Scandal or not? CAA rejects AAIB criticism and safety recommendations!
It seems to me that the option to modify these suspect aircraft has been there for a considerable amount of time with parts available. All aircraft operators have a duty of care. Do they really need an AD to force them to exercise it?
The FAA are responsible for this particular aircraft and unless a cluster broke in the UK it is unlikely that the CAA would have become involved, it would take it's lead from the FAA.
In the 70's 80's the CAA took quite a strong line on modifications to Hughes built helicopters, hence the large number of CAA additional directives. Why this particular modification was not made mandatory is a mystery to me.
However it is my view that the CAA did not carry out an independent engineering review of all service information and relied on operators and maintenance organisations to make recommendations. Given that they were the people with hands on experience this was not unreasonable. The cost of a full independent engineering review of every bulletin from every manufacturer would be astronomic and who would pay for this level of safety?
The FAA are responsible for this particular aircraft and unless a cluster broke in the UK it is unlikely that the CAA would have become involved, it would take it's lead from the FAA.
In the 70's 80's the CAA took quite a strong line on modifications to Hughes built helicopters, hence the large number of CAA additional directives. Why this particular modification was not made mandatory is a mystery to me.
However it is my view that the CAA did not carry out an independent engineering review of all service information and relied on operators and maintenance organisations to make recommendations. Given that they were the people with hands on experience this was not unreasonable. The cost of a full independent engineering review of every bulletin from every manufacturer would be astronomic and who would pay for this level of safety?
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The G-INFO register of UK a/c lists 48 Hughes 269 or Schweitzer 269 model aircraft. Would it not be an idea to contact the registered owners of these aircraft, inform them of the state of play and see how many would care to write to the CAA and voice their feelings as to why the CAA deems it unnecessary to ensure that all safety recommendations of the AAIB are implemented? I for one, would love to see the justification the CAA would come up with. Of course, should the CAA response manage to find it's way to the press, maybe they who would have us grounded as 'a threat to the safety of London' could actually do some good for once and bring to the public's attention the CAA's apparent disregard for aircraft safety.
I may only be a PPL with less than 100 hours TT, but I would like to think that there is an organisation looking out for my safety and that of all affected each time I take off. Will it take another 269 falling out of the sky and maybe landing on a village school before they do what needs doing?
I may only be a PPL with less than 100 hours TT, but I would like to think that there is an organisation looking out for my safety and that of all affected each time I take off. Will it take another 269 falling out of the sky and maybe landing on a village school before they do what needs doing?
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Rob L says - "It seems to me that the option to modify these suspect aircraft has been there for a considerable amount of time with parts available. All aircraft operators have a duty of care.
Do they really need an AD to force them to exercise it?"
Answer - Obviously yes, because many haven't done it voluntarily. Unless we're content to allow people to go on being killed of course.
Do they really need an AD to force them to exercise it?"
Answer - Obviously yes, because many haven't done it voluntarily. Unless we're content to allow people to go on being killed of course.
A quick comment......
In the US FAA system, anyone may offer for consideration a change, amendment, removal, exemption of a current regulation or even propose a new regulation. The procedure is clearly spelled out and the FAA must consider those proposals. The official website www.usfaa.gov can be accessed and the pertinent rules and forms, etc....can be located for one's use in such an effort.
Does the CAA in the UK have such a vehicle for outsiders to make such proposals?
If the CAA Annual Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) inspection does not certify the aircraft to be "airworthy" then just what does all that time, effort, paperwork, and cost of that exercise provide?
Sounds like Flying Lawyer might want to start looking at catalogues of Warbirds for sale.......in this country...there would be some very interesting law suits being filed!
I wonder what records the US Army might be able to produce for the now retired fleet of TH-55A's that were off the shelf purchases of the 269 helicopter. They operated several hundreds of the things from the 1960's to sometime in the early 80's as a Primary trainer. What if someone was to get permission to do an inspection on the mothballed fleet out at Davis Monthan AFB in Arizona and determine how many had bad clusters?
THIS DATA CURRENT AS OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER DATED FEBRUARY 27, 2003
14 CFR - CHAPTER I - PART 11
§ 11.39 How may I participate in FAA's rulemaking process?
You may participate in FAA's rulemaking process by doing any of the following:
(a) File written comments on any rulemaking document that asks for comments, including an ANPRM, NPRM, SNPRM, a final rule with request for comments, or a direct final rule. Follow the directions for commenting found in each rulemaking document.
(b) Ask that we hold a public meeting on any rulemaking, and participate in any public meeting that we hold.
(c) File a petition for rulemaking that asks us to adopt, amend, or repeal a regulation.
This is taken from the US FAA Regulations, United States Code (USC) Chapter 14, Part 11.
Maybe the UK should have something similar?
NTSB Identification: FTW03FA028
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, November 01, 2002 in Fort Gibson, OK
Aircraft: Hughes 269A, registration: N8885F
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 01, 2002, approximately 1150 central standard time, a Hughes 269A helicopter, N8885F, impacted the terrain following a loss of control during cruise flight near Fort Gibson, Oklahoma. The helicopter was owned and operated by Tundra Resources Corporation of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The private pilot, sole occupant, received fatal injuries, and the helicopter was destroyed during the impact sequence and post-crash fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the planned cross-country flight, and a flight plan was not filed. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight originated from Cookson, Oklahoma, at an unknown time, with a planned destination of Tulsa, Oklahoma.
