HEMS crash Turkey
Joined: Oct 1999
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From: Den Haag
Instrument Flying Take Off. The way I was taught was from a low hover, a good reference point close in, climb vertically, with a positive application of T/O power, and confirm good engine response/matching, at about 15 ft transfer totally to an instruments scan, lower the nose by 5 degrees and ensure a positive rate of climb is maintained, along with acceleration. At Vy adjust attitude to maintain.
There are some proponents that say adjust the horizon bars while in the hover, to zero pitch but a) this only applies to older mechanical instruments and, b) I think just confuses things during the rest of the flight!
There are some proponents that say adjust the horizon bars while in the hover, to zero pitch but a) this only applies to older mechanical instruments and, b) I think just confuses things during the rest of the flight!
Joined: May 2002
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From: Downeast
The US Army method was similar to that described by 212man except we did the hover check to determine hover power required....determined the Take Off Power to be used ensuring there was a margin left for safety, do an instrument check for proper indications....then land back....do pre-take off checks and Final Brief....takeoff from the ground using instruments without looking outside....and apply the Takeoff Power...confirm vertical rate and lower the pitch attitude to Five Degrees below level attitude....check for positive rate and acceleration...climb away at Vbroc until reaching a desired altitude then adjust power and attitude for cruise. During the takeoff heading is controlled by pedals until forward airspeed increases through ETL and then by use of cyclic and pedals per normal flight after that.. Takeoffs were done into wind as much as possible. We used that technique quite frequently in dusty conditions with sling loads or at night where there were no lights of any kind also carrying sling loads of all kinds including Huey's.
My Instrument training took place in the UH-1B, D, and H which all were single engine, had no SAS, no RadAlt, and a single VOR and ADF and a RMI with two bearing pointers (VOR and ADF)and a VOR/ILS course deviation/glide slope indicator. There was a backup AI on the Co-Pilot's panel.....and a Mag Compass. These days that layout would be considered an "Emergency Panel". The Chinooks I flew had the same basic setup but did have a SAS system. Both Huey and Chinook had Force Trim systems with the difference being the Chinook required the Force Trim to be on at all times for normal flight but in the Huey it was optional.
My Instrument training took place in the UH-1B, D, and H which all were single engine, had no SAS, no RadAlt, and a single VOR and ADF and a RMI with two bearing pointers (VOR and ADF)and a VOR/ILS course deviation/glide slope indicator. There was a backup AI on the Co-Pilot's panel.....and a Mag Compass. These days that layout would be considered an "Emergency Panel". The Chinooks I flew had the same basic setup but did have a SAS system. Both Huey and Chinook had Force Trim systems with the difference being the Chinook required the Force Trim to be on at all times for normal flight but in the Huey it was optional.
Joined: Sep 2005
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From: Montreal
Pretty common departure from my EMS days, much the same as 212man describes, of course we were mentored by ex-offshore pilots that had it as a polished routine following a strict SOP.
We'd let it go higher than 15' as long as we had ground reference. No drifting around, stay over the spot until you do the 5-10 degree pitch to transition. In this accident the helicopter is clearly visible from the cameraman's position, so unlikely the pilot lost ground reference, the backing up (why, oh why?) got him.
Like SASless, it was done routinely in basic equipment - we used the Bell 222UT with no autopilot, no stabilization, only a force trim. And that aircraft is certified single-pilot IFR. I question reliance on additional avionics to save limited pilots in these situations. Witness the number of well-equipped 139 that manage to stove in on takeoff. Management, training, SOP discipline.
We'd let it go higher than 15' as long as we had ground reference. No drifting around, stay over the spot until you do the 5-10 degree pitch to transition. In this accident the helicopter is clearly visible from the cameraman's position, so unlikely the pilot lost ground reference, the backing up (why, oh why?) got him.
Like SASless, it was done routinely in basic equipment - we used the Bell 222UT with no autopilot, no stabilization, only a force trim. And that aircraft is certified single-pilot IFR. I question reliance on additional avionics to save limited pilots in these situations. Witness the number of well-equipped 139 that manage to stove in on takeoff. Management, training, SOP discipline.
