AW139 incident - Houma
That is the case for the cockpit windows, the cabin windows are pushed out
A helicopter cockpit emergency egress door or window that could to be pulled in? Where are you going to put the darn thing?
Kinda counter intuitive.
Jettison one in forward flight? Regardless of which side the tail rotor is on stranger still.
Kinda counter intuitive.
Jettison one in forward flight? Regardless of which side the tail rotor is on stranger still.
The window was pulled inwards....not jettisoned to the outside according to some reports I. have seen.
What I took from the wording is there might have been a bit of rough treatment of said window in the process of getting some beneficial use of the opening in clearing out the smoke and fumes.
Which....seems very reasonable and understandable if the window was extremely small and wanted enlarging.
What I took from the wording is there might have been a bit of rough treatment of said window in the process of getting some beneficial use of the opening in clearing out the smoke and fumes.
Which....seems very reasonable and understandable if the window was extremely small and wanted enlarging.
It is to enable egress with water pressure opposing. Also allows for a little control of where the window goes, providing a little protection to the floats. Kind of makes sense when you think about it. The ergonomics of the system are not the best, tiny little tab to grab on to remove the beading before pulling the window in.
The video below gives a great demonstration of the windows and some of the ergonomic issues.
https://vimeopro.com/rollingball/wrhs/video/353912555
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Try that in the dark after hitting the water with a lot of force and the aircraft rolling over to one side or the other ....finding that pull tab is not something I would want to bet my life on.
The pull tab is highlighted by a HEELS strip to make it easier to locate if underwater/inverted.
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Just noticed we have a Like button now
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Avoid imitations
Having experienced the difficulties of opening a helicopter cockpit door underwater (thankfully in a training scenario) I’d say that anything that helps make it less difficult is a good idea. The door doesn’t open in the expected sense, it gradually “oozes” away from the frame and only with sustained pressure, rather than a push.
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If the pilot did lower the collective.....why would the crew report there was no collective control response felt or observed.....to the point they were convinced there had been a loss of collective control?
Not challenging your suggestion....just trying to correlate what has been reported to what you suggest may have happened.
Certainly if both engines were at max power.....lowering the collective would not have assisted in controlling the Rotor RPM but you would think they would have known whether the aircraft was responding to a collective movement by observing a pitch change in the blades or felt a reaction.
Not challenging your suggestion....just trying to correlate what has been reported to what you suggest may have happened.
Certainly if both engines were at max power.....lowering the collective would not have assisted in controlling the Rotor RPM but you would think they would have known whether the aircraft was responding to a collective movement by observing a pitch change in the blades or felt a reaction.
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So far we haven’t heard from the crew, company, manufacturer or the FAA.
Just the usual Rumours, Innuendo and Hearsay.
It will be interesting to see the initial and then final reports. Hopefully CVR / FDR info will be available.
One thing also is that wirh the electrical fire / problems they may have had just blank screens to look at. That would have made figuring out what the heck is happening difficult to say the least.
Just the usual Rumours, Innuendo and Hearsay.
It will be interesting to see the initial and then final reports. Hopefully CVR / FDR info will be available.
One thing also is that wirh the electrical fire / problems they may have had just blank screens to look at. That would have made figuring out what the heck is happening difficult to say the least.
is it a given that their FADECs have built in history recorders
Crew Alert System
The primary flight display (PFD) and the multi-function flight display (MFD) present instrumentation to the pilot. The PFD displays FD modes selected, and their status. The MFD displays engine and aircraft system data and the crew alert system (CAS). The CAS displays messages pertaining to the operation and condition of the aircraft to the crew for information and action.
The CAS messages appear in order of priority. Red warnings appear at the top of the list, next are yellow caution messages, third are green advisory messages, and fourth are white status messages. The final line in the list is white text stating ‘END.’ Each page shows twelve lines and crew can scroll through pages. When scrolling, red warnings cannot be hidden and remain at the top of the list on each page.
A warning or caution message will show with a coloured background until acknowledged. Once acknowledged, it appears as coloured text on a black background. Some messages such as “XMSN OVTQ” (main transmission overtorque) will disappear when the condition causing them has passed. White status messages will only show on the ground with weight on wheels.
The “MAINTENANCE” message is significant because following exceedance of a limit such as torque, it will illuminate after landing. The presence of the “MAINTENANCE” message is a cue to an aircraft maintenance engineer (engineer) to investigate and rectify the cause of the message before cancelling the message.
The primary flight display (PFD) and the multi-function flight display (MFD) present instrumentation to the pilot. The PFD displays FD modes selected, and their status. The MFD displays engine and aircraft system data and the crew alert system (CAS). The CAS displays messages pertaining to the operation and condition of the aircraft to the crew for information and action.
The CAS messages appear in order of priority. Red warnings appear at the top of the list, next are yellow caution messages, third are green advisory messages, and fourth are white status messages. The final line in the list is white text stating ‘END.’ Each page shows twelve lines and crew can scroll through pages. When scrolling, red warnings cannot be hidden and remain at the top of the list on each page.
A warning or caution message will show with a coloured background until acknowledged. Once acknowledged, it appears as coloured text on a black background. Some messages such as “XMSN OVTQ” (main transmission overtorque) will disappear when the condition causing them has passed. White status messages will only show on the ground with weight on wheels.
The “MAINTENANCE” message is significant because following exceedance of a limit such as torque, it will illuminate after landing. The presence of the “MAINTENANCE” message is a cue to an aircraft maintenance engineer (engineer) to investigate and rectify the cause of the message before cancelling the message.
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Pulling the strap makes it only easier to jettison a window. Enough force applied, they jettison with the cord still in place.
Depending on the age, wear etc "enough" might be surprisingly little.
Depending on the age, wear etc "enough" might be surprisingly little.
If the pilot did lower the collective.....why would the crew report there was no collective control response felt or observed.....to the point they were convinced there had been a loss of collective control?
Not challenging your suggestion....just trying to correlate what has been reported to what you suggest may have happened.
Certainly if both engines were at max power.....lowering the collective would not have assisted in controlling the Rotor RPM but you would think they would have known whether the aircraft was responding to a collective movement by observing a pitch change in the blades or felt a reaction.
Not challenging your suggestion....just trying to correlate what has been reported to what you suggest may have happened.
Certainly if both engines were at max power.....lowering the collective would not have assisted in controlling the Rotor RPM but you would think they would have known whether the aircraft was responding to a collective movement by observing a pitch change in the blades or felt a reaction.
As recently as November 21, 2021 the FAA issued an AD re chafing of wire bundles in the overhead panel of certain AW-139's that required detailed inspections and related corrective actions to include replacing certain Circuit Breakers.
I found the Congressional Record entry that displayed the FAA's AD.
Phrases like "could cause the loss of control of the aircraft" was part of the verbiage.
https://flightaware.com/live/flight/...0220924/2224ZZ
I found the Congressional Record entry that displayed the FAA's AD.
Phrases like "could cause the loss of control of the aircraft" was part of the verbiage.
https://flightaware.com/live/flight/...0220924/2224ZZ
Last edited by SASless; 2nd Oct 2022 at 13:24.