One witness, who observed the helicopter flying to the west for about 8 seconds, reported a piece of the tail rotor separated. Subsequently, the helicopter pitched to the right, the main rotor separated, the helicopter started spinning, and descending toward the ground.
A second witness reported that he heard a "pop." Subsequently, he observed the main rotor slowing, wobbling, stop turning, break away from the helicopter and travel forward of the helicopter. The helicopter pitched "nose forward and then fell almost vertical." This witness found one tail rotor blade, the left tailboom strut (GPS latitude 35 degrees 46.50 minutes North; 095 degrees 08.19 West), the right stabilator, and the main rotor (GPS latitude 35 degrees 47.00 minutes North; longitude 095 degrees 08.20 minutes West).
Local authorities and the NTSB investigation team, who responded to the accident site, found the helicopter (GPS latitude 35 degrees 46.59 minutes North; longitude 095 degrees 08.19 minutes West) in an inverted attitude at the base of a tree in the wooded wildlife management
NTSB Identification: FTW90FA183 . The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 45513.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, September 17, 1990 in KINGSVILLE, TX
Aircraft: HUGHES 269A, registration: N403SD
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
THE PILOT WAS ON A CATTLE HERDING FLIGHT AND WAS FLYING AT AN ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 100 FT AGL, WHEN THE HELICOPTER'S TAIL BOOM ASSEMBLY SEPARATED. THE HELICOPTER BEGAN TO SPIN TO THE RIGHT, THEN IT NOSED OVER AND COLLIDED WITH THE TERRAIN. AN EXAMINATION REVEALED THAT THE LEFT FLANGE ON THE TAIL BOOM SADDLE FITTING (PN: 269A2324) HAD FAILED FROM FATIGUE, WHICH RESULTED IN SEPARATION OF THE TAIL BOOM.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
THE FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE LEFT FLANGE ON THE TAIL BOOM SADDLE FITTING.
In the US FAA system, anyone may offer for consideration a change, amendment, removal, exemption of a current regulation or even propose a new regulation. The procedure is clearly spelled out and the FAA must consider those proposals. The official website www.usfaa.gov can be accessed and the pertinent rules and forms, etc....can be located for one's use in such an effort.
Does the CAA in the UK have such a vehicle for outsiders to make such proposals?
If the CAA Annual Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) inspection does not certify the aircraft to be "airworthy" then just what does all that time, effort, paperwork, and cost of that exercise provide?
Sounds like Flying Lawyer might want to start looking at catalogues of Warbirds for sale.......in this country...there would be some very interesting law suits being filed!
I wonder what records the US Army might be able to produce for the now retired fleet of TH-55A's that were off the shelf purchases of the 269 helicopter. They operated several hundreds of the things from the 1960's to sometime in the early 80's as a Primary trainer. What if someone was to get permission to do an inspection on the mothballed fleet out at Davis Monthan AFB in Arizona and determine how many had bad clusters?
THIS DATA CURRENT AS OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER DATED FEBRUARY 27, 2003
14 CFR - CHAPTER I - PART 11
§ 11.39 How may I participate in FAA's rulemaking process?
You may participate in FAA's rulemaking process by doing any of the following:
(a) File written comments on any rulemaking document that asks for comments, including an ANPRM, NPRM, SNPRM, a final rule with request for comments, or a direct final rule. Follow the directions for commenting found in each rulemaking document.
(b) Ask that we hold a public meeting on any rulemaking, and participate in any public meeting that we hold.
(c) File a petition for rulemaking that asks us to adopt, amend, or repeal a regulation.
This is taken from the US FAA Regulations, United States Code (USC) Chapter 14, Part 11.
Maybe the UK should have something similar?
NTSB Identification: FTW03FA028
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, November 01, 2002 in Fort Gibson, OK
Aircraft: Hughes 269A, registration: N8885F
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 01, 2002, approximately 1150 central standard time, a Hughes 269A helicopter, N8885F, impacted the terrain following a loss of control during cruise flight near Fort Gibson, Oklahoma. The helicopter was owned and operated by Tundra Resources Corporation of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The private pilot, sole occupant, received fatal injuries, and the helicopter was destroyed during the impact sequence and post-crash fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the planned cross-country flight, and a flight plan was not filed. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight originated from Cookson, Oklahoma, at an unknown time, with a planned destination of Tulsa, Oklahoma.
One witness, who observed the helicopter flying to the west for about 8 seconds, reported a piece of the tail rotor separated. Subsequently, the helicopter pitched to the right, the main rotor separated, the helicopter started spinning, and descending toward the ground.
A second witness reported that he heard a "pop." Subsequently, he observed the main rotor slowing, wobbling, stop turning, break away from the helicopter and travel forward of the helicopter. The helicopter pitched "nose forward and then fell almost vertical." This witness found one tail rotor blade, the left tailboom strut (GPS latitude 35 degrees 46.50 minutes North; 095 degrees 08.19 West), the right stabilator, and the main rotor (GPS latitude 35 degrees 47.00 minutes North; longitude 095 degrees 08.20 minutes West).
