Sikorsky Raider X - FARA contender
SplineDrive
I know Boeing had the unmanned AH6i out there so would that technology be transferable over to the AH64 or is it too advanced for that tech to easily work.
Same with the Apache, though I don't know if Boeing has started autonomy work at all.
Beyond that: nice post, thanks for the insights.
Thank you, Commando Cody. Nice article. (I also liked the one about ADSB). 
Solution, not the Cause
“Changes to the 525’s control laws were added to incorporate a collective control filter to target vibration near the 6 Hz band. The pre-existing cyclic control filters were also tuned and deepened, as were the rate filters in the AHRS system.”
Note that FBW were not the cause of the accident, but rather the solution.
Note that FBW were not the cause of the accident, but rather the solution.
To get the thread back on track the FBW system on the S-97 caused the crash of Ship 1 and laid bare the lie that the blades were so stiff that it was impossible for the two rotors to collide.
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I understand what you are saying Sultan regarding getting the discussion back on track, and your comment on the S-97 incident actually does a good job getting things back on track. FBW will feature heavily in future rotorcraft designs I would imagine.
I’ll admit to in the past being a bit of a Luddite regarding FBW, but having read some technical descriptions of the 525 flight controls system and through conversation with John Dixson about how FBW actually simplifies a flight control system( and the hydraulics systems as well) and makes it safer by removing some of the complexity of mechanical mixing, (the proper operation of which relies heavily on a base of knowledge in your pool of maintenance technicians that can be hard to maintain sometimes), I think I’m slowly coming around to the idea.
I suppose my biggest question to those in the group who are in the know would be, is FBW on rotary wing aircraft being held back by issues with implementation of the mechanical systems (Actuators) or the controls for those systems, with adequate redundancy? Is it the regulatory systems trying to craft regulations for FBW in rotorcraft? Or is it a mixture of the two?
FltMech
I’ll admit to in the past being a bit of a Luddite regarding FBW, but having read some technical descriptions of the 525 flight controls system and through conversation with John Dixson about how FBW actually simplifies a flight control system( and the hydraulics systems as well) and makes it safer by removing some of the complexity of mechanical mixing, (the proper operation of which relies heavily on a base of knowledge in your pool of maintenance technicians that can be hard to maintain sometimes), I think I’m slowly coming around to the idea.
I suppose my biggest question to those in the group who are in the know would be, is FBW on rotary wing aircraft being held back by issues with implementation of the mechanical systems (Actuators) or the controls for those systems, with adequate redundancy? Is it the regulatory systems trying to craft regulations for FBW in rotorcraft? Or is it a mixture of the two?
FltMech
As I understand it, Bell's UH-1Y and AH-1Z are fly by wire.
I think that the RAH-66 Comanche was as well.
I think that the RAH-66 Comanche was as well.
I suppose my biggest question to those in the group who are in the know would be, is FBW on rotary wing aircraft being held back by issues with implementation of the mechanical systems (Actuators) or the controls for those systems, with adequate redundancy? Is it the regulatory systems trying to craft regulations for FBW in rotorcraft? Or is it a mixture of the two?
FltMech
FltMech
Last edited by The Sultan; 22nd Feb 2024 at 17:30.
I suppose my biggest question to those in the group who are in the know would be, is FBW on rotary wing aircraft being held back by issues with implementation of the mechanical systems (Actuators) or the controls for those systems, with adequate redundancy? Is it the regulatory systems trying to craft regulations for FBW in rotorcraft? Or is it a mixture of the two?
Though CTR disagrees with it, FBW has been the primary delay for the program since the start. Yes, there were/are other issues... fuel tank tests, doors supposedly falling off, COVID delays for document submittal approvals, etc. But if this was a traditional control aircraft, it would have been certified already.
