Bristow UK strike
The first rescue by a British civilian helicopter pilot is probably Alan Bristow's Vietnamese adventure for the French army in 1949. The first British civilian SAR contracts were in 1971 when Bristow began operation at Manston in June and BEA began operations at Aberdeen in November. Manston is better known because of the controversy created by so many blow-hards proposing that these bl00dy civvies could never do the job (but their grandchildren never learned from those mistakes apparently ). The first of the present bases was Sumburgh in 1983.
During the last 53 years, the UK government has let over 20 contracts for SAR helicopters. As far as I can tell, only four of those contract have been awarded to companies not called Bristow, and only two to companies that are not now Bristow.
If PC Bellows is right about the £1.6bn for UKSAR2G, and the Award Notice (£1.9bn) is either wrong or; unconventionally; VAT-inclusive, then the pay battle at Bristow, and changes in attitude observed in some quarters, could be just the start of a long painful decline. Whether it is Bristow as a company that suffers the brunt of the decline, or the public service, depends upon not Bristow but clear and decisive decisions in the DfT. That is something that the DfT, and their agents the MCA, in my opinion, are simply not ready for.
Can this go back to the military? Some blame the demise of MilSAR on AVM Niven for not including SAR squadrons in JHC in 1998, making them the unwanted orphans within a shrinking armed forces structure struggling even to man its warfighting capability. The following decade was one of decay followed by another of chaos until the present contract settled down and only reached its full potential about half way through its term. As Crab states, we are running out of time. A few years from now reverting to this solution could take a decade to re-establish the capability.
If not the military, then can it be nationalised? Are we turning into Sweden, whose helicopter industry couldn't cope but their political establishment grew a pair and got on with it? Political establishment grow a pair? What?
Meanwhile, in UK SAR and EMS ops around the country, while senior management predate upon the businesses; including charities; the boys and girls in the air keep making it happen. On Saturday, in these and adjacent parishes, R948, R151 and HLE2 were out doing it for real supporting MRT in Skye, Kintail and other services elsewhere in the Highlands. As I tracked some of that, I could not help noticing on the map the huge level of SAR and EMS activity across the whole of the UK and Western Norway. Well done all.
A number of matters seem to have emerged from the UKSAR2G contract process barely half-formed. I know that seasonal bases proposed at Fort William and Carlisle were examined fairly thoroughly in some respects but here we have a fine example of the military adage "No plan survives contact". Now it seems like nothing is working. The CAA are probably wanting PC1 ops to/from base which is not available at Fort William, the Fort William NIMBYs continue their decades-long campaign to stifle life-saving in the district, a bit of price-gouging by regional airport managers hasn't helped, and now the staffing is in jeopardy.
It is not at all clear where things are going with the contract variables (meant to prevent the CONTRACTOR from making decisions about SAR tasks on cost grounds). How that aligns with the ambition for a "non-prescriptive" contract could be interesting. Perhaps not so much interesting as completely disastrous if it has not been done intelligently.
A new world status as a failed state is easily within our grasp.
During the last 53 years, the UK government has let over 20 contracts for SAR helicopters. As far as I can tell, only four of those contract have been awarded to companies not called Bristow, and only two to companies that are not now Bristow.
If PC Bellows is right about the £1.6bn for UKSAR2G, and the Award Notice (£1.9bn) is either wrong or; unconventionally; VAT-inclusive, then the pay battle at Bristow, and changes in attitude observed in some quarters, could be just the start of a long painful decline. Whether it is Bristow as a company that suffers the brunt of the decline, or the public service, depends upon not Bristow but clear and decisive decisions in the DfT. That is something that the DfT, and their agents the MCA, in my opinion, are simply not ready for.
Can this go back to the military? Some blame the demise of MilSAR on AVM Niven for not including SAR squadrons in JHC in 1998, making them the unwanted orphans within a shrinking armed forces structure struggling even to man its warfighting capability. The following decade was one of decay followed by another of chaos until the present contract settled down and only reached its full potential about half way through its term. As Crab states, we are running out of time. A few years from now reverting to this solution could take a decade to re-establish the capability.
If not the military, then can it be nationalised? Are we turning into Sweden, whose helicopter industry couldn't cope but their political establishment grew a pair and got on with it? Political establishment grow a pair? What?