Local authorities and the NTSB investigation team, who responded to the accident site, found the helicopter (GPS latitude 35 degrees 46.59 minutes North; longitude 095 degrees 08.19 minutes West) in an inverted attitude at the base of a tree in the wooded wildlife management
NTSB Identification: FTW90FA183 . The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 45513.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, September 17, 1990 in KINGSVILLE, TX
Aircraft: HUGHES 269A, registration: N403SD
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
THE PILOT WAS ON A CATTLE HERDING FLIGHT AND WAS FLYING AT AN ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 100 FT AGL, WHEN THE HELICOPTER'S TAIL BOOM ASSEMBLY SEPARATED. THE HELICOPTER BEGAN TO SPIN TO THE RIGHT, THEN IT NOSED OVER AND COLLIDED WITH THE TERRAIN. AN EXAMINATION REVEALED THAT THE LEFT FLANGE ON THE TAIL BOOM SADDLE FITTING (PN: 269A2324) HAD FAILED FROM FATIGUE, WHICH RESULTED IN SEPARATION OF THE TAIL BOOM.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
THE FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE LEFT FLANGE ON THE TAIL BOOM SADDLE FITTING.
Sounds like the FAA is on top of the matter.....how does this compare with the CAA AD?
Airworthiness Directives
Header Information
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2001-SW-58-AD; Amendment 39-12726; AD 2001-25-52]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Schweizer Aircraft Corporation Model 269A, 269A-1, 269B, 269C, and TH-55A Helicopters
PDF Copy (If Available):
Preamble Information
Regulatory Information
2001-25-52 Schweizer Aircraft Corporation: Amendment 39-12726. Docket No. 2001-SW-58-AD. Supersedes AD 76-18-01, Amendment No. 39-2707, Docket No. 72-WE-23-AD.
Applicability: Model 269A, 269A-1, 269B, 269C, and TH-55A helicopters, with tailboom support strut (strut) assemblies, part number (P/N) 269A2015 or P/N 269A2015-5; tailboom center attach fitting, P/N 269A2324; or with a center frame aft cluster fitting, P/N 269A2234 or 269A2235, installed, certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.
To prevent failure of a strut clevis lug (lug) on a center frame aft cluster fitting (cluster fitting), rotation of a tailboom into the main rotor blades, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:
(a) Within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS), and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS, for helicopters with cluster fittings, P/N 269A2234 or 269A2235:
(1) Using paint remover, remove paint from the lugs on each aft cluster fitting. Wash with water and dry.
(2) Dye-penetrant inspect the lugs on each aft cluster fitting. See Figure 1.
(3) If a crack is found, before further flight, replace the cracked cluster fitting with an airworthy cluster fitting. Cluster fittings, P/N 269A2234 and 269A2235, are not eligible to replace a cracked cluster fitting.
FIGURE 1
(b) For helicopters with strut assemblies P/N 269A2015 or 269A2015-5, accomplish the following:
(1) At intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS:
(i) Remove the strut assemblies, P/N 269A2015 or P/N 269A2015-5.
(ii) Visually inspect the strut aluminum end fittings for deformation or damage and dye-penetrant inspect the strut aluminum end fittings for a crack in with accordance Step II of Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-109.2, dated September 1, 1976 (SIN N-109.2).
(iii) If deformation, damage, or a crack is found, before further flight, modify the strut assemblies by replacing the aluminum end fittings with stainless steel end fittings, P/N 269A2017-3 and -5, and attach bolts in accordance with Step III of SIN N-109.2; or replace each strut assembly P/N 269A2015 with P/N 269A2015-9, and replace each strut assembly P/N 269A2015-5 with P/N 269A2015-11.
(2) Within 500 hours TIS or one year, whichever occurs first, modify or replace the strut assemblies in accordance with paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of this AD.
(c) For Schweizer Aircraft Corporation Model 269C helicopters, within 100 hours TIS, serialize each strut assembly, P/N 269A2015-5 and 269A2015-11, in accordance with Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-108, dated May 21, 1973.
(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (NYACO), FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, NYACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the NYACO.
(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(f) The inspections and modifications shall be done in accordance with Steps II and III of Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-109.2, dated September 1, 1976 and Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-108, dated May 21, 1973, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Schweizer Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 147, Elmira, New York 14902. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
(g) This amendment becomes effective on May 8, 2002, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Emergency AD 2001-25-52, issued December 14, 2001, which contained the requirements of this amendment.
Footer Information
Federal Register Information
Comments
Airworthiness Directives
Header Information
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2001-SW-58-AD; Amendment 39-12726; AD 2001-25-52]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Schweizer Aircraft Corporation Model 269A, 269A-1, 269B, 269C, and TH-55A Helicopters
PDF Copy (If Available):
Preamble Information
Regulatory Information
2001-25-52 Schweizer Aircraft Corporation: Amendment 39-12726. Docket No. 2001-SW-58-AD. Supersedes AD 76-18-01, Amendment No. 39-2707, Docket No. 72-WE-23-AD.
Applicability: Model 269A, 269A-1, 269B, 269C, and TH-55A helicopters, with tailboom support strut (strut) assemblies, part number (P/N) 269A2015 or P/N 269A2015-5; tailboom center attach fitting, P/N 269A2324; or with a center frame aft cluster fitting, P/N 269A2234 or 269A2235, installed, certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.
To prevent failure of a strut clevis lug (lug) on a center frame aft cluster fitting (cluster fitting), rotation of a tailboom into the main rotor blades, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:
(a) Within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS), and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS, for helicopters with cluster fittings, P/N 269A2234 or 269A2235:
(1) Using paint remover, remove paint from the lugs on each aft cluster fitting. Wash with water and dry.
