UK R22 Crash G-TGRR - AAIB report
 

is here:

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resou...GRR%209-05.pdf

Imagine how awful the instructor feels. very sombre reading.

"Instrument Appreciation" claims another victim. .

:(

I must have read a different report then as this one says the aircraft stayed VMC and leans more towards carb ice and failure to maintain RRPM.

Please take the time to read the reports in full rather than skim the "sexy bits" and titles and jump to conclusions. It does the industry no good and more importantly nothing will be learnt from the mistakes of others if you can not be bothered to study them properly.

I disagree, I was flying at Wellesbourne that day. Saw the wx and heard the some of the R/T.

"The instructor reported that the pilot of G-TGRR repeated the new speed, and shortly afterwards said “I can’t see a thing”.
The instructor asked the student to clarify whether
he meant that he couldn’t see the lead helicopter or
that he had lost all visual reference, but there was no
reply. The instructor made numerous further attempts
to contact G-TGRR on 123.45 MHz. . ."


"The witnesses stated that the aircraft was clear of cloud
and in steady level flight prior to the initial pitch up.
Nevertheless, in the degraded visual environment the student pilot may have had limited visual references,
especially whilst in a nose up attitude, and may have
become disorientated."

Carb ice. . ? Well they would say that wouldnt they. . .

IMHO

>"Carb ice. . ? Well they would say that wouldnt they. ."

err, i dont understand - ?? what have the AAIB got to gain by saying it was carb ice??

The whole incident is a tragedy, an instructor trying to do what he thought was the right thing, and hindsight demonstrating that the actions may have inadvertantly increased the student's workload. A student who also probably thought the formation would make it easier, found himself in a tough place.

Few R22 PPL's would fancy handling a subtle carb ice engine failure (if, as the report suggests, that was the likely scenario), just hope the real world pans out as well as the training.

The instructor will no doubt find his decisions hard to live with irrespective of the report's findings, and the pilot's family gets no definitive answers.

BW

It is interesting to note that the actual weather was significantly worse than it was forcast to be.

It was a bloody stupid thing to do and that should have been obvious from the start.

Last year a PPL on solo navex from a local field did a forced landing in a grassy area around Burnham. (must have been low when he was lost as we saw nothing on the radar!)

The instructor then phoned up to ask if he could fly in and drop off some fuel, and then fly out together. (He couldn't be allowed as SVFR in the London CTR requires standard separation if not on the Heli routes).

Makes you wonder.......

(Picks up own trumpet) as soon as the AAIB reports appear on the website, they do get posted here, and this one was the first on the list - link to thread

The instructor may have been under pressure from higher up the food chain to get tha aircraft back for another flight/next days work etc , this may also have been a factor not covered in this or other reports., I and other instructors I have worked with have had similar pressures put on which only serve to cloud the judgement. this does happen. In this incident, this may or may not have been another factor.

As instructing in the UK seems to be an entry level position where as in Australia an instructor with 2000 - 3000 hours would be considered low time I was wondering what effect this has on training and training related accidents ?? Anyone know of any studies or statistics comparing the 2 different approaches ??

From reading the AAIB report I understand that the weather was below sensible limits for sending a student solo (See Birmingham’s actual weather and what the FI says when he flew to Welsbourne and the weather deteriorated about 1/2 way on route)

There was to much risk involved sending the student solo, so why did the instructor do it?

Don't give me this hindsight bullsh*t.

What the instructor should have done was fly back dual with the student or arranged other transport for him. Simple no discussion with other FIs or the guy who pay's your wages etc.

So carb icing caused the engine to stop but without a doubt bad weather compounded the problem and put the student under a lot of pressure add this to following another helicopter in formation the outcome of the flight comes as no surprise.

Wow... hang on a second here!
You don't know what it was, it could have been suicide for all we can decipher from that report!

Their is only so much you can blame an instructor for, only because he/ she is the easiest target!

What are you trying to gain by pointlessly knocking this guy?

The FI was not sure the student could not safely complete the flight solo with the weather, so he told him to follow him in formation. The problem is the student is still alone in the helicopter, with a much higher work load than he is use to (Weather & formation flying)

If there is any doubt about the safe conduct of a SOLO flight (The weather in this case) then the student should not be sent solo. There is too much risk involved.

I see a real big difference with a dual flight, on a dual flight the instructor is there to bail the student out (Help prevent inadvertent IMC or make sure the there is enough carb heat etc)

We should not overlook what a huge lesson this is for novice pilots.
I am a relatively novice pilot myself but have refused the offer of following a more experienced pilot back to Surrey from Snowdonia in s**t weather, choosing to make my own plans and go at my own pace. Thank God I did after reading this.
It is hard enough to make the decision to turn back or stick it in a field when flying single ship. Imagine when following an experienced pilot.
I believe there was a similar incident in South of France with group of Brits in Robinsons. Father and daughter in R22 crashed into side of hill trying to follow experienced pilot. Was it the same company? hmmm...
Therefore make your own plans. If you dont feel comfortable dont fly. Leave formation flying to military.