Joined: May 2002
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From: Downeast
The key difference was in our technique there was no transition from visual to instruments....as we started on them thus one less chance to get disoriented.
Offshore takeoffs were a bit different in that oft times you had large bits of steel very close at hand. I always moved to the deck edge then started up looking at the deck momentarily to ensure no awkward drift then look back in...as I rotated forwards....same basic takeoff we did at max weights and very little margin of power left during visual operations that ensured the tail cleared the deck edge.
212man is very familiar with the Rig Ops in 212's at inland areas where rigs were on canals bordered by some very tall trees that rose above the heli-decks.
No PC1 silliness back then....just a canal and a set of pop-out floats for a rejected takeoff.
Oddly, we never lost an aircraft or had to make a forced landing due to an engine failure but we did have some other accidents.
He might offer some input about the improvements in autopilot systems improving safety and use in operations as compared to the 212's.
Offshore takeoffs were a bit different in that oft times you had large bits of steel very close at hand. I always moved to the deck edge then started up looking at the deck momentarily to ensure no awkward drift then look back in...as I rotated forwards....same basic takeoff we did at max weights and very little margin of power left during visual operations that ensured the tail cleared the deck edge.
212man is very familiar with the Rig Ops in 212's at inland areas where rigs were on canals bordered by some very tall trees that rose above the heli-decks.
No PC1 silliness back then....just a canal and a set of pop-out floats for a rejected takeoff.
Oddly, we never lost an aircraft or had to make a forced landing due to an engine failure but we did have some other accidents.
He might offer some input about the improvements in autopilot systems improving safety and use in operations as compared to the 212's.
Joined: May 2002
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From: Downeast
We did that during the hover check....two schools of thought was mentally note the hover attitude as indicated by the AI and mimic that...or adjust the AI to show wings level in the hover.
Side note: the Chinook hovered at 5-7 degrees nose high attitude depending upon loading thus upon take off we rotated to wings level in pitch attitude to accelerate forward. Then just to help out the Cyclic Speed Trims, airspeed controlled electric actuators that leveled the fuselage depending upon IAS (varied by Model of Aircraft...A, B, C etc but generally around 80-100 knots and above) got into the act.
Side note: the Chinook hovered at 5-7 degrees nose high attitude depending upon loading thus upon take off we rotated to wings level in pitch attitude to accelerate forward. Then just to help out the Cyclic Speed Trims, airspeed controlled electric actuators that leveled the fuselage depending upon IAS (varied by Model of Aircraft...A, B, C etc but generally around 80-100 knots and above) got into the act.
Joined: Jan 2009
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From: Sweden
Flying at the Artic circle or north of it means landing and taking if in whiteout conditions 6 months a year.
A regular winter takeoff from any field means doing a Instrument takeoff every time it is sub freezing temp.
At really cold temps and a larger helo like 10t its also very common to generate fog, one landing means you’re in the middle of 1x1 km 200ft high fog cloud that add to the whiteout conditions.
We found Whiteout conditions to be more slightly more challenging than brownout conditions when we went to sand box, but not very different.
The hover instrument is very handy for S/A to make sure you increase the GS in a appropriate manner and its also easy to compensate for side drift. Most helos doesn’t hover wings level and high torque+low Airspeed during the T/O calls for continue with the approx hover attitude.
Its common to drift sideways and not keeping the ground track, which might be dangerous in cities with obstacles.
Performing good instrument T/O’s is a skill that need to be maintained by training, which we do not get very much of in our HEMS business. Its not a economical question in the first place but the issue is that if we would train as much as in the SAR or military we would render ourself useless on Flight Time and Flight Duty Time. So it need to be balanced towards being able to go on the missions.
My guess is that this do not differ much from other HEMS operators.
We have good hover functions in the H145, so we can lift off, and couple the AP (GTC.H /HOVER + cruising height and Go Around at TDP) for a completely safe coupled instrument take off.
