Firefighting 412 chops AStar's longline
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Firefighting 412 chops AStar's longline
Quote from report, happened about a month ago in Alberta Canada.Longlines are typically 100-150' Kevlar core with a protective wrap and with an electrical cord to work the remote hook. No damage to either aircraft they both went back to work.
In the days leading up to the day of the occurrence, the pilot of C-FKMX, an Aerospatiale AS350B3 had been conducting long line forest fire fighting operations in support of Wildfire 017 located
approximately 6 nm NW of Valleyview, Alberta (CEL5) in co-ordination with C-FCCK, a Bell
Helicopters model 412 operated by Summit Helicopters Ltd.
On the day of the occurrence, at approximately 1234 MDT, C-FKMX had been dispatched to conduct long line bucketing operationsin continued support of Wildfire 017 on the east side of Sturgeon Lake, Alberta (Sandy Bay). C-FCCK, had also been dispatched to conduct bucketing operations in support of Wildfire 017 approximately 3.5 nm SE of C-FKMX's location. In addition, C-FALI, a Bell Helicopters model 212 operated by Alpine Helicopters, was called in to assist C-FCCK in working the eastern flank of the fire line.
After approximately 8-9 buckets drops in the Sandy Bay area, C-FKMX was repurposed to join C-FCCK, and C-FALI in firefighting operations on the eastern edge of the fire. Enroute to the new location, C-FKMX refilled the bucket and proceeded southeast to engage in operations.
As C-FKMX approached the new area of operations; the flight crew of the three helicopters engaged in firefighting operations were all communicating on the same frequency. As C-FKMX approached the
drop area from the northwest, visual contact was made with C-FALI, while communicating on the radio and broadcasting current position and intentions and trying to visually acquire the location of C-FCCK. C-FCCK responded to the radio call, but portions of the radio calls between the two pilots were not clearly understood. The pilot of C-FKMX believed that C-FCCK was clear of the immediate area, and the pilot of C-FCCK was not aware that C-FKMX was immediately joining the firefighting efforts at their location.
The pilots of both C-FKMX and C-FCCK both unknowingly observed the same hotspot in the area and had elected to drop their water on it at almost the same time. Due to the pilots' seating position in each helicopter (right seat in C-FKMX, and left seat in C-FCCK) and the relative relationship of the two helicopters to each other in flight, the pilots of both helicopters did not visually acquire the other.
In the process of lining up to deploy the water on thelocation, C-FCCK which was slightly below C-FKMX, made contact with, and severed the long line of C-FKMX approximately 28 feet below the helicopter's fuselage. The majority of the longline and bucket assembly impacted terrain in a non-populated area and both helicopters continued to fly. Departing the immediate area, the pilot of C-FKMX initiated a crab to keep the remaining portion of the severed long line from entangling the tail rotor and found a clearing to land in to complete a
preliminary inspection of the helicopter. No damage was found, and the remaining portion of the long line was removed and placed in the cabin. C-FKMX repositioned to CEL5 to refuel and then return to the Valleyview firebase.
The pilot of C-FCCK was unaware that his main rotor system had severed the longline of C-FKMX believing that C-FKMX had severed its own longline. C-FCCK continued to work the fire until notified by Alberta Forestry that the helicopter had been involved in an occurrence, at which time the helicopter returned to the Valleyview firebase for an inspection by company maintenance. No damage was found, and the helicopter was returned to service.
A subsequent investigation by Alberta Forestry resulted in an amendment to the circuit joining
procedures for aircraft joining a previously established firefighting circuit, and clarification of procedures for aircraft moving work areas.
approximately 6 nm NW of Valleyview, Alberta (CEL5) in co-ordination with C-FCCK, a Bell
Helicopters model 412 operated by Summit Helicopters Ltd.