UH-1Y, AH-1Z FBW
CTR,
Not sure which Yankee and Zulu you are referencing but the ones I worked on and qualified for the U.S. Marine Corp were and are fly-by-wire. We were able to eliminate numerous collective and cyclic mechanical controls located just below the swashplate by connecting the boost cylinders (3) directly to the lower surface of the non-rotating swashplate by using electrical signals to mix the controls vs. mechanical mixing on the AH-1W. That puts Lonewolf back in the right.
Otter
H-1 Flight Test Engineering
Lead Rotor Structural Engineer
H-1 Upgrade Program
Bell Helicopter Ret.
Not sure which Yankee and Zulu you are referencing but the ones I worked on and qualified for the U.S. Marine Corp were and are fly-by-wire. We were able to eliminate numerous collective and cyclic mechanical controls located just below the swashplate by connecting the boost cylinders (3) directly to the lower surface of the non-rotating swashplate by using electrical signals to mix the controls vs. mechanical mixing on the AH-1W. That puts Lonewolf back in the right.
Otter
H-1 Flight Test Engineering
Lead Rotor Structural Engineer
H-1 Upgrade Program
Bell Helicopter Ret.
UH-1Y, AH-1Z FBW...correction
CTR, apologies sir.
The inputs to the three main rotor actuators did include electronic mixing, allowing for the elimination of some control levers below the swashplate but the control inputs from the cockpit sticks were transmitted back to the boost cylinders via hard control tubes. Also the tail rotor control inputs were transmitted via hard control tubes. My bad. Otter
The inputs to the three main rotor actuators did include electronic mixing, allowing for the elimination of some control levers below the swashplate but the control inputs from the cockpit sticks were transmitted back to the boost cylinders via hard control tubes. Also the tail rotor control inputs were transmitted via hard control tubes. My bad. Otter
Otter,
No problem.
Interesting however, Bell Engineering has multiple times proposed a FBW upgrade to the Y and Z. Performance would be enhanced, and there would be a real weight savings by the elimination of heavy ballistically tolerant control tubes. Most cases FBW is the same weight or heavier.
Sadly, like the letters in the alphabet, the H-1 has probably come to the end of the line.
No problem.
Interesting however, Bell Engineering has multiple times proposed a FBW upgrade to the Y and Z. Performance would be enhanced, and there would be a real weight savings by the elimination of heavy ballistically tolerant control tubes. Most cases FBW is the same weight or heavier.
Sadly, like the letters in the alphabet, the H-1 has probably come to the end of the line.
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They have just binned the whole programme
US Army halts £16 billion helicopter program amid strategic shift (msn.com)
It was supposed to be a revolution, but it has turned into a retreat. The U.S. Army announced the termination of the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program, potentially valued at over £16 billion. This decision throws into doubt the entire ambitious plan for the US Army's future aerial capabilities.Clearly, we are closely monitoring global events and adapting – said General James Rainey, head of the Army Futures Command, to reporters yesterday. – We could be ready to engage in conflict tonight, this weekend.
– We learn from the battlefield, especially in Ukraine, that aerial reconnaissance has radically transformed – stated General Randy George, the Army's chief of staff, in a press release. – The use of sensors and weapons on various unmanned systems and in space is becoming more widespread, longer-ranging, and more affordable than ever before.
FARA was part of the broader Future Vertical Lift initiative. The aim of FARA was to design and manufacture light reconnaissance and attack helicopters to replace the retired OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters in 2017. FARA was also intended to assume some responsibilities from the AH-64E (which in turn had taken over some tasks from the OH-58D), and eventually, a variant would replace the AH-6/MH-6 used by special forces. So far, spending on FARA has reached £1.6 billion.
The criteria specified that the helicopter must achieve a speed of at least 180 knots (331 km/h) and weigh no more than 6,350 kg. Given the assumption that future conflicts will likely occur in urban environments, the new helicopter was designed with a rotor diameter not exceeding 12 metres, enabling it to navigate between buildings.
Ashley Roque from the Breaking Defense service highlighted the ironic nature of the decision to cancel the FARA program. Almost exactly twenty years ago, the US Army scrapped the RAH-66 Comanche stealth helicopter program, and sixteen years prior – the ARH-70A Arapaho helicopter program. Both were envisioned as successors to… the OH-58D.