(2) Dye-penetrant inspect the lugs on each aft cluster fitting. See Figure 1.
(3) If a crack is found, before further flight, replace the cracked cluster fitting with an airworthy cluster fitting. Cluster fittings, P/N 269A2234 and 269A2235, are not eligible to replace a cracked cluster fitting.
FIGURE 1
(b) For helicopters with strut assemblies P/N 269A2015 or 269A2015-5, accomplish the following:
(1) At intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS:
(i) Remove the strut assemblies, P/N 269A2015 or P/N 269A2015-5.
(ii) Visually inspect the strut aluminum end fittings for deformation or damage and dye-penetrant inspect the strut aluminum end fittings for a crack in with accordance Step II of Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-109.2, dated September 1, 1976 (SIN N-109.2).
(iii) If deformation, damage, or a crack is found, before further flight, modify the strut assemblies by replacing the aluminum end fittings with stainless steel end fittings, P/N 269A2017-3 and -5, and attach bolts in accordance with Step III of SIN N-109.2; or replace each strut assembly P/N 269A2015 with P/N 269A2015-9, and replace each strut assembly P/N 269A2015-5 with P/N 269A2015-11.
(2) Within 500 hours TIS or one year, whichever occurs first, modify or replace the strut assemblies in accordance with paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of this AD.
(c) For Schweizer Aircraft Corporation Model 269C helicopters, within 100 hours TIS, serialize each strut assembly, P/N 269A2015-5 and 269A2015-11, in accordance with Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-108, dated May 21, 1973.
(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (NYACO), FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, NYACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the NYACO.
(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(f) The inspections and modifications shall be done in accordance with Steps II and III of Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-109.2, dated September 1, 1976 and Schweizer Service Information Notice No. N-108, dated May 21, 1973, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Schweizer Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 147, Elmira, New York 14902. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
(g) This amendment becomes effective on May 8, 2002, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Emergency AD 2001-25-52, issued December 14, 2001, which contained the requirements of this amendment.
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From Dennis Kenyon.
Having just contributed a note to pprune for further discussion, I plan to keep reading the industry's forum notes on my son's G-ZAPS accident. I am disturbed to note an earlier Hughes 269 accident that has not been included in the AAIB report. (not the November 2002 Oklahoma fatal) N403SD crashed fatally in USA on 17th Sept 1990 bringing the listed number of airborne failures now to eight ! Nine including the Australian failure to a 2234-3 airframe. So presumably there are other accidents around the world not yet included in the AAIB report.
So just to confirm I am planning to raise the profile of my son's accident via TV (Meridian have broadcast a five minute report) MP's, then aviation journals and next, perhaps a Channel 4 piece.
I have to say that from time to time, I go home and tell myself ... sod it and everyone. Just forget it all. Nothing will bring young Dennis back. Let someone else suffer my son's fate. What rotten luck. Next morning, I wake and come to my senses and realise I have a greater responsibilty to the industry. As I have said previously .. there must never be a ninth, (now tenth) accident.
Just to say again .. if anywhere out there wishes to discuss any aspect of this tragic event, just call me at my Shoreham Office.
And please .. please keep your views coming.
Dennis Kenyon.
Having just contributed a note to pprune for further discussion, I plan to keep reading the industry's forum notes on my son's G-ZAPS accident. I am disturbed to note an earlier Hughes 269 accident that has not been included in the AAIB report. (not the November 2002 Oklahoma fatal) N403SD crashed fatally in USA on 17th Sept 1990 bringing the listed number of airborne failures now to eight ! Nine including the Australian failure to a 2234-3 airframe. So presumably there are other accidents around the world not yet included in the AAIB report.
So just to confirm I am planning to raise the profile of my son's accident via TV (Meridian have broadcast a five minute report) MP's, then aviation journals and next, perhaps a Channel 4 piece.
I have to say that from time to time, I go home and tell myself ... sod it and everyone. Just forget it all. Nothing will bring young Dennis back. Let someone else suffer my son's fate. What rotten luck. Next morning, I wake and come to my senses and realise I have a greater responsibilty to the industry. As I have said previously .. there must never be a ninth, (now tenth) accident.
Just to say again .. if anywhere out there wishes to discuss any aspect of this tragic event, just call me at my Shoreham Office.
And please .. please keep your views coming.
Dennis Kenyon.
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Re's note.sponse to Lu
Reply for Lu,
Thanks for the interest re G-ZAPS.
Yes, Rex Parkinson (whom I've known for many years) and Jeremy barnett, did invite me to provide some details for the report, but not the actual investigation process. But now that the AAIB report is publised - I am making it my job now to getting very involved.
As we all know the formal AAIB report, is a 1000% comprehensive coverage and apart from the accident causes themselves, it highlights some risky anomolies in other procedures, ie LAMS against HMI and Flight Manual checks A and pre-flight.
It calls on a tightening of welding procedures and authorities. As we stand today, any approved welder can set about any airframe, (presumably a B747) and effect welding repair work on a type he knows absolutely nothing about.
There is no requirement to check the legality of the work, nor any requirement to record details of serial number, type etc, worked on. Had some kind of Certificate of Maker's compliance been in the system for G-ZAPS, the welder would not have completed the requested work and once again, lives would not have been lost.
I believe every helicopter pilot and engineer should read it in detail.
