UK R22 Crash G-TGRR - AAIB report
 

is here:

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resou...GRR%209-05.pdf

Imagine how awful the instructor feels. very sombre reading.

"Instrument Appreciation" claims another victim. .

:(

I must have read a different report then as this one says the aircraft stayed VMC and leans more towards carb ice and failure to maintain RRPM.

Please take the time to read the reports in full rather than skim the "sexy bits" and titles and jump to conclusions. It does the industry no good and more importantly nothing will be learnt from the mistakes of others if you can not be bothered to study them properly.

I disagree, I was flying at Wellesbourne that day. Saw the wx and heard the some of the R/T.

"The instructor reported that the pilot of G-TGRR repeated the new speed, and shortly afterwards said “I can’t see a thing”.
The instructor asked the student to clarify whether
he meant that he couldn’t see the lead helicopter or
that he had lost all visual reference, but there was no
reply. The instructor made numerous further attempts
to contact G-TGRR on 123.45 MHz. . ."


"The witnesses stated that the aircraft was clear of cloud
and in steady level flight prior to the initial pitch up.
Nevertheless, in the degraded visual environment the student pilot may have had limited visual references,
especially whilst in a nose up attitude, and may have
become disorientated."

Carb ice. . ? Well they would say that wouldnt they. . .

IMHO

>"Carb ice. . ? Well they would say that wouldnt they. ."

err, i dont understand - ?? what have the AAIB got to gain by saying it was carb ice??

The whole incident is a tragedy, an instructor trying to do what he thought was the right thing, and hindsight demonstrating that the actions may have inadvertantly increased the student's workload. A student who also probably thought the formation would make it easier, found himself in a tough place.

Few R22 PPL's would fancy handling a subtle carb ice engine failure (if, as the report suggests, that was the likely scenario), just hope the real world pans out as well as the training.

The instructor will no doubt find his decisions hard to live with irrespective of the report's findings, and the pilot's family gets no definitive answers.

BW

It is interesting to note that the actual weather was significantly worse than it was forcast to be.

It was a bloody stupid thing to do and that should have been obvious from the start.

Last year a PPL on solo navex from a local field did a forced landing in a grassy area around Burnham. (must have been low when he was lost as we saw nothing on the radar!)

The instructor then phoned up to ask if he could fly in and drop off some fuel, and then fly out together. (He couldn't be allowed as SVFR in the London CTR requires standard separation if not on the Heli routes).

Makes you wonder.......

(Picks up own trumpet) as soon as the AAIB reports appear on the website, they do get posted here, and this one was the first on the list - link to thread

The instructor may have been under pressure from higher up the food chain to get tha aircraft back for another flight/next days work etc , this may also have been a factor not covered in this or other reports., I and other instructors I have worked with have had similar pressures put on which only serve to cloud the judgement. this does happen. In this incident, this may or may not have been another factor.

As instructing in the UK seems to be an entry level position where as in Australia an instructor with 2000 - 3000 hours would be considered low time I was wondering what effect this has on training and training related accidents ?? Anyone know of any studies or statistics comparing the 2 different approaches ??

From reading the AAIB report I understand that the weather was below sensible limits for sending a student solo (See Birmingham’s actual weather and what the FI says when he flew to Welsbourne and the weather deteriorated about 1/2 way on route)

There was to much risk involved sending the student solo, so why did the instructor do it?

Don't give me this hindsight bullsh*t.

What the instructor should have done was fly back dual with the student or arranged other transport for him. Simple no discussion with other FIs or the guy who pay's your wages etc.

So carb icing caused the engine to stop but without a doubt bad weather compounded the problem and put the student under a lot of pressure add this to following another helicopter in formation the outcome of the flight comes as no surprise.

Wow... hang on a second here!
You don't know what it was, it could have been suicide for all we can decipher from that report!

Their is only so much you can blame an instructor for, only because he/ she is the easiest target!

What are you trying to gain by pointlessly knocking this guy?

The FI was not sure the student could not safely complete the flight solo with the weather, so he told him to follow him in formation. The problem is the student is still alone in the helicopter, with a much higher work load than he is use to (Weather & formation flying)

If there is any doubt about the safe conduct of a SOLO flight (The weather in this case) then the student should not be sent solo. There is too much risk involved.

I see a real big difference with a dual flight, on a dual flight the instructor is there to bail the student out (Help prevent inadvertent IMC or make sure the there is enough carb heat etc)

We should not overlook what a huge lesson this is for novice pilots.
I am a relatively novice pilot myself but have refused the offer of following a more experienced pilot back to Surrey from Snowdonia in s**t weather, choosing to make my own plans and go at my own pace. Thank God I did after reading this.
It is hard enough to make the decision to turn back or stick it in a field when flying single ship. Imagine when following an experienced pilot.
I believe there was a similar incident in South of France with group of Brits in Robinsons. Father and daughter in R22 crashed into side of hill trying to follow experienced pilot. Was it the same company? hmmm...
Therefore make your own plans. If you dont feel comfortable dont fly. Leave formation flying to military.

Kissmysquirrell: Out of curiosity, how many hours did the FI have? How old was he?

No.

i also remember this incident.

1. Not the same company or instructor

2. "he?" well, now there's an assumption