There is no risk of spatial disorientation giving any issues.
So, Automated and safe.
A regular winter takeoff from any field means doing a Instrument takeoff every time it is sub freezing temp.
At really cold temps and a larger helo like 10t its also very common to generate fog, one landing means you’re in the middle of 1x1 km 200ft high fog cloud that add to the whiteout conditions.
We found Whiteout conditions to be more slightly more challenging than brownout conditions when we went to sand box, but not very different.
The hover instrument is very handy for S/A to make sure you increase the GS in a appropriate manner and its also easy to compensate for side drift. Most helos doesn’t hover wings level and high torque+low Airspeed during the T/O calls for continue with the approx hover attitude.
Its common to drift sideways and not keeping the ground track, which might be dangerous in cities with obstacles.
Performing good instrument T/O’s is a skill that need to be maintained by training, which we do not get very much of in our HEMS business. Its not a economical question in the first place but the issue is that if we would train as much as in the SAR or military we would render ourself useless on Flight Time and Flight Duty Time. So it need to be balanced towards being able to go on the missions.
My guess is that this do not differ much from other HEMS operators.
We have good hover functions in the H145, so we can lift off, and couple the AP (GTC.H /HOVER + cruising height and Go Around at TDP) for a completely safe coupled instrument take off.
There is no risk of spatial disorientation giving any issues.
So, Automated and safe.
Joined: Nov 2010
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From: Australia
...We'd let it go higher than 15' as long as we had ground reference. No drifting around, stay over the spot until you do the 5-10 degree pitch to transition. In this accident the helicopter is clearly visible from the cameraman's position, so unlikely the pilot lost ground reference, the backing up (why, oh why?) got him...
The hospital helipad near me was near ground level alongside a few tall hospital buildings as in this case. Often departing helicopters (BK117, AS365N, Bell 412, AW139) would climb while simultaneously 'backing-up' just as seen in this accident, but I have only ever seen such departures in clear (VFR) conditions. I just assumed the pilots were planning for an emergency landing back to the pad rather than into obstructions such as carparks, major roads etc ahead of the pad had they transitioned directly into forward flight after lift-off? Presumably that is what the pilot(s) in Turkiye had also been trying to do, except they drifted(?) further back than intended?
malabo assumes that if the helicopter was still reasonably visible from the cameraman's position (even until it hit the hospital), the pilot(s) should equally have been able to maintain ground references. But is it easier to see a dark object (the helicopter) looking up through fog in a 'back lit' sky than to clearly make out ground references looking down through fog onto dark ground? Or had the pilot(s) 'forgotten' the presence of the hospital while concentrating on ground references below them? The helicopter was facing the hospital when it lifted off before turning through ~180 degrees so that should have offered a final reminder of their surroundings.
I was wondering what obstructions / terrain the pilot(s) had on their planned departure path. The location is "Muğla Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi" on Google Maps (see below). The departure route seemed clear of obstructions with ground level falling away significantly:
Overall aerial view of hospital showing location of pad (H), video camera (C) and collision point (X). It is only around 70m laterally from centre of pad to the hospital impact point:
A view from the pad to the hospital:
A view from the pad in the opposite (180 degrees) direction:
Addition: I wonder if the irregular shape of the hospital mislead the pilots as they 'backed up'? The hospital wing they hit projects out closer to the pad than the other wings that may have been seen more easily from the cabin looking aft?
Last edited by helispotter; 4th January 2025 at 08:21.
Joined: Jan 2022
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From: Destin
As an old VFR and IFR pilot, I often switched between the two different types of skill sets. A couple of times, I'd just use the nearest and tallest structure or building as a reference to climb and minimize drift, i.e. a smoke stack or Aerial / Antenna, or in this case, I may have just maneuvered to a closer but safe distance to the Hospital and used it as a VR.
i wasn't there. I've never been there. I dont know the surrounding environment of the pad and hospital. But it would've definitely been one of the options in my decision making process. As well as the option of not cranking the engines and waiting it out.
i wasn't there. I've never been there. I dont know the surrounding environment of the pad and hospital. But it would've definitely been one of the options in my decision making process. As well as the option of not cranking the engines and waiting it out.