In the next few days and weeks, it is my intention to bring my son's accident under the spotlight. But even here I am fearful. We all know that at my last count there were seventeen accidents to R22 following initial 'mast bumping' and M/R head separation. But it went on for years before the industry addressed the problem adequately.
I'd have to say, Frank Robinson never shied away from his responsibilty to the industry and ensured the run of R22 accidents was made general knowedge while he set about curing the problem. (I have the NTSB list of 17 by serial and registration number)
If only someone at Hughes and latterly Schweizer (or the FAA/CAA) had done the same for the early 269's. Possibly seven or eight accidents prevented and my son still with me.
Thanks to all who are helping with their contributions.
Dennis Kenyon.
we 0\ areveals
Thanks for the interest re G-ZAPS.
Yes, Rex Parkinson (whom I've known for many years) and Jeremy barnett, did invite me to provide some details for the report, but not the actual investigation process. But now that the AAIB report is publised - I am making it my job now to getting very involved.
As we all know the formal AAIB report, is a 1000% comprehensive coverage and apart from the accident causes themselves, it highlights some risky anomolies in other procedures, ie LAMS against HMI and Flight Manual checks A and pre-flight.
It calls on a tightening of welding procedures and authorities. As we stand today, any approved welder can set about any airframe, (presumably a B747) and effect welding repair work on a type he knows absolutely nothing about.
There is no requirement to check the legality of the work, nor any requirement to record details of serial number, type etc, worked on. Had some kind of Certificate of Maker's compliance been in the system for G-ZAPS, the welder would not have completed the requested work and once again, lives would not have been lost.
I believe every helicopter pilot and engineer should read it in detail.
In the next few days and weeks, it is my intention to bring my son's accident under the spotlight. But even here I am fearful. We all know that at my last count there were seventeen accidents to R22 following initial 'mast bumping' and M/R head separation. But it went on for years before the industry addressed the problem adequately.
I'd have to say, Frank Robinson never shied away from his responsibilty to the industry and ensured the run of R22 accidents was made general knowedge while he set about curing the problem. (I have the NTSB list of 17 by serial and registration number)
If only someone at Hughes and latterly Schweizer (or the FAA/CAA) had done the same for the early 269's. Possibly seven or eight accidents prevented and my son still with me.
Thanks to all who are helping with their contributions.
Dennis Kenyon.
we 0\ areveals
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Dennis,
As a long time friend of both you and young Den I feel totally powerless to help you. Of course I will support you in writting letters voicing opinions and in any other method you feel that is necessary, but will it really help?
It's only a small token gesture, but looking at the responses to a thread that is concerning the misfortune that has happened to me and my company, currently running along side this thread, there are some good people in pprune that have voiced some very strong views, for this I must thank them all. I am sure they will do their bit to support your case.
Getting back to my gesture, you have convinced me that the 269a/b and early 269c's with the thin clusters are unsafe to fly (an accident waiting to happen AGAIN!). As one of a few TRE's on this type of aircraft who can carry out LPC's and CAA flight tests I've decided not to to fly this aircraft until the new thicker cluster has been fitted. I would also like to point out that my pilots have also agreed not to fly these helicopters. At least I feel like I / we are doing something to support your case.
Good hunting
Bill
As a long time friend of both you and young Den I feel totally powerless to help you. Of course I will support you in writting letters voicing opinions and in any other method you feel that is necessary, but will it really help?
It's only a small token gesture, but looking at the responses to a thread that is concerning the misfortune that has happened to me and my company, currently running along side this thread, there are some good people in pprune that have voiced some very strong views, for this I must thank them all. I am sure they will do their bit to support your case.
Getting back to my gesture, you have convinced me that the 269a/b and early 269c's with the thin clusters are unsafe to fly (an accident waiting to happen AGAIN!). As one of a few TRE's on this type of aircraft who can carry out LPC's and CAA flight tests I've decided not to to fly this aircraft until the new thicker cluster has been fitted. I would also like to point out that my pilots have also agreed not to fly these helicopters. At least I feel like I / we are doing something to support your case.
Good hunting
Bill
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Reply to Ali250
Any support will help Dennis and its good to see so many people
determined to add their voices to this issue.
Your decision not to fly the unmodifyed Hughes 300 will actually not only help support Dennis, but could also benefit you by keeping you alive a bit longer than might otherwise be the case if you carried on flying the early type of this machine!
The CAA stance is baffling - if the continued failure of a component had been to a B747 and not a Hughes 300, there is no question that they would have taken effective action at an early stage. I can only conclude its a numbers game, an acceptable body count if you like.
And if the CAA continue to think that issuing yet more bits of paper is effective, then yet more people are doomed to die. Don't let it be you!
Any support will help Dennis and its good to see so many people
determined to add their voices to this issue.
Your decision not to fly the unmodifyed Hughes 300 will actually not only help support Dennis, but could also benefit you by keeping you alive a bit longer than might otherwise be the case if you carried on flying the early type of this machine!
The CAA stance is baffling - if the continued failure of a component had been to a B747 and not a Hughes 300, there is no question that they would have taken effective action at an early stage. I can only conclude its a numbers game, an acceptable body count if you like.
And if the CAA continue to think that issuing yet more bits of paper is effective, then yet more people are doomed to die. Don't let it be you!
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For my dear pilot friend Bill at BHH and all 269 pilots - yes I think it is a sensible decision to ban your flying of the 'thin wall' cluster models. The fact is that as I write, I have located no less than nine failures, ten with the later dash 3 Australia accident.