Originally, five contenders entered the competition: Boeing, Karem with a helicopter designated AR40, the AVX Aircraft and L3Harris Technologies consortium, and two finalists: Bell-Textron and Sikorsky.
Bell presented a design named 360 Invictus – a two-seater helicopter with a frontal tandem cockpit in a traditional configuration, featuring a single rotor and a tail rotor, humorously referred to as – ironically – the Sikorsky configuration. Several technical aspects, including the main rotor system and the fly-by-wire control, were adapted from the Bell 525 Relentless, which achieved speeds of 230 knots (425 km/h) in test flights. However, while the Relentless is equipped with a five-blade rotor, the Invictus was scheduled to have a four-blade rotor. The helicopter was also designed to have wings to increase lift.
Upon releasing the first artistic impressions of the Invictus, immediate comparisons were made to the Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche. Yet, as determined by The War Zone in discussions with insiders at the manufacturing facility, the design of the Invictus, though outwardly similar, was driven not by stealth requirements but by aerodynamic efficiency and resistance to gunfire. However, it is possible to somewhat reduce radar visibility, for instance, by applying more advanced coatings than those used for the Comanche. This does not preclude the application of technologies to minimize detectability in both the acoustic and infrared spectra.
A notable common feature between the Comanche and the Invictus was the type of tail rotor. Initially, the Bell 360 planned to use – like the RAH-66 – a fenestron, or a fan-in-fin tail rotor set at an angle to the vertical (as shown in the promotional video, summarizing the vision of using the helicopter in urban combat). In the end, however, a traditional tail rotor was chosen for its simplicity, minimal weight, and reliable construction. This rotor could be directly adopted from the Bell 525, along with other components.
The competing Raider X draws inspiration from the Sikorsky X2 concept, similar to the S-97 Raider that flew in May 2015. The latter essentially acts as a smaller prototype of the Raider X, testing the aerodynamic design and control strategies. The S-97 easily surpassed speeds of 200 knots. The Raider X is approximately 20 percent larger, mainly to accommodate the GE Aerospace T901-GE-900 Improved Turbine Engine (ITE).
The powerplant – the T901-900 engine – was a top-down decision. The same engines will also be integrated into the AH-64 and UH-60. They are expected to deliver more power (up to 4,000 horsepower) while consuming 25 percent less fuel per unit of power produced. Additionally, it was decided that the XM915 20 mm caliber three-barrel rotary cannon produced by General Dynamics would serve as FARA's primary weapon.
In the present circumstances, it's no longer feasible for any of these helicopters to take to the skies, despite the prototypes being nearly complete. A few years back, it was projected that prototypes would be ready for comparative flight testing in the first quarter of the fiscal year 2023, i.e., in the final months of 2022. However, delays in engine deliveries necessitated a revision of these plans. The most recent schedule pushed flight testing to the second half of 2024.
First and foremost, the Americans are not abandoning the second program under the Future Vertical Lift project – FLRAA (Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft), in which the tiltrotor V-280 Valor, proposed by Bell Textron, was selected. Meanwhile, the funds freed up by cancelling FARA are expected to support four other initiatives.
First: The US Army plans to sign a multi-year contract with Lockheed for the acquisition of UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, bypassing upgrades to the UH-60V variant. Second: To officially proceed with the production of CH-47F Block II heavy lift helicopters. Third: To invest in developing and acquiring unmanned reconnaissance systems. Fourth: To fund (or more accurately: to ensure steady funding for) the FLRAA project.
To be precise, the FARA program isn't ending today. If Congress approves a budget inclusive of funding for this initiative (and if Congress can overcome its recent difficulties), the program will continue until the end of the current fiscal year, i.e., until 30 September. This approach aims to protect the industrial base from the impacts of a sudden funding stop and to complete at least some of the planned testing phases.