Joined: Apr 2000
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From: EGDC
The RAF expected their pilots to be able to depart in very poor visibility. The relevant takeoff technique, as described above, was given a slightly different, but highly important emphasis after a serious accident in NI during “the troubles”. A Wessex lifted off at night from a high, unlit helipad (Forkhill) with an adjacent radio mast. The aircraft drifted laterally, shortly after lifting off and hit the mast. The aircraft crashed and rolled down the hill, causing serious injuries and a fatality. The change made in the technique was to establish a low hover using visual references but then to confirm the hover attitude using the main AI before attempting to proceed any further and to maintain that attitude as collective pitch was increased to initiate the climb. This minimises drift. By the time the aircraft had a positive rate of climb the pilot should be transferring to instruments.
Any changes to the IFTO were only made as an a&&e-covering exercise because two Sqn pilots couldn't fly a simple night departure. Both pilots had a history of bumping into things in aircraft!
I flew the Board of Inquiry team in there the next day to show them the site.
Back to the IFTO technique - if you have two pilots, one can maintain the visual hover while the other starts to build his instrument scan then, at the appropriate time, control is handed over and power is pulled for the vertical climb. For single pilot then you can go from the ground as SASless describes if you are in dust/sand, or from the hover if you have some visual references (that is the more tricky version and the one that was practised a lot).
Identifying the correct hover attitude (left wheel/skid low in American rotation helos) was the key to this technique - it allowed a vertical climb to whatever height you deemed suitable to clear the obstacles before selecting an accelerative attitude. By the time you got to 40 Kts, you could use a normal wings level attitude to base your instrument scan around.
If you don't concentrate on the attitude (especially holding the left wing low) you might do as I did one night in Cyprus, lifting from a very dusty football pitch surrounded by trees and trying to get visual references too soon - I came out of the top of the dust cloud with about 15 degrees of bank (fortunately still going up) and only missed the tallest tree by a small margin. Ah the days before NVG.........
Joined: Jan 2009
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From: Sweden
I guess both the accident and the drift discussed above show why this would not be a safe procedure for HEMS crews that cannot train it properly and keep current.
Even if modern helos have hover instrument showing lateral and longitudinal movements which make it possible to detect the drift when no visual clues exists, flying these procedures is a handicraft which needs much training to be safe, and continous practice to keep current. Despite this and even if being military “of the right stuff” spatial desorientation or other small misses in the hand job performed. No one is immune!
These procedures should, in the HEMS context, be left for automation to be performed, with pilots proficient to monitor and take action if the automation fails.
There is also one thing to take into account about risk vs the perceived risk. Many things made in the military feels safe because we have been trained, current and performed procedures thousand of times.
But if the real risk is counted correctly it might be not considered that safe from a commercial transport perspective. It is all about risk acceptance: Is 1 accident out of 1000 or 10.000 or 100.000 procedures acceptable.
Even if modern helos have hover instrument showing lateral and longitudinal movements which make it possible to detect the drift when no visual clues exists, flying these procedures is a handicraft which needs much training to be safe, and continous practice to keep current. Despite this and even if being military “of the right stuff” spatial desorientation or other small misses in the hand job performed. No one is immune!
These procedures should, in the HEMS context, be left for automation to be performed, with pilots proficient to monitor and take action if the automation fails.
There is also one thing to take into account about risk vs the perceived risk. Many things made in the military feels safe because we have been trained, current and performed procedures thousand of times.
But if the real risk is counted correctly it might be not considered that safe from a commercial transport perspective. It is all about risk acceptance: Is 1 accident out of 1000 or 10.000 or 100.000 procedures acceptable.
Joined: Apr 2000
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From: EGDC
AAKEE - you put the onus on automation rather than training - which is exactly where aviation has gone so wrong in the past 20 years.
The reason the regulators like automation is because it means it's not their fault when something goes wrong and the reason the operators like it is because automation is easier and cheaper than training.