On the day of the occurrence, at approximately 1234 MDT, C-FKMX had been dispatched to conduct long line bucketing operationsin continued support of Wildfire 017 on the east side of Sturgeon Lake, Alberta (Sandy Bay). C-FCCK, had also been dispatched to conduct bucketing operations in support of Wildfire 017 approximately 3.5 nm SE of C-FKMX's location. In addition, C-FALI, a Bell Helicopters model 212 operated by Alpine Helicopters, was called in to assist C-FCCK in working the eastern flank of the fire line.
After approximately 8-9 buckets drops in the Sandy Bay area, C-FKMX was repurposed to join C-FCCK, and C-FALI in firefighting operations on the eastern edge of the fire. Enroute to the new location, C-FKMX refilled the bucket and proceeded southeast to engage in operations.
As C-FKMX approached the new area of operations; the flight crew of the three helicopters engaged in firefighting operations were all communicating on the same frequency. As C-FKMX approached the
drop area from the northwest, visual contact was made with C-FALI, while communicating on the radio and broadcasting current position and intentions and trying to visually acquire the location of C-FCCK. C-FCCK responded to the radio call, but portions of the radio calls between the two pilots were not clearly understood. The pilot of C-FKMX believed that C-FCCK was clear of the immediate area, and the pilot of C-FCCK was not aware that C-FKMX was immediately joining the firefighting efforts at their location.
The pilots of both C-FKMX and C-FCCK both unknowingly observed the same hotspot in the area and had elected to drop their water on it at almost the same time. Due to the pilots' seating position in each helicopter (right seat in C-FKMX, and left seat in C-FCCK) and the relative relationship of the two helicopters to each other in flight, the pilots of both helicopters did not visually acquire the other.
In the process of lining up to deploy the water on thelocation, C-FCCK which was slightly below C-FKMX, made contact with, and severed the long line of C-FKMX approximately 28 feet below the helicopter's fuselage. The majority of the longline and bucket assembly impacted terrain in a non-populated area and both helicopters continued to fly. Departing the immediate area, the pilot of C-FKMX initiated a crab to keep the remaining portion of the severed long line from entangling the tail rotor and found a clearing to land in to complete a
preliminary inspection of the helicopter. No damage was found, and the remaining portion of the long line was removed and placed in the cabin. C-FKMX repositioned to CEL5 to refuel and then return to the Valleyview firebase.
The pilot of C-FCCK was unaware that his main rotor system had severed the longline of C-FKMX believing that C-FKMX had severed its own longline. C-FCCK continued to work the fire until notified by Alberta Forestry that the helicopter had been involved in an occurrence, at which time the helicopter returned to the Valleyview firebase for an inspection by company maintenance. No damage was found, and the helicopter was returned to service.
A subsequent investigation by Alberta Forestry resulted in an amendment to the circuit joining
procedures for aircraft joining a previously established firefighting circuit, and clarification of procedures for aircraft moving work areas.
Last edited by T28B; 8th Jun 2023 at 11:49. Reason: added quote tags
"No damage was found, and the helicopter was returned to service."
I know rotor blades are tougher than they might look, but I would think severing a longline would leave some sort of impact damage...
I know rotor blades are tougher than they might look, but I would think severing a longline would leave some sort of impact damage...
On the same job it was discovered that someone had replaced the aluminium shear rivet on. the weak link with a steel rivet …full stop while A) we checked all long lines and rigging and B) the project manager launched a high speed missile at the head office.
Last edited by albatross; 8th Jun 2023 at 18:23. Reason: weak link remark added.
Sounds like 'sudden stoppage' to me & pretty sure Bell PSE would agree.
The longline on a B3 is probably designed to take about 3,000 Lbs, (proof load 6,000?) so slicing through that is not trivial. Pretty sure they wouldn't find anything wrong during the sudden stoppage inspection, but would still need to be done.
Fly Safe, Always
The longline on a B3 is probably designed to take about 3,000 Lbs, (proof load 6,000?) so slicing through that is not trivial. Pretty sure they wouldn't find anything wrong during the sudden stoppage inspection, but would still need to be done.
