Mi 17-2 down
GunsssR4ever
Joined: Sep 1999
Posts: 3,816
Likes: 0
From: Out there somewhere ...
Very interesting comments IJ !
Pressume you are in Nigeria area.
I remember in my old SAAF days we as pilots one day decided to at random test PUMA ejection systemns .. I am afraid it was a nightmare and bieg repurcations ? spelling? was heard and felt as we though ourselves as "very professional" in the 70's and 80's (good old days)
I promise you our aircraft WILL be tested tomorrow
Cheers (also) from West Africa !
Pressume you are in Nigeria area.
I remember in my old SAAF days we as pilots one day decided to at random test PUMA ejection systemns .. I am afraid it was a nightmare and bieg repurcations ? spelling? was heard and felt as we though ourselves as "very professional" in the 70's and 80's (good old days)
I promise you our aircraft WILL be tested tomorrow
Cheers (also) from West Africa !
I don't want to be the best pilot in the world - Just the oldest
Joined: Jun 2001
Posts: 1,013
Likes: 0
From: Here and there
G'day Gunship,
Did Nigeria (Lagos) a couple of years back but despite positive reception from DPR, the training centre never really took off [sic].
Currently working in Luanda.
Cheers
IJ
Did Nigeria (Lagos) a couple of years back but despite positive reception from DPR, the training centre never really took off [sic].
Currently working in Luanda.
Cheers
IJ
Joined: Dec 2002
Posts: 413
Likes: 1
From: 1500' AMSL
Hello Gunship and Islander Jock !
I have been around in Africa for quite a while me too...now in Gabon but very likely in Angola again very soon.
To come back to emergency exits on these russian "Mi", I remember having seen an army Mi 8 MTV just after it crashed on landing; it stopped on its right side (as on most of cases), the tank was cruhed and fuel was everywhere....the 2 emergency exits on the right side were of course unusable and the left sliding door was out of reach because of the fuselage width.
Everybody on board (5) went off from the cockpit roof hatch.
Lucky it wasn't winter with the big "KA50" heater/burner switched on (just in front of right fuel tank !!!)
No chance left, let alone with 24 passengers aboard (but again, this helicopter never has been designed for "public transport")
If correctly maintained, (and this is the problem now,in a "no investment / maximum profit context") the jettisoning system looks reliable.
I have an accidental out of control ditching some years ago, in S365C model, and althought the emergency exits jettisoning is very simple here, I couldn't jettison my right door only because the bottom of it was already under a few centimeters of water and pressure was already too high on this big surface.
But my 4 passengers where outside in seconds!!! I managed to follow from the co-pilot door once inverted!
In general I think the problem is a lack of standardization in jettisoning systems and doors lockings, no wonder passengers are confused.
But apparently an effort has been made on new generation of off-shore helicopters.
Not too hot where you are now Gunship ?
I have been around in Africa for quite a while me too...now in Gabon but very likely in Angola again very soon.
To come back to emergency exits on these russian "Mi", I remember having seen an army Mi 8 MTV just after it crashed on landing; it stopped on its right side (as on most of cases), the tank was cruhed and fuel was everywhere....the 2 emergency exits on the right side were of course unusable and the left sliding door was out of reach because of the fuselage width.
Everybody on board (5) went off from the cockpit roof hatch.
Lucky it wasn't winter with the big "KA50" heater/burner switched on (just in front of right fuel tank !!!)
No chance left, let alone with 24 passengers aboard (but again, this helicopter never has been designed for "public transport")
If correctly maintained, (and this is the problem now,in a "no investment / maximum profit context") the jettisoning system looks reliable.
I have an accidental out of control ditching some years ago, in S365C model, and althought the emergency exits jettisoning is very simple here, I couldn't jettison my right door only because the bottom of it was already under a few centimeters of water and pressure was already too high on this big surface.
But my 4 passengers where outside in seconds!!! I managed to follow from the co-pilot door once inverted!
In general I think the problem is a lack of standardization in jettisoning systems and doors lockings, no wonder passengers are confused.
But apparently an effort has been made on new generation of off-shore helicopters.
Not too hot where you are now Gunship ?
Joined: Oct 1999
Posts: 1,444
Likes: 21
From: Beyond the black stump!
ONGC chopper was grounded, repair was on until day of crash
INQUIRY REPORT: Crash that killed 23 ONGC personnel last year because of poor maintenance, shoddy checks and pilot’s haste
RITU SARIN
NEW DELHI, MAY 28: The MI-172 Mesco helicopter that crashed on August 11 last year killing 23 ONGC personnel and four crew on board had been grounded just four days earlier to replace key components, including the tail rotor shaft and the gear box. In fact, maintenance work continued right until the morning of the crash. And there is no evidence to show that requisite tests were done before allowing the chopper to take off with passengers.