Meanwhile, in UK SAR and EMS ops around the country, while senior management predate upon the businesses; including charities; the boys and girls in the air keep making it happen. On Saturday, in these and adjacent parishes, R948, R151 and HLE2 were out doing it for real supporting MRT in Skye, Kintail and other services elsewhere in the Highlands. As I tracked some of that, I could not help noticing on the map the huge level of SAR and EMS activity across the whole of the UK and Western Norway. Well done all.
A number of matters seem to have emerged from the UKSAR2G contract process barely half-formed. I know that seasonal bases proposed at Fort William and Carlisle were examined fairly thoroughly in some respects but here we have a fine example of the military adage "No plan survives contact". Now it seems like nothing is working. The CAA are probably wanting PC1 ops to/from base which is not available at Fort William, the Fort William NIMBYs continue their decades-long campaign to stifle life-saving in the district, a bit of price-gouging by regional airport managers hasn't helped, and now the staffing is in jeopardy.
It is not at all clear where things are going with the contract variables (meant to prevent the CONTRACTOR from making decisions about SAR tasks on cost grounds). How that aligns with the ambition for a "non-prescriptive" contract could be interesting. Perhaps not so much interesting as completely disastrous if it has not been done intelligently.
A new world status as a failed state is easily within our grasp.
This is an Apples to Oranges comparison between the UK and US concepts of aviation in general and SAR in particular.
This side of the Pond we have a "Coast Guard" that is part of the Department of Treasury and a Federal Aviation Administration that are both government agencies.
They are funded in the main by General Fund Tax monies.
As they are government operations and funded by Tax monies their are not required to be profitable or even non-profit.
We share those costs across the board by tax revenues levied upon all of our citizens (leastways the ones that are working and paying taxes) rather than levying costs directly on the Users.
Thus, the cost per person using the services is much lower than the UK where the funding is via a much smaller portion of the population.
Add in the USAF for very long range helicopter SAR operations and you have a completely different concept than in the UK.
Our Coast Guard has a much more involved mission set than does the UK Coast Guard/UKSAR as ours also maintains marine navigation infrastructure, conducts port security, drug interdiction operations, fishery patrols ice breaking, licensing of mariners and commercial vessels, and other functions.
Jim is probably close in his final statement as the UK appears to have gone the wrong path as is evident in more ways than just the UKSAR contract situation.
A lot of folks over here would probably take a similar view of our own prospects but for different reasons so you in the UK should not feel like you have a monopoly on systemic problems.
We have our problems but at least when it comes to SAR operations in maritime or coastal areas we are blessed to have our Coast Guard that does such a good job for us.
Several times In the past couple of years I had the demonstrated by two successful SAR Ops out my front door involving Jayhawk's from Coast Guard Station Elizabeth City and a tragic crash of a Pilatus Turboprop offshore not far from here.
That is not being critical of those doing the job in the UK but is only an observation re the ways our two governments approach the same kinds of tasks.
This side of the Pond we have a "Coast Guard" that is part of the Department of Treasury and a Federal Aviation Administration that are both government agencies.
They are funded in the main by General Fund Tax monies.
As they are government operations and funded by Tax monies their are not required to be profitable or even non-profit.
We share those costs across the board by tax revenues levied upon all of our citizens (leastways the ones that are working and paying taxes) rather than levying costs directly on the Users.
Thus, the cost per person using the services is much lower than the UK where the funding is via a much smaller portion of the population.
Add in the USAF for very long range helicopter SAR operations and you have a completely different concept than in the UK.
Our Coast Guard has a much more involved mission set than does the UK Coast Guard/UKSAR as ours also maintains marine navigation infrastructure, conducts port security, drug interdiction operations, fishery patrols ice breaking, licensing of mariners and commercial vessels, and other functions.
Jim is probably close in his final statement as the UK appears to have gone the wrong path as is evident in more ways than just the UKSAR contract situation.
A lot of folks over here would probably take a similar view of our own prospects but for different reasons so you in the UK should not feel like you have a monopoly on systemic problems.
We have our problems but at least when it comes to SAR operations in maritime or coastal areas we are blessed to have our Coast Guard that does such a good job for us.
Several times In the past couple of years I had the demonstrated by two successful SAR Ops out my front door involving Jayhawk's from Coast Guard Station Elizabeth City and a tragic crash of a Pilatus Turboprop offshore not far from here.
That is not being critical of those doing the job in the UK but is only an observation re the ways our two governments approach the same kinds of tasks.
And we used to have exchange tours from both the RN and RAF with the USCG helping to cross-pollinate ideas and techniques as well as crossing the cultural bridges between us. Something else lost in the desire to move costs off one balance sheet onto another.