Fly Safe, Always
The Forest is being obscured by the trees.....it is not about rotor blades and a longline....it is about a near mid-air collision and a pair of Pilots who came that close and did not see each other and AFTER cutting the line with the attached bucket....the one aircraft continued flying without the pilot realizing what had happened.
I have been on Fires where there were lots of helicopters and airplanes fighting the fire....from Chinooks and Skycranes right down to Bell JetRangers.....and maintaining flight separation was accomplished without any real difficultly due to the procedures being used....and pilots keeping their situational awareness up in high gear.
My interest is less in the differences in lines and such and much more wondering how the near mid-air came to happen.
I have been on Fires where there were lots of helicopters and airplanes fighting the fire....from Chinooks and Skycranes right down to Bell JetRangers.....and maintaining flight separation was accomplished without any real difficultly due to the procedures being used....and pilots keeping their situational awareness up in high gear.
My interest is less in the differences in lines and such and much more wondering how the near mid-air came to happen.
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The Forest is being obscured by the trees.....it is not about rotor blades and a longline....it is about a near mid-air collision and a pair of Pilots who came that close and did not see each other and AFTER cutting the line with the attached bucket....the one aircraft continued flying without the pilot realizing what had happened.
My interest is less in the differences in lines and such and much more wondering how the near mid-air came to happen.
My interest is less in the differences in lines and such and much more wondering how the near mid-air came to happen.
I know when I am doing Helco, I establish a "gate" close to the dip site that is outside the flight path of the aircraft using it. Pilots assigned to join that segment, fly to the gate and observe the "daisy chain" of aircraft and then merge into it at an appropriate gap. This requires minimal communication once the chain is set up. When brining a new helicopter to the mix, I like to have him just follow me and I provide a "show me" run with him in trail. I then go up 500' and just watch.....
Momentum and velocity have powers of their own. Looking at the cable of a cable car you would think it would literally tear an aluminium plane apart yet there are instances where jet aircraft wings have severed cables with the apparent damage to the wing being some crushing forward of the spar.
It may have helped that the bucket was full so the line was under max. tension.
According to local source the line was Dynema.
Definite and very concerning lack of protocol around the drop area. One of the problems of fire operations is that support and directing crews are provincial fire employees and while many, not all, have experience with air operations they are not all primarily air operators. For instance helicopter bases, often set up before any aircrews arrive, are not always the best layout for operations
It may have helped that the bucket was full so the line was under max. tension.
According to local source the line was Dynema.
Definite and very concerning lack of protocol around the drop area. One of the problems of fire operations is that support and directing crews are provincial fire employees and while many, not all, have experience with air operations they are not all primarily air operators. For instance helicopter bases, often set up before any aircrews arrive, are not always the best layout for operations
Gordy describes my experience on large fires.
One helicopter.....you do your thing coordinating your work by radio with the fire crew you are assigned to support.
Two helicopters....you fall into what the first guy is doing but on a common radio frequency and told which fire crew to work with.
Three or more....and now you fall into the flow of traffic with the spacing you need to allow the guy in front of you to make his drop and depart for the water source before you arrive for your drop.
Watching experienced and capable Pilots working a fire is an interesting experience.
Usually by the time several aircraft are dropping water or retardant there will probably be a small helicopter orbiting overhead monitoring the air traffic and coordinating with the fire fighters on the ground, the Fire Base,Operations Center, ensuring everything stays coordinated.
For two helicopters to come within 27 feet of one another and the pilots fail to realize that happened is a miracle.....as Lady Luck smiled upon both of them.
One helicopter.....you do your thing coordinating your work by radio with the fire crew you are assigned to support.
Two helicopters....you fall into what the first guy is doing but on a common radio frequency and told which fire crew to work with.
Three or more....and now you fall into the flow of traffic with the spacing you need to allow the guy in front of you to make his drop and depart for the water source before you arrive for your drop.
Watching experienced and capable Pilots working a fire is an interesting experience.