This is the startling revelation in the confidential inquiry report submitted to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) this week. The 51-page report, obtained by The Indian Express, has a wealth of detail: on how poor maintenance compounded by pilot error caused one of the worst crashes in India’s chartered flight sector. And snatches of personal and poignant details from on board the flight minutes before it crashed into the Arabian Sea after take-off from the ONGC helideck.
Like crew members discussing the fall in share prices and the quality of coffee served before take-off. ‘‘Is this cold water or bloody hot coffee?’’ a crew member had asked.
For Mesco, the Mumbai-based company which operated the helicopter and employed the crew, the report is bad news although the helicopter had a vaild certificate of registration and airworthiness. The inquiry’s findings expose glaring loopholes in its maintenance set-up and suggests that the ‘‘extreme haste with which the operators were handling sensitive flying operations’’ could have been one factor behind the crash.
The salient findings in the report:
• On August 8 (four days prior to the crash) the helicopter was grounded to replace the tail rotor drive shaft, intermediate gear box and tail gear box because these units were reaching their ‘‘life limitation.’’
Work continued until the morning of August 11—the day of the crash. No checks were done before take-off.
What needs to be done asap
The crash probe report recommends:
• Russian helicopter systems should be closely monitored
• Detailed maintenance procedure sheets should be prepared for MI-172 choppers
• Small operators should be made to give names of engineers who carry out inspections, even if they are not on the rolls
• Safety audit of all helidecks
• As the chopper’s rudder controls are disturbed while changing these units, the control adjustment has to be done. No records available to show that this was indeed done.
• From August 7 to 11, the ‘‘travelling control transmission’’ was also replaced. There are no documents confirming the reliability of the new adjustment. After replacement, the crew switched on the engines and hovered for (only) three minutes to test the systems.
• Cockpit conversations show that the pilots had detected ‘‘abnormalities’’ in the right pedal. Pedal’s records show that the new control system wasn’t regulated.
• The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data show that the sensor was not properly installed during maintenance work and so the tail rotor’s pitch values were not recorded.
• Evidently, the pilot was in haste, the liftoff was ‘‘unusually quick.’’
• The emergency flotation system was not switched on during the fall of the helicopter and its activation button remained closed.
INQUIRY REPORT: Crash that killed 23 ONGC personnel last year because of poor maintenance, shoddy checks and pilot’s haste
RITU SARIN
NEW DELHI, MAY 28: The MI-172 Mesco helicopter that crashed on August 11 last year killing 23 ONGC personnel and four crew on board had been grounded just four days earlier to replace key components, including the tail rotor shaft and the gear box. In fact, maintenance work continued right until the morning of the crash. And there is no evidence to show that requisite tests were done before allowing the chopper to take off with passengers.
This is the startling revelation in the confidential inquiry report submitted to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) this week. The 51-page report, obtained by The Indian Express, has a wealth of detail: on how poor maintenance compounded by pilot error caused one of the worst crashes in India’s chartered flight sector. And snatches of personal and poignant details from on board the flight minutes before it crashed into the Arabian Sea after take-off from the ONGC helideck.
Like crew members discussing the fall in share prices and the quality of coffee served before take-off. ‘‘Is this cold water or bloody hot coffee?’’ a crew member had asked.
For Mesco, the Mumbai-based company which operated the helicopter and employed the crew, the report is bad news although the helicopter had a vaild certificate of registration and airworthiness. The inquiry’s findings expose glaring loopholes in its maintenance set-up and suggests that the ‘‘extreme haste with which the operators were handling sensitive flying operations’’ could have been one factor behind the crash.
The salient findings in the report:
• On August 8 (four days prior to the crash) the helicopter was grounded to replace the tail rotor drive shaft, intermediate gear box and tail gear box because these units were reaching their ‘‘life limitation.’’
Work continued until the morning of August 11—the day of the crash. No checks were done before take-off.
What needs to be done asap
The crash probe report recommends:
• Russian helicopter systems should be closely monitored
• Detailed maintenance procedure sheets should be prepared for MI-172 choppers
• Small operators should be made to give names of engineers who carry out inspections, even if they are not on the rolls
• Safety audit of all helidecks
• As the chopper’s rudder controls are disturbed while changing these units, the control adjustment has to be done. No records available to show that this was indeed done.