Though it seems unlikely, Congress could theoretically compel the Army to persist with the program by injecting funds for the coming years. This appears improbable, but cannot be entirely dismissed. Members of Congress from Connecticut, where Sikorsky is based, expressed "extreme disappointment" with the Army's decision, highlighting that they "were repeatedly assured FARA was a top priority".
It's evident we're at a pivotal moment in the history of the combat helicopter. As General George mentioned – the war in Ukraine has had a significant impact. The conflict in the Gaza Strip also plays a role, where helicopters, though not frequently downed by anti-aircraft systems (as Hamas terrorists lack them), proved less effective than anticipated. For pure reconnaissance tasks, drones are more suitable, while for close ground support, the IDF prefers using fighter jets, even F-35Is.
Recently, a decision was made to expedite the retirement of the Tiger combat helicopter near our western border. Its interim replacement will be the Leichter Kampfhubschrauber (LKH, light combat helicopter), namely the H145M adapted for tank destruction and integrated with the HForce weapons module. In seeking a definitive successor to the Tiger, Germany showed interest in the FARA program, among others. It has been suggested that both Invictus and Raider X – regardless of the eventual winner – would be well-suited for this role.
This doesn't mean that combat helicopters are becoming obsolete, like night fighters or anti-tank rifles. The role of combat helicopters needs re-evaluation and, in some respects, a reinvention. This particularly applies to its reconnaissance function, which inherently involves close proximity to the enemy and their defences.
The vulnerabilities revealed by combat helicopters in open landscapes are expected to be compensated by new long-range weapons capable of "fire and forget" operations and by integrating helicopters with drone squads. In this scenario, drones serve as loyal wingmen and an advance force, identifying and targeting portable anti-aircraft systems. This strategy is challenging but significantly enhances the survivability of rotorcraft. Another alternative is employing drones for target marking, allowing attacks beyond the reach of anti-aircraft defenses.
From a U.S. perspective, where a conflict over steppes is less likely than over the vast Pacific, the disadvantages of helicopters – notably their limited speed and range – are pronounced. The U.S. Army remains committed to preserving the capabilities that FARA promised – an armed reconnaissance tool capable of engaging valuable ground targets and, if necessary, providing fire support to its units. Nevertheless, it is exploring unmanned systems to fulfil these requirements.
– We learn from the battlefield, especially in Ukraine, that aerial reconnaissance has radically transformed – stated General Randy George, the Army's chief of staff, in a press release. – The use of sensors and weapons on various unmanned systems and in space is becoming more widespread, longer-ranging, and more affordable than ever before.
FARA was part of the broader Future Vertical Lift initiative. The aim of FARA was to design and manufacture light reconnaissance and attack helicopters to replace the retired OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters in 2017. FARA was also intended to assume some responsibilities from the AH-64E (which in turn had taken over some tasks from the OH-58D), and eventually, a variant would replace the AH-6/MH-6 used by special forces. So far, spending on FARA has reached £1.6 billion.
The criteria specified that the helicopter must achieve a speed of at least 180 knots (331 km/h) and weigh no more than 6,350 kg. Given the assumption that future conflicts will likely occur in urban environments, the new helicopter was designed with a rotor diameter not exceeding 12 metres, enabling it to navigate between buildings.
Ashley Roque from the Breaking Defense service highlighted the ironic nature of the decision to cancel the FARA program. Almost exactly twenty years ago, the US Army scrapped the RAH-66 Comanche stealth helicopter program, and sixteen years prior – the ARH-70A Arapaho helicopter program. Both were envisioned as successors to… the OH-58D.
Originally, five contenders entered the competition: Boeing, Karem with a helicopter designated AR40, the AVX Aircraft and L3Harris Technologies consortium, and two finalists: Bell-Textron and Sikorsky.
