SAR S-92 Missing Ireland
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NS dives concluded at Blackrock for the night. Resuming in the am. Plans to carry out partial lift of R116 wreckage tomorrow afternoon.
I find the idea of the SARTech/Flight Engineer (hoist operator) having a say in the go/no go decision interesting but I think it would only work when you're on top the vessel with the door open, hook in hand and they can see what they are getting into. Even then I don't think it would work as it's been my experience that those guys will jump into lava to rescue someone.
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Previously when helicopters have ditched in the North Sea they have been recovered by a dive support vessel using its main crane or if close enough to a platform, the platforms crane has been used. It would usually be done in a single lift so I'm guessing the lift bags are being used to move the wreckage further away from Blackrock for the safety of the recovery vessel. Even though the water depth is 40 meters, the wreckage is only 60 meters from the rock which would be quite close, even for a vessel with 'dynamic positioning' such as the Grainneuaille -particularly in a lazy Atlantic swell.
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Naval Service divers have successfully attached a number of lifting bags to the wreckage of Coast Guard Rescue Helicopter 116.
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Nitrogen OR Helium, the bottles generally come from the OEM filled with helium and is an option in the AMM (slightly different charge pressures apply) final bag pressure is dependant on temperature and gas type.
Same again - the Canadian SAR-techs are a different breed - as Viper 7 said they would dive into molten lava - it's just the way they operate.
Therefore, although he is part of the crew, his default position is to go regardless which makes his CRM input somewhat skewed and he is unlikely to be the 'voice of reason' that leads you to stand down.
Therefore, although he is part of the crew, his default position is to go regardless which makes his CRM input somewhat skewed and he is unlikely to be the 'voice of reason' that leads you to stand down.
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Per the AMM:
HELIUM AND NITROGEN CANNOT BE MIXED IN THE SAME FLOTATION
BOTTLE. IF OPERATOR SWITCHES FROM HELIUM TO NITROGEN,
BOTTLE MUST BE COMPLETELY EVACUATED BEFORE BEING FILLED
WITH NITROGEN.
HELIUM CHARGED BOTTLES AND NITROGEN CHARGED BOTTLES CANNOT
BE INSTALLED ON THE SAME HELICOPTER, ALL FLOTATION
BOTTLES MUST BE FILLED WITH SAME INFLATION MEDIUM.
Bag operating pressure at standard day conditions is 3.5 psi but yes could vary due to atmospheric conditions. Just trying to be accurate not argumentative, too much of that on these sites already.
Until your are looking up at the winchman.
How much more air would be required to achieve lift off at a given depth? Is it as simple as another bottle or same bottle design under more pressure? As life vest rises to the surface and water pressure reduces, a relief valve could release air pressure?
Too hard? Too expensive?
Mickjoebill
Viper 7, the Canada EMS outfit that I have dealings with have a policy of the drivers not knowing the condition of the patient after pickup.
Dispatch will tell them what the callout is (car v truck and first responder assessment for instance), but once the patient is onboard, there is no communication of the patients condition with those driving so as to to prevent "get there fast or they die" from influencing crew decisions that may compromise safety.
Don't know if that is standard in Canadian EMS ops, but that is how they work. Those up front fly from A to B as per SOP's. Those in back care for the patient.
Dispatch will tell them what the callout is (car v truck and first responder assessment for instance), but once the patient is onboard, there is no communication of the patients condition with those driving so as to to prevent "get there fast or they die" from influencing crew decisions that may compromise safety.
Don't know if that is standard in Canadian EMS ops, but that is how they work. Those up front fly from A to B as per SOP's. Those in back care for the patient.
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Operation to lift R116 cancelled due to spring tides and the impact they're having on the effort. Resume am weather permitting.
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http://nlb.g2b.info/docs/GLA_Helicopter_Services_2015_-_CIL_Landing_Site_Register.pdf
Relevant pages 16 and 24,
Protocol for Irish lights Helicopters landing at Blackrock and Blacksod
Relevant pages 16 and 24,
Protocol for Irish lights Helicopters landing at Blackrock and Blacksod
Nooby,
Really? So when the Neo-Nate Team trundles out an Isolette.....the Flight Crew cannot tweak to it being a Preemie?
I have operated in both regimes...."Tell and Don't Tell! but the end result is you know pretty much what is going on.
That is where the Pilot(s) have to make business decisions....purely professional decisions based upon the information at hand that enter into that decision such as Weather, current and forecast, whether other operations have rejected the call, and so forth and so on.
Condition of the Patient and the possible outcome of Helicopter EMS intervention received or denied, has nothing to do with that decision.
Pilots (and Crew) have to accept that People die every day in this World and before the advent of Helicopters....rode in ground ambulances....and lived or died as it happened.
We set professional limits for a reason.....and we should use our preset Matrix to determine if we go....or don't go based upon those criteria. That is what makes us Professionals.
That doesn't mean we are heartless......and it doesn't mean we sometimes have regrets or second thoughts....but when you make the decision in that professional manner you know you did so correctly.