Two sides to every coin Sasless.
Regarding the UK coin, from these threads one will see only a tiny sliver of many tasks of the MCA and its daddy the DfT. The Coastguard struck out in 1971 (happier times in many respects, when government still believed in governing) to fill a couple of gaps in the helicopter coverage that had during the previous 18 years proved to be an almost miraculous life-saving tool. Through those actions, successive governments have somehow got the idea that the coasties know about aviation. For fleeting moments, intelligent individuals have made their way through the mire of the civil service hierarchy with either a knowledge of aviation or the special facility of understanding that they didn't know about it. 2011 perhaps.
Regarding the USA coin, on land, the scenario is very different. Though your DoT has a figure for 'Value of a life saved' of nearly four times the value used by the UK on recent contracts, nobody sees any point in applying that value to any person ill, injured, lost or in any other form of distress on dry land!
Regarding the UK coin, from these threads one will see only a tiny sliver of many tasks of the MCA and its daddy the DfT. The Coastguard struck out in 1971 (happier times in many respects, when government still believed in governing) to fill a couple of gaps in the helicopter coverage that had during the previous 18 years proved to be an almost miraculous life-saving tool. Through those actions, successive governments have somehow got the idea that the coasties know about aviation. For fleeting moments, intelligent individuals have made their way through the mire of the civil service hierarchy with either a knowledge of aviation or the special facility of understanding that they didn't know about it. 2011 perhaps.
Regarding the USA coin, on land, the scenario is very different. Though your DoT has a figure for 'Value of a life saved' of nearly four times the value used by the UK on recent contracts, nobody sees any point in applying that value to any person ill, injured, lost or in any other form of distress on dry land!
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
And we used to have exchange tours from both the RN and RAF with the USCG helping to cross-pollinate ideas and techniques as well as crossing the cultural bridges between us. Something else lost in the desire to move costs off one balance sheet onto another.
The first rescue by a British civilian helicopter pilot is probably Alan Bristow's Vietnamese adventure for the French army in 1949. The first British civilian SAR contracts were in 1971 when Bristow began operation at Manston in June and BEA began operations at Aberdeen in November. Manston is better known because of the controversy created by so many blow-hards proposing that these bl00dy civvies could never do the job (but their grandchildren never learned from those mistakes apparently ). The first of the present bases was Sumburgh in 1983.
During the last 53 years, the UK government has let over 20 contracts for SAR helicopters. As far as I can tell, only four of those contract have been awarded to companies not called Bristow, and only two to companies that are not now Bristow.
If PC Bellows is right about the £1.6bn for UKSAR2G, and the Award Notice (£1.9bn) is either wrong or; unconventionally; VAT-inclusive, then the pay battle at Bristow, and changes in attitude observed in some quarters, could be just the start of a long painful decline. Whether it is Bristow as a company that suffers the brunt of the decline, or the public service, depends upon not Bristow but clear and decisive decisions in the DfT. That is something that the DfT, and their agents the MCA, in my opinion, are simply not ready for.
Can this go back to the military? Some blame the demise of MilSAR on AVM Niven for not including SAR squadrons in JHC in 1998, making them the unwanted orphans within a shrinking armed forces structure struggling even to man its warfighting capability. The following decade was one of decay followed by another of chaos until the present contract settled down and only reached its full potential about half way through its term. As Crab states, we are running out of time. A few years from now reverting to this solution could take a decade to re-establish the capability.
If not the military, then can it be nationalised? Are we turning into Sweden, whose helicopter industry couldn't cope but their political establishment grew a pair and got on with it? Political establishment grow a pair? What?
Meanwhile, in UK SAR and EMS ops around the country, while senior management predate upon the businesses; including charities; the boys and girls in the air keep making it happen. On Saturday, in these and adjacent parishes, R948, R151 and HLE2 were out doing it for real supporting MRT in Skye, Kintail and other services elsewhere in the Highlands. As I tracked some of that, I could not help noticing on the map the huge level of SAR and EMS activity across the whole of the UK and Western Norway. Well done all.
A number of matters seem to have emerged from the UKSAR2G contract process barely half-formed. I know that seasonal bases proposed at Fort William and Carlisle were examined fairly thoroughly in some respects but here we have a fine example of the military adage "No plan survives contact". Now it seems like nothing is working. The CAA are probably wanting PC1 ops to/from base which is not available at Fort William, the Fort William NIMBYs continue their decades-long campaign to stifle life-saving in the district, a bit of price-gouging by regional airport managers hasn't helped, and now the staffing is in jeopardy.
