effort was coordinated through joint US-Honduran diplomatic channels, and was executed with help from members of the Honduran military. At both the villages and the aerial port, Hondurans assisted in loading and unloading the CV-22s, delivering over 20 tons of supplies to local residents.

"The power, range, and speed of the CV-22 Osprey offer unique capabilities to a broad spectrum of humanitarian relief efforts," said Colonel Sheets. "Precious food, shelter, and medicine can be delivered to the most remote regions a given country with the speed of an aircraft and the austere landing capability of a helicopter."

usmc helo Gee, pretty testy today. I also would have assumed you knew my 'intent' but you chose to 'correct' me, and when I simply asked you to get the Major on the same sheet of music as you and I, you again chose to be arguementative. Military.com has a lot of folks like you there and also at the Bell site. Your pain needs to be directed at those from your service that chose to put money ahead of themselves rather than pride and honor when they allowed this aircraft to continue. If you're looking to argue with someone, email those who create the articles rather than the messengers here. Of course as you've found, they'll simply ignore your assnine assumptions and hope you'll go away, like I think I will.

Nail in V22's Coffin? Let's hope.
 

Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Osprey Shortfalls Lead Chairman to Call for Production Halt



For immediate release: Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Contact: Oversight and Government Reform Press Office, 202-225-5051

Osprey Shortfalls Lead Chairman to Call for Production Halt
Towns determines V-22 Osprey performance, cost, safety issues not a recipe for longevity

Washington D.C. – House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Edolphus “Ed” Towns (D-NY) today called for a halt to production of the V-22 Osprey. The Chairman reached this conclusion during a committee hearing titled, “The Future of the V-22 Osprey: Costs, Capabilities and Challenges.” The hearing examined the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) study of the operational effectiveness, suitability and cost of the V-22 Osprey. After hearing witness testimony from individuals with extensive knowledge of the V-22 Osprey and reviewing the GAO report, Chairman Towns stated in his closing statement, “It’s time to put the Osprey out of its misery.”

Closing statement of Chairman Towns:
At the outset of this hearing, I expressed strong reservations about the performance and cost of the V-22 Osprey, but I wanted to hear what our witnesses said today before reaching a conclusion.
What we have heard today convinces me that the dream of a viable high-speed, long-range, tilt-rotor aircraft has not been realized.
Moreover, there is at least some evidence that the aircraft is inherently unsafe.
To sum up, it has problems in hot weather, it has problems in cold weather, it has problems with sand, it has problems with high altitude, and it has restricted maneuverability.
The list of what the Osprey can’t do is longer than the list of what it can do.
Not only has the Osprey failed to live up to its initial billing, it has failed expensively.
Our investigation indicates that we’ve gotten half the aircraft for three times the cost – that’s not a recipe for longevity.
I am going to ask the staff to prepare a report on the findings of this investigation, which we will forward to the Appropriations Committee with recommendations for further action. It’s time to put the Osprey out of its misery.

The complete GAO report.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09692t.pdf

Looks like a cut & paste from all the conclusions stated here and at G2MIL over the years. What took them so long?

H-53 Reliability
 

SAS/Sultan, I called the SA pilot who was in the Mayaguez operation and he confirmed the loss of that ship with the police. Cause was traced to an improper re-assembly of one of the sleeve/spindle assemblies by the NARF at Pensacola.

As to the RH-53D that turned back on the way to Desert One, I believe that was related to the loss of attitude reference. Those ships had been modified ( don't know by whom ) with strap down inertial systems and I think the situation was that some of the USMC troops on board put their gear on top ( they were on the floor up front ) and they over heated.

And I was reminded that during the flight over, the flight crews were on a C-141 that when it landed on Diego Garcia had to sit in the machine for an extended period because the USAF crew went out of crew duty time, so they had to wait for the fresh 141 crew. They didn't get much sleep, if any, on the boat either.

Thanks,
John Dixson

By the Numbers
 

The old adage “Number lie and liars use numbers” may be pertinent to some of the past discussions. There are some engineering numbers that are pertinent and absolute when comparing the two vehicles.



V-22 CH-53E
• Empty Weight 35000 lbs. 35000 lbs.
• MGW 52000 lbs. 69750 lbs.
• Total Installed Hp 12800 ESHP 13110 ESHP
• Max Payload 17000 lbs. 34750 lbs.
• Max Passengers 24 + 3 crew 55 +3 crew
• Main Rotor Disk Loading 22.94 lbs/sq ft 14.25 lbs/sq ft
• Power Loading 4.06 lbs/ESHP 5.32 lbs/ ESHP

Some of the issues with the V-22 are purely a function of its physical design. The V-22 has two small rotors relative to its design lift requirement. As a result, the V-22 requires engine power similar to that of an aircraft that is 35% heavier. Along with a requirement for more horse power the high disk loading also brings with it questionable maneuverability in the helicopter mode and unmanageable auto rotational flight characteristics (i.e. very high rate of descent). These arguments and discussions will continue well into the autumn of our rotary wing careers. In the end Newton and Bernoulli are in the driver’s seat, and they are indisputable and they will have the final word.:ok:

sound familiar?
 