Usually by the time several aircraft are dropping water or retardant there will probably be a small helicopter orbiting overhead monitoring the air traffic and coordinating with the fire fighters on the ground, the Fire Base,Operations Center, ensuring everything stays coordinated.
For two helicopters to come within 27 feet of one another and the pilots fail to realize that happened is a miracle.....as Lady Luck smiled upon both of them.
The gate concept and other procedural deconfliction is the way ahead, but also surely ads-b on the go would be a pretty powerful SA tool in that environment (albeit with alerting suppressed)? I know large elements of the US community are buying into ATAK in a big way to share SA between air and ground teams, but in this case even a common thing like ads-b would have told the folks where everyone else was, if not necessarily their intent or routing.
And there is always that “Slow Guy” and/or the “Fast Guy” screwing it all up. Not to mention the guy who is “Situationally Challenged”and the fellow who clutters up the frequency. Fun Daze!
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Yep... "I'm in your 6"..... Rally, why did I need to know that........unless we are conflicting STFU.....
Or:
"I see you in my 2'oclock, pass right right"...... Again, just say "right right' if you absolutely have to... and do NOT say it every time....
Nothing worse than the talkers interupting your music......
Or:
"I see you in my 2'oclock, pass right right"...... Again, just say "right right' if you absolutely have to... and do NOT say it every time....
Nothing worse than the talkers interupting your music......
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This happened during the early days of this unusually busy fire season. There was a lot of excitement, houses burning over, evacuations, and so on. Fires were growing rapidly and frequencies were jam packed as they struggled to get organized and assign channels.
Combine that with a lot of inexperienced personnel, both on the side of forestry as well as in the drivers seats. Due to the unexpected early start, a lot of companies hadn't finished winter maintenance and/or hiring and training. There were people getting last second type endorsements on machines in the evening after the previous pilot returned them from the fire, to be sent out on the line the next day. And so on.
So all that may be the reason why the usual procedures weren't followed.
I have no idea who was flying these two machines, but the whole thing should serve as a reminder not to get excited, especially when things get exciting. There's always the option to go bucket somewhere else, or land.
Combine that with a lot of inexperienced personnel, both on the side of forestry as well as in the drivers seats. Due to the unexpected early start, a lot of companies hadn't finished winter maintenance and/or hiring and training. There were people getting last second type endorsements on machines in the evening after the previous pilot returned them from the fire, to be sent out on the line the next day. And so on.
So all that may be the reason why the usual procedures weren't followed.
I have no idea who was flying these two machines, but the whole thing should serve as a reminder not to get excited, especially when things get exciting. There's always the option to go bucket somewhere else, or land.
Slow down, and come home at night......
You start dropping water to give fire fighters a chance at being over run by the fire....hurry all you can....otherwise fly safe, be deliberate, and remember fires are going to burn down some houses and cars....they can be replaced..
People cannot not be replaced.
Gordy knows a thing or two about that kind of thing....helping fire fighters who were in a very bad situation.
People cannot not be replaced.
Gordy knows a thing or two about that kind of thing....helping fire fighters who were in a very bad situation.
This thing blew up during the burn period.......someone thought it a good idea to have an inmate crew and dozer working the top of the ridge:
Long story--the inmate crew started to get over run by fire, deployed shelters, Gary Dahlen--a friend of mine flying a 205, told them to ditch the shelters and run..... I was doing Helco, (basically ATC and controller in the air), I found a route for them to run... Gary took care of the route with buckets:
I routed the crew to a safe spot---I had them running for 45 minutes to the nearest spot where we could pick them up....even the dozer got burned over..
You can see the crew bottom left....Gary is there to meet them. He got the HAI award that year.
We are not heroes, we are there to support the guys on the ground.
For anyone who wants to learn about helicopter firefighting, I share this, kinda long, but it gives a good overview:
https://rotarywingshow.com/rws-20-firefighting-gordy-cox/ Scroll down and click back to see the interview--will not link direct.
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