Kissmysquirrell: Out of curiosity, how many hours did the FI have? How old was he?

No.

i also remember this incident.

1. Not the same company or instructor

2. "he?" well, now there's an assumption

Assumption helicopter-redeye?

I do wish people would read the report more carefully;) ......it does state….

'....the student told his instructor that he was having difficulty following him ,'

Not to mention numerous other masculine indications...

'...On his return to Shobdon, the instructor contacted..' etc.

Yet again carb ice appears in an R22 fatal AAIB report.

Come on Frank. Kill the R22 or put injection on it - and preferably available as a mod on all the ones already flying as well.

I await the whingers who will post to say 'why'?, 'pilots responsibility', 'can't be done' etc. All crap in my opinion.

Fact is carb ice will continue to feature in fatal reports as long as carbs are fitted to helicopters flown by low time pilots.

Ah! RTFR. I'm conditioned only to respond to multi choice options and there was none, so ...

;) ;)

If you want to read the French accident report into G-YKEN which was flying in loose formation with two other UK helis take a look at

http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/2001/g-...-en010505.html

You will see that the report says that shortly before the accident the lead helicopter reported the visibility as not greater than 20 metres. No, that's not a typo, twenty metres.

A man and his daughter were killed in this accident.

anyone care to translate? all i can make out is the aircraft was out of Denham

The bottom line kinda sums it up Anyway, here is the loose translation of the synopsis (like the summary on an AAIB) if you really want to know.

"Four pilots and their passengers leave on board a R 44 and three R 22's for a trip (VFR) Denham (the United Kingdom) bound for Ajaccio in Corsica. The crews fly under VFR flight rules under a flight plan of Denham to Amiens, then continue without a flight plan.

After a stopover with Albert (80mins) for fuelling, the R 44 takes off the first towards 145 pm to join the Gigny-on-Saone (71). Its pilot indicates that it arrived at the Trawl-net-on-Saone to refuel at 3.40 pm without seeing bad weather conditions out of VFR.

He took the same road appreciably that the other helicopters will follow thereafter. At Worms 14. 00hrs, the three helicopters R 22 take off in their turn of Albert, adopting between them a formation called "out of rafter", carried out by a helicopter indicated A (on the diagram, not translatable), G-YKEN and another helicopter indicated B occupying the two rear positions.

The pilots communicate between them on VHF, the freq of which they allotted arbitrarily (ie not safetycom, most likely 123.45).

Arriving in the area of Semur-in-Auxois (21), the weather conditions, in particular the cloud ceiling, did not make it possible to continue their planned transit altitude.

The pilots descend to maintain flying conditions VFR and decide to change the type of formation of flight and form themselves in column. G-YKEN is then the last of the formation. The pilots maintain their decision to press on to their planned stopover of the evening.

While the helicopters fly over wood covered hills, the weather conditions are getting worse. The pilot of helicopter A (indicated) that at this time, said the visibility did not exceed twenty meters. The helicopters fly very slowly. The pilots decide to make half-turn and go back.

Towards 4 25hrs, the pilot of the R 22 "B", having made an about turn, is in a valley. Meanwhile the two other helicopters are operating at a walking pace and close to the countours (ground??), the pilot of G-YKEN announces that he cannot see anything any more and that he is flying in cloud.

The others control lose the radio operator contact with G-YKEN. They start a search with the participation of the R 44 in the area of the accident after having heard on the radio the difficulties encountered by the other helicopter.

The wreck of G-YKEN is found in the forest.

The people on board died."

from that it sounds like needless deaths caused by poor weather and poor decisions. was anyone ever 'blamed' or prosecuted for the accident?

out of interest what's the legal standpoint of a person following someone else's advice to push on in bad weather?

Im sorry but you can't blame others if you lose control (Inadvertent IMC). As the pilot in command it is your responsibillity to maintain control of the helicopter to your abillity, experience, state of mind etc.

Obviously the student situation is a different thing altogether and i suspect once the families lawyers get hold of it there will be a successful procecution.

it will certainly make me think twice before sending em solo

There seems to be some confusion here.
The French incident involved 3 qualified owner-pilot PPLs flying their own helicopters not a student pilot.
One of them flew into cloud, with sadly predictable consequences.

I agree with one of cyclic flare's comments: "You can't blame others if you lose control (Inadvertent IMC). As the pilot in command it is your responsibillity to maintain control of the helicopter to your abillity, experience, state of mind etc."