I have to say, I don't think we are likely to see another UK accident. I believe the awareness level is now so high. But what about in five years time, or ten. Remember these accidents are occuring around once per three years.
But what about some of the third world countries, where I guarantee pilots are flying the type knowing nothing at all of the problem.
Can you imagine how I have agonised over whether I should have spotted the cracked cluster one flight prior to my son's fatal. I just have to convince myself it was not there to be seen, but this is against the evidence of the metallurgist. But once all models are modified, we can start to fly a safe helicopter again. I love flying the type, a fine training machine - a view increasingly shared by many instructors in our industry.
And finally - just another call to the CAA. Please .. please do it now. How do you feel knowing that yet another pilot lost his life just four months ago. Don't wait for the FAA Forget your legal exposure. Mandate the fitting now. Cluster failure accidents now total NINE. !!! If you don't it is just a question of time before we are reading about the tenth.
Dennis Kenyon.
I have to say, I don't think we are likely to see another UK accident. I believe the awareness level is now so high. But what about in five years time, or ten. Remember these accidents are occuring around once per three years.
But what about some of the third world countries, where I guarantee pilots are flying the type knowing nothing at all of the problem.
Can you imagine how I have agonised over whether I should have spotted the cracked cluster one flight prior to my son's fatal. I just have to convince myself it was not there to be seen, but this is against the evidence of the metallurgist. But once all models are modified, we can start to fly a safe helicopter again. I love flying the type, a fine training machine - a view increasingly shared by many instructors in our industry.
And finally - just another call to the CAA. Please .. please do it now. How do you feel knowing that yet another pilot lost his life just four months ago. Don't wait for the FAA Forget your legal exposure. Mandate the fitting now. Cluster failure accidents now total NINE. !!! If you don't it is just a question of time before we are reading about the tenth.
Dennis Kenyon.
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I wanted to ask what a pilot who is very concerned at the way the CAA have acted in this case, but does not happen to fly the Hughes, should do?
I guess my question is directed probably to Dennis. I want to help, but I am not sure what is the best thing to do. Is there anything useful that I and other pilots can do to help??
I guess my question is directed probably to Dennis. I want to help, but I am not sure what is the best thing to do. Is there anything useful that I and other pilots can do to help??
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G-ZAPS accident.
From Dennis Kenyon,
First a reply to Hovernut, (aren't we all) I'm not sure that as a non Hughes driver there is much you can do practically. But if my words and the letters above are taken on board AND you help publicise my son's accident - that will perhaps allow the CAA to appreciate the strength of feeling ot here, and bring the matter to the public's attention and perhaps put pressure on the CAA.
BHH pilot's are not flying the affected type. (early Hughes models, 1970's serial nos 0-570.) If all pilots in the country act similarly - we will have effectlively grounded the type and bring this dangerous situation under control.
I am having e mail correspondence on the matter from many countries in the world and requests for more detail. On Friday 7th March, the south counties paper, Evening Argus are running a longsh piece. Being only interested in the dispute aspects of the story, the article is not that objective, but at least gets to the bones of the problem of the CAA's refusal to accept AAIB's recommendations.
But once again a CAA press office spokesman trotted out the familiar, "the accident to G-ZAPS was due to the illegal actions of an engineer." When asked what they had to say about the other eight accidents where there had been no welding to the critical clevis cluster, the reply was "we have no 'significant' knowledge of the other accidents. Presumably they don't believe the AAIB report which list them all, by serial number, registration, date, location and description of failure.
It just goes on and on. So just to confirm, a writ was served on the CAA today.
I can think of no logical reason why the AAIB recommendations are not accepted, except perhaps the legal liability aspect - I'm sure our flying lawyer will know more of that and may have something to say perhaps. At the time of the G-ZAPS failure, the cost of modification by cluster modification/replacement to the Dash 3 item was in the £10,000 - £15,000 area, (the change required engine pylon removal, with attendant M/R hub/blades off, tail boom and gear box split. However, I am advised by a well respected Hughes engineer (ML at Sywell) that the work can now be done for well under £5,000. Not much to ensure a safe helicopter I would have thought.
Please keep your words coming.
Dennis Kenyon
First a reply to Hovernut, (aren't we all) I'm not sure that as a non Hughes driver there is much you can do practically. But if my words and the letters above are taken on board AND you help publicise my son's accident - that will perhaps allow the CAA to appreciate the strength of feeling ot here, and bring the matter to the public's attention and perhaps put pressure on the CAA.
BHH pilot's are not flying the affected type. (early Hughes models, 1970's serial nos 0-570.) If all pilots in the country act similarly - we will have effectlively grounded the type and bring this dangerous situation under control.
I am having e mail correspondence on the matter from many countries in the world and requests for more detail. On Friday 7th March, the south counties paper, Evening Argus are running a longsh piece. Being only interested in the dispute aspects of the story, the article is not that objective, but at least gets to the bones of the problem of the CAA's refusal to accept AAIB's recommendations.
But once again a CAA press office spokesman trotted out the familiar, "the accident to G-ZAPS was due to the illegal actions of an engineer." When asked what they had to say about the other eight accidents where there had been no welding to the critical clevis cluster, the reply was "we have no 'significant' knowledge of the other accidents. Presumably they don't believe the AAIB report which list them all, by serial number, registration, date, location and description of failure.