It is not at all clear where things are going with the contract variables (meant to prevent the CONTRACTOR from making decisions about SAR tasks on cost grounds). How that aligns with the ambition for a "non-prescriptive" contract could be interesting. Perhaps not so much interesting as completely disastrous if it has not been done intelligently.
A new world status as a failed state is easily within our grasp.
During the last 53 years, the UK government has let over 20 contracts for SAR helicopters. As far as I can tell, only four of those contract have been awarded to companies not called Bristow, and only two to companies that are not now Bristow.
If PC Bellows is right about the £1.6bn for UKSAR2G, and the Award Notice (£1.9bn) is either wrong or; unconventionally; VAT-inclusive, then the pay battle at Bristow, and changes in attitude observed in some quarters, could be just the start of a long painful decline. Whether it is Bristow as a company that suffers the brunt of the decline, or the public service, depends upon not Bristow but clear and decisive decisions in the DfT. That is something that the DfT, and their agents the MCA, in my opinion, are simply not ready for.
Can this go back to the military? Some blame the demise of MilSAR on AVM Niven for not including SAR squadrons in JHC in 1998, making them the unwanted orphans within a shrinking armed forces structure struggling even to man its warfighting capability. The following decade was one of decay followed by another of chaos until the present contract settled down and only reached its full potential about half way through its term. As Crab states, we are running out of time. A few years from now reverting to this solution could take a decade to re-establish the capability.
If not the military, then can it be nationalised? Are we turning into Sweden, whose helicopter industry couldn't cope but their political establishment grew a pair and got on with it? Political establishment grow a pair? What?
Meanwhile, in UK SAR and EMS ops around the country, while senior management predate upon the businesses; including charities; the boys and girls in the air keep making it happen. On Saturday, in these and adjacent parishes, R948, R151 and HLE2 were out doing it for real supporting MRT in Skye, Kintail and other services elsewhere in the Highlands. As I tracked some of that, I could not help noticing on the map the huge level of SAR and EMS activity across the whole of the UK and Western Norway. Well done all.
A number of matters seem to have emerged from the UKSAR2G contract process barely half-formed. I know that seasonal bases proposed at Fort William and Carlisle were examined fairly thoroughly in some respects but here we have a fine example of the military adage "No plan survives contact". Now it seems like nothing is working. The CAA are probably wanting PC1 ops to/from base which is not available at Fort William, the Fort William NIMBYs continue their decades-long campaign to stifle life-saving in the district, a bit of price-gouging by regional airport managers hasn't helped, and now the staffing is in jeopardy.
It is not at all clear where things are going with the contract variables (meant to prevent the CONTRACTOR from making decisions about SAR tasks on cost grounds). How that aligns with the ambition for a "non-prescriptive" contract could be interesting. Perhaps not so much interesting as completely disastrous if it has not been done intelligently.
A new world status as a failed state is easily within our grasp.
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The only bit I would argue, is the assertion that SAR may have been better off within JHC. The Army just about cope with funding, operating and supporting RAF green fleet assets, and yellow aircraft would have had no chance..... would have perhaps imploded before offloading.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
We could - always......
Had Crab ever been in the company of a US Army Warrant Officer Helicopter Pilot he would have seen a. public contest of that claim and practical demonstration of its falseness.....just saying.
But if there was something that does bind helicopter pilots together as a group....Beer certainly is one of the things common to all of us.
Crab being British prefers OPB when on the sauce...."Other People's Beer".
Had Crab ever been in the company of a US Army Warrant Officer Helicopter Pilot he would have seen a. public contest of that claim and practical demonstration of its falseness.....just saying.
But if there was something that does bind helicopter pilots together as a group....Beer certainly is one of the things common to all of us.
Crab being British prefers OPB when on the sauce...."Other People's Beer".
But if there was something that does bind helicopter pilots together as a group....Beer certainly is one of the things common to all of us.
Crab being British prefers OPB when on the sauce...."Other People's Beer".
I hope he is doing well - he was the ultimate ambassador for the US Army.
MGD - as I have seen many times, the US military talk the talk but when you've been raised on Bud light, real beer comes as a bit of a shock and walking the walk turns quickly into a stagger
Saless, you want to try drinking with the Belgians!!!