I can't see any grounds for prosecuting the FI in the other incident. Even if there were, it wouldn't achieve anything.
_______________


autosync
"What are you trying to gain by pointlessly knocking this guy?"
Good question. I don't know the answer. I've wondered the same thing many times in various threads over the years.
The FI probably feels terrible, whether or not he did anything wrong. Why people feel the need to make him feel worse by criticising him on a public forum is beyond me.

'The CAA have found that the instructor wasn't at fault'.....

You make this point very strongly. Do you know this or is it merely an assumption based purely on the fact that he hasn't been prosecuted?

My guess is that this tragic accident will be debated in the Civil Court so a good idea for all to back off for that one reason alone.

HP

the last thing i could wish for was the instructor to be procecuted in this case and im sure he had nothing but the best possible intentions to help this student, unfortunately it all went pear shaped and i probably would of done the same thing, (prior to hindsight of course) but i think the odds are stacked against him and his FTO.

Procecuting will achieve nothing but isnt that the case in most procecutions

"A civil case would be a waste of time IMHO. and costly."

kissmysquirrel,
I think that would be a matter for a legal professional to advise and the family to decide!

The CAA would have very little to do with a civil case, other than individuals expert opinion/testimony.

That doesn't appear to be strictly true....you care enough to write...

I get the impression that it does bother you that people have an opinion contrary to your own on this matter.

This is PPRUNE after all...!

!I believe new R-22´s now are injected ! However I don´t know if older ships can be modified.

But people also do run out of fuel or get into inadvertent IMC, there is no such thing as a fail safe helicopter. If the helicopter someone fly´s has carburator he better know how and when to use carb heat.

Awareness is the name of the game.

I agree with posters that stated that this student was no newbie, he had fixed wing license and should have known that he should not fly in weather below his limits no matter what anyone else say´s. If the weather was the cause of this accident that is?

Aesir

i dont think r22's are injected, well i know there not i think your getting mixed up with the r44 raven 11.

How difficult is it to monitor the carb heat!!!!!!

The student was not a newbie...but he was still a student. Therefore the instructor was responsible for him.

Concerning carb heat - if I find myself in an overload situation, I pull full carb heat and leave it out. It doesn't do any harm, and it's one less thing to think about. Unless you really need full power, of course...goes without saying.

Something that seems to have been overlooked in both the UK and French accidents is peer pressure. In both cases an instructor said that it was OK to fly and led by example. Even if you have your licence this sort of pressure is massive.

Formation
 

The french report states formally that the formation flight was inappropriate because the pilots improvised it, and no prior formation request had been made.

Without wanting to participate in the blaming exercise, it think that one of the lessons learned is that inexperienced pilots should not improvise formation flight, and certainly not as a tactic to deal with poor visibility.
I fully agree with splitneedles "peer pressure" comment.
Flying formation may distracted the pilot, so that less attention is available for being "in charge of his own heli", and certainly being prepaired to avoid or deal with inadvert IMC.

I know of several cases where formation flights were done to get a group of helos through similar conditions. For instance the Francorchamps F1 races.
But in this case the lead pilot was an experienced military pilot used to this kind of flying and using his local knowledge to show the others a passage through the valleys staying away from low cloud and mist and wires.

d3

splitneedles
"In both cases an instructor said that it was OK to fly and led by example."
That is not what happened in the French incident. The FI was a passenger in one of three helicopters, all flown by qualified owner-pilots. He did not tell or advise any other pilot it was OK to fly on, and he wasn't flying. Each pilot made his own decision whether to continue. One followed the helicopter in which the FI was a passenger through the valleys without entering cloud. Sadly, the third went into cloud and crashed.


UwantME2landWHERE!
I don't think TFS is bothered that people have an opinion contrary to his own, but bothered by people criticising someone he knows and respects as a FI. He's bothered about people criticising someone who, as the AAIB found, tried to reduce the student pilot’s workload, but inadvertently increased it.
"This is PPRUNE after all...!"
Yes, PPRuNe at its worst IMHO.
Even if the FI made a mistake in his efforts to help the student, it mystifies me what people gain from criticising him on a public forum. I assume as long as it makes them feel better, they're not bothered how it makes the poor FI feel.

Yes, but Heliport, I haven’t actually criticised anyone.

I was merely airing an opinion that regarding what was being written on this forum. I have made no comment regarding the summation, content or findings of the AAIB investigation.

I personally feel this was a tragic and probably only with hindsight, a preventable accident.

Regarding the FI,

There but for the grace of god go I.......


Agreed.
It was a general comment, not specifically aimed at you.

Heliport