It just goes on and on. So just to confirm, a writ was served on the CAA today.
I can think of no logical reason why the AAIB recommendations are not accepted, except perhaps the legal liability aspect - I'm sure our flying lawyer will know more of that and may have something to say perhaps. At the time of the G-ZAPS failure, the cost of modification by cluster modification/replacement to the Dash 3 item was in the £10,000 - £15,000 area, (the change required engine pylon removal, with attendant M/R hub/blades off, tail boom and gear box split. However, I am advised by a well respected Hughes engineer (ML at Sywell) that the work can now be done for well under £5,000. Not much to ensure a safe helicopter I would have thought.
Please keep your words coming.
Dennis Kenyon
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Lu
I see you've deleted the post which I edited, and to which I added comments.
That is your right.
However, the warning I added to your post still stands:
If you think I'm bluffing - try me.
Heliport
I see you've deleted the post which I edited, and to which I added comments.
That is your right.
However, the warning I added to your post still stands:
I've given you more leeway on this forum than any other contributor. I have done so out of respect for your advanced years.
However, I will not allow you to use this high profile thread to gain a wider audience for your pet theories which have nothing whatsoever to do with the very specific issues under discussion.
I have previously had to ban you from this forum.
If you post once more on this thread, I will ban you from PPRuNe entirely - not just from this forum.
However, I will not allow you to use this high profile thread to gain a wider audience for your pet theories which have nothing whatsoever to do with the very specific issues under discussion.
I have previously had to ban you from this forum.
If you post once more on this thread, I will ban you from PPRuNe entirely - not just from this forum.
Heliport
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Dennis,
About 18 months ago we replaced a suspect rear cluster on a later Schweizer 300 (G-GINZ). As you can imagine there were very few welders willing to do this job. However, once we overcome that hurdle I couldn't believe how easy the job was to do. The part was $1200 the rest was made up of one days labour, including the hire of the jig. The total bill was around £2,000. If we double this for replacing both clusters then I can confirm your estimate was spot on.
By you bringing the cost of this mod to the attention of the owners (and I know of 2 within our area). Maybe they might think their lives are worth at least this amount? I'm sure by the end of your campaign every potential Hughes 269/300 purchaser will know about these "thin wall clusters" and refuse to buy the aircraft unless this work has been carried out!
Bill
About 18 months ago we replaced a suspect rear cluster on a later Schweizer 300 (G-GINZ). As you can imagine there were very few welders willing to do this job. However, once we overcome that hurdle I couldn't believe how easy the job was to do. The part was $1200 the rest was made up of one days labour, including the hire of the jig. The total bill was around £2,000. If we double this for replacing both clusters then I can confirm your estimate was spot on.
By you bringing the cost of this mod to the attention of the owners (and I know of 2 within our area). Maybe they might think their lives are worth at least this amount? I'm sure by the end of your campaign every potential Hughes 269/300 purchaser will know about these "thin wall clusters" and refuse to buy the aircraft unless this work has been carried out!
Bill
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Dennis,
I know not an awful lot about the 300's. That said, I have followed your most frustrating situation from day one, with great interest and admiration of your persistance against the red tape and bureaucracy you/we seem to be up against.
It beggars belief that such an important safety issue can be cast aside, or swept under the carpet with a blatant disregard to the voice (s) of those who are fundamentally at the sharp end.
My belief is in this case "the tail SHOULD be wagging the dog" and not the other way round.
No other industry in this day and age, with Health & Safety, Public Accountability and Best working practices, would ever dare stoop so low for fear of serious reprisal.
Count me in.
Happy
I know not an awful lot about the 300's. That said, I have followed your most frustrating situation from day one, with great interest and admiration of your persistance against the red tape and bureaucracy you/we seem to be up against.
It beggars belief that such an important safety issue can be cast aside, or swept under the carpet with a blatant disregard to the voice (s) of those who are fundamentally at the sharp end.
My belief is in this case "the tail SHOULD be wagging the dog" and not the other way round.
No other industry in this day and age, with Health & Safety, Public Accountability and Best working practices, would ever dare stoop so low for fear of serious reprisal.
Count me in.
Happy
Avoid imitations
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I am not qualified to fly this type of helicopter but speaking as an experienced helicopter (and to a lesser extent, fixed wing) pilot I cannot understand the stance of the CAA. They surely have a mandate to take whatever action is possible in order to prevent a recurrence of this catastrophic structural failure.
Having one man made a scapegoat is not the way to go, they are shirking their responsibility IMHO.
This thread is beginning to sound like the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash in some respects. Blame an individual rather than address the wider problem.
Dennis, we haven't met but please accept my sincere condolences.
Having one man made a scapegoat is not the way to go, they are shirking their responsibility IMHO.
This thread is beginning to sound like the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash in some respects. Blame an individual rather than address the wider problem.
Dennis, we haven't met but please accept my sincere condolences.
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Hughes accident - G-ZAPS
Thursday 13th.
I thought Rotorhead readers might like an update on the G-ZAPS accident, since I am not letting go of this safety issue until our CAA come to their senses.
I have always been a great CAA supporter believing that overall they get it right most of the time (in a difficult environment) But now I find myself in conflict with their decision. I attended the Belgrano this afternoon for an 'over sixty' stress ECG - and there framed at the entrance stood the logo we know so well. SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT.
I had to stop and think as I parked the car. Do the anonymous guys/engineers who made the decision to not accept the AAIB recommendations also stop to read it !!