Pilot skills are not dirty words and all that civil regulation of previously military capabilities has achieved is to reward mediocrity and make box-ticking in the sim easier..
I wouldn't expect a surgeon, with a patient's life in his hands, to be allowed to let a machine do something he is more than capable of with appropriate training - because of something goes wrong he can bring far more to the situation than algorithmic responses.
Equally, why let the aircraft fly a non-PC1 departure with the pilot ready to take over (if he can when things go suddenly wrong) when he could fly it himself and probably have a far better idea of options if he is already intimately involved in the process (rather than waiting for the machine to tell him something has failed).
Shy - ** and ** both changed their stories between their hot witness statements at Bessbrook, in the immediate aftermath, and the testimony to the BOI.
** was a top bloke and a bloody good crewman who didn't deserve the blame to be shoved his way.
The reason the regulators like automation is because it means it's not their fault when something goes wrong and the reason the operators like it is because automation is easier and cheaper than training.
Pilot skills are not dirty words and all that civil regulation of previously military capabilities has achieved is to reward mediocrity and make box-ticking in the sim easier..
I wouldn't expect a surgeon, with a patient's life in his hands, to be allowed to let a machine do something he is more than capable of with appropriate training - because of something goes wrong he can bring far more to the situation than algorithmic responses.
Equally, why let the aircraft fly a non-PC1 departure with the pilot ready to take over (if he can when things go suddenly wrong) when he could fly it himself and probably have a far better idea of options if he is already intimately involved in the process (rather than waiting for the machine to tell him something has failed).
Shy - ** and ** both changed their stories between their hot witness statements at Bessbrook, in the immediate aftermath, and the testimony to the BOI.
** was a top bloke and a bloody good crewman who didn't deserve the blame to be shoved his way.
Joined: Aug 2001
Posts: 696
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From: Shropshire
Hi Crab
One thing to bear in mind when talking about most UK HEMS is that it is generally a VFR operation with occasional IFR recovery/diversion (Scotland being the main exception). With no PinS approaches to hospitals or HEMS bases, IFR is only much use for operations returning to HEMS bases at instrument aerodromes or very occasionally as a cloud break at an instrument aerodrome near an incident. It is very difficult for HEMS pilots to maintain approach currency unless they are based at an IFR aerodrome, so the idea of being current on military style instrument departures is highly unlikely, even if you could get approval from the Authority to conduct them.
Even for a 'proceed visually' PinS departure, you need a visual segment to the initial departure fix (IDF) and to design that, you have to have a full annex 14 style survey carried out at a cost of several thousand GBP, not a typical hospital landing site sketch conducted with a laser range finder and a magnetic compass.
Cheers
TeeS
One thing to bear in mind when talking about most UK HEMS is that it is generally a VFR operation with occasional IFR recovery/diversion (Scotland being the main exception). With no PinS approaches to hospitals or HEMS bases, IFR is only much use for operations returning to HEMS bases at instrument aerodromes or very occasionally as a cloud break at an instrument aerodrome near an incident. It is very difficult for HEMS pilots to maintain approach currency unless they are based at an IFR aerodrome, so the idea of being current on military style instrument departures is highly unlikely, even if you could get approval from the Authority to conduct them.
Even for a 'proceed visually' PinS departure, you need a visual segment to the initial departure fix (IDF) and to design that, you have to have a full annex 14 style survey carried out at a cost of several thousand GBP, not a typical hospital landing site sketch conducted with a laser range finder and a magnetic compass.
Cheers
TeeS
Joined: May 2002
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From: Downeast
Whilst discussing this accident in Turkey lets not forget our international audience by focusing our comments through just a UK prism.
The Untied States has just shy of 500 EMS bases using helicopters and about 77 that use airplanes.
The terrain and weather varies greatly throughout the country as does the population densities.
All of which are factors in where the bases are located and the types of services offered that can be determined by the size of the aircraft utilized.
Consider many of the helicopters are single engine versions also plays a role in safety calculations.