Bell presented a design named 360 Invictus – a two-seater helicopter with a frontal tandem cockpit in a traditional configuration, featuring a single rotor and a tail rotor, humorously referred to as – ironically – the Sikorsky configuration. Several technical aspects, including the main rotor system and the fly-by-wire control, were adapted from the Bell 525 Relentless, which achieved speeds of 230 knots (425 km/h) in test flights. However, while the Relentless is equipped with a five-blade rotor, the Invictus was scheduled to have a four-blade rotor. The helicopter was also designed to have wings to increase lift.
Upon releasing the first artistic impressions of the Invictus, immediate comparisons were made to the Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche. Yet, as determined by The War Zone in discussions with insiders at the manufacturing facility, the design of the Invictus, though outwardly similar, was driven not by stealth requirements but by aerodynamic efficiency and resistance to gunfire. However, it is possible to somewhat reduce radar visibility, for instance, by applying more advanced coatings than those used for the Comanche. This does not preclude the application of technologies to minimize detectability in both the acoustic and infrared spectra.
A notable common feature between the Comanche and the Invictus was the type of tail rotor. Initially, the Bell 360 planned to use – like the RAH-66 – a fenestron, or a fan-in-fin tail rotor set at an angle to the vertical (as shown in the promotional video, summarizing the vision of using the helicopter in urban combat). In the end, however, a traditional tail rotor was chosen for its simplicity, minimal weight, and reliable construction. This rotor could be directly adopted from the Bell 525, along with other components.
The competing Raider X draws inspiration from the Sikorsky X2 concept, similar to the S-97 Raider that flew in May 2015. The latter essentially acts as a smaller prototype of the Raider X, testing the aerodynamic design and control strategies. The S-97 easily surpassed speeds of 200 knots. The Raider X is approximately 20 percent larger, mainly to accommodate the GE Aerospace T901-GE-900 Improved Turbine Engine (ITE).
The powerplant – the T901-900 engine – was a top-down decision. The same engines will also be integrated into the AH-64 and UH-60. They are expected to deliver more power (up to 4,000 horsepower) while consuming 25 percent less fuel per unit of power produced. Additionally, it was decided that the XM915 20 mm caliber three-barrel rotary cannon produced by General Dynamics would serve as FARA's primary weapon.
In the present circumstances, it's no longer feasible for any of these helicopters to take to the skies, despite the prototypes being nearly complete. A few years back, it was projected that prototypes would be ready for comparative flight testing in the first quarter of the fiscal year 2023, i.e., in the final months of 2022. However, delays in engine deliveries necessitated a revision of these plans. The most recent schedule pushed flight testing to the second half of 2024.
A look into the future
First and foremost, the Americans are not abandoning the second program under the Future Vertical Lift project – FLRAA (Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft), in which the tiltrotor V-280 Valor, proposed by Bell Textron, was selected. Meanwhile, the funds freed up by cancelling FARA are expected to support four other initiatives.First: The US Army plans to sign a multi-year contract with Lockheed for the acquisition of UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, bypassing upgrades to the UH-60V variant. Second: To officially proceed with the production of CH-47F Block II heavy lift helicopters. Third: To invest in developing and acquiring unmanned reconnaissance systems. Fourth: To fund (or more accurately: to ensure steady funding for) the FLRAA project.
To be precise, the FARA program isn't ending today. If Congress approves a budget inclusive of funding for this initiative (and if Congress can overcome its recent difficulties), the program will continue until the end of the current fiscal year, i.e., until 30 September. This approach aims to protect the industrial base from the impacts of a sudden funding stop and to complete at least some of the planned testing phases.
Though it seems unlikely, Congress could theoretically compel the Army to persist with the program by injecting funds for the coming years. This appears improbable, but cannot be entirely dismissed. Members of Congress from Connecticut, where Sikorsky is based, expressed "extreme disappointment" with the Army's decision, highlighting that they "were repeatedly assured FARA was a top priority".