I've drunk with a few US Army WO pilots - nice guys but lightweights on the p*ss - you should try a few Royal Marine NCO pilots if you want a drinking challenge.
Saless, you want to try drinking with the Belgians!!!
I've drunk with a few US Army WO pilots - nice guys but lightweights on the p*ss - you should try a few Royal Marine NCO pilots if you want a drinking challenge.
So today there are 5 bases off state again. I would expect 4 tomorrow with 1 being kept online by managers.
It was stated today that there is a fixed sum to cover the dispute, all that will change are the differing variables.
I do wonder the penalties Bristow are incurring from their O&G clients and the MCA?
There is very much the impression that the workforce are the scapegoat for some pretty poor managerial decision making and implementation of the UKSAR2G plan. Aircraft not ordered on time, seasonal base land not secured and subsequently no longer available. Bristow request to drop seasonal bases when they bacame a bit difficult but the MCA insisting of what was signed. All of this is eating into the margin and so the savings from staff pay is to cover this.
It was stated today that there is a fixed sum to cover the dispute, all that will change are the differing variables.
I do wonder the penalties Bristow are incurring from their O&G clients and the MCA?
There is very much the impression that the workforce are the scapegoat for some pretty poor managerial decision making and implementation of the UKSAR2G plan. Aircraft not ordered on time, seasonal base land not secured and subsequently no longer available. Bristow request to drop seasonal bases when they bacame a bit difficult but the MCA insisting of what was signed. All of this is eating into the margin and so the savings from staff pay is to cover this.
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I've drunk with a few US Army WO pilots - nice guys but lightweights on the p*ss
No, you can't go out as a helicopter pilot.
So today there are 5 bases off state again. I would expect 4 tomorrow with 1 being kept online by managers.
It was stated today that there is a fixed sum to cover the dispute, all that will change are the differing variables.
I do wonder the penalties Bristow are incurring from their O&G clients and the MCA?
There is very much the impression that the workforce are the scapegoat for some pretty poor managerial decision making and implementation of the UKSAR2G plan. Aircraft not ordered on time, seasonal base land not secured and subsequently no longer available. Bristow request to drop seasonal bases when they bacame a bit difficult but the MCA insisting of what was signed. All of this is eating into the margin and so the savings from staff pay is to cover this.
It was stated today that there is a fixed sum to cover the dispute, all that will change are the differing variables.
I do wonder the penalties Bristow are incurring from their O&G clients and the MCA?
There is very much the impression that the workforce are the scapegoat for some pretty poor managerial decision making and implementation of the UKSAR2G plan. Aircraft not ordered on time, seasonal base land not secured and subsequently no longer available. Bristow request to drop seasonal bases when they bacame a bit difficult but the MCA insisting of what was signed. All of this is eating into the margin and so the savings from staff pay is to cover this.
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From an operational SAR contingency perspective how are the MCA handling this? Are they tasking the bases that are open on longer range missions? Are they utilising CHC Ireland to assist on west coast and/or the industry SAR aircraft in Aberdeen for MCA tasks? Are the air ambulances and NPAS seeing an increase in tasking on strike days? Have the military been asked to support at all?
Have there been events that have taken a turn for the worse due to lack of a SAR helicopter or are things generally being handled by other resources? There seems little National media coverage of such a significant drop in emergency cover when compared to a nationwide fire service strike.
Have there been events that have taken a turn for the worse due to lack of a SAR helicopter or are things generally being handled by other resources? There seems little National media coverage of such a significant drop in emergency cover when compared to a nationwide fire service strike.
The MCA are probably crossing their fingers and hoping nothing bad happens - also probably wondering how their land grab for UKSAR could have gone so wrong.
From an operational SAR contingency perspective how are the MCA handling this? Are they tasking the bases that are open on longer range missions? Are they utilising CHC Ireland to assist on west coast and/or the industry SAR aircraft in Aberdeen for MCA tasks? Are the air ambulances and NPAS seeing an increase in tasking on strike days? Have the military been asked to support at all?
Have there been events that have taken a turn for the worse due to lack of a SAR helicopter or are things generally being handled by other resources? There seems little National media coverage of such a significant drop in emergency cover when compared to a nationwide fire service strike.
Have there been events that have taken a turn for the worse due to lack of a SAR helicopter or are things generally being handled by other resources? There seems little National media coverage of such a significant drop in emergency cover when compared to a nationwide fire service strike.
Over 500,000 call outs a year, fire related deaths around 250,000 a year.