Twins sometimes are just as much a liability as are singles.....thinking of high elevation locations and the earlier model twins that suffered from severe weight limitations when single engine capability was calculated.
Here is a web site that offers some pretty easy to use information. One being a map of all of the bases and what I found interesting is the big dark black area where there are no EMS Helicopter Bases at all.
I look to the map and understanding how many different Operators there are and how training was done in the past....it raises questions how those costs can be controlled yet still accomplish more than a box checking job to it.
When it comes to an IFR program especially....as VFR is no where as complicated. It is trying to teach" aeronautical decision making" at the VFR programs that is the difficult task to convince the Line Pilots that they can say "No" without being at risk for having done so for articulable reasons. At IFR programs the decision is more about determining if the intentional flying in adverse weather is safe. VFR crews are at greater risk should they encounter inadvertent instrument meteorological weather conditions (IIMC) while flying in marginal weather especially at night over dark terrain.
Looking at a Flight Tracker web site I see three EMS helicopters in the air within a 150 nm radius of where I live....and that is only a half circle area.
https://www.ethosdatabase.org/apps/0...1da242/explore
The Untied States has just shy of 500 EMS bases using helicopters and about 77 that use airplanes.
The terrain and weather varies greatly throughout the country as does the population densities.
All of which are factors in where the bases are located and the types of services offered that can be determined by the size of the aircraft utilized.
Consider many of the helicopters are single engine versions also plays a role in safety calculations.
Twins sometimes are just as much a liability as are singles.....thinking of high elevation locations and the earlier model twins that suffered from severe weight limitations when single engine capability was calculated.
Here is a web site that offers some pretty easy to use information. One being a map of all of the bases and what I found interesting is the big dark black area where there are no EMS Helicopter Bases at all.
I look to the map and understanding how many different Operators there are and how training was done in the past....it raises questions how those costs can be controlled yet still accomplish more than a box checking job to it.
When it comes to an IFR program especially....as VFR is no where as complicated. It is trying to teach" aeronautical decision making" at the VFR programs that is the difficult task to convince the Line Pilots that they can say "No" without being at risk for having done so for articulable reasons. At IFR programs the decision is more about determining if the intentional flying in adverse weather is safe. VFR crews are at greater risk should they encounter inadvertent instrument meteorological weather conditions (IIMC) while flying in marginal weather especially at night over dark terrain.
Looking at a Flight Tracker web site I see three EMS helicopters in the air within a 150 nm radius of where I live....and that is only a half circle area.
https://www.ethosdatabase.org/apps/0...1da242/explore
Last edited by SASless; 4th January 2025 at 18:20.
Joined: Nov 2006
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From: After all, what’s more important than proving to someone on the internet that they’re wrong? - Manson
The details of "PC1", "IFTO", "Military IFTO" & "cloud breaking procedure" are beyond me as a non-pilot.
The hospital helipad near me was near ground level alongside a few tall hospital buildings as in this case. Often departing helicopters (BK117, AS365N, Bell 412, AW139) would climb while simultaneously 'backing-up' just as seen in this accident, but I have only ever seen such departures in clear (VFR) conditions. I just assumed the pilots were planning for an emergency landing back to the pad rather than into obstructions such as carparks, major roads etc ahead of the pad had they transitioned directly into forward flight after lift-off? Presumably that is what the pilot(s) in Turkiye had also been trying to do, except they drifted(?) further back than intended?
malabo assumes that if the helicopter was still reasonably visible from the cameraman's position (even until it hit the hospital), the pilot(s) should equally have been able to maintain ground references. But is it easier to see a dark object (the helicopter) looking up through fog in a 'back lit' sky than to clearly make out ground references looking down through fog onto dark ground? Or had the pilot(s) 'forgotten' the presence of the hospital while concentrating on ground references below them? The helicopter was facing the hospital when it lifted off before turning through ~180 degrees so that should have offered a final reminder of their surroundings.