I shall pose a rhetorical question that calls for no posted answer.
Losing the Tip of a finger....and being in pain by itself is generally not life threatening.
What if the Crew of 116 and 118 had decided to wait till Daylight to make the flight....and in the mean while the Trawler had headed towards shore. How might this have turned out?
Really? So when the Neo-Nate Team trundles out an Isolette.....the Flight Crew cannot tweak to it being a Preemie?
I have operated in both regimes...."Tell and Don't Tell! but the end result is you know pretty much what is going on.
That is where the Pilot(s) have to make business decisions....purely professional decisions based upon the information at hand that enter into that decision such as Weather, current and forecast, whether other operations have rejected the call, and so forth and so on.
Condition of the Patient and the possible outcome of Helicopter EMS intervention received or denied, has nothing to do with that decision.
Pilots (and Crew) have to accept that People die every day in this World and before the advent of Helicopters....rode in ground ambulances....and lived or died as it happened.
We set professional limits for a reason.....and we should use our preset Matrix to determine if we go....or don't go based upon those criteria. That is what makes us Professionals.
That doesn't mean we are heartless......and it doesn't mean we sometimes have regrets or second thoughts....but when you make the decision in that professional manner you know you did so correctly.
I shall pose a rhetorical question that calls for no posted answer.
Losing the Tip of a finger....and being in pain by itself is generally not life threatening.
What if the Crew of 116 and 118 had decided to wait till Daylight to make the flight....and in the mean while the Trawler had headed towards shore. How might this have turned out?
SAS, as you'll see in my comment, the crew know what they are picking up, just not the extent of injuries or condition of the patient.
Not all Premies in Isolettes are in critical condition, some are being transferred to a better facility or one closer to family location.
Once onboard, there is no communication between front and back with regard to the condition of the patient.
That is just how they do it at this particular outfit.
Sorry about the thread drift.
Not all Premies in Isolettes are in critical condition, some are being transferred to a better facility or one closer to family location.
Once onboard, there is no communication between front and back with regard to the condition of the patient.
That is just how they do it at this particular outfit.
Sorry about the thread drift.
I shall pose a rhetorical question that calls for no posted answer.
Losing the Tip of a finger....and being in pain by itself is generally not life threatening.
What if the Crew of 116 and 118 had decided to wait till Daylight to make the flight....and in the mean while the Trawler had headed towards shore. How might this have turned out?
Losing the Tip of a finger....and being in pain by itself is generally not life threatening.
What if the Crew of 116 and 118 had decided to wait till Daylight to make the flight....and in the mean while the Trawler had headed towards shore. How might this have turned out?
Given the now ubiquitous litigious culture, what Doc isn't going to call worst case scenario?
This issue of crews having some information on the patient's condition and possibly being influenced to "push the limits" misses the point. All aviation is a risk v gain decision & SAR / EMS is often at the extremis of those decisions. Higher risks & higher gains. As someone who has done a fair bit of both, I believe that I (we) can only make an informed decision when I have all of the relevant information. I don't need to know every clinical detail anymore than the tasking agency needs to know all of the operational aspects, but without some information I only have half of the equation. What is required though, is the culture of being able to maintain a professional decision making process, regardless of the emotive, "this 2 year old child will die if you don't go" influence. I have made "no-go" decisions and people have perished as I'm sure many here will have had to. I have also made plenty of "go" decisions that have pushed myself and my crew close to the limits & people have been saved.
Accidents will happen & when they do, it is right & proper that we analyse what could have been done better, but we should be doing that anyway. The argument that R118 & R116 shouldn't have been tasked for an injury that may or may not have been life-threatening misses the point. It could be argued that this accident would still have occurred if the mission was to save a boatload of cute children. Let's focus on the cause of this tragic accident and work on ways to mitigate those risks that are inherent in our line of work.
I will say it one last time .... in my opinion, NVD's are a "must" technology for this type of work. Having done plenty with & plenty without, I wouldn't want to go back to doing what the crew of R116 were doing without the aid of NVD.
Accidents will happen & when they do, it is right & proper that we analyse what could have been done better, but we should be doing that anyway. The argument that R118 & R116 shouldn't have been tasked for an injury that may or may not have been life-threatening misses the point. It could be argued that this accident would still have occurred if the mission was to save a boatload of cute children. Let's focus on the cause of this tragic accident and work on ways to mitigate those risks that are inherent in our line of work.
I will say it one last time .... in my opinion, NVD's are a "must" technology for this type of work. Having done plenty with & plenty without, I wouldn't want to go back to doing what the crew of R116 were doing without the aid of NVD.
in my opinion, NVD's are a "must" technology for this type of work
Thankfully, the IAA has the experience of the UK AAIB assisting it, so no doubt the root causes will be found in due course. As in the Sumburgh accident, I'd be interested in how the procedures utilized the installed equipment, the automation and training to ensure a safe operation, including when to reject and return to base. Has the operator changed any procedures in the interim, or are they waiting for an official IAA/AAIB report?