Griffith Island crash report
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There are 2 prominent schools of thought, or philosophies, with regards to mitigating the risk of an IIMC accident. Some helicopter operators, such as GSH, have adopted an “avoid-at-all-costs” approach to IIMC. This approach relies exclusively on a VFR pilot’s ability to recognize when meteorological conditions are approaching IMC and to initiate action before visual references are lost. Since this approach is predicated on a pilot’s ability to fly using external visual references, some operators will dispatch helicopters to operate, regardless of location, without the basic flight instruments needed to carry out an IIMC recovery solely by reference to the flight instruments. The underlying rationale provided by some operators, including GSH, is that VFR helicopter pilots lack the proficiency to carry out an IIMC recovery procedure solely by reference to their flight instruments.
Another approach adopted by some helicopter operators in Canada and around the world is to provide VFR pilots with IIMC recovery training, using full-motion simulators and/or a company helicopter and to equip their helicopters with the necessary equipment to do so. Typically, these operators conduct IIMC training as part of their annual recurrent training
Another approach adopted by some helicopter operators in Canada and around the world is to provide VFR pilots with IIMC recovery training, using full-motion simulators and/or a company helicopter and to equip their helicopters with the necessary equipment to do so. Typically, these operators conduct IIMC training as part of their annual recurrent training
The company (GSH2018) does not own or operate an FTD or an FFS, and it had not conducted any simulator training since the company’s inception in 2018.
The problem with "flat light" whiteout is it can be difficult sometimes to actually recognise it. Partial or Sector Whiteout even more so because you can't see it?
Kind of the exact opposite of too dark, it's too white, and you are NOT in cloud or fog or snow yet the conditions are IMC.
Unless you experience it a few times hopefully on the ground it is hard to explain the phenomena in a class room.
Additionally it comes in various flavours - I have been in "whiteout" in a snow basin in 8/8th's blue and 100 nm vis and everything is just white. Luckily I had been there before and the only real reference is your own shadow otherwise complete loss of depth perception.
Also it is insidious - flying into a cloud is instantly obvious - whiteout on the other hand.....................................
Kind of the exact opposite of too dark, it's too white, and you are NOT in cloud or fog or snow yet the conditions are IMC.
Unless you experience it a few times hopefully on the ground it is hard to explain the phenomena in a class room.
Additionally it comes in various flavours - I have been in "whiteout" in a snow basin in 8/8th's blue and 100 nm vis and everything is just white. Luckily I had been there before and the only real reference is your own shadow otherwise complete loss of depth perception.
Also it is insidious - flying into a cloud is instantly obvious - whiteout on the other hand.....................................
I’m just skimming through the summary on my phone, but I find the terms being used curious. It talks about Flat Light and Whiteout, but then talks about IIMC. They’re not the same. You are not in clouds when in Flat Light conditions. This is what happened to the Air NZ DC-10 on Mount Erebus.
It talks about Flat Light and Whiteout, but then talks about IIMC. They’re not the same. You are not in clouds when in Flat Light conditions
Being in cloud is only one of the means by which an aviator is deprived of the ability to control an aircraft by looking out of the window.
This is what happened to the Air NZ DC-10 on Mount Erebus
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I’m just skimming through the summary on my phone, but I find the terms being used curious. It talks about Flat Light and Whiteout, but then talks about IIMC. They’re not the same. You are not in clouds when in Flat Light conditions. This is what happened to the Air NZ DC-10 on Mount Erebus.
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Of course, I understand your points and sentiment entirely, but IMC is defined by visibility and distance from cloud. Not by visual references and cues. So, as Megan says about Mt Erebus, you can be VMC and still fly into the ground in Whiteout.
But there is not.
I must be getting old!
OH
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It is a significant risk when it occurs and maybe needs to be bashed into folk a little more just how it can trick you.
i.e.from the recommendations -
This was in Juneau and I was in the same area that day.
Not a great photo as about 35 years ago, but shows that without the rocks there is nothing much else to see. The guy on all fours walked off the edge which could not be seen!
Viz > 30 nm - ceiling above the site ~ 1500'
i.e.from the recommendations -
3 of which involved a single operator and occurred on the same day, within a 2 NM radius of one another. The first helicopter crashed while conducting a VFR sightseeing flight of a glacier. The 2 other helicopters crashed during subsequent attempts to locate and rescue survivors from the 1st crash.
Not a great photo as about 35 years ago, but shows that without the rocks there is nothing much else to see. The guy on all fours walked off the edge which could not be seen!
Viz > 30 nm - ceiling above the site ~ 1500'
Last edited by RVDT; 20th Feb 2024 at 02:53.
All the TSB recommendations are pretty solid, and probably already in use by most reputable operators. Recommendation 3 has some history: helicopters were originally limited to .5 mile viz in uncontrolled airspace, that inadvertently changed to one mile on a regs rewrite, so then an Ops Spec variation was required to get back to .5 mile. That required some training that is typically helps the turnaround in decreasing visibility but is insufficient for inadvertent IFR. Some operators never reapplied for the .5 viz relief because they didn't want their helicopters out in viz that poor.
I'd put a lot of focus on recovery from inadvertent IFR when I was instructing both commercial students and in-company annual training. Basic instruments: horizon, turn and bank, airspeed, altimeter. Glass was a bonus, but not a replacement for training. Rad Alt was a bonus when used properly, not required or often seen in VFR operations. Map displays set to ground proximity a godsend for night VFR.
I never had anyone question my decision to turn around. My old chief pilot once told me that the pilot is the last guy on board the helicopter to decide he wants to turn around.
I'd put a lot of focus on recovery from inadvertent IFR when I was instructing both commercial students and in-company annual training. Basic instruments: horizon, turn and bank, airspeed, altimeter. Glass was a bonus, but not a replacement for training. Rad Alt was a bonus when used properly, not required or often seen in VFR operations. Map displays set to ground proximity a godsend for night VFR.
I never had anyone question my decision to turn around. My old chief pilot once told me that the pilot is the last guy on board the helicopter to decide he wants to turn around.
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