I was wondering what obstructions / terrain the pilot(s) had on their planned departure path. The location is "Muğla Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi" on Google Maps (see below). The departure route seemed clear of obstructions with ground level falling away significantly:
Overall aerial view of hospital showing location of pad (H), video camera (C) and collision point (X). It is only around 70m laterally from centre of pad to the hospital impact point:
A view from the pad to the hospital:
A view from the pad in the opposite (180 degrees) direction:
Addition: I wonder if the irregular shape of the hospital mislead the pilots as they 'backed up'? The hospital wing they hit projects out closer to the pad than the other wings that may have been seen more easily from the cabin looking aft?
The hospital helipad near me was near ground level alongside a few tall hospital buildings as in this case. Often departing helicopters (BK117, AS365N, Bell 412, AW139) would climb while simultaneously 'backing-up' just as seen in this accident, but I have only ever seen such departures in clear (VFR) conditions. I just assumed the pilots were planning for an emergency landing back to the pad rather than into obstructions such as carparks, major roads etc ahead of the pad had they transitioned directly into forward flight after lift-off? Presumably that is what the pilot(s) in Turkiye had also been trying to do, except they drifted(?) further back than intended?
malabo assumes that if the helicopter was still reasonably visible from the cameraman's position (even until it hit the hospital), the pilot(s) should equally have been able to maintain ground references. But is it easier to see a dark object (the helicopter) looking up through fog in a 'back lit' sky than to clearly make out ground references looking down through fog onto dark ground? Or had the pilot(s) 'forgotten' the presence of the hospital while concentrating on ground references below them? The helicopter was facing the hospital when it lifted off before turning through ~180 degrees so that should have offered a final reminder of their surroundings.
I was wondering what obstructions / terrain the pilot(s) had on their planned departure path. The location is "Muğla Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi" on Google Maps (see below). The departure route seemed clear of obstructions with ground level falling away significantly:
Overall aerial view of hospital showing location of pad (H), video camera (C) and collision point (X). It is only around 70m laterally from centre of pad to the hospital impact point:
A view from the pad to the hospital:
A view from the pad in the opposite (180 degrees) direction:
Addition: I wonder if the irregular shape of the hospital mislead the pilots as they 'backed up'? The hospital wing they hit projects out closer to the pad than the other wings that may have been seen more easily from the cabin looking aft?
As below -
Joined: Jan 2024
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From: Finland
As was proven here a few years ago quite a few pilots were not aware of the meaning or the relevance of the orientation of the "H" marking other than it depicting it is in fact a helipad. The final approach orientation is at 90 degrees to the cross bar of the "H" i.e. in line with the long vertical legs. It would stand to reason that this would/could also be significant on a departure. "If" still visual with the "H" of course it would have given some orientation at least.
While operating under PC1, the direction of H is helpfull but not controlling. If the accident take off was flown under PC1, the direction of take-off was probably pre surveyed and approved (but possibly not suitable or the best available).
Joined: Mar 2005
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From: Aus
When learning to fly helos the USN taught for an instrument take off in the H-34 to leave your boots flat on the floor until reaching some forgotten airspeed. Reason being to get your feet off the micro switches on the pedals and let the automatics maintain heading until safely in the climb. Never thought of the technique when flying other types. Comments?
Joined: Oct 1999
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From: Den Haag
When learning to fly helos the USN taught for an instrument take off in the H-34 to leave your boots flat on the floor until reaching some forgotten airspeed. Reason being to get your feet off the micro switches on the pedals and let the automatics maintain heading until safely in the climb. Never thought of the technique when flying other types. Comments?
But, honestly, no harm in keeping your feet on the pedal edges I’d suggest
Joined: Nov 2010
Posts: 880
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From: Australia
As was proven here a few years ago quite a few pilots were not aware of the meaning or the relevance of the orientation of the "H" marking other than it depicting it is in fact a helipad. The final approach orientation is at 90 degrees to the cross bar of the "H" i.e. in line with the long vertical legs. It would stand to reason that this would/could also be significant on a departure. "If" still visual with the "H" of course it would have given some orientation at least.
As below -...
As below -...