• From August 7 to 11, the ‘‘travelling control transmission’’ was also replaced. There are no documents confirming the reliability of the new adjustment. After replacement, the crew switched on the engines and hovered for (only) three minutes to test the systems.
• Cockpit conversations show that the pilots had detected ‘‘abnormalities’’ in the right pedal. Pedal’s records show that the new control system wasn’t regulated.
• The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data show that the sensor was not properly installed during maintenance work and so the tail rotor’s pitch values were not recorded.
• Evidently, the pilot was in haste, the liftoff was ‘‘unusually quick.’’
• The emergency flotation system was not switched on during the fall of the helicopter and its activation button remained closed.
Joined: Sep 2002
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
Posts: 4,721
Likes: 636
From: Great South East, tired and retired
The survivor's comment scares me:
He had the seatbelt off even before it crashed.
Great Huet technique, eh? But why is it that the only survivors were the ones who took off their belts before impact?
He had the seatbelt off even before it crashed.
Great Huet technique, eh? But why is it that the only survivors were the ones who took off their belts before impact?
Joined: Oct 1999
Posts: 1,444
Likes: 21
From: Beyond the black stump!
Chopper trouble for ONGC
Kanika Datta / New Delhi September 10, 2004
Report questions company's helicopter charter policy.
The three-member independent committee set up to investigate the ONGC helicopter crash off the Sagar Kiran rig near Mumbai on August 11, 2003, in which 27 people died, has strongly criticised ONGC for irregularities in chartering the helicopter from Mesco Airlines and the lack of helicopter underwater escape training for personnel working on its rigs.
The report, which is still under wraps, has also censured the civil aviation policy on aircraft charter which limits ONGC’s options to government-owned Pawan Hans Helicopters Ltd (PHHL) and small domestic operators “of small status” rather than the best available globally.
The report, a copy of which is available with Business Standard, was submitted to the petroleum ministry in March this year, when the National Democratic Alliance was in power.
Mesco's Mi-172 helicopter was chartered on “call out” or stand-by duty in March 2003, owing to Pawan Hans' inability to provide an Mi-172.
The report observed that Mesco was the only other domestic operator to possess an Mi-172 and, therefore, the only one in a position to make an offer. Thus, it said, the “call out award would smack of accepting a single tender”.
The report said: “This ought not to have escaped the attention of the officers who processed the tender. As a rule of wisdom, they should have included the alternative of two or three medium helicopters as well in lieu of the Mi-172. “
ONGC has not yet replied to a faxed questionnaire sent on September 2. The report said ONGC's tender committee omitted several important qualifying criteria in the letter the corporation sent to bidders on March 20, 2003 after a pre-bid conference (Pawan Hans was a token bidder who was disqualified early in the proceedings).
The excluded criteria covered the requirement that the helicopter should have more than 400 flying hours life on major components since the last overhaul and a certificate from an authorised agency that the helicopter's instrument flight rating (IFR) equipment was in working order.
When the committee questioned ONGC’s chief of offshore logistics on these waivers, he said: “ONGC had no option but to accede to the request of the bidders in the face of limited availability of helicopters in the domestic market and stringent Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) guidelines regarding hiring helicopters from foreign operators.”
The report questioned whether the waivers were called for and whether the chief of offshore logistics (COL) was competent to accord these. It observed that the circumstances “raise eyebrows and not without reason in the aftermath of the events”.
The helicopter in question had been grounded for legal reasons for six months to March 30, 2003. The report said the helicopter did not have a certificate of airworthiness from the DGCA on the day the bid was submitted (March 27, 2003).
When contacted by Business Standard, Natasha Singh, CEO of Mesco Airlines, denied this, saying the DGCA initially issued a limited authorisation for seven days, after which it was revalidated for a year. The report, however, said the limited certificate of airworthiness was obtained only on March 31, 2003.
The report also said the helicopter lacked a valid IFR certificate. This is usually issued by an “authorised agency” designated by the DGCA. In Mesco's case, the designated DGCA authority was the airline's quality control manager . But the instrument flight rating certificate had been signed by Mesco's engineering-in-charge, who was not an authorised signatory.
Mesco's Singh explained that this had been the practice since 1996, since the engineering-in-charge was directly responsible for the maintenance of the aircraft and therefore in a better position to certify its safety than the quality control manager who was “a commercial person and the DGCA's man on Mesco's board”.
The committee also found that the helicopter had less than the stipulated amount of residual flying hours for several key components and that Mesco Airlines had submitted a false certificate to this effect.