Jack,

Your numbers are irrefutable. But you left out one, Airspeed. The customers primary desire was airspeed and range, not payload. Remember that the Marines already have a world class heavy lift aircraft. Given that could you fill in the variables of what it would take to make the CH-53E go 250 kts?

V-22 CH-53E
• Empty Weight 35000 lbs. _______ lbs.
• MGW 52000 lbs. _________lbs.
• Total Installed Hp 12800 ESHP ________ ESHP
• Max Payload 17000 lbs. ________ lbs.
• Max Passengers 24 + 3 crew ___________ crew
• Main Rotor Disk Loading 22.94 lbs/sq ft __________ lbs/sq ft
• Power Loading 4.06 lbs/ESHP ___________ lbs/ ESHP

SASLESS, thanks for the link to the GAO. I found some interesting stuff there.

From GAO report 101184 CH-53E Helicopter Program. February 25, 1977
- Specifically, we have not been able to find a clear mission need and there was no competition during its development.

- While it is difficult to speculate on what the outcome of a program such as this woild have been if the acquisition policy had been different--this current program has been plagued by controversy ot- the need for the helicopters, by significant

cost growth (the current estimated unit cost is $11 million as opposed to the original estimate of $7,8 million), and significant technolngical problems.

- Mission Need The mission of the CH-53E has not been specifically defined and, as a result, the program was subjected to much debate. In our Feburary 1972 study we reported that elements of OSD questioned the need for the CH-53E in view of the capability of existing helicopters to support the Marine Corps amphibious assault operations. In 1973, Department of Defense system analysts, based on extensive review, believed the described missions for the
CH-53E did not represent firm requirements nor did they justify a 16-ton lift capability because the missions could be satisfied by a less capable helicopter.
- In summary, Mr. Chairman, the CH-53E program has prcgressed almost to the point of a production decision although
--there is a questionable need for an aircraft with its characteristics,
--the consideration of alternatives was limited,
and
-- there was no competition in the developmental phase.
Its current status can best be described as excessively high
cost and a fair degree of risk because of the problems being

encountered.

From GAO report PSAD 78-27
Is Production of the CH-53E Helicopter Warranted? 1978

These concerns and the recent reduction to 49 aircraft make procurement of the CH-53E debatable. GAO questions the merits of a 49-aircraft program and believes it should be reevaluated.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Congress and the Secretary of Defense should determine whether the capability provided by 49 CH-53E helicopite:s warrants the planned expenditure. The Secretary of Defense should determine whether the deficiencies identified during Navy testing have been satisfactorily resolved prior to the initial production decision. Similarly, the Secretary of Defense should make sure that the operational testing, scheduled to be completed in November 1978, is successful before the Navy is allowedto
exercise the option to purchase the 14 fiscal year 1979 aircraft.

Downwash
Operational tests have cited the CH-53E downwash as being operationally inhibiting (i.e., personnel were not able to perform normal duties and nearby aircraft were damaged). The September 21, 1977, OPTEVFOR report noted that two downwash incidents occurred during shipboard trials. One involved a loose object being blown into and causing damage to another aircraft, and the other involved a crewman being slightly

injured when blown down by downwash.

The OPTEVFOR report stated that proper fleet training will be required to eliminate downwash damage, injuries, and surprise. The report further stated that the CH-53E, at a 68,000 pound gross weight and at a 75 foot height or less, can seriously injure personnel moving within 80 feet of the

aircraft.

the airlift of trucks would substantially affect the outcome of an amphibious assault has not been documented and should be further evaluated. A Marine Corps official stated that every item of assault echelon equipment has been selected and screened due to limited ship space. He added that determin- ing the criticality of items is difficult without knowing the particular combat situation or ground commander's plan- ned maneuvers.

And yet it went on to become a very valuable asset to the USMC.

The point of the discussion was not to compare the 53E to the V-22. It was to establish a baseline for helicopter design. A similar comparison could have been made with a fixed wing aircraft. in terms of wing loading. Once again the V-22 would not fare very well. I do not have any specific issues with the V-22 only that it is stuck in the middle with an insufficient rotor to be a decent helicopter and not enough wing to be a decent transport airplane.

Speed was not specifically addressed as was HOGE. Either number would be skewed to a specific machine. To specifically answer the 250 KIAS H-53 question, the answer is most likely never. But I did fly an H-53E at 194 KIAS in straight and level flight as part of a demonstration sanctioned by the USN to verify what speed may be attainable in a future medium lift helicopter. 194 KIAS was achieved without exceeding airframe or engine limitations. Only the Vne was exceeded. That would make up 50% of the V-22 advantage.