It's evident we're at a pivotal moment in the history of the combat helicopter. As General George mentioned – the war in Ukraine has had a significant impact. The conflict in the Gaza Strip also plays a role, where helicopters, though not frequently downed by anti-aircraft systems (as Hamas terrorists lack them), proved less effective than anticipated. For pure reconnaissance tasks, drones are more suitable, while for close ground support, the IDF prefers using fighter jets, even F-35Is.
Recently, a decision was made to expedite the retirement of the Tiger combat helicopter near our western border. Its interim replacement will be the Leichter Kampfhubschrauber (LKH, light combat helicopter), namely the H145M adapted for tank destruction and integrated with the HForce weapons module. In seeking a definitive successor to the Tiger, Germany showed interest in the FARA program, among others. It has been suggested that both Invictus and Raider X – regardless of the eventual winner – would be well-suited for this role.
This doesn't mean that combat helicopters are becoming obsolete, like night fighters or anti-tank rifles. The role of combat helicopters needs re-evaluation and, in some respects, a reinvention. This particularly applies to its reconnaissance function, which inherently involves close proximity to the enemy and their defences.
The vulnerabilities revealed by combat helicopters in open landscapes are expected to be compensated by new long-range weapons capable of "fire and forget" operations and by integrating helicopters with drone squads. In this scenario, drones serve as loyal wingmen and an advance force, identifying and targeting portable anti-aircraft systems. This strategy is challenging but significantly enhances the survivability of rotorcraft. Another alternative is employing drones for target marking, allowing attacks beyond the reach of anti-aircraft defenses.
From a U.S. perspective, where a conflict over steppes is less likely than over the vast Pacific, the disadvantages of helicopters – notably their limited speed and range – are pronounced. The U.S. Army remains committed to preserving the capabilities that FARA promised – an armed reconnaissance tool capable of engaging valuable ground targets and, if necessary, providing fire support to its units. Nevertheless, it is exploring unmanned systems to fulfil these requirements.
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So ends future vertical lift, with only one new aircraft created. With a lower power to weight ratio, and greater aerodynamic drag, there was no reason to buy the more complex and unproven Raider X. So rather than award a second contract to Bell, the Army chose to cancel FARA, to provide funding for the Black Hawk and Chinook. This was partly a political decision, not what the Army needs decision, to maintain a larger supplier base. It does allow for a greater number of helicopters to be procured over the next five years.
If the Army would have tried to award the FARA contract to Sikorsky, it is unlikely the award would have been sustained after a protest from Bell.
If the Army would have tried to award the FARA contract to Sikorsky, it is unlikely the award would have been sustained after a protest from Bell.
Last edited by noneofyourbusiness; 26th Mar 2024 at 15:32.
So ends future vertical lift, with only one new aircraft created. With a lower power to weight ratio, and greater aerodynamic drag, there was no reason to buy the more complex and unproven Raider X. So rather than award a second contract to Bell, the Army chose to cancel FARA, to provide funding for the Black Hawk and Chinook. This was partly a political decision, not what the Army needs decision, to maintain a larger supplier base. It does allow for a greater number of helicopters to be procured over the next five years.
If the Army would have tried to award the FARA contract to Sikorsky, it is unlikely the award would have been sustained after a protest from Bell.
If the Army would have tried to award the FARA contract to Sikorsky, it is unlikely the award would have been sustained after a protest from Bell.
If the competitive prototypes got to flight test, I don't think the award would have gone to Sikorsky. The Bell was poised to be faster and would have undoubtedly marched through its flight test points more quickly than Sikorsky. I think you're right... FVL yielded the more important of the two vehicles (FLRAA) and rather than deal with the political risk and fallout of awarding both aircraft to Bell, the Army killed the program and peanut buttered some legacy pork around. Sad thing is, both companied poured hundreds of millions of private investment into FARA, so the program ended up being damaging to the industry. There was definitely other work/programs NOT done because they were spending their own (and USG) money competing on FARA.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikehir...h=479f146f4b5f
The Army needs to refund that $500 million. Of course they won't.
Last edited by noneofyourbusiness; 28th Mar 2024 at 08:53.