“Critical examination of crucial details, gathered from Mesco...confirms that the left engine had 343.07 residual hours and the tail gear box, tail rotor drive shaft and intermediate gear box 266.04 hours as on 31.2.03,” the report said.
Singh refuted this, saying the certificate validated the residual hours on the in-house stock of components which were available, not necessarily the components on the helicopter and that this had been standard practice in the past.
The committee was headed by former Petroleum Secretary TS Vijayaraghavan, former Chairman and Managing Director of Oil India SCN Jatar and Pritam Singh, the head of the Gurgaon-based Management Development Institute.
Kanika Datta / New Delhi September 10, 2004
Report questions company's helicopter charter policy.
The three-member independent committee set up to investigate the ONGC helicopter crash off the Sagar Kiran rig near Mumbai on August 11, 2003, in which 27 people died, has strongly criticised ONGC for irregularities in chartering the helicopter from Mesco Airlines and the lack of helicopter underwater escape training for personnel working on its rigs.
The report, which is still under wraps, has also censured the civil aviation policy on aircraft charter which limits ONGC’s options to government-owned Pawan Hans Helicopters Ltd (PHHL) and small domestic operators “of small status” rather than the best available globally.
The report, a copy of which is available with Business Standard, was submitted to the petroleum ministry in March this year, when the National Democratic Alliance was in power.
Mesco's Mi-172 helicopter was chartered on “call out” or stand-by duty in March 2003, owing to Pawan Hans' inability to provide an Mi-172.
The report observed that Mesco was the only other domestic operator to possess an Mi-172 and, therefore, the only one in a position to make an offer. Thus, it said, the “call out award would smack of accepting a single tender”.
The report said: “This ought not to have escaped the attention of the officers who processed the tender. As a rule of wisdom, they should have included the alternative of two or three medium helicopters as well in lieu of the Mi-172. “
ONGC has not yet replied to a faxed questionnaire sent on September 2. The report said ONGC's tender committee omitted several important qualifying criteria in the letter the corporation sent to bidders on March 20, 2003 after a pre-bid conference (Pawan Hans was a token bidder who was disqualified early in the proceedings).
The excluded criteria covered the requirement that the helicopter should have more than 400 flying hours life on major components since the last overhaul and a certificate from an authorised agency that the helicopter's instrument flight rating (IFR) equipment was in working order.
When the committee questioned ONGC’s chief of offshore logistics on these waivers, he said: “ONGC had no option but to accede to the request of the bidders in the face of limited availability of helicopters in the domestic market and stringent Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) guidelines regarding hiring helicopters from foreign operators.”
The report questioned whether the waivers were called for and whether the chief of offshore logistics (COL) was competent to accord these. It observed that the circumstances “raise eyebrows and not without reason in the aftermath of the events”.
The helicopter in question had been grounded for legal reasons for six months to March 30, 2003. The report said the helicopter did not have a certificate of airworthiness from the DGCA on the day the bid was submitted (March 27, 2003).
When contacted by Business Standard, Natasha Singh, CEO of Mesco Airlines, denied this, saying the DGCA initially issued a limited authorisation for seven days, after which it was revalidated for a year. The report, however, said the limited certificate of airworthiness was obtained only on March 31, 2003.
The report also said the helicopter lacked a valid IFR certificate. This is usually issued by an “authorised agency” designated by the DGCA. In Mesco's case, the designated DGCA authority was the airline's quality control manager . But the instrument flight rating certificate had been signed by Mesco's engineering-in-charge, who was not an authorised signatory.
Mesco's Singh explained that this had been the practice since 1996, since the engineering-in-charge was directly responsible for the maintenance of the aircraft and therefore in a better position to certify its safety than the quality control manager who was “a commercial person and the DGCA's man on Mesco's board”.
The committee also found that the helicopter had less than the stipulated amount of residual flying hours for several key components and that Mesco Airlines had submitted a false certificate to this effect.
“Critical examination of crucial details, gathered from Mesco...confirms that the left engine had 343.07 residual hours and the tail gear box, tail rotor drive shaft and intermediate gear box 266.04 hours as on 31.2.03,” the report said.
Singh refuted this, saying the certificate validated the residual hours on the in-house stock of components which were available, not necessarily the components on the helicopter and that this had been standard practice in the past.
The committee was headed by former Petroleum Secretary TS Vijayaraghavan, former Chairman and Managing Director of Oil India SCN Jatar and Pritam Singh, the head of the Gurgaon-based Management Development Institute.