As a former AOC holder, I know full well the lengths my CAA OPS Inspector would go to in ensuring I ran a safe operation, and boy would he pick up as much as a thirty minute overun on my FTLS (flight time limitation scheme) or a lift off at 20 lbs fuel load below my approved minimum. I considered this as 'nit picking' but always decided that if my operation was made more safe, then such inspections were welcome.
But now we have a glaring safety issue. One where the FAA/CAA decision not to accept an AAIB recommendation HAS ALREADY RESULTED in a further accident. Absolutely and totally and without argument an unacceptable situation. I believe the CAA may well have cause to regret their inaction, certainly in the USA/FAA case where the lawyers are already sharpening knives following the Tulsa November 2002 accident.
As earlier advised, I have instituted the first prod towards legal proceedings. The Sussex paper - 'Evening Argus' has run a prominent news story on the case which I am hoping will be taken up elsewhere on a national basis.
Mr Gerald Howarth M.P. is behind me and may decide to take political action. So gentlemen, I have set the ball rolling and rather like Saddam Hussein, the CAA only have to make one small decision to avert a war. Please issue the mandate for cluster component change the AAIB are recommending.
Thanks to my friends and colleagues in the industry for their words of support. At times I feel like going to bed and forgetting the whole sodding thing. Then my lost son tells me I have to do something for him. And I am doing just that.
Dennis Kenyon.
I thought Rotorhead readers might like an update on the G-ZAPS accident, since I am not letting go of this safety issue until our CAA come to their senses.
I have always been a great CAA supporter believing that overall they get it right most of the time (in a difficult environment) But now I find myself in conflict with their decision. I attended the Belgrano this afternoon for an 'over sixty' stress ECG - and there framed at the entrance stood the logo we know so well. SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT.
I had to stop and think as I parked the car. Do the anonymous guys/engineers who made the decision to not accept the AAIB recommendations also stop to read it !!
As a former AOC holder, I know full well the lengths my CAA OPS Inspector would go to in ensuring I ran a safe operation, and boy would he pick up as much as a thirty minute overun on my FTLS (flight time limitation scheme) or a lift off at 20 lbs fuel load below my approved minimum. I considered this as 'nit picking' but always decided that if my operation was made more safe, then such inspections were welcome.
But now we have a glaring safety issue. One where the FAA/CAA decision not to accept an AAIB recommendation HAS ALREADY RESULTED in a further accident. Absolutely and totally and without argument an unacceptable situation. I believe the CAA may well have cause to regret their inaction, certainly in the USA/FAA case where the lawyers are already sharpening knives following the Tulsa November 2002 accident.
As earlier advised, I have instituted the first prod towards legal proceedings. The Sussex paper - 'Evening Argus' has run a prominent news story on the case which I am hoping will be taken up elsewhere on a national basis.
Mr Gerald Howarth M.P. is behind me and may decide to take political action. So gentlemen, I have set the ball rolling and rather like Saddam Hussein, the CAA only have to make one small decision to avert a war. Please issue the mandate for cluster component change the AAIB are recommending.
Thanks to my friends and colleagues in the industry for their words of support. At times I feel like going to bed and forgetting the whole sodding thing. Then my lost son tells me I have to do something for him. And I am doing just that.
Dennis Kenyon.
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From Dennis Kenyon.
Just a small update on the G-ZAPS position.
Earlier, doubt was expressed that the MP route might not achieve anything. So to tell you all, that Gerald Howarth M.P. (shadow defence minister) is in correspondence with me. He advised the matter is being taken up with the CAA. I will keep pprune advised of any significant developments.
Pat Malone of the AOPA mag is running the piece in next month's issue.
I have submitted an article to Flight and will ask Ian Seager (Flyer)and Dave Calderwood (Pilot) to do something. For whatever reason, the CAA are (rather like Tony Blair) entrenched in their
position - and as I have said before, the only remedy I (and the industry) have is through the media, which for all their faults and assets, will bring the issue to the public's attention.
I will keep writing.
Just a smallie for Genghis - is it lawful for me to leave the cluster on my Schweizer 269, G-DRKJ unpainted - just varnished. I know that I couldn't detect the crack on G-ZAPS through the paint and a little dirt. So that is MY FIX. I hope not wrong.
A big thanks to all my pilot and other friends who are with me on this issue.
DRK
[
Just a small update on the G-ZAPS position.
Earlier, doubt was expressed that the MP route might not achieve anything. So to tell you all, that Gerald Howarth M.P. (shadow defence minister) is in correspondence with me. He advised the matter is being taken up with the CAA. I will keep pprune advised of any significant developments.
Pat Malone of the AOPA mag is running the piece in next month's issue.
I have submitted an article to Flight and will ask Ian Seager (Flyer)and Dave Calderwood (Pilot) to do something. For whatever reason, the CAA are (rather like Tony Blair) entrenched in their
position - and as I have said before, the only remedy I (and the industry) have is through the media, which for all their faults and assets, will bring the issue to the public's attention.
I will keep writing.
Just a smallie for Genghis - is it lawful for me to leave the cluster on my Schweizer 269, G-DRKJ unpainted - just varnished. I know that I couldn't detect the crack on G-ZAPS through the paint and a little dirt. So that is MY FIX. I hope not wrong.
A big thanks to all my pilot and other friends who are with me on this issue.
DRK
[