Bristow S92 down west of Bergen Norway
Presumably the automatic deployment system would be automatically disarmed above a certain IAS and re-armed below it. Which is of course a manual operation at the moment. But the specific issue that seems to have caused the floats to not be activated in this accident, is not addressed by this change.
Presumably the automatic deployment system would be automatically disarmed above a certain IAS and re-armed below it. Which is of course a manual operation at the moment. But the specific issue that seems to have caused the floats to not be activated in this accident, is not addressed by this change.
Operators were suggesting to SIK to incorporate an IAS switch over ten years ago……
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Last edited by 212man; 16th May 2024 at 08:28.
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Apart from the power issues that allow a safety system like the floats to fail to deploy (which genius designed that?), I found this interesting
Have crews become too complacent with the advent of reliable, digital autopilots so they don't monitor what the aircraft is doing closely enough? It happens easily - the difference between the steam-driven Mk31 AFCS in the Mk 3 Sea King and the SN500 duplex digital AFCS in the Mk 3A was very marked.
When you flew with the Mk 31 you never relaxed during the TD as it had so many failure modes that would fly you into the water - the SN500 on the other hand was super-reliable with in-built monitoring. That meant that only good use of SOPS between PF and PM and CRM could prevent an unexpected failure on the SN500 from getting you wet or scaring you sh*tless.
I wonder if some complacency with automation was a factor here - when the nose goes from 12 degrees up to 30 - as it gets close to 20 you wonder what they were monitoring and why they didn't intervene earlier.
The report says they were not flying with NVG - wtf are people doing overnight SAR without NVG for in the 21st century?. Even one pilot on goggles would have been able to see the unusual attitude starting to develop and intervene early.
Analysis of data from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), HUMS information and data from the Flight Control Computer (FCC) indicates that the pitch attitude started to increase abnormally when the helicopter was near the training beacon (150 ft radio altimeter altitude and speed decreasing to near 10 kt). The nose of the helicopter started to rise from the expected 10°–12° nose up attitude to a 30° nose up attitude over several seconds. When the crew became aware of the situation, they attempted to correct the unusual attitude however the aircraft impacted the water and sank to a depth of 220 metres. The NSIA is working to determine the cause of the pitch up manoeuvre.
When you flew with the Mk 31 you never relaxed during the TD as it had so many failure modes that would fly you into the water - the SN500 on the other hand was super-reliable with in-built monitoring. That meant that only good use of SOPS between PF and PM and CRM could prevent an unexpected failure on the SN500 from getting you wet or scaring you sh*tless.
I wonder if some complacency with automation was a factor here - when the nose goes from 12 degrees up to 30 - as it gets close to 20 you wonder what they were monitoring and why they didn't intervene earlier.
The report says they were not flying with NVG - wtf are people doing overnight SAR without NVG for in the 21st century?. Even one pilot on goggles would have been able to see the unusual attitude starting to develop and intervene early.
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Apart from the power issues that allow a safety system like the floats to fail to deploy (which genius designed that?)
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Is it fair to whine when your feet get wet if you forget to put on your Waders?
Engineers cannot design out every human error no matter how hard they try as humans stupid as we are can outsmart them given the opportunity.
Engineers cannot design out every human error no matter how hard they try as humans stupid as we are can outsmart them given the opportunity.
I don't know what their SOPs are but perhaps the APU isn't started until they establish the hover and complete the pre-winching checks.
If it is an uncontrolled ditching without the intention to winch then the APU isn't likely to be running either so that makes the flotation system poorly designed in my mind.
I don't think anyone is 'whining'................
If it is an uncontrolled ditching without the intention to winch then the APU isn't likely to be running either so that makes the flotation system poorly designed in my mind.
I don't think anyone is 'whining'................
Originally Posted by [email protected]
I don't know what their SOPs are but perhaps the APU isn't started until they establish the hover and complete the pre-winching checks.
If it is an uncontrolled ditching without the intention to winch then the APU isn't likely to be running either so that makes the flotation system poorly designed in my mind.
I don't think anyone is 'whining'................
If it is an uncontrolled ditching without the intention to winch then the APU isn't likely to be running either so that makes the flotation system poorly designed in my mind.
I don't think anyone is 'whining'................
NB we discovered that there was not much advantage turn on the APU and going to idle except if you were going to actually shut down. Noise, wind and heat level didn’t go down especially if there was any wind over the deck. Saved time on the turnaround too.
Never done any winching in a 92 APU on seems a very good idea but waiting until established in. the hover seems a little late in the day/night to start the APU …heck of a time to discover that the darned thing doesn’t want to start.
Perhaps a partial solution is to have the immersion switches and outo-inflate connected on the battery or essential bus just like a 212 or a 76. Why have it running through a computer to do anything except to monitor status and turn on the warning if you exceed 70 Kts.IAS? KISS works.
Why you wouldn't have a dedicated emergency battery for something as crucial as the flotation gear is beyond me.
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S92 SAR in the U.K. have for years used the APU to mitigate loss of AC fed systems including avionics for winching in the case of a single engine failure should the Nr droop enough during flyaway, in addition to a ditching event for exactly this reason.
One of the benefits of experience gained since 2007, as the U.K. is one of the leading S92 SAR user nations globally.
Did Bristow Norway use this vast experience that was on tap?
A repeat of CHC Ireland perhaps where too many egos and Union rules jumped ahead of reality, risk, sense and knowledge.
The crew were clearly not alert enough and not monitoring closely to be ready for an uncommanded deviation if the report is accurate.
Back to standards and training.
One of the benefits of experience gained since 2007, as the U.K. is one of the leading S92 SAR user nations globally.
Did Bristow Norway use this vast experience that was on tap?
A repeat of CHC Ireland perhaps where too many egos and Union rules jumped ahead of reality, risk, sense and knowledge.
The crew were clearly not alert enough and not monitoring closely to be ready for an uncommanded deviation if the report is accurate.
Back to standards and training.
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